United States v. Moore 1 In the

16‐1604 (L)
United States v. Moore
1
In the 2
United States Court of Appeals 3
For the Second Circuit 4
________ 5
6
A UGUST TERM , 2017 7
8
S UBMITTED: MARCH 27, 2018 9
D ECIDED: F EBRUARY 25, 2019 10
11
No. 16‐1604 (L), No. 16‐1624 (con) 12
13
U NITED S TATES OF AMERICA, 14
Appellee, 15
16
v. 17
18
C ALVIN S TEPHON MOORE , 19
Defendant‐Appellant. 20
________ 21
22
Appeal from the United States District Court 23
for the Northern District of New York. 24
No. 1:15‐cr‐27‐1 – Thomas J. McAvoy, District Judge. 25
________ 26
27
Before: K ATZMANN, Chief Judge, WALKER and POOLER , Circuit Judges. 28
________ 29
30
Defendant‐Appellant Calvin Stephon Moore appeals his 31
sentence following a guilty plea to three counts of federal bank 32
robbery in the United States District Court for Northern District of 33

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2 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Judge). Moore received three 1
concurrent 135‐month terms of imprisonment. 2
On appeal, Moore argues that the district court erred in 3
determining that he was subject to a sentencing enhancement as a 4
career offender under the 2015 version of the Career Offender 5
Guidelines of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, §§ 4B1.1–2. He 6
argues that neither federal bank robbery nor New York robbery in the 7
third degree are crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. 8
Rejecting Moore’s arguments, we AFFIRM. 9
________ 10
Grant C. Jaquith, United States Attorney for the 11
Northern District of New York (Michael S. Barnett 12
and Steven D. Clymer, Assistant United States 13
Attorneys, on the brief), Syracuse, NY, for Appellee. 14
15
Lisa A. Pebbles, Federal Public Defender for the 16
Northern District of New York (Molly Corbett and 17
James P. Egan, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, 18
on the brief), Albany, NY, for Defendant‐Appellant. 19
________ 20
JOHN M. WALKER , JR ., Circuit Judge: 21
Defendant‐Appellant Calvin Stephon Moore appeals his 22
sentence following a guilty plea to three counts of federal bank 23
robbery in the United States District Court for Northern District of 24
New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Judge). Moore received three 25
concurrent 135‐month terms of imprisonment. 26

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3 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
On appeal, Moore argues that the district court erred in 1
determining that he was subject to a sentencing enhancement as a 2
career offender under the 2015 version of the Career Offender 3
Guidelines of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, §§ 4B1.1–2. He 4
argues that neither federal bank robbery nor New York robbery in the 5
third degree are crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. 6
Rejecting Moore’s arguments, we AFFIRM. 7
BACKGROUND 8
In October 2015, Moore pled guilty to committing the following 9
three counts of robbery of federally insured banks in late 2014. On 10
November 17, 2014, Moore and an accomplice robbed a branch of 11
KeyBank in Schenectady, New York. During the robbery, Moore said, 12
“[T]his is a hold up give me money.” App’x at 37. Moore’s 13
accomplice was arrested and told the police that Moore threatened 14
the teller by stating he had a gun. On November 18, 2014, Moore 15
robbed a branch of Adirondack Bank in Utica, New York. According 16
to a teller, Moore said, “I have a gun, I will start shooting, give me all 17
bundles 100’s and 50’s.” Id. at 38. He also presented a note stating 18
that he had a gun and would shoot if necessary. The final offense 19
occurred on December 30, 2014, when Moore robbed a branch of First 20
Citizens Bank in Columbia, South Carolina. Moore told a teller that 21
he had a gun and presented a note demanding money. Later that 22
evening, South Carolina police officers received a report of a person 23

