Shanae M. Miller v. Department of the Air Force

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
SHANAE M. MILLER,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
Respondent
______________________
2025-1380
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DA-0752-21-0010-I-1.
______________________
Decided: December 3, 2025
______________________
SHANAE M. MILLER, Schertz, TX, pro se.
ISABELLE AUBRUN, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ALBERT S.
IAROSSI, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE.
______________________
Before LOURIE, SCHALL, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Case: 25-1380 Document: 28 Page: 1 Filed: 12/03/2025

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MILLER v. AIR FORCE 2
Shanae Miller petitions for review of the final decision
of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) affirming
the decision of the Department of the Air Force (“Air
Force”) to remove her from her position after her security
clearance was revoked. Miller v. Dep’t of the Air Force, No.
DA-0752-21-0010-I-1 (Dec. 18, 2024). For the following
reasons, we affirm the Board’s final decision.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Miller obtained a Secret security clearance in No-
vember of 2010 pursuant to the requirements of her posi-
tion at the time as a GS-7 Acquisition Program Manager in
the Air Force. See S. App. 19.1 In March of 2016, Ms. Miller
accepted a tentative selection offer for a GS-12 Acquisition
Program Manager position at Lackland Air Force Base
(“AFB”). Id. Because the Lackland AFB position required
a higher level (Top-Secret) security clearance than the
clearance she presently held, she completed a Question-
naire for National Security Positions (SF-86), and the Air
Force initiated a background investigation. See id. at 19–
20. While the investigation was pending, Ms. Miller de-
clined the offer with Lackland AFB and instead accepted a
promotion to a GS-13 Acquisition Program Manager posi-
tion at Wright Patterson AFB, a position that did not re-
quire a Top-Secret security clearance, but did require a
Secret security clearance. Id. at 20; S. App. 102. However,
the background investigation for Ms. Miller’s Top-Secret
security clearance continued. S. App. 20.
The Office of Personnel Management completed Ms.
Miller’s background investigation in February of 2017. Id.
The Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications
Facility (“DoD CAF”) issued a letter on October 11, 2017,
notifying Ms. Miller of its preliminary decision to revoke
1 “S. App.” refers to the Supplemental Appendix filed
by Respondent.
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MILLER v. AIR FORCE 3
both her eligibility to access classified information and her
assignment to duties that have been designated national
security sensitive. Id. DoD CAF’s Statement of Reasons
(“SOR”) supporting its decision explained that Ms. Miller
had a history of delinquent debts and that she had failed to
report her delinquent debts in the SF-86 that she had sub-
mitted in connection with the Lackland AFB application.
Id.; S. App. 224–26. Ms. Miller responded to the SOR on
April 18, 2018. S. App. 20.
In June of 2018, Ms. Miller was reassigned to a GS-13
Program Manager position at Randolph AFB. Id. Later
that year, she was reassigned to a GS-13 Career Field Ad-
ministrator position at Randolph AFB. Id. As a condition
of her employment in that role, she was required to main-
tain eligibility to serve in a noncritical-sensitive position.
Id. at 21.
On July 26, 2019, DoD CAF issued its final decision re-
voking Ms. Miller’s eligibility for access to classified infor-
mation, her eligibility for assignment to duties that have
been designated national security sensitive, and her eligi-
bility for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information.
Id. at 20; S. App. 208. Ms. Miller’s appeal of that decision
to the Air Force Personnel Security Appeal Board was de-
nied. S. App. 20.
The Air Force consequently removed Ms. Miller from
her position as a GS-13 Career Field Administrator at Ran-
dolph AFB, effective September 16, 2020, because of her
loss of eligibility to occupy a noncritical-sensitive position.
Id. at 21; S. App. 109. Ms. Miller filed an appeal with the
Board.
In the Board’s initial decision, the administrative judge
(“AJ”) assigned to the case determined that the Air Force
had met its burden to prove that: (1) Ms. Miller’s position
was classified as noncritical sensitive; (2) her eligibility to
occupy a noncritical-sensitive position had been revoked;
(3) she was provided with the required procedural
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MILLER v. AIR FORCE 4
protections; and (4) there is no Air Force policy entitling
Ms. Miller to be reassigned to a nonsensitive position. S.
