Google LLC v. Wildseed Mobile, LLC

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
GOOGLE LLC,
Appellant
v.
WILDSEED MOBILE, LLC,
Appellee
______________________
2024-2178
______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2023-
00247.
______________________
Decided: February 13, 2026
______________________
DAN L. BAGATELL, Perkins Coie LLP, Hanover, NH, ar-
gued for appellant. Also represented by NATHAN K.
KELLEY, JONATHAN IRVIN TIETZ, Washington, DC; TARA
LAUREN KURTIS, Chicago, IL.
ZACHARIAH HIGGINS, Kramer Alberti Lim & Tonkovich
LLP, Foster City, CA, argued for appellee. Also repre-
sented by DAVID ALBERTI, ROBERT KRAMER, SAL LIM,
MICHELE R. WOODRUFF LYONS; RICHARD M. BEMBEN,
RICHARD CRUDO, JASON A. FITZSIMMONS, STEVEN PAPPAS,
Case: 24-2178 Document: 41 Page: 1 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 1 of 7 --

GOOGLE LLC v. WILDSEED MOBILE, LLC 2
MICHAEL D. SPECHT, Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox
PLLC, Washington, DC.
______________________
Before PROST, HUGHES, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
PROST, Circuit Judge.
Google LLC (“Google”) petitioned for inter partes re-
view (“IPR”) of claims 1–22 of U.S. Patent No. 10,869,169
(“the ’169 patent”). In a final written decision, the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) concluded that claims
1–14 and 16–22, but not claim 15, are unpatentable as ob-
vious. Google LLC v. Wildseed Mobile, LLC, No. IPR2023-
00247, Paper No. 33, 2024 WL 2819590 (P.T.A.B. June 3,
2024) (“Final Written Decision”). Google appeals the
Board’s determination that claim 15 is not unpatentable.
For the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand.
BACKGROUND
I
Wildseed Mobile, LLC (“Wildseed”) is the owner of the
’169 patent. The ’169 patent is titled “Method and Systems
for Generating and Sending a Hot Link Associated with a
User Interface to a Device.” ’169 patent Title (capitaliza-
tion normalized). It relates to “generating and sending a
hot link to a device.” Id. at col. 1 ll. 66–67. “The hot link
contains an action that instructs the receiving device to
perform some activity when an associated user interface is
selected.” Id. at col. 1 l. 67–col. 2 l. 3. Claim 15 recites:
15. The computer system of claim 10, wherein the
processor circuitry is to:
generate the hot link message as a Short Message
Service (SMS) message for transmission over a cel-
lular communication network, or
Case: 24-2178 Document: 41 Page: 2 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 2 of 7 --

GOOGLE LLC v. WILDSEED MOBILE, LLC 3
generate the hot link message as an instant mes-
saging (IM) message for transmission over a com-
munications network.
Id. at claim 15 (emphasis added). Relevant to this ap-
peal, claim 15 thus recites two limitations—an SMS limi-
tation and an IM limitation—separated by “or.” Id.
II
In 2023, Google petitioned for IPR of claims 1–22 of the
’169 patent. For dependent claim 15, Google argued in its
petition that U.S. Patent No. 8,645,211 (“Rothschild”) dis-
closes the claim limitations. Google quoted language from
Rothschild and explained that “Rothschild describes its
technique with the example of an e-mail message, but
states that it is applicable to other forms of communication
including SMS messages and instant messages.” J.A. 115,
129. Wildseed’s sur-reply responded to Google’s claim 15
arguments. Wildseed acknowledged that “[Google’s] sole
allegations regarding SMS and IM are that Rothschild also
discloses those formats.” J.A. 477. Wildseed, however, con-
fined its arguments to the SMS limitation of claim 15, ar-
guing that Google never rebutted explanation by
Wildseed’s expert that “SMS messages do not use HTML
tags.” J.A. 477.
The Board determined claims 1–14 and 16–22, but not
claim 15, unpatentable for obviousness over various refer-
ences including Rothschild and U.S. Patent No. 6,836,792
(“Chen”). In addressing claim 15, the Board limited its
analysis to the SMS limitation and did not mention the IM
limitation. The Board noted that HTML code is relied upon
as teaching the rendering limitation in the independent
claims but “the record establishes that SMS does not use
HTML or any other formatting in sending a message.” Fi-
nal Written Decision, 2024 WL 2819590, at *15. The Board
determined that “[b]ecause SMS messages are not format-
ted, [Google] has not persuasively explained how a message
sent by SMS would satisfy the ‘instructions for rendering
Case: 24-2178 Document: 41 Page: 3 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 3 of 7 --

