Sara Corcoran v. Office of Personnel Management

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
SARA CORCORAN,
Petitioner
v.
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
Respondent
______________________
2024-2349
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DC-0843-22-0380-I-1.
______________________
Decided: July 8, 2026
______________________
L AINA L OPEZ, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Wash-
ington, DC, argued for petitioner.
STEPHANIE F LEMING, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by
REGINALD T HOMAS BLADES , J R., BRIAN M. B OYNTON,
P ATRICIA M. MC CARTHY .
______________________
Before REYNA, SCHALL , and CUNNINGHAM , Circuit Judges.
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CORCORAN v. OPM 2
REYNA, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Sara Corcoran seeks survivor annuity bene-
fits under the Federal Employees Retirement System. To
receive benefits, Ms. Corcoran must establish that she and
her late husband, Anthony Schinella, were married for at
least nine months prior to his passing. Because we find no
error in the Merit Systems Protection Board’s determina-
tion that Mr. Schinella and Ms. Corcoran were married less
than nine months before Mr. Schinella’s passing, we affirm
the denial of Ms. Corcoran’s claim for survivor annuity ben-
efits.
BACKGROUND
I.
Mr. Schinella worked for the federal government from
1991 until his death in 2020. During that time he contrib-
uted to the Federal Employees Retirement System
(“FERS”).
Mr. Schinella and Ms. Corcoran (collectively, the “cou-
ple”) began dating in the summer of 2018. Around Decem-
ber 2018, Mr. Schinella gave Ms. Corcoran a diamond
necklace and earrings. On December 15, 2018, Ms. Corco-
ran referred to Mr. Schinella as her husband in a social
media post. Mr. Schinella gave Ms. Corcoran an engage-
ment ring in February 2019. The couple cohabitated from
approximately January 2019 until Mr. Schinella’s death,
spending time at both Mr. Schinella’s house in Virginia and
Ms. Corcoran’s residence in Washington, D.C.
The couple held a civil marriage ceremony in Virginia
on May 29, 2020. Mr. Schinella passed away on June 14,
2020.
II.
Ms. Corcoran filed a claim with the Office of Personnel
Management (“OPM”) to receive survivor annuity benefits
under FERS. In the claim, Ms. Corcoran referenced her
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CORCORAN v. OPM 3
May 29, 2020 marriage to Mr. Schinella and attached the
couple’s marriage certificate.
A threshold issue is whether Ms. Corcoran qualifies as
a “widow” under 5 U.S.C. § 8441(1). Section 8441(1)(A) de-
fines a widow as the “surviving wife of an employee . . . who
. . . was married to him for at least 9 months immediately
before his death.” OPM denied Ms. Corcoran’s claim, find-
ing she and Mr. Schinella had not been married at least
nine months before Mr. Schinella’s death. Ms. Corcoran
requested reconsideration. On review, OPM determined
that based on the couple’s May 29, 2020 civil ceremony, the
couple had not been married for nine months prior to
Mr. Schinella’s June 14, 2020 passing. OPM also consid-
ered and rejected Ms. Corcoran’s attempt to establish a
common law marriage in Virginia prior to the civil cere-
mony. OPM pointed out that the Commonwealth of
Viriginia does not recognize common law marriages “unless
you lived together in a State that recognizes common-law
marriage and then moved to Virginia.” J.A. 157. OPM af-
firmed its denial of benefits.
Ms. Corcoran appealed to the Merit Systems Protection
Board (“Board”), this time asserting a common law mar-
riage in the District of Columbia. An administrative judge
(“AJ”) affirmed OPM’s denial, finding that Ms. Corcoran
failed to present preponderant evidence that she and
Mr. Schinella established a common law marriage in the
District of Columbia. The AJ found that the documents of
record—in particular, Ms. Corcoran’s initial application for
death benefits, which made no mention of a marriage in the
District of Columbia, and Ms. Corcoran’s 2019 tax returns,
which she filed as “single”—did not support Ms. Corcoran’s
claim. The AJ further found that testimony from Ms. Cor-
coran failed to establish that she and Mr. Schinella cohab-
itated as husband and wife prior to May 29, 2020.
Specifically, the AJ noted that Ms. Corcoran was unable to
identify a particular conversation or point in time at which
she and Mr. Schinella expressly agreed that they were
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CORCORAN v. OPM 4
presently husband and wife. Although the AJ found credi-
ble that the couple at times referred to each other as “hus-
band” and “wife,” she concluded that they spoke the words
as terms of endearment rather than indicating that they
had mutually agreed to be presently married. The AJ
found that testimony from Ms. Corcoran’s mother and
Ms. Corcoran’s close friend supported the conclusion that
the couple were engaged to be married and referred to each
other as “husband” and “wife” as terms of endearment both
prior to and during their engagement. Finally, the AJ
found that the couple’s diligent pursuit of a civil marriage
ceremony despite Ms. Corcoran’s health-related obstacles
and the COVID-19 pandemic supported the finding that
the couple had not created a common law marriage in the
District of Columbia prior to their civil marriage in May
2020.