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4 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
at a Motel 6 tossing a suspicious item over a fence and into a parking 1
lot. The item was a dye pack and several $20 bills. Officers began 2
stopping people near the Motel 6 and asking for identification. At 3
some point, they stopped Moore and discovered that he was wanted 4
for federal bank robberies in New York. The officers searched his 5
motel room pursuant to a warrant and found currency stolen earlier 6
in the day from the Columbia branch of First Citizens Bank. 7
In January 2015, a federal grand jury in the Northern District of 8
New York returned an indictment charging Moore with two counts 9
of bank robbery “by intimidation” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). 10
Id. at 11. In February 2015, a federal grand jury in the District of South 11
Carolina returned an indictment charging Moore with one count of 12
bank robbery “by force and violence and by intimidation” in violation 13
of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Id. at 13. Subsequently, the South Carolina case 14
was transferred to the Northern District of New York. 15
In October 2015, Moore pled guilty to all three counts of federal 16
bank robbery. The Probation Office recommended that Moore be 17
sentenced under the Career Offender Guidelines. See U.S. Sentencing 18
Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2015).1 19
1 Citations to the Guidelines are hereinafter referred to as “U.S.S.G.” With
only one exception not relevant here, district courts are to sentence
defendants pursuant to the version of the Guidelines in effect on the date
of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii); see also Beckles v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 890 n.1 (2017). Accordingly, unless otherwise stated,

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Specifically, the Probation Office determined that: (1) Moore was at 1
least 18 years old when he committed the crimes; (2) federal bank 2
robbery is a crime of violence; and (3) Moore had two prior felony 3
convictions for New York robbery in the third degree, New York 4
Penal Law § 160.05, which the Probation Office considered to be 5
crimes of violence. With adjustments for Moore’s acceptance of 6
responsibility, his offense level of 29 and criminal history category of 7
VI yielded a Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months. 8
Moore objected to the Probation Office’s conclusion that he was 9
a career offender, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 10
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (“Johnson I”), and Johnson 11
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (“Johnson II”), narrowed the 12
definition of a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) in such a 13
way that he should not be considered a career offender because 14
neither federal bank robbery nor New York robbery in the third 15
degree are crimes of violence. Johnson I clarified that the term 16
“physical force” in the definition of the term “violent felony” under 17
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), 18
means “violent” force, or “force capable of causing physical pain or 19
injury to another person.” 559 U.S. at 140. Johnson II held that the 20
all references to the Guidelines are to the November 2015 version, which
was in effect when Moore was sentenced on May 9, 2016. Thus, the
amendments to §§ 4B1.1–2 that were in effect between August 1, 2016, and
October 31, 2016, do not apply to this appeal. See also infra note 2.

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6 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
residual clause of the ACCA—which is worded identically to the 2015 1
version of the Career Offender Guidelines under which Moore was 2
sentenced—was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. 135 S. Ct. at 3
2557. 4
Rejecting Moore’s arguments, the district court sentenced him 5
to concurrent 135‐month terms of imprisonment on each of the three 6
counts of conviction, followed by three years of supervised release. 7
App’x at 187–88. At the sentencing hearing, the district judge 8
announced, “[F]or the record . . . regardless of any potential difference 9
in the guidelines calculations, including the fact that the criminal 10
offender guideline application was not taken into account in the plea 11
agreement, the Court would have imposed the same sentence based 12
upon the [previously stated] factors and reasoning.” Id. at 188. Moore 13
now challenges his sentence on the grounds that neither federal bank 14
robbery nor New York robbery in the third degree qualifies as a crime 15
of violence under the Career Offender Guidelines. 16
Before we turn to the merits of Moore’s appeal, we note the 17
somewhat unusual briefing schedule of this appeal. In November 18
2016, after Moore had already filed his opening brief, we vacated our 19
opinion in United States v. Jones, 830 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Jones I”) 20
in light of the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Beckles v. United 21
States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). See United States v. Jones, 838 F.3d 296 (2d 22
Cir. 2016) (order vacating Jones I). Moore’s opening brief heavily 23

