Daniel James Lynn v. Department of Veterans Affairs

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
DANIEL JAMES LYNN,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent
______________________
2026-1095
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. SF-0714-17-0702-C-1.
______________________
Decided: July 16, 2026
______________________
D ANIEL J AMES L YNN, Curlew, WA, pro se.
N ELSON K UAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by S TEVEN
MICHAEL M AGER, P ATRICIA M. M CC ARTHY , BRETT
SHUMATE.
______________________
Before P ROST , CHEN, and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
Case: 26-1095 Document: 23 Page: 1 Filed: 07/16/2026

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LYNN v. DVA 2
P ER CURIAM .
Daniel Lynn, appearing pro se, petitions for review of
a final decision1 from the Merit Systems and Protection
Board (Board) denying Mr. Lynn’s petition for enforcement
of his settlement agreement (Agreement) with the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs (VA). Lynn v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affs., No. SF-0714-17-0702-C-1, 2025 WL 2170239
(M.S.P.B. July 21, 2025) (Decision) (SAppx 1–29).2 Be-
cause the Agreement unambiguously states that the settle-
ment payment must be paid to Mr. Lynn (and not his
designated representative), we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2017, the VA removed Mr. Lynn from his position of
Police Officer. Decision, 2025 WL 2170239, at 1. Mr. Lynn
subsequently sought Board review of his removal. In 2023,
Mr. Lynn and the VA executed a settlement agreement re-
solving the dispute underlying the Board proceedings. See
id. at 2; SAppx 34–37 (Agreement).
The Agreement “constitutes the entire understanding
between the Parties and fully supersedes any and all
prior . . . understandings pertaining to the subject matter.”
SAppx 35. The Agreement refers to Mr. Lynn as “Appel-
lant” and Section 2(1) requires the VA to pay “Appellant” a
lump sum settlement payment. Id. at 34. In turn,
Mr. Lynn agreed, among other things, that he would “not
be returned to his former position” at the VA. Id. at 35. To
1 The administrative judge issued an initial decision
that became final 35 days later. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113 (2024).
2 Because the electronic version of the Decision lacks
page numbers, we refer to the page numbers listed in the
Supplemental Appendix (SAppx) filed with the VA’s Cor-
rected Informal Brief. ECF No. 15.
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LYNN v. DVA 3
receive his settlement payment, Mr. Lynn also agreed in
Section 2(2) to:
provide the Agency with a completed VA Form
10091 and any necessary paperwork to complete
the vendorization process for payment within ten
(10) business days from the date on which the final
signature on the agreement, completed and signed
by Brook Beesley, appellant’s authorized repre-
sentative with the exception of those which are
marked OPTIONAL and Mr. Beesley need not com-
plete, if he chooses not to do so.
Id. at 34–35. Mr. Beesley is Mr. Lynn’s non-attorney rep-
resentative. Decision, 2025 WL 2170239, at 6.
The VA denied the payment request submitted by
Mr. Beesley because the form he submitted listed “BLB
Federal Labor Mgmt. Consulting” under
“PAYEE/VENDOR NAME” instead of Mr. Lynn. Id.; see
also SAppx 38. According to the VA, the Agreement re-
quired that Mr. Lynn be listed as the payee. See Decision,
2025 WL 2170239, at 5.
Mr. Lynn petitioned the Board for enforcement and ar-
gued that the VA materially breached the Agreement. See
id. at 22. The Board denied the petition, concluding that
the Agreement’s payment terms were unambiguous. Id. at
15. The Board explained that “Appellant,” when used in
the Agreement, refers to Mr. Lynn. Id. The Board also
found that Mr. Lynn materially breached the Agreement in
failing to provide Form 10091 with his own name as the
payee.3 Id. at 16–17.
3 Despite Mr. Lynn’s breach, the VA represented be-
low that it is prepared to pay the full amount directly to
Mr. Lynn once he provides a compliant Form 10091 listing
himself as payee. Decision, 2025 WL 2170239, at 21. In
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LYNN v. DVA 4
Mr. Lynn timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
D ISCUSSION
A settlement agreement is a contract, and its construc-
tion is a question of law we review de novo. Lutz v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 485 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted). “If a contract provision is clear and unambigu-
ous, the court may not resort to extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret it.” Premier Off. Complex of Parma, LLC v. United
States, 916 F.3d 1006, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citation omit-
ted). And when contract language is “unambiguous on its
face, our inquiry ends and the plain language of the Agree-
ment controls.” Id. at 1011–12 (citation omitted).
Mr. Lynn argues that the Agreement unambiguously
states that the payee of the settlement payment may be
Mr. Beesley. See Pet’r’s Informal Br. 8–9. In particular, he
argues that because Section 2(2) of the Agreement allows
Mr. Beesley to “complete[] and sign[]” the “vendorization
paperwork,” this unambiguously means that Mr. Beesley
may be listed as the payee on VA Form 10091. Id.
The Agreement here, however, lacks any statement to
that effect. In fact, it states the opposite. The Agreement
lists Mr. Lynn as the “Appellant.” SAppx 34. And Section
2(1) of the Agreement states that the VA “will pay Appel-
lant a lump sum.” Id. These provisions unambiguously
specify that the VA must pay Mr. Lynn the settlement pay-
ment. Even though the Agreement specifies that Mr. Bees-
ley will complete and sign the vendor paperwork, nothing
addition, the VA also “remains open” to executing an ad-
dendum to the Agreement to allow direct payment to
Mr. Beesley, but Mr. Lynn explained below that he was un-
willing to do that too. Id.
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LYNN v. DVA 5
in the Agreement indicates that the VA may pay the settle-
ment payment directly to Mr. Beesley or any entity other
than Mr. Lynn.
Mr. Lynn argues that we should consider extrinsic evi-
dence—a settlement agreement between the VA and a
third party—to interpret the disputed Agreement terms.
See Pet’r’s Informal Br. 9. We cannot consider extrinsic ev-
idence, however, to interpret or modify otherwise unambig-
uous contract language, even if it is relevant to a party’s
“course of dealing,” as Mr. Lynn suggests. See Barron
Bancshares, Inc. v. United States, 366 F.3d 1360, 1375–76
(Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Pet’r’s Informal Br. 9. We there-
fore agree with the Board’s interpretation of the Agree-
ment.
We are unconvinced by Mr. Lynn’s remaining argu-
ments. Mr. Lynn asserts that the Board improperly cred-
ited the VA’s post-hoc rationalizations for why it refused to
accept the form submitted by Mr. Beesley. Pet’r’s Informal
Br. 11. That argument is irrelevant to our analysis because
the Board found, and we agree, that the Agreement lan-
guage unambiguously resolves the parties’ dispute. Deci-
sion, 2025 WL 2170239, at 15. Likewise, Mr. Lynn’s
suggestion that the VA violated its duty of good faith and
fair dealing cannot prevail, see Pet’r’s Informal Br. 9, be-
cause the VA’s compliance with the unambiguous terms of
the Agreement cannot violate that duty. See Scott Timber
Co. v. United States, 692 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Lynn’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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