Ms. Corcoran petitioned for review of the AJ’s decision.
The Board determined that the AJ correctly concluded that
Ms. Corcoran failed to establish that she and Mr. Schinella
created a common law marriage at least nine months be-
fore Mr. Schinella’s death. The Board largely adopted the
AJ’s analysis, identifying the evidence that the AJ found
persuasive and noting its own deference to the AJ’s credi-
bility determinations. The Board agreed with the AJ’s
finding that Ms. Corcoran proffered insufficient evidence to
establish that she and Mr. Schinella formed a common law
marriage in the District of Columbia prior to their civil
marriage ceremony, and consequently, that Ms. Corcoran
failed to establish entitlement to FERS survivor benefits.
Ms. Corcoran petitions this court for review. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
D ISCUSSION
I.
Ms. Corcoran argues the Board erred in determining
that she and Mr. Schinella had not entered into a common
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CORCORAN v. OPM 5
law marriage at least nine months prior to Mr. Schinella’s
passing. In addition to a general contention that the
Board’s finding was not supported by substantial evidence,
see Appellant Br. 18, Ms. Corcoran challenges three aspects
of the AJ’s factfinding, id. at 25–40.
We will affirm the Board’s decision unless we find it to
be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-
erwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without
procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of New York v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
The District of Columbia is one of only a handful of ju-
risdictions that continue to allow the formation of common
law marriages. Cleary v. Cleary, 318 A.3d 536, 540 (D.C.
2024). The elements of common law marriage in the Dis-
trict of Columbia are “cohabitation as husband and wife,
following an express mutual agreement, which must be in
words of the present tense.’’ Coates v. Watts, 622 A.2d 25,
27 (D.C. 1993). Thus, to establish her common law mar-
riage to Mr. Schinella in the District of Columbia, Ms. Cor-
coran was required to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that she and Mr. Schinella expressly agreed that
they were presently husband and wife. See Coleman v.
United States, 948 A.2d 534, 544 (D.C. 2008). “Although
there is no set formula required for the [express mutual]
agreement, the exchange of words must inescapably and
unambiguously imply that an agreement was being en-
tered into to become man and wife as of the time of the mu-
tual consent.” Coates, 622 A.2d at 27 (citation modified).
II.
We first address Ms. Corcoran’s general contention
that the Board’s conclusion was not supported by substan-
tial evidence. Because the Board largely adopted the AJ’s
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CORCORAN v. OPM 6
analysis, we consider whether the AJ identified substantial
evidence to support the Board’s conclusion.
The AJ cited documents of record in support of her find-
ing. J.A. 24–25. She noted that Ms. Corcoran listed
Mr. Schinella’s Virginia address as her address on their
joint 2020 tax returns, which she filed in 2021. J.A. 24. In
contrast, Ms. Corcoran filed her 2019 return as single, sep-
arately from Mr. Schinella, and under her District of Co-
lumbia address. J.A. 24–25. The Board subsequently
relied on this evidence to distinguish the instant case from
Jackson v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 58 (D.D.C. 1988), a case
cited by Ms. Corcoran. J.A. 12. The Board noted that in
Jackson, the appellant and the decedent filed two tax re-
turns under “married filing joint returns” status prior to
the decedent’s death. Id. (citing 690 F. Supp. at 60–64).
The Jackson court characterized these joint returns as
“most noteworthy.” 690 F. Supp. at 62. Here, the AJ found
Ms. Corcoran’s 2019 tax return to indicate that Ms. Corco-
ran did not consider herself and Mr. Schinella to be legally
married in the District of Columbia at that time.
J.A. 24–25.
The AJ cited Ms. Corcoran’s testimony as additional
evidence supporting her finding of no common law mar-
riage. The AJ noted that Ms. Corcoran “was unable to iden-
tify a particular conversation or point in time” at which she
and Mr. Schinella expressly agreed that they were pres-
ently husband and wife. J.A. 25. The AJ analyzed Ms. Cor-
coran’s testimony as follows:
The appellant testified that the couple became en-
gaged in or around December 2018 or January
2019 when Schinella gave her a diamond necklace
from Bahrain. Her testimony was inconsistent as
to the meaning of that gift and the engagement
ring Schinella later gave her in February 2019.
First, she testified that Schinella “asked me to
marry him” when he gave her the necklace. She
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CORCORAN v. OPM 7
later testified that the two considered themselves
already married after he gave her the necklace.
