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25-1398•Theresa Garner v. United States
25-1398Court of Appeals for the Federal CircuitDec 9, 2025
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
THERESA GARNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2025-1398
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
Claims in No. 1:24-cv-00795-PSH, Judge Philip S. Hadji.
______________________
Decided: December 9, 2025
______________________
THERESA GARNER, Detroit, MI, pro se.
TARA K. HOGAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE.
______________________
Before DYK, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Case: 25-1398 Document: 36 Page: 1 Filed: 12/09/2025
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GARNER v. US 2
Theresa Garner appeals the decision of the Court of
Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) dismissing her com-
plaint. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Garner is a former federal employee who, at vari-
ous times, worked for the Department of Commerce
(“Commerce”), the Department of Labor (“Labor”), and the
Department of Defense (“Defense”). For a period of time,
she worked as a dual appointee at both Commerce and
Labor. In litigation settlement agreements with Com-
merce and Labor, Ms. Garner agreed to drop certain
employment-related claims and voluntarily resign in
exchange for a settlement payment and promises that the
agencies would provide neutral references and, in the case
of the Labor agreement, that Labor would make certain
corrections to her personnel files. She later worked for
Defense before being granted disability retirement in the
form of an annuity.
In this case, Ms. Garner’s amended complaint alleged
four enumerated counts related to her retirement benefits
and additional claims generally related to the settlement
agreements. The government moved to dismiss. The
government argued that the Claims Court lacked jurisdic-
tion over the four enumerated counts in the amended
complaint and that Ms. Garner had failed to state a claim
as to the settlement contract claims. The Claims Court
granted the motion and entered judgment accordingly.
Ms. Garner appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
Ms. Garner argues that the Claims Court erred in
granting the government’s motion to dismiss. We review
de novo the Claims Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.
Roman v. United States, 61 F.4th 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
Case: 25-1398 Document: 36 Page: 2 Filed: 12/09/2025
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GARNER v. US 3
2023); Turping v. United States, 913 F.3d 1060, 1064
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
I. THE ENUMERATED COUNTS
Ms. Garner argues that the Claims Court erred in
dismissing her enumerated counts for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. In Count 1, Ms. Garner alleged that
her annuity was improperly calculated based on an incor-
rect date of her last paycheck, resulting in $7,054.58 in
damages. In Count 2, she alleged that her annuity was
improperly calculated based on a failure to properly credit
her work history as a dual appointee at Commerce and
Labor, resulting in $88,146.80 in damages. In Count 3,
she alleged that health benefits were deducted from her
paycheck, but that she did not receive health benefits
coverage, resulting in damages of $5,897.88. And in
Count 4, she alleged that the government failed to provide
disability compensation for a hip fracture she sustained
while working, resulting in damages of $292,345.34.
Counts 1 and 2 are both directed to the calculation of
Ms. Garner’s retirement annuity. The Claims Court
correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over
Counts 1 and 2. The Office of Personnel Management
(“OPM”) has exclusive authority to “adjudicate all claims”
related to the Federal Employee Retirement System, such
as claims regarding an improper calculation of annuity.
5 U.S.C. § 8461(c). Decisions of OPM may only be ap-
pealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the
“Board”). 5 U.S.C. §§ 8347(d), 8461(d). We have consist-
ently held that OPM’s authority and the Board’s corre-
sponding appellate authority are exclusive and the Claims
Court lacks jurisdiction over such claims. See El
v. United States, 730 F. App’x 928, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(citing Lindahl v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 773–
75 (1985)); Stekelman v. United States, 752 F. App’x 1008,
1010–11 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Pueschel v. United
States, 297 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Court
Case: 25-1398 Document: 36 Page: 3 Filed: 12/09/2025
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GARNER v. US 4
of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over a case
that could be heard by the MSPB.”).
