Woodway USA, Inc. v. Lifecore Fitness, Inc., Dba Assault Fitness

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
WOODWAY USA, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
LIFECORE FITNESS, INC., DBA ASSAULT
FITNESS,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2025-1431
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California in No. 3:22-cv-00492-JO-
BLM, Judge Jinsook Ohta.
______________________
Decided: July 21, 2026
______________________
K ADIE M. J ELENCHICK , Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwau-
kee, WI, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented
by D ANIEL F LAHERTY , Chicago, IL.
J OHN M. HALAN, Brooks Kushman PC, Royal Oak, MI,
argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by J OHN
S. L EROY , ANDREW B. T URNER.
______________________
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 2
Before L OURIE, H UGHES , and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
HUGHES , Circuit Judge.
Appellant Woodway USA, Inc. appeals the final judg-
ment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California granting summary judgment of non-
infringement in favor of Appellee LifeCORE Fitness, Inc.
Because the district court’s grant of judgment relied on an
overly restrictive claim construction, we vacate and re-
mand for further proceedings.
I
A
Woodway USA, Inc. (Woodway) is the owner of U.S. Pa-
tent Nos. 9,039,580; 10,561,884; and 10,799,745 (collec-
tively, the Asserted Patents), which share substantially
overlapping specifications and a common parent applica-
tion. These patents are generally directed to manual tread-
mills with a curved or contoured running surface, an
exemplary embodiment of which is shown below:
’580 Patent fig. 1.
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 3
While the treadmills disclosed in the Asserted Patents
are generally designed for the running belt to rotate rear-
ward, the Asserted Patents also recognize that “the run-
ning belt is capable of rotating forward,” which can pose
safety hazards. See, e.g., id. 26:65–27:1. For instance, when
a user mounts the treadmill by placing their weight-bear-
ing foot toward the rear portion of the curved running sur-
face, the running belt can move forward, causing the user
to lose their footing. To address this issue, the Asserted Pa-
tents disclose several safety devices that can be used with
the treadmill “to help prevent undesirable forward rotation
of the running belt.” Id. 27:7–9. For example, one embodi-
ment features a one-way bearing assembly structured such
that, when the running belt is rotated rearward, the as-
sembly allows the running belt to freely rotate. See id.
27:41–47. When the belt is rotated forward, however, the
assembly “provides a counter force, preventing . . . the for-
ward rotation of the running belt.” See id. 27:48–58. The
Asserted Patents also list “cam locking systems . . . taper
locks, a user operated pin system, or a band brake system
with a lever” as means to “prevent undesirable forward ro-
tation of the running belt.” Id. 29:23–28.
In line with these disclosures, and as relevant to this
appeal, the Asserted Patents all require substantial pre-
vention of running belt movement in a second, dispreferred
direction while allowing free movement of the belt in a pre-
ferred first direction. For example, claim 25 of the ’580 pa-
tent recites:
25. A method, comprising:
providing a manually powered treadmill, the
manually powered treadmill having a
frame with a front end and rear end;
providing a first bearing rail and a second bear-
ing rail, the first and second bearing rails
each comprising a plurality of bearings and
extending longitudinally on the frame,
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 4
wherein the first and second bearing rails
define a curved top profile;
disposing a running belt on the plurality of
bearings of the first bearing rail and the
second bearing rail such that the running
belt follows a top curved running surface
corresponding to the curved top profile of
the first and second bearing rails;
permitting movement of the running belt in a
first direction; and
substantially preventing movement of the run-
ning belt in a second direction opposite the
first direction.
Id. 36:1–18 (emphasis added).
B
In April 2022, Woodway filed suit against LifeCORE
Fitness, doing business as Assault Fitness (LifeCORE), al-
leging that certain manual treadmills offered by LifeCORE
infringed the Asserted Patents. The parties then engaged
in claim construction, with a Markman hearing taking
place in April 2023. During claim construction, Woodway
argued that, regarding the “substantially prevent[ ]” limi-
tation, “substantially” should be given its plain and ordi-
nary meaning of “entirely/largely/mostly/generally though
not necessarily entirely,” and “prevent[ ]” need not be con-
strued. J.A. 671. LifeCORE, meanwhile, argued that “sub-
stantially prevent[ ]” ought to be construed as “prevent any
movement after allowing no or minimal movement.”
J.A. 671.
In November 2023, the district court issued its claim
construction order, ultimately siding with neither party.