App. 21–25. The AJ also determined that Ms. Miller failed
to prove harmful error in the application of the Air Force’s
procedures, id. at 25–28, and that the Air Force’s removal
of Ms. Miller promoted the efficiency of the service, id. at
28–30.
Ms. Miller petitioned for review of the initial decision.
On December 18, 2024, the Board issued a Final Order af-
firming the initial decision except with respect to the deci-
sion’s analysis of Ms. Miller’s allegations regarding the Air
Force’s compliance with its own procedures in conducting
the security clearance investigation process, which the
Board vacated as outside the scope of the Board’s jurisdic-
tion. S. App. 8–10. The AJ’s initial decision, as supple-
mented by the Board’s Final Order, therefore became the
final decision of the Board. Id. at 11.
Ms. Miller timely appealed. We have jurisdiction un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
DISCUSSION
The scope of our review of an appeal from a Board de-
cision is limited by statute. We may set aside a Board de-
cision only if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) ob-
tained without procedures required by law, rule, or regula-
tion having been followed; or (3) unsupported by
substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We review the
Board’s legal determinations de novo and its underlying
factual findings for substantial-evidence support. Torres v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 88 F.4th 1379, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir.
2023). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 1383 (citation omitted).
The Board’s review of adverse actions stemming from
security clearance determinations is limited to
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MILLER v. AIR FORCE 5
determining (1) “whether a security clearance was denied,”
(2) “whether the security clearance was a requirement for
[the] appellant’s position,” and (3) “whether the procedures
set forth in [§] 7513 were followed.” Hornseth v. Dep’t of
the Navy, 916 F.3d 1369, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Hesse v. Dep’t of State, 217
F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
Ms. Miller’s primary argument before us is that her re-
moval was improper because the position from which she
was removed—GS-13 Career Field Administrator—did not
in fact require a Top-Secret or Secret security clearance
and instead was merely classified as noncritical sensitive.
Petitioner’s Br. 4–9.2 According to Ms. Miller, the position
description for that job did not require a security clearance,
and she never had access to classified information while
working in that position. Id. at 2–7. In other words, Ms.
Miller takes issue with the Board’s determination that a
“security clearance” was a requirement for her position as
Career Field Administrator because that position was clas-
sified as noncritical sensitive.
We have previously explained, however, that the
Board’s authority, and correspondingly, our authority, is
restricted not only with respect to challenges to determina-
tions pertaining to security clearances, but also with re-
spect to challenges to determinations pertaining to
positions classified as noncritical sensitive. Kaplan v. Co-
nyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1151, 1155–66 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (noting limitations on the Board’s review with re-
spect to “determinations concerning eligibility of an em-
ployee to occupy a ‘sensitive’ position, regardless of
whether the position requires access to classified infor-
mation”); see Brown v. Dep’t of Def., 646 F. App’x 989, 992
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In cases concerning the denial of
2 Our citations to Ms. Miller’s brief refer to the page
numbers generated by this court’s CM/ECF system.
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MILLER v. AIR FORCE 6
eligibility to occupy a sensitive position, our review is . . .
limited to determinations relating to whether an agency
properly followed its own internal procedures.”).
Ms. Miller was removed from her position as a Career
Field Administrator at Randolph AFB. S. App. 21; S. App.
108. In its final decision, the Board found that that posi-
tion was classified as noncritical sensitive and that Ms.
Miller’s eligibility to occupy a noncritical-sensitive position
had been revoked. S. App. 21–22 (citing S. App. 241, 246).
The Board also determined that Ms. Miller had been af-
forded the appropriate procedural protections. Id. at 24.
We see no error in the Board’s determinations, which are
supported by substantial evidence. To the extent Ms. Mil-
ler challenges the Air Force’s classification of the Career
Field Administrator position as noncritical sensitive or the
DoD’s determination concerning her eligibility to occupy a
noncritical-sensitive position, we lack the authority to re-
view such challenges. See Kaplan, 733 F.3d at 1151, 1160.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Ms. Miller’s other arguments and
find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
firm the Board’s final decision.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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