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7 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
relied on Jones I, so we stayed this appeal until Jones I could be 1
reconsidered in the wake of Beckles. In Beckles, the Supreme Court 2
held that because the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and not 3
mandatory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), they 4
are not subject to a void for vagueness challenge, and therefore, the 5
residual clause of the Career Offender Guidelines was not 6
unconstitutional. 137 S. Ct. at 894–95. In United States v. Jones, 878 7
F.3d 10, 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Jones II”), we held that New York first 8
degree robbery qualified as a crime of violence under the residual 9
clause of the 2014 version of the Career Offender Guidelines. The 10
language of the 2014 version of the Career Offender Guidelines is 11
substantively the same as the 2015 (pre‐amendment) version that 12
applies to Moore’s sentence here. Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2014), 13
with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2015). 14
In September 2017, we lifted the stay, but Moore opted to rest 15
on his originally filed opening brief, which relied substantially on our 16
vacated and superseded opinion in Jones I. After the Government 17
filed its brief in December 2017, Moore filed a reply brief relying on 18
new arguments. At our request, the Government submitted 19
additional briefing in response to Moore’s argument that, contrary to 20
dictum in Jones II, New York’s definition of robbery lacks an element 21
present in the generic definition of robbery. 22
23

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8 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
DISCUSSION 1
The two issues in this appeal are whether the district court 2
erred in determining that federal bank robbery by intimidation in 3
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and New York third‐degree robbery 4
in violation of New York Penal Law § 160.05 are crimes of violence 5
under the 2015 version of the Career Offender Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 6
§§ 4B1.1–2. We review de novo a district court’s determination of 7
whether an offense is a crime of violence under the Guidelines. United 8
States v. Van Mead, 773 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 2014). 9
I. The Career Offender Guidelines 10
The Career Offender Guidelines provide for an enhanced 11
sentence when the defendant: (1) is at least 18 years old at the time 12
she committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) has an instant 13
offense of conviction that is a felony crime of violence; and (3) has at 14
least two prior felony convictions constituting crimes of violence or 15
controlled substance offenses. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 16
When Moore was sentenced in May 2016, there were three 17
separate provisions in the applicable U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 Guideline 18
defining “crime of violence.” The first clause, commonly known as 19
the “force clause” or the “elements clause,” specifies that a crime of 20
violence is a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or 21
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Id. 22
§ 4B1.2(a)(1). The second clause, known as the “enumerated clause,” 23

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9 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
enumerates four offenses that qualify as crimes of violence: “burglary 1
of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, [or crimes] involv[ing the] use of 2
explosives. . . .” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Finally, the residual clause specifies 3
that a crime of violence also includes any felony that “otherwise 4
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 5
injury to another.”2 Id. 6
In addition to these three clauses in the text of the § 4B1.2(a) 7
Guideline, application note 1 in the commentary to the Guideline 8
includes an additional list of enumerated offenses that qualify as 9
crimes of violence: “murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated 10
assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate 11
extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling.” Id. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. 12
For the sake of clarity, this opinion will refer to this fourth provision 13
defining crimes of violence as the “commentary clause.”3 14
2 After Johnson II, the Sentencing Commission amended the Career Offender
Guidelines through a supplement to the 2015 Guidelines, effective August
1, 2016, to remove the residual clause. See Jones II, 878 F.3d at 14 n.1 (citing
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 4–5
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment‐
process/official‐text‐amendments/20160121_Amendments_0.pdf (last
visited Feb. 22, 2019)). This amendment does not apply to Moore, as noted
supra note 1.
3 Other opinions inside and outside this circuit have referred to the
enumerated offenses in the commentary simply as “enumerated offenses,”
but that can lead to confusion because the four offenses specifically
identified in the text of the 2015 (pre‐amendment) § 4B1.2(a)(2) Guideline
are commonly referred to as the “enumerated offenses” or the “enumerated
clause.” Other opinions have referred to these offenses listed in the

