Rodriguez v. Gusman

19-2213-cv
Rodriguez v. Gusman
1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3
____________________ 4
5
August Term, 2020 6
7
(Argued: August 17, 2020 Decided: August 31, 2020) 8
9
Docket No. 19-2213-cv 10
11
____________________ 12
13
JOSE RODRIGUEZ, 14
15
Plaintiff-Appellant, 16
17
v. 18
19
DR. MIKAIL A. GUSMAN, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, EASTERN CORRECTIONAL 20
FACILITY, FKA DR. GUZMAN, FKA DR. GUSMAN, NANCY ANTHONY, 21
REGISTERED NURSE, EASTERN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, FKA MS. 22
ANTHONY, DR. ANN ANDOLA, REGISTERED NURSE, EASTERN 23
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, FKA MS. ANNDOLA, FKA DOCTOR 24
ANANDOLAS, JEFFREY MCKOY, DR. BIPIN BHAVSAR, EASTERN 25
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, MEGAN MCGLYNN, ROGER TRAYNOR, 26
DAVID JACOBS, AMANDA DEMSHICK, 27
28
Defendants-Appellees.1 29
30
____________________ 31
32
Before: NEWMAN, POOLER, and HALL, Circuit Judges. 33
1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as above.

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2
1
Jose Rodriguez appeals from the June 21, 2019 decision and order of the 2
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Mae A. 3
D’Agostino, J.) adopting the Magistrate Judge’s sua sponte order 4
administratively closing Rodriguez’s civil rights suit against defendants and 5
denying Rodriguez’s motion to reconsider. The district court concluded that, 6
because Rodriguez had been deported to the Dominican Republic, Rodriguez 7
would be unavailable in the United States for depositions, further medical 8
examinations, and trial testimony, and the case should be closed. Our Circuit has 9
yet to address what standard guides administrative-closure decisions when a 10
plaintiff is unavailable. We hold that an administrative closure in such 11
circumstances is a last resort that is appropriate only when all other alternatives 12
are virtually impossible or so impractical as to significantly interfere with the 13
operations of the district court or impose an unreasonable burden on the party 14
opposing the plaintiff’s claim. On the present record, numerous alternatives to 15
the issues identified by the district court exist, and none appears to meet the 16
above-articulated standard. We accordingly vacate the district court’s order and 17
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 18

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3
VACATED and REMANDED. 1
____________________ 2
ROBERT J. O’LOUGHLIN, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 3
Wharton & Garrison LLP (Karen King, Ayelet M. 4
Evrony, Amanda B. Horowitz, on the brief), New York, 5
N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellant Jose Rodriguez. 6
7
FRANK BRADY, Assistant Solicitor General (Jeffrey W. 8
Lang, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia 9
James, Attorney General of the State of New York, New 10
York, N.Y., for Defendant-Appellees. 11
12
POOLER, Circuit Judge: 13
Jose Rodriguez appeals from the June 21, 2019 decision and order of the 14
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Mae A. 15
D’Agostino, J.) adopting the Magistrate Judge’s sua sponte order 16
administratively closing Rodriguez’s civil rights suit against defendants2 and 17
2 The defendants in this case are Dr. Mikail A. Gusman, the Medical Director of
New York’s Eastern Correctional Facility (“ECF”); Nancy Anthony, a registered
nurse at ECF; Dr. Ann Andola, a doctor at ECF; Jeffrey McKoy, the Deputy
Commissioner of Program Services at ECF; Dr. Bipin Bhavsar, a doctor at ECF;
Megan McGlynn, a Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
Inmate Classification Analyst; Roger Traynor, the Supervising Rehabilitation
Coordinator at Franklin Correctional Facility; David Jacobs, a Rehabilitation
Counselor at Franklin Correctional Facility; and Amanda Demshick, the
Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator at the Shawangunk Correctional Facility
(collectively, “Defendants”).

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4
denying Rodriguez’s motion to reconsider. The district court concluded that, 1
because Rodriguez had been deported to the Dominican Republic, Rodriguez 2
would be unavailable in the United States for depositions, further medical 3
examinations, and trial testimony, and the case should be closed. Our Circuit has 4
yet to address what standard guides administrative-closure decisions when a 5
plaintiff is unavailable. We hold that an administrative closure in such 6
circumstances is a last resort that is appropriate only when other all alternatives 7
are virtually impossible or so impractical as to significantly interfere with the 8
operations of the district court or impose an unreasonable burden on the party 9
opposing the plaintiff’s claim. On the present record, numerous alternatives to 10
the issues identified by the district court exist, and none appears to meet the 11
above-articulated standard. We accordingly vacate the district court’s order and 12
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 13
BACKGROUND 14
Rodriguez is a former lawful permanent resident of the United States who 15
currently lives in the Dominican Republic. The present suit arises out of an 16
incident that occurred while Rodriguez was incarcerated at New York’s Eastern 17
Correctional Facility (“Eastern”). In 2011, Rodriguez began suffering from a 18