She alleged the engagement ring and later wedding
“was just part of this continuum where we agreed
to be each other’s partner for eternity” and that “it
was clear we had made a lifelong commitment to
each other.”
J.A. 25–26 (citations omitted). Like the Board, we find no
fault with the AJ’s analysis. See J.A. 9. Ms. Corcoran’s
inability to identify when the couple reached an express
mutual agreement in words of the present tense to be hus-
band and wife supports the conclusion that Ms. Corcoran
and Mr. Schinella did not form a common law marriage in
the District of Columbia. See Coates, 622 A.2d at 27.
That conclusion is further supported by testimony from
Ms. Corcoran’s close friend, Morgan Allen, and Ms. Corco-
ran’s mother, Carol Anderson. Ms. Allen testified to
Mr. Schinella’s plans to propose to Ms. Corcoran, the cou-
ple’s engagement celebration with Ms. Allen, and Ms. Cor-
coran’s excitement about the engagement and being
Mr. Schinella’s fiancée. J.A. 27; J.A. 91–93. Ms. Anderson
testified that Mr. Schinella asked her for her daughter’s
hand in marriage in or around January 2019, and that
Mr. Schinella was her daughter’s fiancé in early 2019.
J.A. 27; J.A. 102–03. We agree with the Board that the tes-
timony supports the AJ’s finding that, prior to their May
2020 civil marriage ceremony, Ms. Corcoran and Mr. Schi-
nella possessed only a future intention to be married at
some later date. See J.A. 9–10.
Because the Board’s decision is supported by evidence
identified by the AJ, including documentary evidence and
testimony from multiple witnesses, we hold that substan-
tial evidence supports the Board’s determination that
Ms. Corcoran and Mr. Schinella did not create a common
law marriage at least nine months prior to Mr. Schinella’s
death.
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CORCORAN v. OPM 8
III.
Ms. Corcoran raises three specific challenges to the
AJ’s fact finding. First, Ms. Corcoran challenges the AJ’s
finding that the couple used the words “husband” and
“wife” merely as terms of endearment. Appellant
Br. 25–34. She contends that the finding rests entirely on
the AJ’s disbelief of Ms. Corcoran’s testimony. Id. But the
AJ’s analysis boils down to a weighing of the evidence. The
AJ gave less weight to Ms. Corcoran’s testimony regarding
the couple’s use of those words than to evidence indicating
that the couple were not presently husband and wife. See
J.A. 25–27. As noted above, the AJ found persuasive
Ms. Corcoran’s inability to identify a particular time or
conversation in which she and Mr. Schinella expressly
agreed that they were presently husband and wife, as well
as testimony from Ms. Allen and Ms. Anderson regarding
the couple’s engagement and plans to marry. Id. Ms. Cor-
coran’s argument is an invitation to reweigh the evidence,
which we cannot do. Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., 834 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We do not
disturb the weight that the AJ afforded to the competing
record evidence.”).
Second, Ms. Corcoran argues that the AJ erred by jus-
tifying her finding of no common law marriage on snippets
of testimony taken out of context. Appellant Br. 34–39.
Ms. Corcoran contends that the AJ ignored the entirety of
the testimony, instead choosing portions favoring a conven-
tional notion of what it means to be “engaged.” Id. at 35.
Like her first argument, Ms. Corcoran’s second argument
invites us to stand in the place of the AJ, which we cannot
do. The AJ detailed the evidence upon which she relied,
and she explained why she found some portions of testi-
mony more credible than others. See J.A. 26–28. “The de-
termination of the credibility of the witnesses is within the
discretion of the presiding official who heard their testi-
mony and saw their demeanor.” Griessenauer v. Dep’t of
Energy, 754 F.2d 361, 364 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Like the Board,
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CORCORAN v. OPM 9
we find no reason to challenge the AJ’s “specific and ex-
plained credibility findings.” J.A. 10.
Third, Ms. Corcoran argues that the AJ erred by giving
undue weight to the couple’s civil marriage ceremony. Ap-
pellant Br. 39–40. Ms. Corcoran again asks us to reweigh
evidence. The AJ heard testimony from Ms. Corcoran,
Ms. Allen, Ms. Anderson, and the couple’s car mechanic,
and found that the weight of the evidence supported the
conclusion that the couple had not formed a common law
marriage in the District of Columbia prior to their civil
marriage ceremony in Virginia. J.A. 26–28. “It is not for
this court to reweigh evidence on appeal.” Rickel v. Dep’t
of the Navy, 31 F.4th 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Ms. Corcoran’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons stated
above, we affirm the Board’s decision affirming OPM’s de-
nial of Ms. Corcoran’s claim for survivor annuity benefits.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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