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10 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
II. Federal Bank Robbery “by Force and Violence, or by 1
Intimidation” Is a Crime of Violence Because it Is 2
Specifically Enumerated in the Commentary Clause 3
and Conforms to the Definition of Generic Robbery 4
Moore argues that federal bank robbery does not qualify as a 5
crime of violence under the force clause because the offense can be 6
committed by mere intimidation, which does not necessarily require 7
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent force. Appellant’s 8
Br. at 27–29. We have yet to address in a published opinion the issue 9
of whether federal bank robbery is a crime of violence under any of 10
the Guidelines’ provisions defining a crime of violence.4 We take this 11
commentary as specific examples of crimes of violence that would be
captured under the residual clause. While this is true, the fact that they
have been specifically enumerated provides them with a special status akin
to the four enumerated offenses in the Guideline so that there is no need for
a court to decide the central question under the residual clause of whether
these offenses “involve[] conduct that presents a potential risk of physical
injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). For this reason, these specifically
enumerated offenses deserve their own designation, and we think the
“commentary clause” is the most appropriate title. However, when the
residual clause was eliminated on August 1, 2016, in the supplement to the
2015 Guidelines, the enumerated offenses in the commentary clause were
incorporated into the text of § 4B1.2(a)(2). Therefore, references to the
commentary clause are only relevant to cases applying § 4B1.2 before the
August 1, 2016 amendments.
4 The issue was addressed in two recent summary orders. United States v.
Dykes, 724 F. App’x 39, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) concluded that
because the definition of generic robbery “mirrors the elements of statutory
federal bank robbery,” federal bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence
under the commentary clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Killion v. United States,
728 F. App’x 19, 21–22 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) held that federal
bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the similarly‐worded
force clause of the ACCA.

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11 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
occasion now to hold that federal bank robbery “by force and 1
violence, or by intimidation” under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) qualifies as a 2
crime of violence under the commentary clause because it is 3
enumerated in the Guidelines commentary and conforms to the 4
definition of generic robbery. In so holding, we make no 5
determination as to whether federal bank robbery “by force and 6
violence, or by intimidation” is also a crime of violence under the 7
other clauses. 8
Commentary and application notes in the Guidelines must be 9
given controlling weight unless they: (1) conflict with a federal 10
statute, (2) violate the Constitution, or (3) are plainly erroneous or 11
inconsistent with the Guidelines provision they purport to interpret. 12
Jones II, 878 F.3d at 18 (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 13
(1993)). Neither party contends that any such flaws exist here. We 14
must therefore treat robbery the same as if it were an enumerated 15
offense in the Guidelines text. See United States v. Jackson, 60 F.3d 128, 16
131 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Application Note 1 is authoritative because it 17
interprets and explains § 4B1.2 by listing offenses that constitute . . . 18
‘crimes of violence’ . . . even though the broadened definition of 19
[‘crimes of violence’] articulated in the commentary does not appear 20
in an actual guideline. . . .”). 21
Treating robbery as we would an enumerated offense in the 22
Guidelines text, we must analyze its applicability to the bank 23

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12 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
robberies in the case at hand by using what is known as the 1
categorical or modified categorical approach. See Jones II, 878 F.3d at 2
15–16 (citing Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013)). 3
Under the categorical approach we examine the legal elements of the 4
criminal statute of conviction (rather than the circumstances of the 5
criminal act) to determine whether they are identical to or narrower 6
than a “generic” version of the offense. See id. at 16; see also United 7
States v. Castillo, 896 F.3d 141, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2018). The generic 8
definition of an offense is the “contemporary understanding of the 9
term,” as ascertained from the criminal codes of the states, federal 10
criminal statutes, the Model Penal Code, scholarly treatises, legal 11
dictionaries, and, when appropriate, the common law. Castillo, 896 12
F.3d at 150 (internal quotations omitted). If the offense matches or is 13
narrower than the generic version, a conviction under the statute 14
categorically qualifies as a predicate crime of violence offense. Jones 15
II, 878 F.3d at 16. If, however, the statute criminalizes any conduct 16
that would not fall within the scope of the generic offense, the offense 17
cannot be considered a crime of violence. Castillo, 896 F.3d at 149–50. 18
As noted, the categorical approach is confined to the legal elements of 19
the statute, with no consideration of the facts of the underlying crime. 20
Jones II, 878 F.3d at 16. 21
In the event a statute criminalizes multiple acts in the 22
alternative, thereby defining multiple crimes, it is considered 23