Instead, the district court construed the limitation to mean
“restricts rotation to allow for only one rotational direction
of movement.” Woodway USA, Inc. v. LifeCore Fitness Inc.,
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 5
No. 22-cv-00492, 2023 WL 7713595, at *8 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 14, 2023) (Claim Construction Order). The district
court rejected Woodway’s proposed construction because it
found that Woodway had clearly and unmistakably surren-
dered an invention allowing bidirectional movement of the
treadmill belt during prosecution of the ’884 patent when
it distinguished two prior art references, Bostic1 and Savet-
tiere.2 However, the district court also rejected LifeCORE’s
proposed construction because Woodway had made no
statements during prosecution “about the degree of possi-
ble movement in the second rotational direction (the possi-
bility of an initial swing back of the treadmill) before the
safety device function locks in to allow for movement in one
direction.” Id. at *8. Finally, the district court found its con-
struction supported by the Asserted Patents’ specifications,
which generally discuss enabling rotation in only one pre-
ferred direction.
After engaging in expert discovery, the parties cross-
moved for summary judgment. At a January 2025 hearing,
the district court announced its intent to grant summary
judgment of noninfringement for LifeCORE because it con-
strued “substantially prevent[ ]” to require that the
claimed running belt moves only in one direction, and the
running belts of the accused products rotate bidirection-
ally. See J.A. 5474–75. Later that month, the district court
granted LifeCORE’s motion for summary judgment in an
oral opinion. The court concluded that judgment was war-
ranted because “defendants have introduced evidence
showing that the accused products’ running belts can ro-
tate fully in two directions under normal conditions.”
J.A. 43.
1 U.S. Patent No. 5,492,517.
2 U.S. Patent Application Publication
No. 2005/0009668.
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 6
The district court then entered final judgment for
LifeCORE. Woodway appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
II
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment according to the law of the regional circuit, here the
Ninth Circuit, where summary judgment is reviewed de
novo.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d
1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). In the Ninth
Circuit, summary judgment is appropriate “when, drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,
there are no genuine issues of material fact.” Contour IP
Holding LLC v. GoPro, Inc., 113 F.4th 1373, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2024). “We apply Federal Circuit law to substan-
tive questions of patent law, including claim construction.”
NexStep, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 119 F.4th
1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
“We review claim constructions based solely on the in-
trinsic record, as here, de novo.” Rembrandt Wireless
Techs., LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 853 F.3d 1370, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2017). Generally, claim terms are “given their
plain and ordinary meanings to one of skill in the art when
read in the context of the specification and prosecution his-
tory.” Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758 F.3d
1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014). One exception to this general
rule is the doctrine of prosecution history disclaimer, which
serves to limit the scope of claim terms “when the patentee
disavows the full scope of the claim term . . . during prose-
cution.” Id. (citation omitted). For disclaimer to attach, dis-
avowals must be “both clear and unmistakable.” Omega
Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2003). As a result, “where the alleged disavowal is ambig-
uous, or even amenable to multiple reasonable interpreta-
tions, we have declined to find prosecution disclaimer.”
Maquet Cardiovascular LLC v. Abiomed Inc., 131 F.4th
1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (cleaned up).
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 7
III
Woodway argues that: (1) the district court’s construc-
tion of “substantially prevent[ ]” as requiring complete pre-
vention of rotation in the dispreferred direction, and (2) the
district court’s subsequent grant of summary judgment
were erroneous. We address each argument in turn.
A
We begin with Woodway’s claim construction argu-
ments. Woodway argues that the district court erred in con-
struing the “substantially prevent[ ]” limitation by
deviating from its plain and ordinary meaning and finding
prosecution disclaimer of treadmill belt movement in a sec-
ond direction. We agree with both points.
i
Starting with the claim language, we conclude that the
district court overlooked intrinsic evidence when it rejected
Woodway’s suggested plain and ordinary meaning of “sub-
stantially prevent[ ].” The district court concluded that the
Asserted Patents “do not elaborate on the degree to which
the safety device impedes rotation of the belt in the second
direction.” Claim Construction Order, 2023 WL 7713595,
at *5. This, however, is untrue: the claim language broadly
specifies that rotation in the second, dispreferred direction
is “substantially” prevented. As Woodway points out, “[t]he
word ‘substantially’ is commonly used in patent claims and
readily understood as a term of approximation meaning,
for example, ‘largely but not wholly.’” Appellant Br. 29 (col-
lecting cases). We find this understanding consistent with
Woodway’s originally proposed plain and ordinary mean-
ing of “substantially prevent[ ]”—that is, “entirely/largely/
mostly/generally though not necessarily entirely” prevent.