Count 3 alleges entitlement to repayment of
Ms. Garner’s healthcare premiums. To establish jurisdic-
tion in the Claims Court, a plaintiff must identify a
money-mandating source of law for the asserted claims,
that is, a “source of law that ‘can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for
the damage sustained.’” Dinh v. United States, 145 F.4th
1316, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (quoting United States
v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472
(2003)). We agree with the Claims Court that the sources
of law identified in Ms. Garner’s amended complaint—
5 U.S.C. §§ 5596 (authorizing “[b]ack pay due to unjusti-
fied personnel action”), 8342(a) (addressing entitlement to
“[l]ump-sum benefits” due to separation from service or
transfer) and 13 U.S.C. § 23(b) (allowing the Secretary of
Commerce to establish temporary positions for
“[a]dditional officers and employees”)—are not sources of
law that compel the government to refund the healthcare
premiums. The Claims Court correctly determined that it
lacked jurisdiction over Count 3.
Count 4 alleges entitlement to compensation for an in-
jury Ms. Garner alleges she incurred while working,
relying on the Federal Employment Compensation Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 8103, 8105. However, Congress vested the
power to “decide all questions” related to this statutory
scheme in the Secretary of Labor, 5 U.S.C. § 8145, and
foreclosed judicial review of the Secretary’s decisions,
5 U.S.C. § 8128(b). Therefore, this statute cannot provide
a basis for the Claims Court’s jurisdiction, and the Claims
Court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over
Count 4.
II. THE CONTRACT CLAIMS
Ms. Garner also alleged claims arising from alleged
breaches of the settlement agreements, specifically that
Case: 25-1398 Document: 36 Page: 4 Filed: 12/09/2025
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GARNER v. US 5
“Defendant is in breach of settlement contract” because
her former employers improperly modified her employ-
ment record and provided negative references and em-
ployment documents to others, including OPM, contrary
to the terms of the settlement agreements. S. App’x 51–
52, 54–57.1 The interpretation of a contract is a question
of law that we review de novo. Turping, 913 F.3d at 1064.
First, the amended complaint alleges that the gov-
ernment breached the settlement agreements’ provisions
requiring the agencies to provide neutral references to
“prospective employers.” S. App’x 24–25, 34. The Claims
Court correctly concluded that the allegations do not
correspond with the actual language of the settlement
agreements. The settlement agreements provide that
Ms. Garner will direct prospective employers to particular
contacts at the agencies, who will then provide only
neutral references. The amended complaint does not
allege that Ms. Garner directed any employer to the
specified contacts, or that upon doing so, any employer
received a nonneutral reference. It also does not allege
that any prospective employers were provided with a
nonneutral reference. Therefore, even with all factual
allegations made in the complaint assumed to be true,
Ms. Garner has not stated a claim for breach of contract
that would entitle her to damages under this theory.
Next, Ms. Garner asserts the Claims Court improper-
ly dismissed her amended complaint insofar as it alleged
that Commerce and Labor did not comply with the set-
tlement agreements’ requirements to modify Ms. Garner’s
personnel file as agreed. However, Ms. Garner does not
identify any provision in the Commerce settlement
agreement that this alleged conduct breached. While she
identifies a provision of the Labor settlement agreement
1 Citations to “S. App’x” refer to the Supplemental
Appendix filed by the government. Dkt. No. 21.
Case: 25-1398 Document: 36 Page: 5 Filed: 12/09/2025
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GARNER v. US 6
requiring that agency to correct her separation docu-
ments, she does not allege any monetary damages associ-
ated with that alleged breach.
To the extent that Ms. Garner is asserting a claim
purely for injunctive relief, the Claims Court lacks juris-
diction over a claim for injunctive relief that is not “inci-
dent of or collateral to” a money judgment. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(2). The Claims Court therefore did not err in
concluding that Ms. Garner’s amended complaint failed to
sufficiently state a contract claim that entitled her to
relief.
We have considered Ms. Garner’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 25-1398 Document: 36 Page: 6 Filed: 12/09/2025
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