International Rights Advocates v. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security, Rodney S. Scott, Commissioner of…

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, RODNEY S. SCOTT,
COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION,
Defendants-Appellees
______________________
2024-2316
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of International
Trade in No. 1:23-cv-00165-CRK, Judge Claire R. Kelly.
______________________
Decided: June 5, 2026
______________________
T ERRENCE C OLLINGSWORTH , International Rights Ad-
vocates, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant.
AIMEE L EE , Appellate Section, International Trade Lit-
igation, United States Department of Justice, New York,
NY, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by
CHRISTOPHER B ERRIDGE , P ATRICIA M. MCC ARTHY , J USTIN
REINHART MILLER, BRETT SHUMATE; SABAHAT CHAUDHARY ,
Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, United States Customs
& Border Protection, Washington, DC.
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 2
______________________
Before REYNA, T ARANTO, and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
STOLL , Circuit Judge.
International Rights Advocates filed a complaint before
the United States Court of International Trade, alleging
that United States Customs and Border Protection has un-
lawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed action on
IRAdvocates’ petitions urging Customs to investigate
whether cocoa and cocoa products imported from Côte
d’Ivoire are produced using forced child labor in violation
of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The Trade Court
dismissed IRAdvocates’ complaint for failure to establish
organizational standing. For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I
Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1307, prohibits the admission of goods into the
United States that have been produced, in whole or in part,
using forced, indentured, or convict labor. Specifically, sec-
tion 307 states:
All goods . . . produced, or manufactured wholly or
in part in any foreign country by convict labor
or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor under
penal sanctions shall not be entitled to entry at any
of the ports of the United States, and the importa-
tion thereof is hereby prohibited, and the Secretary
of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pre-
scribe such regulations as may be necessary for the
enforcement of this provision.
“Forced labor[,”] as herein used, shall mean all
work or service which is exacted from any person
under the menace of any penalty for its
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 3
nonperformance and for which the worker does not
offer himself voluntarily. For purposes of this sec-
tion, the term “forced labor or/and indentured la-
bor” includes forced or indentured child labor.
19 U.S.C. § 1307 (emphases added). The Secretary of the
Treasury delegated authority to the United States Cus-
toms Service, now United States Customs and Border Pro-
tection, to issue regulations under section 307. See id.
§ 2071.
Customs’ implementing regulation for section 307,
19 C.F.R. § 12.42,1 governs Customs’ receipt and require-
ments for petitions, initiation of investigations, and issu-
ance of Withhold Release Orders to detain shipments at
United States ports of entry for potential importation. The
implementing regulation permits “[a]ny person outside
[Customs] who has reason to believe that merchandise pro-
duced [with forced child labor] . . . is being, or is likely to
be, imported into the United States” to communicate this
belief to Customs. 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(b). The communica-
tion must contain “(1) [a] full statement of the reasons for
the belief; (2) [a] detailed description or sample of the mer-
chandise; and (3) [a]ll pertinent facts obtainable as to the
production of the merchandise abroad.” Id. “If any infor-
mation filed with a port director pursuant to para-
graph (b) . . . does not conform with the requirements of
that paragraph, the communication shall be returned
promptly to the person who submitted it,” otherwise, “[i]f
such information is found to comply with the requirements,
it shall be transmitted . . . within 10 days to the Commis-
sioner of [Customs].” Id. § 12.42(c). “Upon receipt by the
Commissioner . . . of any communication . . . found to
1 We are aware of no other regulations implementing
section 307 and IRAdvocates confirmed the same during
oral argument. Oral Arg. at 9:56–10:40, https://www.cafc.
uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/24-2316_04092026.mp3.
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 4
comply with the requirements of [paragraph (a) or (b) of
section 12.42], the Commissioner will cause such investi-
gation to be made as appears to be warranted by the cir-
cumstances of the case . . . .” Id. § 12.42(d). “If the
Commissioner . . . finds at any time that information avail-
able reasonably but not conclusively indicates that mer-
chandise within the purview of section 307 is being, or is
likely to be, imported, he will promptly advise all port di-
rectors accordingly and the port directors shall thereupon
withhold release of any such merchandise,” such as
through a Withhold Release Order. Id. § 12.42(e). The im-
porter then would have the opportunity to “establish[] by
satisfactory evidence that the merchandise was not . . . pro-
duced[] or manufactured in any part with the use of” forced
child labor. Id. § 12.42(g).
