John Suggs v. Merit Systems Protection Board

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JOHN SUGGS,
Petitioner
v.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
Respondent
______________________
2024-2285
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DC-3443-20-0561-I-1.
______________________
Decided: March 9, 2026
______________________
WAYNE J OHNSON, Deciccio & Johnson, Winter Park,
FL, for petitioner.
CONSTANCE E. T RAVANTY , Office of the General Coun-
sel, United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ALLISON
J ANE BOYLE, K ATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH .
______________________
Before P ROST , T ARANTO, and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
Case: 24-2285 Document: 50 Page: 1 Filed: 03/09/2026

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SUGGS v. MSPB 2
P ER CURIAM .
John Suggs petitions for review of a decision of the
Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing his
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the following reasons,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Suggs worked for the Government Publishing Of-
fice (“agency”) until he was involuntarily removed in 2015
due to medical conditions affecting his performance.
App’x 44.1 Mr. Suggs sought severance pay from the
agency with the assistance of his state’s senator. App’x
67–68. The agency denied him severance pay because he
was eligible to receive an annuity for disability retirement
at the same time. App’x 64–66. Furthermore, because he
had already received an advance of sick and annual leave
before his separation, the agency determined that he had
been overpaid. App’x 62. The agency thus reported a debt,
which led to the National Finance Center garnishing
Mr. Suggs’s social security disability benefits. App’x
47–48.
Mr. Suggs appealed the denial of severance pay and
garnishment of his social security benefits to the Board.
Shortly after filing his appeal, an administrative judge
(“AJ”) issued an Order to Show Cause requiring Mr. Suggs
to demonstrate jurisdiction or show he was entitled to a
hearing on the issue. App’x 35–40. Mr. Suggs’s response
was untimely. App’x 3. Nevertheless, after receiving sub-
missions from Mr. Suggs and the agency, the AJ issued an
initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdic-
tion. App’x 1–13. Mr. Suggs filed a petition for review, and
the full Board issued a final order affirming the initial de-
cision. App’x 14–21.
1 “App’x” refers to the appendix filed by Mr. Suggs.
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SUGGS v. MSPB 3
Mr. Suggs timely petitioned this court for review. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
D ISCUSSION
Whether the Board properly dismissed Mr. Suggs’s ap-
peal for lack of jurisdiction is an issue we review de novo.
Mouton-Miller v. MSPB, 985 F.3d 864, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
“The Board does not have plenary appellate jurisdiction
over personnel actions.” Id. at 869. Rather, for the Board
to have jurisdiction, the underlying personnel action must
be “appealable to the Board under [a] law, rule, or regula-
tion.” 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a). As relevant here, the Board’s
authority to hear appeals is limited by statute to certain
“adverse actions,” Mouton-Miller, 985 F.3d at 869: “(1) a re-
moval; (2) a suspension for more than 14 days; (3) a reduc-
tion in grade; (4) a reduction in pay; and (5) a furlough of
30 days or less.” 5 U.S.C. § 7512.
Before us, Mr. Suggs appears to argue that Board ju-
risdiction flows from his allegedly improper removal and
extends to “matters incident to that,” including severance
pay. Pet’r’s Br. 4. We decline to entertain Mr. Suggs’s be-
lated and undeveloped merits challenge to his 2015 re-
moval. See Conant v. OPM, 255 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“It is well-settled law that appellants from an ad-
ministrative agency decision may not raise claims for the
first time on appeal.”). Mr. Suggs’s appeal to the Board was
premised on his being “[i]mproperly denied severance pay
and then garnished for severance pay that was never re-
ceived.” App’x 27; S. App’x 4.2 As the AJ recognized,
“[t]here is no statute or regulation which provides the
Board with the authority to review severance pay issues or
the merits of a debt claim.” App’x 4. Mr. Suggs’s appeal to
the Board did not challenge his removal. And Mr. Suggs
2 “S. App’x” refers to the supplemental appendix
filed by the government.
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SUGGS v. MSPB 4
never alleged any other action over which the Board has
jurisdiction.
Mr. Suggs also relies on Roach v. Department of the
Army, 82 M.S.P.R. 464 (1999), to allege that garnishment
of wages constitutes a reviewable adverse action. Pet’r’s
Br. 8–11. Both the AJ and Board determined that
Mr. Suggs’s claims regarding garnishment were not an ad-
verse action, such as “a reduction in pay” under § 7512. See
App’x 4, 15–16. We agree. The Roach decision held that
wage garnishment could satisfy the statutory definition of
“personnel action” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A), allowing
such action to support Board jurisdiction in an Individual
Right of Action claim for whistleblower reprisal.
82 M.S.P.R. at 470. Mr. Suggs appears to conflate the term
“personnel action” in the whistleblower context with an
“adverse action” pursuant to § 7512. But similarity of lan-
guage aside, Mr. Suggs fails to explain how a “personnel
action,” like that in Roach, establishes jurisdiction here,
where Mr. Suggs has not alleged whistleblower reprisal.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Suggs’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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