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5
rapid heart rate and irregular breathing. On February 16, 2012, Rodriguez 1
ultimately had a stroke, which left him partially paralyzed. He alleges that 2
Defendants’ deliberate indifference to his medical needs while he was 3
incarcerated at Eastern led to his stroke. As relevant here, Rodriguez alleges that 4
Defendants failed to respond to his complaints about his symptoms over several 5
months; did not consult his medical doctors or provide a Spanish interpreter; did 6
not prescribe any medication; did not adequately monitor his condition; and 7
minimized his complaints, such as when on one occasion, defendant Dr. Bipin 8
Bhavsar merely instructed him to meditate. 9
On May 19, 2015, Rodriguez filed suit, proceeding as a pro se prisoner. 10
Initially, Rodriguez raised only an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference 11
claim. Acting sua sponte, the district court dismissed Rodriguez’s complaint with 12
prejudice as time barred. After appointing pro bono counsel, this Court vacated 13
and remanded, holding that the district court erred in failing to provide 14
Rodriguez an opportunity to amend. Rodriguez v. Griffin, 672 F. App’x 106 (2d 15
Cir. 2016). 16
Pro bono counsel continued to represent Rodriguez, and he subsequently 17
amended his complaint and added claims of First Amendment retaliation and 18

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6
access to the courts. In the amended complaint, Rodriguez alleges that after he 1
filed the above-mentioned appeal, he was, without justification, transferred to a 2
remote prison near the Canadian border, which made it difficult for him to meet 3
with counsel, and that he was subject to new limitations on the number and 4
length of calls with counsel. 5
On October 3, 2017, after discovery had begun and Rodriguez had been 6
released from prison, Rodriguez was deported to the Dominican Republic. 7
Rodriguez cannot return to the United States for twenty years absent special 8
permission from the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2). The case 9
continued to be actively litigated by pro bono counsel on Rodriguez’s behalf; for 10
instance, from January through November 2018, pro bono counsel deposed five 11
Defendants and one additional witness. 12
On October 15, 2018, during a telephonic discovery conference, the 13
Magistrate Judge sua sponte raised the issue of whether the case should be 14
administratively closed until Rodriguez returns to the United States. After the 15
parties briefed the issue, the Magistrate Judge administratively closed the case, 16
stating: 17

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7
The Court commends Plaintiff’s pro bono counsel for the 1
excellent work they have done on Plaintiff’s behalf and their 2
willingness to continue to represent Plaintiff in this action despite the 3
substantial burden created by his deportation to the Dominican 4
Republic. Nonetheless, considering the logistical difficulties and 5
substantial cost of continuing with discovery; the logistical 6
difficulties, required technological resources from the court, and 7
prohibitive cost of trying the case without the Plaintiff in the 8
courtroom; and the inefficient use of judicial resources in addressing 9
the difficulties and disputes between the parties that would no doubt 10
arise and require court intervention and resolution throughout the 11
litigation, including throughout the remaining discovery and at trial, 12
the Court concludes there is no further reason to maintain this action 13
on the open docket for statistical purposes and directs administrative 14
closure of the case. 15
16
App’x at 150-51. The text order noted that the case could be reopened for “good 17
cause shown,” which was defined as Rodriguez’s “reentry into the United States 18
and ability to complete prosecution of the case.” 19
Rodriguez then moved for reconsideration. The district court adopted the 20
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. It explained that “[a] significant 21
body of jurisprudence—developed primarily in connection with lawsuits filed by 22
incarcerated persons—instructs federal district courts not to dismiss or 23
administratively close actions in which litigants are unable to appear without 24
first considering less drastic alternatives.” App’x at 213-14. The district court then 25
listed those alternatives, including making provisions so the prisoner can travel 26

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8
and attend the trial in person; trying the case on depositions or affidavits, or with 1
video; and trying the case without a jury at a location near where the prisoner is 2
located. The district court found that “none of the alternatives are practical” and 3
Rodriguez “will be unavailable to appear at trial,” App’x at 214, but failed to 4
explain why the alternatives were unworkable. 5
The district court noted that “discovery in this case has not yet concluded.” 6
App’x at 214. While acknowledging that “there are mechanisms through which 7
depositions can be taken remotely,” it focused on the fact that “the nature of 8
Plaintiff’s allegations and alleged injuries will more than likely require additional 9
examinations of Plaintiff.” App’x at 215. It also decided that Defendants would 10
not have a reasonable opportunity to depose any physicians treating Rodriguez 11
in the Dominican Republic, but it did not explain why that was. Finally, the 12
district court found that the case “will likely require the retention of an expert 13
witness, who would necessarily be forced to conduct a physical examination of” 14
Rodriguez in the Dominican Republic. App’x at 215. While “not unsympathetic” 15
to Rodriguez, the district court concluded that it “would be unduly prejudicial 16
to Defendants and an inefficient use of judicial resources” to allow the case to 17
continue absent Rodriguez’s return. App’x at 215. 18