II
IRAdvocates is a self-described organization that “ad-
vocates for and with working people around the world” and
“is committed to overcoming the problems of child labor,
forced labor, and other abusive labor practices in the global
economy.” J.A. 85 ¶ 117. Starting in February 2020,
IRAdvocates and its co-allegers submitted several petitions
to the Acting Commissioner of Customs pursuant to
19 C.F.R. § 12.42(b). In each petition, IRAdvocates alleged
that cocoa and cocoa products being imported into the
United States from Côte d’Ivoire have been produced using
forced child labor for over two decades in violation of sec-
tion 307. Notably, IRAdvocates alleged that although Côte
d’Ivoire “is the world’s top cocoa producer, producing ap-
proximately 32% of the world’s cocoa,” its “cocoa farmers
are the lowest paid.” J.A. 94 (citation omitted). “The aver-
age daily income for a cocoa farmer in [Côte d’Ivoire] is less
than what a consumer pays for a single chocolate bar.” Id.
IRAdvocates asserted that “the low price farmers receive
for their cocoa[] and the severe imbalances in the value
chain” led to human rights risks with “[b]y far the most
documented abuse in the cocoa industry” being related to
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 5
“the use of child labor, both through local family and social
networks and through national and international child
trafficking.” Id.
IRAdvocates also highlighted that, far from being a
new problem, the prevalence of forced child labor in the co-
coa industry has been apparent to Congress and the major
chocolate companies for decades. IRAdvocates explained
that, after lobbying against pending legislation that sought
to ban the importation of cocoa harvested by child labor,
the major cocoa companies signed the 2001 Harkin-Engel
Protocol, in which the industry “acknowledged the problem
of forced child labor in West Africa” and committed to phas-
ing out such child labor by 2005. J.A. 97 (quoting J.A. 124).
By 2020, however, the petitions note that the chocolate
companies still failed to fulfill the promises they made in
the 2001 Harkin-Engel Protocol.
IRAdvocates further stressed that “there has been
clear documentation of trafficked and forced child labor in
[Côte d’Ivoire’s] cocoa sector for years.” J.A. 96. The docu-
mentation in the petitions includes reports authored by the
United States Department of Labor and State Department.
For example, the Department of Labor published an an-
nual report regarding forced child labor in Côte d’Ivoire
from 2001 to 2024 and, even as of 2024, the Department of
Labor acknowledged that “[c]hildren in Côte d’Ivoire are
subjected to the worst forms of child labor, including in
forced labor in the harvesting of cocoa” and “sometimes as
a result of human trafficking.” E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Child Labor and
Forced Labor Reports: Côte d’Ivoire (2024),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_re
ports/tda2024/C%C3%B4te-dIvoire.pdf; see also J.A. 96
nn.28–29 (collecting sources). The petitions note that the
State Department has similarly recognized:
Within agriculture, [the] worst forms of child labor
were particularly prevalent in the cacao and coffee
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 6
sectors. Inspections during the year did not result
in investigations into child labor crimes. Penalties
were seldom applied and were not a deterrent to
violations. The number of inspectors and resources
for enforcement were insufficient to enforce the
law.
U.S. Embassy in Côte d’Ivoire, Côte d’Ivoire 2018 Human
Rights Report (2018), https://www.state.gov/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/03/Cote-Divoire-2018.pdf.
To demonstrate the ongoing use of forced child labor in
the cocoa industry, IRAdvocates further supplied Customs
with affidavits, photos, videos, and audio recordings from
IRAdvocates’ investigations in its petitions. This evidence
included first-hand accounts collected by IRAdvocates from
current and former child workers regarding their living
and working conditions, including: working without the
pay or education they were promised, being provided little
food, living in isolation, sleeping in lean-to structures made
of sticks and tarps, performing hazardous work with ma-
chetes, carrying heavy loads of cocoa beans, and using pes-
ticides and herbicides without protective equipment.
Based on the evidence presented by IRAdvocates, Cus-
toms initiated an investigation into the use of forced child
labor in the Côte d’Ivoire cocoa industry and the potential
United States importation of goods made with such cocoa.
