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26-1028•Seth A. Hooper v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs
26-1028Court of Appeals for the Federal CircuitMar 16, 2026
N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
SETH A. HOOPER,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2026-1028
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 25-358, Judge Grant Jaquith.
______________________
Decided: March 16, 2026
______________________
SETH A. HOOPER, Ocean, NJ, pro se.
ERIC P. BRUSKIN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
P ATRICIA M. MC CARTHY , BRETT A. SHUMATE.
______________________
Before REYNA, HUGHES , and CUNNINGHAM , Circuit
Judges.
Case: 26-1028 Document: 38 Page: 1 Filed: 03/16/2026
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 2
P ER CURIAM .
Seth Hooper appeals pro se from a decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Vet-
erans Court”), affirming the decision of the Board of Veter-
ans’ Appeals (“Board”) denying Mr. Hooper earlier effective
dates for his service-connected disability compensation for
PTSD, migraines, and a combined disability rating of
100%. Hooper v. Collins, No. 25-0358, 2025 WL 2484992,
at *1 (Vet. App. Aug. 29, 2025) (“Decision”). For the rea-
sons below, we affirm-in-part and dismiss-in-part.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Hooper served on multiple active-duty tours in the
U.S. military between 2000 and 2011. See Decision at *1;
see also Hooper v. McDonough, No. 2024-1262, 2024 WL
2064606, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 2024). Mr. Hooper filed claims for
disability benefits in April 2006 for bilateral tinnitus and
bilateral impaired hearing. Decision at *2; see also
S. App’x 35; App’x 180.1 Mr. Hooper was evaluated by a
Veterans Affairs (“VA”) examiner in May 2006 for his
claims, where he also discussed his knee and dental con-
cerns. Decision at *2. In October 2007, a VA regional office
(“RO”) granted Mr. Hooper service connection for left ear
hearing loss and left knee patellofemoral syndrome
(“PFS”). Decision at *2; see also App’x 174–83.
Between January 2019 and February 2020, Mr. Hooper
sought and was granted compensation in RO decisions for
other conditions relevant to this appeal: (1) PTSD,
App’x 110–13; (2) migraines, App’x 131–36; and (3) trau-
matic brain injury (“TBI”), App’x 104–08. See Decision
1 We refer to the supplemental appendix filed by the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs as “S. App’x,” ECF No. 28,
and the appendix filed by Mr. Hooper as an attachment to
his reply brief as “App’x,” ECF No. 31.
Case: 26-1028 Document: 38 Page: 2 Filed: 03/16/2026
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 3
at *2–3. Mr. Hooper was awarded a combined disability
rating of 100% effective July 15, 2019. See S. App’x 42.
In May 2024, Mr. Hooper moved for reconsideration,
arguing that the VA made five clear and unmistakable er-
rors (“CUE”), including failing to notify Mr. Hooper of his
100% Combined Disability Rating award related to the
January 21, 2020, rating decision and four errors in not as-
signing an effective date of August 24, 2005, to
Mr. Hooper’s disability ratings for TBI, for migraines, for
PTSD, and for a 100% combined disability rating.
App’x 56; Decision at *3. On July 12, 2024, the RO denied
all CUE grounds except for the TBI CUE claim, which it
did not address. See S. App’x 82–87 (the “2024 RO CUE
Decision”); Decision at *3 & n.3. In July 2024, Mr. Hooper
filed a Notice of Disagreement with the RO decision, as-
serting the same five CUE claims. Decision at *3;
S. App’x 99.
The Board denied all of Mr. Hooper’s claims in the ap-
peal of the 2024 RO CUE decision, indicating that it lacked
jurisdiction over the TBI claim because it was not covered
in the 2024 RO CUE Decision. See S. App’x 13–24; id.
at 15. Mr. Hooper appealed to the Veterans Court, which
affirmed the Board’s decision denying Mr. Hooper’s claims
for earlier effective dates for migraine, PTSD, or a 100%
disability rating. Decision at *5–8. The Board’s decision
further explained that the TBI issue was subject to “a sep-
arate claim stream”2 and part of a different appeal to the
2 On February 13, 2020, Mr. Hooper filed a separate
Notice of Disagreement, alleging the January 2020 RO de-
cision (the “2020 RO Decision”) should have provided an
effective date of August 24, 2005, for Mr. Hooper’s TBI dis-
ability claim. See S. App’x 92. In the appeals that followed,
the Veterans Court remanded to the Board to further ana-
lyze Mr. Hooper’s TBI claim, and we dismissed
Mr. Hooper’s appeal of that Veterans Court decision for
lack of jurisdiction. Hooper v. McDonough, 2024 WL
Case: 26-1028 Document: 38 Page: 3 Filed: 03/16/2026
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 4
Veterans Court. Decision at *4. Mr. Hooper then appealed
to this court. S. App’x 29.