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13 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
“divisible,” and we apply the modified categorical approach. Id. A 1
statute is not considered divisible if, instead of defining multiple 2
crimes, it lists various factual means of committing a single crime. Id. 3
For example, a statute that prohibits “the lawful entry or the unlawful 4
entry of a premises with intent to steal” is divisible because it 5
criminalizes two alternative offenses—the less serious offense of 6
burglary with lawful entry and the more serious offense of burglary 7
with unlawful entry. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 8
(2016) (internal quotations omitted). In a case like that, a court would 9
apply the modified categorical approach and look to “a limited class 10
of documents,” such as “the indictment, jury instructions, or plea 11
agreement and colloquy” to determine which of those two alternative 12
offenses was the offense of conviction. Id. (internal quotations 13
omitted). The court would then return to the categorical analysis and 14
compare the elements of the offense of conviction with the elements 15
of the relevant generic offense. Id. 16
The parties do not contest that § 2113(a) of the federal bank 17
robbery statute is divisible, and we agree. That subsection delineates 18
two methods of committing the crime of bank robbery: (1) “by force 19
and violence, or by intimidation” or (2) “by enter[ing] or attempt[ing] 20
to enter” a federal financial institution “with intent to commit . . . any 21
felony affecting” such financial institution “and in violation of any 22
statute of the United States, or any larceny.” 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). 23

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14 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
Therefore, § 2113(a) is divisible, and we may look to Moore’s plea 1
agreements to determine under which method he was convicted. See 2
United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80, 84 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018) (accepting the 3
district court’s determination that § 2113(a) is divisible because it 4
contains two separate paragraphs, each containing a separate version 5
of the crime of federal bank robbery); United States v. Rinker, 746 F. 6
App’x 769, 772 n.21 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (collecting cases); 7
see also Jones II, 878 F.3d at 16. 8
According to Moore’s plea agreements, he was convicted under 9
the first method: bank robbery “by force and violence, or by 10
intimidation.” See Plea Agreement 3–4, United States v. Moore, No. 15‐ 11
cr‐27 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2015), ECF No. 17; Plea Agreement 3–4, 12
United States v. Moore, No. 15‐cr‐281 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2015), ECF No. 13
5. 14
While the text of the 2015 version of the Guidelines only 15
enumerates four general crimes that per se qualify as crimes of 16
violence—“burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, [or crimes] 17
involv[ing the] use of explosives . . . ,” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)—the 18
commentary clause specifically lists robbery as a crime of violence, 19
along with murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, 20
forcible sex offenses, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, 21
and burglary of a dwelling. Id. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. For the reasons stated 22
earlier, we give these enumerated offenses in the commentary clause 23

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15 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
the same effect as we would if they were in the text of the Guideline 1
itself. Jackson, 60 F.3d at 131. 2
Thus, we must determine whether the “by force and violence, 3
or by intimidation” clause of the federal bank robbery statute 4
corresponds in substance to the generic definition of robbery. See 5
United States v. Walker, 595 F.3d 441, 445–46 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]here a 6
specific offense . . . is listed as a qualifying [crime of violence], ‘then 7
the trial court need find only that the state statute corresponds in 8
substance to the generic meaning of [the specific offense].’” (quoting 9
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990))). We found in Walker 10
that “all fifty states define robbery, essentially, as the taking of 11
property from another person or from the immediate presence of 12
another person by force or by intimidation,” thus meeting the generic 13
definition of robbery Id. at 446 (emphasis in original). The relevant 14
clause in § 2113(a) defines bank robbery as taking “by force and 15
violence, or by intimidation, . . . from the person or presence of 16
another . . . any property or money or any other thing of value 17
belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or 18
possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan 19
association.” 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). This definition criminalizes conduct 20
that contains all of the elements of generic robbery we announced in 21
Walker. 595 F.3d at 446; accord United States v. Dykes, 724 F. App’x 39, 22
45 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). Thus, because the “by force and 23