See Appellees’ Br. 6, 19. As part of its investigation, Cus-
toms issued requests for information and questionnaires to
various importers of cocoa or products made with cocoa
from Côte d’Ivoire (although the public record does not in-
clude any responses). Customs also met with IRAdvocates
regarding its first petition about a month after filing and
then again a year later. Over a year after IRAdvocates filed
its first petition, it filed a first supplemental petition, in-
cluding new evidence of forced child labor and child traf-
ficking gathered by an investigatory team in November
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 7
and December 2020. Customs met with IRAdvocates again
a few months later.
Two years after filing its first petition, IRAdvocates—
joined by numerous stakeholders, including the AFL-CIO
and sixteen sustainable chocolate companies as signato-
ries—sent a letter urging Customs to withhold release of
cocoa and cocoa products imported from Côte d’Ivoire. Cus-
toms did not respond to the letter but met with IRAdvo-
cates six months later. Two months after their meeting,
IRAdvocates sent Customs an email requesting an update
on the investigation. Customs responded with a letter af-
firming that it “is committed to enforcing U.S. law prohib-
iting the importation of goods made wholly or in part with
forced labor” but noting “that the information submitted
with the petition was dated and did not provide a sufficient
basis for [Customs] to move forward with enforcement ac-
tion under [section 307].” J.A. 162. IRAdvocates re-
sponded by arguing that the evidence was dated only
because Customs failed to take action in the three years
since IRAdvocates filed its first petition. IRAdvocates then
submitted a second supplemental petition to Customs, in-
cluding new evidence of child trafficking and forced child
labor gathered by an investigatory team in September
2022.
Six months later, after hearing nothing from Customs,
IRAdvocates filed suit at the Trade Court, alleging that
Customs unlawfully withheld and/or unreasonably delayed
action on its petitions under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. Specifically, IRAdvocates al-
leged that it “suffered financial harm . . . , requiring ongo-
ing and expensive investigations to provide updated
information,” J.A. 84 ¶ 114, and “expended resources in an
ongoing, multi-year effort to obtain enforcement of the Tar-
iff Act by [Customs],” J.A. 86 ¶ 119. IRAdvocates sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the Trade Court to
compel Customs to issue a Withhold Release Order or at
least declare that IRAdvocates submitted sufficient
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 8
evidence to warrant such an order. The Government
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and
for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, arguing, in part, that IRAdvocates lacked consti-
tutional standing to bring its action. The Trade Court
granted the Government’s motion, determining that
IRAdvocates failed to establish organizational standing.
IRAdvocates appeals. In a letter filed under Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 28(j), Customs “advise[d the court]
that since mid-August 2024, no new information has been
received or developed by the agency and that the investiga-
tion is not being actively pursued at this time.” ECF
No. 54. At the same time, counsel for the Government elab-
orated at oral argument that, to date, Customs has neither
withheld release of cocoa and cocoa products imported from
Côte d’Ivoire nor denied IRAdvocates’ petitions. Oral Arg.
at 22:00–26:05. Counsel explained that the investigation
is “not active right now . . . but . . . it is still pending,” “not
just based on IRAdvocates’ petition or information,” and
not confined by a time limit, so Customs is still “looking to
see whether it can make a determination either way.” See
Oral Arg. at 22:00–30:42.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(5).
D ISCUSSION
IRAdvocates argues that the Trade Court erred in dis-
missing its complaint for lack of organizational standing.
The Government disagrees, arguing that IRAdvocates can-
not show injury-in-fact. For the following reasons, we
agree with the Government.
I
We review a dismissal by the Trade Court for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Rimco Inc. v. United
States, 98 F.4th 1046, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing
Hutchison Quality Furniture, Inc. v. United States,
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 9
827 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). As before the Trade
Court, we accept as true the well-pleaded factual allega-
tions of the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the claimant. Hutchison, 827 F.3d at 1359 (ci-
tation omitted).