II. D ISCUSSION
“This court’s jurisdiction to review decisions by the Vet-
erans Court is limited.” Wanless v. Shinseki, 618 F.3d
1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We “have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to review and decide any challenge to the validity of
any statute or regulation or any interpretation
thereof . . . and to interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, to the extent presented and necessary to a deci-
sion.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c); Wanless, 618 F.3d at 1336.
However, absent a constitutional issue, we lack jurisdiction
to “review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or
(B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts
of a particular case.” § 7292(d)(2). “In other words, while
we can review questions of law, we cannot review applica-
tions of law to fact.” Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
As an initial matter, Mr. Hooper’s appeal here arises
out of the 2024 RO CUE Decision, which addressed his ser-
vice-connected PTSD, migraines, and combined 100% disa-
bility rating claims, but not his TBI claim. See Decision
at *4 & n.3. Because the TBI claim has been the subject of
a separate claim stream arising out of the separate 2020
2064606, at *1–2 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2024). On October 30,
2024, the RO denied Mr. Hooper’s claim for an earlier ef-
fective date for service connection for his TBI claim.
S. App’x 98. In May 2025, the Veterans Court again re-
manded the TBI effective date issue to the Board. Hooper
v. Collins, 2025 WL 1546948, at *5–6 (Vet. App. May 30,
2025). The Secretary indicates that Mr. Hooper has ap-
pealed the subsequent Board decision denying an earlier
effect date for his TBI claim, which was pending before the
Veterans Court as of December 2, 2025. See Secretary’s
Br. 15 n.2.
Case: 26-1028 Document: 38 Page: 4 Filed: 03/16/2026
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 5
RO Decision, we do not have jurisdiction to hear his appeal
with respect to his TBI benefits. Decision at *1 n.1; id.
at *4; S. App’x 15; Howard v. Gober, 220 F.3d 1341, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Board has not yet rendered a final
decision on the CUE claim . . . . Accordingly, the [Veterans
Court] correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
the CUE claim.”) (citing Ledford v. West, 136 F.3d 776, 779
(Fed. Cir 1998)). Thus, as part of this appeal, we lack ju-
risdiction to hear those issues in Mr. Hooper’s appeal chal-
lenging the treatment of his TBI claim, including his claim
that the VA violated his due process rights by providing
insufficient notice. See Appellant’s Br. 14–16. We proceed
to address below the issues in Mr. Hooper’s appeal regard-
ing his PTSD, migraines, and combined 100% disability
rating claims.
Mr. Hooper first argues that the Veterans Court failed
to apply 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) to his PTSD, migraines, and
combined 100% disability ratings claims. Appellant’s
Br. 5–6; Appellant’s Reply Br. 6–8. Section 3.156(c) re-
quires the VA to reconsider a claim if “at any time after VA
issues a decision on a claim, [ ] VA receives or associates
with the claims file relevant official service department
records that existed and had not been associated with the
claims file when VA first decided the claim.” 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.156(c) (emphasis added). Mr. Hooper contends that
38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) required the VA to conclude that his
claims for PTSD and migraines should receive an effective
date of August 24, 2005. Appellant’s Br. 6. However, the
Veterans Court held that section 3.156(c) was inapplicable
because “the Board plausibly found that the PTSD and mi-
graine claims were first submitted in 2019” and there was
no earlier decision on these claims to reconsider. Decision
at *7. To the extent that Mr. Hooper challenges the Veter-
ans Court’s conclusion that section 3.156(c) is inapplicable
when there is no prior decision to reconsider, the Veterans
Court’s legal interpretation is consistent with the language
of the regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (applying only “after
VA issues a decision on a claim”); see Blubaugh
Case: 26-1028 Document: 38 Page: 5 Filed: 03/16/2026
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 6
v. McDonald, 773 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (ex-
plaining that “[s]ection 3.156(c) only applies when VA re-
ceives official service department records that were
unavailable at the time that VA previously decided a claim
for benefits and those records lead VA to award a benefit
that was not granted in the previous decision.”) (quoting
New and Material Evidence, 70 Fed. Reg. 35,388, 35,388
(June 20, 2005)) (original emphasis removed and emphasis
added). We thus reject Mr. Hooper’s challenge to the Vet-
erans Court’s interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c).
Mr. Hooper next argues that the Veterans Court mis-
applied Shea v. Wilkie, 926 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019), spe-
cifically contending that 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2005)
required the VA to find that his April 2006 claim encom-
passed Mr. Hooper’s claims on appeal here. Appellant’s
Br. 6–8; Appellant’s Reply Br. 8–9. Specifically,
Mr. Hooper contends that a VA form he submitted in April
2006 cited a July 2005 demobilization exam supporting his
earlier effective date claims. Appellant’s Br. 7. However,
the Veterans Court did not ignore Shea but instead con-
cluded that the Board did not err in finding that
Mr. Hooper “did not submit the July 2005 demobilization
physical examination report,” and that “the Board’s finding
that neither migraines nor [PTSD] was reasonably encom-
passed within the expanded April 2006 claim is plausibly
supported by the evidence of record.” Decision at *5–6; see
id. at *5, *7 (describing Shea). We lack jurisdiction to re-
view this application of law to fact.