J.A. 671. Were “substantially prevent[ ]” to be interpreted
otherwise, as it was by the district court, to encompass only
complete prevention of undesired rotation, the word “sub-
stantially” would be rendered meaningless, a result that
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 8
our case law disfavors. See Lashify, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 130 F.4th 948, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“[A] claim
construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the
claim is preferred over one that does not do so.” (citation
omitted)).
Further, nothing in the specifications of the Asserted
Patents alters our understanding of this plain meaning of
“substantially prevent[ ].” While LifeCORE is correct that
(1) the specifications of the Asserted Patents discuss safety
devices, such as a one-way bearing assembly, that permit
rotation in only one direction, and (2) the specifications
generally disparage forward rotation of the safety belt, we
are not convinced that these facts alone limit the claim
term’s plain and ordinary meaning. For one, several em-
bodiments discussed in the specification mention no safety
device. See, e.g., ’580 Patent 2:63–3:34. And when such
safety devices are mentioned, nothing indicates that the
prevention of dispreferred rotation must be total: instead,
language like “help prevent undesirable forward rotation”
appears alongside language like “permit rotation . . . in
only one direction” and “prevent[ ] . . . forward rotation.”
Id. 27:8, 12–14, 50–52. Such phrases either explicitly indi-
cate that the prevention is not expected to be complete or
do not specify the extent to which rotation is prevented in
the dispreferred direction. In any event, no phrasing in the
Asserted Patents’ specifications is inconsistent with the
plain and ordinary meaning of “substantially prevent[ ]”
suggested by Woodway. Under these circumstances, we de-
cline to find “words or expressions of manifest exclusion or
restriction” in the Asserted Patents’ specifications that
limit the plain and ordinary meaning of the “substantially
prevent[ ]” limitation. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad,
Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 9
ii
The district court nonetheless rejected Woodway’s pro-
posed construction of the “substantially prevent[ ]” limita-
tion because it found that Woodway clearly and
unmistakably disclaimed any bidirectional rotation at least
twice during the prosecution of the ’884 patent. This, too,
was error.
a
The district court first found that, in seeking to over-
come an obviousness rejection based on Bostic, Woodway
made claim amendments and presented arguments to the
examiner disclaiming bidirectional rotation of the tread-
mill belt. Bostic also discloses a manual treadmill, but in
Bostic, the front portion of the treadmill consists of a fly-
wheel that is connected to the front shaft and in contact
with a drag or resistance strap that controls the intensity
of the user’s workout. Inside Bostic’s flywheel is a one-way
clutch that allows free movement in one direction but pre-
cludes rotation of the flywheel in the opposite direction.
The examiner’s rejection thus noted that Bostic taught “a
safety device” that, as Woodway’s original claim language
required, was “structured to restrict movement of at least
one of the running belt, the front shaft, and the rear shaft.”
See J.A. 726 (emphasis added).
Contrary to the district court’s conclusions and LifeC-
ORE’s arguments on appeal, we do not believe that either
subsequent amendment or arguments based on this rejec-
tion effected a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of claim
scope. First, turning to the alleged amendment-based dis-
claimer, Woodway amended the above claim language to
instead specify that the safety device “substantially pre-
vents rotation of the portion of the safety device, the run-
ning belt and . . . at least one of the front shaft and the rear
shaft.” J.A. 736 (emphasis added). In context, this amend-
ment does not, as the district court concluded, “clarify that
the running belt does not move in two directions.” Claim
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 10
Construction Order, 2023 WL 7713595, at *6. Rather,
through this amendment, Woodway called attention to a
broader difference between its claimed invention and Bos-
tic: in Bostic, while “[t]he one-way clutch does not affect
movement of the treadmill surface” because it only affects
rotation of the flywheel, in the claimed invention, the
safety device impacts rotation of multiple treadmill ele-
ments, including the running belt. J.A. 750–51. Based on
this objectively discernable reason for the amendment, we
cannot say that “the alleged disavowing action[ ] . . . both
clear[ly] and unmistakabl[y]” surrendered a treadmill with
a bidirectionally rotating belt. See Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d
at 1326.
Similar logic counsels against finding disclaimer
grounded in Woodway’s arguments on Bostic presented to
the examiner. As LifeCORE points out, Woodway distin-
guished their invention from Bostic in two places: (1) when
Woodway stated that “the one-way clutch of Bostic does not
provide for rotation in only one direction. . . . [T]he tread-
mill belt of Bostic is free to move in both directions,”
J.A. 749, and (2) when Woodway stated separately that
“the treadmill belt [of Bostic] is free to move in both direc-
tions,” J.A. 752. Again, the issue for LifeCORE is that nei-
ther statement unmistakably disclaims bidirectional
rotation of the running belt. Rather, in the context of Wood-
way’s repeated statements that Bostic’s safety device does
not affect treadmill belt movement, see J.A. 751–52, the
first statement can be reasonably interpreted to merely re-
inforce this distinction between Bostic and the claimed in-
vention, which restricts the treadmill belt such that it is
not “free to move” in both directions. And, as Woodway ar-
gues, saying that Bostic’s belt is “free to move” in both di-
rections says nothing about the amount of limitation the
claimed treadmill places on the dispreferred direction of
movement—it simply distinguishes a device that impedes
movement in one direction from a device that does not. See
Appellant Br. 37. We therefore find no prosecution history
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 11
disclaimer resulting from Woodway’s arguments on Bostic.