“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the
case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citation omit-
ted). The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”
consists of three elements. Id. First, a plaintiff must per-
sonally present an “injury in fact,” meaning “an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and par-
ticularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” See id. (citation modified). This require-
ment ensures that the plaintiff has a “personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975) (citation modified). Second, there must be
a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of—that is, plaintiff’s injury must be “fairly . . .
trace[able]” to the challenged “putatively illegal conduct of
the defendant,” and not the result of independent action of
some third party not before the court. See Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Finally, it must be
“likely” that the injury will be redressable by the requested
relief. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
Advocacy organizations, like IRAdvocates, must
demonstrate the same requirements to show standing.
Mil.-Veterans Advoc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affs., 7 F.4th
1110, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); Food & Drug
Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 393–94
(2024) (“[O]rganizations must satisfy the usual standards
for injury in fact, causation, and redressability that apply
to individuals.” (citation omitted)). The burden of estab-
lishing jurisdiction rests on the party invoking it. Norsk
Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States, 472 F.3d 1347, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The case here turns on
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 10
whether IRAdvocates has established a “concrete and de-
monstrable injury to the organization’s activities.” Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). The Su-
preme Court has distinguished between organizations that
have plausibly alleged that their business activities have
been impeded and thus have suffered a concrete and de-
monstrable injury from those that have merely alleged that
their organizational social policy interests have been com-
promised by government action or inaction. The Supreme
Court’s decisions in Havens and Alliance for Hippocratic
Medicine govern and inform our analysis of what side of the
line this case falls on, and the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Abigail Alliance for
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach,
469 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cited by IRAdvocates, is also
instructive. We discuss each case in turn.
In Havens, the Supreme Court held that advocacy or-
ganization HOME had standing to challenge real estate
company Havens Realty’s racial steering practices.
HOME’s organizational purpose was “to make equal oppor-
tunity in housing a reality,” and “[i]ts activities included
the operation of a housing counseling service, and the in-
vestigation and referral of complaints concerning housing
discrimination.” Havens, 455 U.S. at 368 (citations omit-
ted). In holding that HOME had suffered a real and con-
crete injury, the Court emphasized that Havens Realty’s
unlawful racial steering practices directly unraveled and
frustrated HOME’s nondiscriminatory counseling and re-
ferral services, requiring HOME to expend significant re-
sources to identify and counteract Havens Realty’s
misinformation. Id. at 379. The Court thus recognized
that “[s]uch concrete and demonstrable injury to the organ-
ization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the or-
ganization’s resources—constitute[d] far more than simply
a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.”
Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 11
More recently, in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, the
Supreme Court held that pro-life medical associations
lacked standing to challenge Food and Drug Administra-
tion regulations that made the abortion pill mifepristone
easier to access. See All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S.
at 372–73. Framing their injury, the medical associations
claimed that the “FDA ha[d] ‘impaired’ their ‘ability to pro-
vide services and achieve their organizational missions.’”
Id. at 394 (citation omitted). The Court began its analysis
by stressing that an organization cannot demonstrate a
concrete injury based on abstract social policy interests re-
gardless of the organization’s intense or longstanding com-
mitment to furthering those interests, strong opposition to
the government’s conduct, or qualifications to advocate for
the interests. Id. (first citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486;
and then citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739).
The Court also rejected the medical associations’ spe-
cific allegations that the FDA’s inaction caused them to
conduct their own studies on mifepristone, engage in public
advocacy and education, and “expend considerable time,
energy, and resources” drafting citizen petitions to the
FDA. Id. The Court determined that, unlike the organiza-
tion in Havens, the medical associations did not suffer a
concrete injury because the FDA’s regulations did not im-
pede the medical associations’ advocacy businesses. Id.
at 395. At most, the Court reasoned, the medical associa-
tions were forced to collect and disseminate their own in-
formation about mifepristone, but they did not (and could
not) allege an informational injury because the FDA was
not required to disseminate such information. Id. at 395–
96. The Court explained that “an organization that has not
suffered a concrete injury caused by a defendant’s action
cannot spend its way into standing simply by expending
money to gather information and advocate against the de-
fendant’s action. An organization cannot manufacture its
own standing in that way.” Id. at 394.