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16 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
violence, or by intimidation” clause of the federal bank robbery 1
statute “is the same as, or narrower than, the relevant generic offense” 2
of robbery, it constitutes a crime of violence subject to U.S.S.G. § 3
4B1.2’s sentencing enhancement. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257.5 4
Accordingly, we hold that federal bank robbery “by force and 5
violence, or by intimidation” is a crime of violence under the 6
5 Moore does not contend that federal bank robbery fails to meet the generic
definition of robbery. Rather, he focuses his argument exclusively on the
force clause, arguing that “intimidation” does not require the use or threat
of violent force and that this bank robbery statute does not require the
defendant make an intentional threat of physical force. Appellant’s Br. at
27–29. Since we conclude that federal bank robbery is a predicate crime of
violence under the Guidelines’ commentary clause, we decline to resolve
the question of whether federal bank robbery is also a crime of violence
under the force clause. We note, however, that this circuit, in a summary
order, and our sister circuits, in published opinions, have consistently held
that federal bank robbery by intimidation is a crime of violence under the
force clause of various sentence enhancement Guidelines and statutes. See
Killion, 728 F. App’x at 21–22 (“Killion argues that in light of Johnson [I],
federal armed bank robbery is no longer a violent felony . . . [because] the
offense does not require the use of any force . . . [since] intimidation
involves at most a threat of injury. . . . [However,] the threat of injury is still
a threat to use physical force, and is punishable under the ACCA’s force
clause.” (internal citations omitted)); see also United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d
80, 84–85 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Harper, 869 F.3d 624, 626–27 (8th Cir.
2017); United States v. Ellison, 866 F.3d 32, 35–40 (1st Cir. 2017); United States
v. Brewer, 848 F.3d 711, 715–16 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. McGuire, 678
F. App’x 643, 645–46 (10th Cir. 2017) (summary order); McBride, 826 F.3d at
295–96; United States v. Jenkins, 651 F. App’x 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam); United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141, 152–53 (4th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Jones, 932 F.2d 624, 625 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d
749, 751 (9th Cir. 1990).

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17 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
commentary clause of the Career Offender Guidelines because it 1
conforms to the generic definition of robbery. 2
III. New York Robbery in the Third‐Degree Is a Crime of 3
Violence Under the Force Clause 4
Moore also argues that the district court erred in applying the 5
Career Offender Guidelines’ sentencing enhancement because New 6
York robbery in the third degree is not a crime of violence under 7
either the force clause or the commentary clause. We hold that New 8
York robbery in the third degree is categorically a crime of violence 9
under the force clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). Our holding today 10
parallels this court’s recent decisions in United States v. Thrower, No. 11
17‐445, 2019 WL 385652, at *3 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2019) (per curiam), and United 12
States v. Pereira‐Gomez, 903 F.3d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 2018), in which we 13
held that New York robbery in the third degree is a violent felony 14
under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(3)(2)(B) and a crime of 15
violence under the force clause of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 of the 2014 16
Guidelines, respectively. In light of our holding under the force 17
clause, we do not consider Moore’s argument that the New York 18
statute is broader than the definition of generic robbery and not a 19
crime of violence under the commentary clause.6 20
6 Moore also argues in his reply brief that New York robbery in the third
degree is not a crime of violence under the residual clause but concedes that
the district court did not rely on the residual clause in making the
determination that New York robbery in the third degree is a crime of

