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24-1900•Diana Z. Kammunkun v. Department of Defense
24-1900Court of Appeals for the Federal CircuitJan 26, 2026
N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
DIANA Z. KAMMUNKUN,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Respondent
______________________
2024-1900
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. SF-0752-17-0667-M-2.
______________________
Decided: January 26, 2026
______________________
CHRISTOPHER H UGH BONK, Gilbert Employment Law,
PC, Silver Spring, MD, argued for petitioner. Also repre-
sented by RENN C. F OWLER, K EVIN O WEN.
ANTONIA RAMOS SOARES , Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also repre-
sented by BRIAN M. B OYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE H OSFORD,
P ATRICIA M. MC CARTHY .
______________________
Case: 24-1900 Document: 48 Page: 1 Filed: 01/26/2026
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KAMMUNKUN v. DEFENSE 2
Before P ROST , WALLACH , and STARK, Circuit Judges.
P ROST , Circuit Judge.
Diana Z. Kammunkun petitions for review of the final
decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”)
affirming the Department of Defense’s decision to remove
her from employment. J.A. 1–19. We affirm.
I
We have jurisdiction over Ms. Kammunkun’s petition
for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). We review a Board
decision for whether it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule,
or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by
substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). “This court must
reverse a decision of the Board if its decision is not in ac-
cordance with the requirements of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment or any other constitutional provi-
sion.” Blank v. Dep’t of Army, 247 F.3d 1225, 1228
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
II
Ms. Kammunkun argues that she was denied due pro-
cess because of the involvement of a deciding official who
was not impartial in her removal from employment. We
disagree.
The removal proceedings in this case do not present
due process concerns. “The essential requirements of due
process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond.”
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546
(1985); see also id. (“The tenured public employee is enti-
tled to oral or written notice of the charges against [her],
an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an oppor-
tunity to present [her] side of the story.”). Ms. Kam-
munkun received all that is required by Loudermill.
Case: 24-1900 Document: 48 Page: 2 Filed: 01/26/2026
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KAMMUNKUN v. DEFENSE 3
Moreover, our precedent forecloses Ms. Kammunkun’s
due-process-violation claims. In Hanley, we rejected the
petitioner’s argument “that he was denied procedural due
process because the same individual . . . ordered the inves-
tigation, issued the Notice of Proposed Removal, and
signed the removal letter.” Hanley v. GSA, 829 F.2d 23, 25
(Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,
52 (1975) (“[O]ur cases . . . offer no support for the bald
proposition . . . that agency members who participate in an
investigation are disqualified from adjudicating. The in-
credible variety of administrative mechanisms in this
country will not yield to any single organizing principle.”).
We have also held that
[a]t the pre-termination stage, it is not a violation
of due process when the proposing and deciding
roles are performed by the same person. The law
does not presume that a supervisor who proposes
to remove an employee is incapable of changing his
or her mind upon hearing the employee’s side of the
case.
DeSarno v. Dep’t of Com., 761 F.2d 657, 660 (Fed. Cir.
1985). The reasoning that led us to reject the due process
claims in Hanley and DeSarno is applicable to the facts
here. Thus, we reject Ms. Kammunkun’s due-process-vio-
lation claims.
III
We have considered Ms. Kammunkun’s remaining ar-
guments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 24-1900 Document: 48 Page: 3 Filed: 01/26/2026
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