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 12
In Abigail Alliance, the D.C. Circuit held that advocacy
organization Abigail Alliance survived a motion to dismiss
by adequately pleading facts to support standing to chal-
lenge the FDA’s authority to restrict terminally ill patients’
access to investigational drugs because “[t]he challenged
regulations . . . caused a drain on Abigail Alliance’s re-
sources and time.” Abigail All., 469 F.3d at 132–33 (cita-
tion omitted). The court acknowledged that “an
organization is not injured [simply] by expending resources
to challenge” government conduct. Id. at 133 (citation
omitted). But the court, relying on Havens Realty, deter-
mined that Abigail Alliance “met [the organizational
standing] threshold by alleging that it actively engages in
‘counseling, referral, advocacy, and educational services,’”
id. (quoting complaint), and that it “had to divert signifi-
cant time and resources from [its counseling, referral, ad-
vocacy, and educational] activities toward helping its
members and the public address the unduly burdensome
requirements that the FDA impose[d] on experimental
treatments,” id. at 132–33 (citation omitted).
II
Turning to the case before us, we hold that IRAdvo-
cates has not established that it suffered a concrete injury
and thus that it has standing to challenge Customs’ inac-
tion in response to its petitions. On appeal, IRAdvocates
alleges that it suffered two injuries: (1) a drain on its re-
sources caused by its efforts to convince Customs to act on
its petitions, and (2) the denial of one of few litigation tools
available to it to achieve its mission. Appellant’s Br. 19.
We address each in turn.
A
IRAdvocates alleges that it “suffered financial harm
[due] to the inaction of [Customs], requiring ongoing and
expensive investigations to provide updated information.”
J.A. 84 ¶ 114; Appellant’s Br. 29–43. Specifically, IRAdvo-
cates’ complaint asserts:
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 13
Due to the failure/refusal of [Customs] to properly
enforce the law, . . . IRAdvocates has expended its
own resources to investigate allegations of forced
child labor in Côte d’Ivoire, and to initiate its own
campaign to prevent the importation of this illegal
merchandise. Further, IRAdvocates has expended
resources in an ongoing, multi-year effort to obtain
enforcement of the Tariff Act by [Customs].
J.A. 85–86 ¶ 119. Based on this alleged injury, IRAdvo-
cates contends that it is positioned similarly to the organi-
zations in Havens and Abigail Alliance and unlike the
medical associations in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine.
We are not persuaded.
IRAdvocates’ allegation that it suffered financial harm
because it invested resources to compel Customs to issue a
Withhold Release Order seems more akin to the alleged in-
jury in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. Indeed, instead
of asserting that any of its activities have been impeded,
IRAdvocates alleges that its mission has been compro-
mised by Customs’ inaction. As the Supreme Court has ex-
plained, however, “an organization may not establish
standing simply based on the ‘intensity of the litigant’s in-
terest’ or because of strong opposition to the government’s
conduct,” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 394 (quot-
ing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486), “no matter how
longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the
organization,” id. (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739).
Moreover, an organization “cannot spend its way into
standing simply by expending money to gather information
and advocate against the defendant’s action.” Id.; see Abi-
gail All., 469 F.3d at 133 (“[A]n organization is not injured
by expending resources to challenge the regulation itself;
we do not recognize such self-inflicted harm.”).
Notably, unlike the plaintiffs in Havens and Abigail Al-
liance, IRAdvocates has not alleged that its customer-ser-
vice activities have been impeded such that it has suffered
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 14
a concrete and demonstrable injury. It is not enough to
claim that it has been required to expend its own resources
to maintain its social policy interests; IRAdvocates must
allege that its customer-service activities have been dimin-
ished or precluded due to the government’s inaction. The
complaint alleges “IRAdvocates promotes enforcement of
labor rights internationally through public education and
mobilization, research, litigation, legislation, and collabo-
ration with labor, government[,] and business groups.”
J.A. 85 ¶ 117. However, IRAdvocates has not asserted that
Customs’ failure to act on the petitions caused IRAdvocates
to divert resources from its educational, research, litiga-
tion, or legislation activities. For example, IRAdvocates
has not alleged that Customs’ inaction caused it to divert
resources from making educational documentaries or pre-
vented it from representing individuals in litigation.