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18 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
As with the commentary clause, we analyze whether an offense 1
is a crime of violence under the force clause using the categorical 2
approach. Pereira‐Gomez, 903 F.3d at 164 (citing Stuckey v. United 3
States, 878 F.3d 62, 66–67 (2d Cir. 2017)). This approach, familiar by 4
now, involves two steps: first we identify the elements of the 5
predicate conviction by determining the minimum criminal conduct 6
a defendant must commit to be convicted; second, we determine 7
whether that minimum criminal conduct “has as an element the use, 8
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” U.S.S.G. 9
§ 4B1.2(a)(1). Stuckey, 878 F.3d at 67; see also United States v. Hill, 890 10
F.3d 51, 55–56 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]o show a predicate conviction is not 11
a crime of violence ‘requires more than the application of legal 12
imagination to [the] . . . statute’s language.’ . . . [T]here must be a 13
‘realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,’ that the statute at 14
issue could be applied to conduct that does not constitute a crime of 15
violence.” Hill, 890 F.3d at 56 (alterations omitted) (quoting Gonzales 16
v. Duenas‐Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). This means that a 17
defendant must point to at least one case in which a court in fact 18
applied a particular statute in a manner for which he or she argues. 19
Id. 20
violence. We decline to consider this argument given our holding that New
York robbery in the third degree is a crime of violence under the force
clause.

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19 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
New York third‐degree robbery is not divisible, and therefore 1
we apple the categorical approach without modification. See Mathis, 2
136 S. Ct. at 2248–49. A person is guilty of New York third‐degree 3
robbery when she “forcibly steals property.” N.Y. Penal Law § 160.05. 4
A person forcibly steals property when, 5
in the course of committing a larceny, he uses or 6
threatens the immediate use of physical force upon 7
another person for the purpose of: (1) [p]reventing or 8
overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to 9
the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or 10
(2) [c]ompelling the owner of such property or another 11
person to deliver up the property or to engage in other 12
conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny. 13
N.Y. Penal Law § 160.00; see also Pereira‐Gomez, 903 F.3d at 165. 14
Distilled to its basic elements, third‐degree robbery in New 15
York requires the use or threat of immediate physical force upon 16
another in furtherance of a larceny. Plainly then, the elements of this 17
offense constitute a crime of violence under the force clause of the 18
Career Offender Guidelines because they include “as an element the 19
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 20
person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). 21
Moore’s arguments that New York robbery in the third degree 22
does not qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause of the 23
Career Offender Guidelines are unavailing. He argues that New York 24
third‐degree robbery does not require violent force but can be violated 25
with “relatively minor physical power,” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 14, 26

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20 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
and therefore runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s requirement in 1
Johnson I that physical force be “violent force—that is, force capable 2
of causing physical pain or injury to another person,” Johnson I, 559 3
U.S. at 140 (emphasis omitted).7 4
To support his argument, Moore principally relies on our 5
vacated opinion in Jones I. To the extent anything in our vacated Jones 6
I opinion may have supported Moore’s position, it has no 7
precedential value. See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 721 F.3d 8
54, 68 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[V]acatur dissipates precedential force.”); see 9
also Pereira‐Gomez, 903 F.3d at 165 n.45 (“In [Jones I], this Court initially 10
reversed Spencer on the basis of perceived supervening Supreme 11
Court guidance. But Jones I was subsequently vacated and our ruling 12
in Spencer was reinstated.”); Massey v. United States, 895 F.3d 248, 251 13
n.6 (2d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (same). 14
7 In holding that physical force means violent force or force capable of
causing physical pain or injury to another person, the Johnson I Court was
interpreting the ACCA’s force clause defining a “violent felony” and not
the Career Offender Guidelines’ force clause defining a “crime of violence.”
559 U.S. at 135, 140. The Supreme Court has never directly held that Johnson
I’s definition of physical force applies to the Career Offender Guidelines’
force clause. However, the two clauses are substantively similar to one
another, and, as discussed, the Supreme Court indicated in Johnson I that
case law interpreting a specific force clause can be reliably applied to other,
similarly phrased force clauses. See id. at 140. Therefore, we assume
without holding that Johnson I’s definition of physical force applies to the
force clause of the Career Offender Guidelines at issue in this case. See, e.g.,
Hill, 890 F.3d at 58 (assuming, without deciding, that Johnson I’s definition
of physical force applies to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)’s similar force clause
definition of crime of violence).