See Genuine Enabling Tech. LLC v. Nintendo Co., 29 F.4th
1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“If the challenged statements
are . . . amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations,
prosecution disclaimer is not established.”).
b
The district court also found that Woodway disclaimed
bidirectional treadmill movement in response to an obvi-
ousness rejection based on a combination of prior art in-
cluding Savettiere. Savettiere discloses a combination
elliptical-treadmill apparatus that contains a one-way
clutch inside rollers attached to the elliptical pedals and
disposed atop the treadmill belt. The examiner’s rejection
therefore concluded that “[i]t would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art . . . to modify the device
taught by Bostic by providing the safety mechanism taught
by Savettiere in order to prevent accidental reverse move-
ment of the belt.” J.A. 1218.
To distinguish Savettiere, Woodway argued the exam-
iner misunderstood Savettiere’s disclosure and that, in
Savettiere, “the one-way clutch does not control the direc-
tion of rotation of the treadmill belt.” J.A. 1141. Instead,
per Woodway, the one-way clutch of Savettiere allows the
rollers to freely roll relative to the treadmill belt when op-
erated in one direction but in the other direction locks the
rollers such that they frictionally engage the treadmill belt
and cause the belt to move rearward. Thus, Woodway con-
cluded, the alleged safety device of Savettiere did not “con-
trol a rotational movement direction of the treadmill belt
as a ‘safety device.’” J.A 1142. Woodway also added that
Savettiere’s one-way clutch “does not teach enabling or al-
lowing only one rotational direction of movement” because
“[a]t no point are the rollers . . . used to restrict rotation of
the treadmill belt . . . to move in only one rotational direc-
tional [sic].” J.A. 1142. Based on these arguments, the dis-
trict court found that Woodway “emphasized that its
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 12
patents featured a running belt that moved in one rota-
tional direction only.” Claim Construction Order, 2023 WL
7713595, at *8.
We are unpersuaded. Once again, the district court
failed to consider the full context within which Woodway’s
statements were made. This context makes clear that
Woodway distinguished Savettiere on the basis that it “did
not disclose a safety device [restricting treadmill belt move-
ment] at all,” but rather a clutch that impacts the move-
ment of rollers disposed atop the treadmill belt, which in
turn facilitate intended belt movement. See Appellant
Br. 38–39. And again, “enabling or allowing only one rota-
tional direction of movement” does not necessarily suggest
total prevention of rotation in the dispreferred direction.
Even Woodway’s use of the phrase “restrict . . . to move in
only one rotational directional [sic],” is ambiguous because
it does not specify whether the restriction of movement in
the dispreferred direction is absolute. J.A. 1142. Because
we again note “multiple reasonable interpretations” of the
prosecution history, we decline to find that Woodway
clearly and unmistakably disclaimed a treadmill capable of
bidirectional belt movement. Genuine Enabling Tech.,
29 F.4th at 1374.
In sum, we conclude that the district court erred in its
construction of “substantially prevent[ ]” that relied on
prosecution disclaimer to narrow the scope of the claim lim-
itation. The district court should have construed the claim
term in line with its plain and ordinary meaning, as iden-
tified by Woodway.
B
We next consider Woodway’s summary judgment argu-
ments. Woodway first argues that, under the plain and or-
dinary meaning of “substantially prevent [ ] ,” there is no
dispute that LifeCORE’s accused products infringe. Sec-
ond, Woodway argues that summary judgment must be va-
cated because the district court’s infringement analysis
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WOODWAY USA, INC. v. LIFECORE FITNESS, INC. 13
either relied on a flawed claim construction or resolved fac-
tual disputes regarding the amount of force needed to op-
erate the accused products in the dispreferred forward
direction. While we take no position here on Woodway’s
first argument, we partially agree with the second. Be-
cause the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement
was derived from an erroneous claim construction, we va-
cate the district court’s decision and remand for further
proceedings in light of the correct claim construction.
IV
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment of
noninfringement and remand for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
COSTS
Costs to Appellant.
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