Third, Mr. Hooper argues that the Veterans Court vio-
lated a “duty to adjudicate all claims reasonably related to
that in-service injury,” citing a Veterans Court opinion,
DeLisio v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 45 (2011). Appellant’s
Br. 9–10; Appellant’s Reply Br. 9–10. However, no duty to
assist can arise if the VA does not “comprehend[]” the con-
dition on which the claim is based. Sellers v. Wilkie,
965 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020). As the Veterans
Court explained, Mr. Hooper’s argument—that the VA
should be required to sympathetically read any disabilities
Case: 26-1028 Document: 38 Page: 6 Filed: 03/16/2026
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 7
linked to the same service event—“conflicts with” our prec-
edent in Sellers, Decision at *6, which holds that the VA’s
duty to assist is “trigger[ed]” only by VA’s “receipt of a for-
mal claim that identifies the medical condition for which
benefits are sought,” Sellers, 965 F.3d at 1338.
Mr. Hooper’s proposed rule would undermine our holdings
that “a veteran’s formal claim is required to identify the
sickness, disease, or injuries for which compensation is
sought, at least at a high level of generality.” Id. (citing
Shea, 926 F.3d at 1362). Moreover, while Mr. Hooper al-
leges that the Veterans Court’s failure to apply DeLisio
“created constitutional violations of unlawful delay and
claim fragmentation,” Appellant’s Br. 20, delay due to re-
quiring a veteran to identify his injury does not violate the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Mansfield
v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Fourth, Mr. Hooper contends that both the Board and
the Veterans Court erred by substituting their “own medi-
cal judgment in place of uncontroverted medical evidence
and binding favorable findings,” in violation of 38 U.S.C.
§ 5104A. Appellant’s Br. 10–12; Appellant’s Reply Br. 10–
11. Mr. Hooper did not raise any such challenge before the
Veterans Court, so we lack jurisdiction to review it. See
Belcher v. West, 214 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[The
veteran’s] issue was not addressed by or presented to the
[Veterans Court]. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction
to consider it.”).
Fifth, Mr. Hooper argues that the Veterans Court
“acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of 38 U.S.C.
§ 7104(a) and § 7261(a)(3)(A) by affirming the VA’s incon-
sistent application of the CUE standard” to his claims be-
cause the VA eventually granted CUE on his tinnitus claim
but not on the other claims, such as migraines and PTSD,
that are the focus of this appeal. Appellant’s Br. 12–14;
Appellant’s Reply Br. 11–13. Mr. Hooper’s appeal here is
focused on the Veterans Court’s “application” of these stat-
utes to the facts of his case. Appellant’s Br. 12–14. While
Mr. Hooper invokes 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) and
Case: 26-1028 Document: 38 Page: 7 Filed: 03/16/2026
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 8
§ 7261(a)(3)(A), he does not meaningfully challenge the
Veterans Court’s limited interpretations of the statutes.
See Decision at *5, *7. To the extent Mr. Hooper suggests
the statutes together require the Veterans Court to “apply
the same standard consistently to similarly situated
claims,” that rule was not violated because the claims were
not similarly situated. Appellant’s Br. 13; cf. Serv.
Women’s Action Network v. Sec’y of Veterans Affs., 815 F.3d
1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“find[ing] the distinction be-
tween [military sexual trauma]-based PTSD and non-[mil-
itary sexual trauma]-based PTSD rational.”). Here,
because Mr. Hooper challenges the Veterans Court’s appli-
cation of the CUE rules to the facts of his claims and fails
to meaningfully challenge any statutory interpretation of
the Veterans Court, we lack jurisdiction over this challenge
by Mr. Hooper.
Finally, Mr. Hooper challenges the VA’s calculation of
his 100% combined disability rating and the assigned effec-
tive dates under 38 U.S.C. § 1155 and 38 C.F.R. § 4.25, Ap-
pellant’s Br. 18–19; Appellant’s Reply Br. 14–15. We do
not have jurisdiction to review this argument on appeal be-
cause “the factual findings of when a disability was claimed
or service connection established are not subject to our re-
view.” Butler v. Shinseki, 603 F.3d 922, 926 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Hooper’s remaining argu-
ments, including, but not limited to, the arguments raised
in his Memorandum in Lieu of Oral Argument, ECF
No. 36, and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we affirm-in-part and dismiss-in-part.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, DISMISSED-IN-PART
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 26-1028 Document: 38 Page: 8 Filed: 03/16/2026
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