Joe Pena v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JOE PENA,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2026-1361
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 24-2579, Judge Margaret C. Bart-
ley.
______________________
Decided: June 11, 2026
______________________
J OE P ENA, San Antonio, TX, pro se.
MARTIN F. H OCKEY , J R., Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
P ATRICIA M. MCCARTHY , BRETT SHUMATE; CHRISTOPHER O.
ADELOYE, Y. K EN L EE , Office of General Counsel, United
States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
______________________
Case: 26-1361 Document: 19 Page: 1 Filed: 06/11/2026

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PENA v. COLLINS 2
Before REYNA, CHEN, and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
Joe Pena appeals from a decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (1) affirming a deci-
sion of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which denied enti-
tlement to a higher initial disability evaluation, and
(2) rejecting Mr. Pena’s other arguments, including his re-
quest to have the Veterans Court strike the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs’ response brief and enter judgment in his
favor. Because Mr. Pena’s challenges are outside the scope
of our jurisdiction, we dismiss.
BACKGROUND
The procedural history of the disability benefits claim
at issue is lengthy and involves multiple previous appeals
to the Board and the Veterans Court. Relevant to this ap-
peal, Mr. Pena appealed an April 2, 2024 Board decision
denying a higher disability rating to the Veterans Court.
On the day the Secretary’s response brief was due, the Sec-
retary moved for a 45-day extension of time based on cur-
rent deadlines and workload considerations. That same
day, the Clerk of the Court granted the Secretary’s motion.
However, Mr. Pena timely opposed the Secretary’s motion
three days later, and the Clerk subsequently revoked the
government’s extension of time and forwarded the motion
and opposition to the Veterans Court for consideration.
The Veterans Court granted the extension for good cause
shown, extending the Secretary’s deadline to November 4,
2024. Without the Chief Judge of the Veterans Court cer-
tifying an interlocutory order for appeal under 38 U.S.C.
§ 7292(b)(1), Mr. Pena appealed the Veterans Court’s order
granting the extension of time. We dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. Pena v. Collins, No. 2025-1092,
2025 WL 635448, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 2025).
After the case returned to the Veterans Court, the
court discovered that the Secretary had failed to file his re-
sponse. Because the Veterans Court did not stay the case
pending Mr. Pena’s appeal to this court, the Veterans
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PENA v. COLLINS 3
Court deemed the Secretary’s response overdue and or-
dered the Secretary to file his brief within ten days.
Mr. Pena sent the Veterans Court correspondence assert-
ing that the Secretary’s response was filed late and re-
questing that the Veterans Court enter judgment in
Mr. Pena’s favor. However, the Veterans Court deter-
mined that Mr. Pena’s correspondence did not comply with
the Veterans Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure and
did not clearly move the Veterans Court to reconsider, va-
cate, or modify the order for the Secretary to file his re-
sponse within ten days. The Secretary complied with the
order, and the Veterans Court subsequently affirmed the
Board’s decision on November 20, 2025. Pena v. Collins,
No. 24-2579, 2025 WL 3471313, at *3–4 (Vet. App.
Nov. 20, 2025).
Mr. Pena appeals.
D ISCUSSION
The scope of our review in an appeal from a Veterans
Court decision is limited. Wanless v. Shinseki, 618 F.3d
1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We “have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to review and decide any challenge to the validity of
any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof . . .
and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to
the extent presented and necessary to a decision.”
38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). However, absent a constitutional is-
sue, we lack jurisdiction to “review (A) a challenge to a fac-
tual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation
as applied to the facts of a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2).
We lack jurisdiction over Mr. Pena’s appeal because he
fails to challenge any particular aspect of the Veterans
Court’s decision based on the validity or interpretation of
any statute or regulation. Instead, Mr. Pena asserts that
the Veterans Court acted contrary to its own Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure and 38 U.S.C. § 7261 in allowing the
Secretary an additional ten days to file his response rather
than immediately entering judgment in Mr. Pena’s favor.
Appellant’s Inf. Br. 1–2. In addition, Mr. Pena appears to
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PENA v. COLLINS 4
re-argue his underlying claim that there is clear and un-
mistakable error in earlier rating decisions but fails to
point to any legal errors with respect to the relevant deci-
sion by the Veterans Court. Appellant’s Inf. Br. 3.
Mr. Pena’s arguments, ultimately, relate to the Veterans
Court’s discretion in enforcing procedure and “disagree-
ments with how the facts were weighed or how the law was
applied to the facts in this particular case, which we do not
have jurisdiction to review.” Guillory v. Shinseki, 669 F.3d
1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2));
see Checo v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(recognizing “the Veterans Court[’s] broad discretion to
prescribe, interpret, and apply its own rules”). As Mr. Pena
fails to allege any issues of statutory or regulatory inter-
pretation, we lack jurisdiction over his appeal.
Although Mr. Pena also appears to argue that the Vet-
erans Court decided a constitutional issue, Appellant’s Inf.
Br. 2, “he has simply put a ‘due process’ label on his con-
tention” such that “his claim is constitutional in name
only.” Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Therefore, Mr. Pena’s unsupported allegations are insuffi-
cient to raise a non-frivolous constitutional issue, and we
lack jurisdiction. Id. (“[The] characterization of [a] ques-
tion as constitutional in nature does not confer upon [this
court] jurisdiction that we otherwise lack.”).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Pena’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we dismiss
Mr. Pena’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
DISMISSED
COSTS
No costs.
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