IRAdvocates has not alleged that it or its members produce
more costly ethical chocolate and are underpriced by choc-
olate makers who use less-expensive cocoa made by forced
child labor. Nor has IRAdvocates alleged that it or its
members have invested in obtaining ethical certifications
(e.g., Fair Trade, Rainforest Alliance) that have been tar-
nished by the lack of adequate monitoring enabled by Cus-
toms’ inaction.
Although IRAdvocates argues that it has demonstrated
something more here, we are not persuaded. Like the med-
ical associations in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine who
incurred costs to oppose FDA’s actions, IRAdvocates claims
to have standing because it incurred costs to oppose Cus-
toms’ inaction. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 394.
IRAdvocates specifically alleges that its injury arose from
investing its resources in investigating forced child labor,
initiating its own campaign to prevent the importation of
cocoa and cocoa products from Côte d’Ivoire, and seeking
enforcement of section 307 by Customs. The “costly steps
IRAdvocates took . . . to obtain [Customs’] compliance with
[section 307]” include costs to prepare for meetings with
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 15
Customs, collect and prepare additional evidence to include
in their supplemental petitions, and draft communications
to Customs. Appellant’s Br. 31–33. But, as the Supreme
Court explained, standing does not exist simply because an
organization has diverted its resources in response to the
defendant’s actions or inactions. All. for Hippocratic Med.,
602 U.S. at 394–95.
The Supreme Court’s rationale applies equally to the
expenses IRAdvocates incurred after Customs notified it
that the information in its first two petitions was dated.2
These costs were voluntary, self-inflicted, and directed to-
ward advocating against Customs’ inaction. Just as an or-
ganization cannot spend its way into standing, it also
cannot do so by spending more money to gather infor-
mation and advocate against a defendant’s action after the
agency tells them the initial information has gone stale.
See id.
B
IRAdvocates next asserts injury because Customs’ fail-
ure to act on IRAdvocates’ petitions denied it a major tool—
i.e., section 307—in its limited arsenal of tools to litigate
against forced child labor. Appellant’s Br. 19–29. IRAdvo-
cates did not, however, allege this injury in its complaint
or before the Trade Court and it is now forfeited. See In re
2 Notably, nearly all the expenses identified by
IRAdvocates—including those related to the latest investi-
gatory trip to Côte d’Ivoire—occurred during Customs’ pro-
longed investigation and before Customs informed
IRAdvocates that the information was stale. See Appel-
lant’s Br. 31–33 (listing costs); see J.A. 162 (indicating that
IRAdvocates’ evidence submitted as of December 13, 2022,
was stale); see also J.A. 165–71 (explaining that the addi-
tional evidence in IRAdvocates’ second supplemental peti-
tion was collected in September 2022).
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 16
Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (“[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely asser-
tion of a right.” (citation omitted)). But even if the argu-
ment is not forfeited, the alleged injury is not sufficient for
Article III standing.
“[T]he grant of a procedural right alone,” like that to
petition Customs to investigate whether certain products
being imported into the United States are produced with
the use of forced child labor, “cannot serve as the basis for
Article III standing unless the procedures in question are
designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of pe-
titioners’ that is the ultimate basis of [their] standing.” US
Inventor, Inc. v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 156 F.4th
1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (quoting Gettman v. Drug Enf’t
Admin., 290 F.3d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); see Consumer
Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found., 753 F.3d 1258,
1261–62 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding an agency’s denial of re-
quested administrative action is insufficient to confer
standing). Section 307 and its implementing regulation al-
low anyone to petition Customs to investigate whether cer-
tain products being imported into the United States are
produced with the use of forced child labor. See 19 C.F.R.
§ 12.42(a)–(b). However, the ability to petition Customs to
initiate an investigation does not inherently protect any in-
terest of the petitioners. See Gettman, 290 F.3d at 433
(“The fact that Congress may have given all interested par-
ties the right to petition the agency does not in turn ‘auto-
matic[ally]’ confer Article III standing when that right is
deprived.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). And
IRAdvocates has failed to show that it has a “concrete in-
terest apart from the procedural injury.” US Inventor,
156 F.4th at 1314 (quoting Fund Democracy, LLC v. SEC,
278 F.3d 21, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
CONCLUSION
We have considered IRAdvocates’ other arguments and
find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
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INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN 17
conclude that the Court of International Trade did not err
in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
AFFIRMED
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