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21 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
Moore also relies on decisions from other circuits interpreting 1
other states’ robbery statutes to support his argument that New York 2
robbery in the third degree is not a crime of violence under the force 3
clause because it does not require violent force. Even if those other 4
states’ robbery statutes were identical to the relevant New York 5
statute, however, they are not controlling in this circuit. Our circuit 6
has addressed this exact argument in Pereira‐Gomez and concluded 7
that “[b]y its plain language . . . New York’s robbery statute includes 8
as an element the use of violent force.” 903 F.3d at 165 (emphasis 9
added). Moore’s argument that New York robbery in the third degree 10
does not require violent force as defined by Johnson I is foreclosed by 11
our recent opinion in Pereira‐Gomez, as supported by the New York 12
Court of Appeals’s interpretation of the statute. Id.8 13
8 In Pereira‐Gomez, we held that robbery in any degree under New York law
is a crime of violence under the force clause of § 2L1.2 of the 2014
Guidelines. 903 F.3d at 166. Even more recently in United States v. Thrower,
we reached the same conclusion as it pertains to violent felonies under the
force clause in the ACCA. 2019 WL 385652, at *3–4. We have reached
similar conclusions on other, prior occasions. See, e.g., United States v.
Spencer, 955 F.2d 814, 820 (2d Cir. 1992) (attempted New York robbery in
the third degree “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another” because it requires
“forcibly stealing property and using or threatening the immediate use of
physical force upon another person” (internal quotations and alterations
omitted)); United States v. Brown, 52 F.3d 415, 425–26 (2d Cir. 1995) (New
York attempted robbery in the third degree constitutes a violent felony
under the force clause of the ACCA, which uses the same language to define
a violent felony as the Career Offender Guidelines: any crime that “has as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

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22 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
Any doubt as to the lack of merit of Moore’s argument was 1
recently removed by the Supreme Court’s rejection of a similar 2
challenge to Florida’s robbery statute, which requires “resistance by 3
the victim that is overcome by the physical force of the offender.” See 4
Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 549 (2019) (internal quotations 5
omitted). The Court held that the Florida statute does constitute a 6
violent felony under the force clause of the ACCA despite the fact that 7
the force may be minor and may not cause pain or injury, because 8
Johnson I’s definition of violent force is concerned with only the 9
potential of the force to cause pain or injury, rather than the likelihood 10
that it will. Id. at 554. Like the Florida robbery statute at issue in 11
against the person of another”) (internal quotations omitted); United States
v. Miles, 748 F.3d 485, 490 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (same). Pereira‐Gomez,
Thrower, Brown, and Miles addressed the force clauses of § 2L1.2 and the
ACCA, but we see no reason why the reasoning of these prior cases should
not apply with equal force to the materially identical force clause of the
Career Offender Guidelines in § 4B1.2. See United States v. Parnell, 524 F.3d
166, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“We have previously relied on
authorities interpreting the ACCA’s definition of a ‘violent felony’ to
interpret the [Career Offender] Guidelines’ definition of ‘crime of violence’
. . . because those provisions are substantively similar, making authority
interpreting one phrase persuasive in interpreting the other phrase.”
(internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted)); see also Johnson I,
559 U.S. at 140 (applying case law interpreting the force clause of 18 U.S.C.
§ 16’s crime of violence provision to an issue requiring interpretation of the
ACCA’s “very similar” force clause provision). In this case, the force
clauses in the 2014 Guidelines’ version of § 2L1.2 and in the ACCA have the
exact same definition as the force clause in the 2015 version of § 4B1.2: an
offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another.” Compare Pereira‐Gomez, 903
F.3d at 164, and Thrower, 2019 WL 385652, at *2, with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).

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23 16‐1604 (L), 16‐1624 (con)
Stokeling, the New York robbery statute requires the use or threat of 1
force in order to overcome the victim’s resistance to the theft, and 2
therefore, it is “capable of causing physical pain or injury.” Id. at 555 3
(quoting Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140). 4
CONCLUSION 5
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court appropriately 6
applied the 2015 (pre‐amendment) Career Offender Guidelines’ 7
sentencing enhancement in this case, and thus, we AFFIRM the 8
judgment of the district court. 9

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