GOOGLE LLC v. WILDSEED MOBILE, LLC 4
and displaying the hot link’ recited in claim 10 that are in-
corporated into dependent claim 15.” Id. The Board ana-
lyzed Google’s alternate assertion that the image data “e.g.,
a JPEG file, informs the receiving device how to display the
image.” Id. The Board found that this assertion “is part of
the HTML embodiment that [Google] relies upon.” Id. at
*16. The Board determined that “[b]ecause [Google] does
not explain how an image displayed in an SMS would be
rendered” and Wildseed’s expert “attest[ed] that the ’169
patent does not apply formatting to the SMS message, . . .
[Google] has not persuasively shown that the data of the
image field itself provides the claimed instructions for dis-
playing and rendering.” Id.
The Board thus determined that “[Google] has not per-
suasively shown that Rothschild in view of Chen teaches
instructions for displaying and rendering where the hot
link message is generated as an SMS message as recited in
claim 15.” Id. The Board concluded that as a result,
“[Google] has not shown, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that claim 15 would have been obvious over Roth-
schild in view of Chen.” Id.
Google timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
DISCUSSION
We review the Board’s decisions “under the standards
provided in the Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’),
5 U.S.C. § 706.” Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc.,
841 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Under
the APA, the Board’s actions “are to be set aside if ‘arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law’ or ‘unsupported by substantial ev-
idence.’” Pride Mobility Prods. Corp. v. Permobil, Inc.,
818 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “In order to provide
for effective judicial review, then, the Board is obligated to
‘provide an administrative record showing the evidence on
which the findings are based, accompanied by the agency’s
Case: 24-2178 Document: 41 Page: 4 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 4 of 7 --

GOOGLE LLC v. WILDSEED MOBILE, LLC 5
reasoning in reaching its conclusions.’” TQ Delta, LLC v.
Cisco Sys., Inc., 942 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quot-
ing In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “We
do not require perfect explanations . . . and ‘we will uphold
a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may
reasonably be discerned.’” In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d
1376, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Bowman Transp.,
Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286
(1974)). “We do, however, require that the Board’s own ex-
planation be sufficient ‘for us to see that the agency has
done its job.’” Alacritech, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 966 F.3d 1367,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting NuVasive, 842 F.3d at 1383).
On appeal, Google argues that the Board abused its
discretion and therefore violated the APA by failing to ad-
dress Google’s arguments raised under the IM limitation of
claim 15. Appellant’s Br. 28; Reply Br. 19.
We agree with Google that the Board should have ad-
dressed claim 15’s IM limitation. The Board is required to
“articulate a satisfactory explanation . . . [that] enables the
court to exercise its duty to review the [Board’s] decisions
to assess whether those decisions are ‘arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or . . . unsupported by substantial
evidence.’” NuVasive, 842 F.3d at 1382 (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A), (E)). Here, the Board’s silence on the IM limi-
tation of claim 15 does not meet this requirement. Claim
15 explicitly recites generating a hot link message either
as an SMS message or an IM message. A petitioner can
therefore satisfy either of these two disjunctive limitations
to show unpatentability. Google’s petition discusses the
SMS limitation and IM limitation of claim 15. See J.A. 115,
129. Wildseed specifically addressed claim 15 for the first
time in its patent owner’s sur-reply but provided argu-
ments only for the SMS limitation. See J.A. 477. In its
final written decision, the Board analyzed claim 15 but
only regarding the SMS limitation. Although the Board
performed a thorough analysis of the SMS limitation, the
Board failed to address the IM limitation. Indeed, it made
Case: 24-2178 Document: 41 Page: 5 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 5 of 7 --

GOOGLE LLC v. WILDSEED MOBILE, LLC 6
no mention of IM and even omitted the IM limitation in its
quotation of claim 15. See Final Written Decision, 2024 WL
2819590, at *15.
The Board’s analysis therefore does not acknowledge
the IM limitation, much less explain that the asserted prior
art does not teach or suggest the IM limitation. Nor does
the Board provide a non-merits reason—such as failure to
include an IM-based ground in the petition, subsequent
abandonment of such a ground, waiver, or forfeiture—for
not addressing the IM limitation. Thus, we cannot reason-
ably discern the basis upon which the Board concluded that
Google has not shown that claim 15 would have been obvi-
ous over the prior art. The Board is required to “document
its reasoning on the record to allow accountability . . . [and]
effective judicial review.” In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2002); see Provisur Techs., Inc. v. Weber, Inc., 50
F.4th 117, 125 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“Because the Board never
directly or implicitly addressed the arguments that [peti-
tioner] had set forth in its petition, it erred.”). We therefore
vacate and remand the Board’s decision as to claim 15.
Wildseed argues that Google stated in its petitioner’s
reply, and the Board found, that Google’s HTML argument
was limited to email only. Appellee’s Br. 11, 38. While we
cannot rule out the possibility that this was the Board’s
reason for not addressing the IM limitation, the Board’s si-
lence makes it impossible to discern and we cannot resort
to speculation. Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Necessary findings must be expressed
with sufficient particularity to enable our court, without
resort to speculation, to understand the reasoning of the
Board.”). Nor can we determine if such a reading of
Google’s petition in the context of Google’s reply and other
statements Google made (and did not make) in its brief and
at the oral hearing, would constitute an abuse of discretion.
On remand, the Board needs to explain its reasoning with
respect to the IM limitation.
Case: 24-2178 Document: 41 Page: 6 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 6 of 7 --

GOOGLE LLC v. WILDSEED MOBILE, LLC 7
Accordingly, we vacate the Board’s obviousness deter-
mination as to claim 15 and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Wildseed’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
vacate and remand.
VACATED AND REMANDED
COSTS
Costs to Appellant.
Case: 24-2178 Document: 41 Page: 7 Filed: 02/13/2026

-- 7 of 7 --