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9
Rodriguez timely appealed. 1
DISCUSSION 2
This Court reviews a district court’s decision to administratively close a 3
case under an abuse of discretion standard. Leftridge v. Conn. State Trooper Officer 4
No. 1283, 640 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2011). A district court abuses its discretion 5
when it “bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly 6
erroneous assessment of the evidence, or if its decision—though not necessarily 7
the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be 8
located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. (internal quotation marks, 9
brackets, and citations omitted). 10
I. The Governing Legal Standard 11
The issue of what standard a court applies in deciding whether to 12
administratively close a case is an issue of first impression in our Circuit. The 13
Fourth Circuit has taken up this question, however, and its decision is 14
instructive. 15
In an analogous case involving an incarcerated litigant, the Fourth Circuit 16
explained that “the most drastic alternatives of dismissal for failure to prosecute 17
or indefinite stay should only be considered, if at all, as last resorts after all other 18

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10
alternatives, starting with securing the prisoner’s presence, have been rejected.” 1
Muhammad v. Warden, 849 F.2d 107, 112-13 (4th Cir. 1988). Thus, while “an 2
incarcerated litigant’s right is necessarily qualified, . . . [that] does not mean that 3
it can be arbitrarily denied by dismissal or indefinite stays; the law requires a 4
reasoned consideration of the alternatives,” such as: 5
making provisions for the prisoner to attend in person, either at his 6
own expense, or at government expense, and in any case in 7
government custody; trying the case without the prisoner’s presence 8
in the courtroom, either on depositions or affidavits or with aid of 9
video; and even trying the case without a jury in the place of 10
incarceration. 11
12
Id. at 111-12. 13
We agree with the Fourth Circuit that administrative closure, as one of the 14
“most drastic alternatives” available to a district court, should be used sparingly 15
and only as a last resort. But we must still consider what that entails in practice. 16
Is administrative closure properly considered as a last resort when other 17
alternatives are infeasible, or only when other alternatives are actually 18
impossible? 19
We hold that other alternatives must be virtually impossible, or so 20
impractical as to significantly interfere with the operations of the district court or 21

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11
impose an unreasonable burden on the party opposing the plaintiff’s claim, in 1
order to justify an administrative closure. An administrative closure lasting 2
years, decades even, makes finding witnesses and conducting discovery 3
“difficult if not impossible.” See id. at 110. At bottom, an administrative closure 4
effectively ends a case. Id. But this runs afoul of the fundamental principle set 5
forth by Chief Justice Marshall, and echoed by courts ever since, that “where 6
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, 7
whenever that right is invaded.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 8
(1803) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 9
The importance of this principle is even greater in civil rights suits given 10
the weighty public interest in ensuring accountability for officials who violate the 11
Constitution. This interest exists regardless of whose rights are violated. But 12
when plaintiffs are unavailable due to incarceration or deportation, in particular, 13
administrative closure may insulate officials from liability for violating the rights 14
of prisoners or immigrants subject to removal. A strict standard is necessary to 15
ensure that these plaintiffs are not deeply prejudiced. 16
We are mindful, of course, of the well-settled principle that “a district 17
court possesses inherent authority to control the disposition of the causes on its 18

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docket and has power to stay an action as an incident of that authority.” Range v. 1
480-486 Broadway, LLC, 810 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks 2
and citation omitted). Our holding limits district courts’ ability to 3
administratively close a case as a matter of convenience in light of the 4
countervailing prejudice to plaintiffs, but it does not bar administrative closure 5
when appropriate. If, for instance, there is only a slim likelihood that an 6
alternative will be possible, a district court may nonetheless administratively 7
close the case. 8
Having determined that administrative closure is only appropriate as a 9
last resort when other alternatives are virtually impossible or so impractical as to 10
significantly interfere with the operations of the district court or impose an 11
unreasonable burden on the party opposing the plaintiff’s claim, we now turn to 12
the question of whether that standard is met in Rodriguez’s case based on the 13
present record. 14
II. Application of this standard to Rodriguez’s case 15
Rodriguez argues that the alternatives listed in Muhammad are sufficient 16
here because Rodriguez and other witnesses can adequately testify or be deposed 17
by video, Defendants can obtain additional medical examinations through local 18

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13
physicians in the Dominican Republic or by sending a physician there from the 1
United States, and Rodriguez’s pro bono counsel can effectively prosecute the 2
case in Rodriguez’s absence. In response, Defendants focus exclusively on their 3
need to conduct additional medical examinations of Rodriguez, arguing that 4
traveling to the Dominican Republic for examinations is cost-prohibitive and 5
unduly burdensome. 6
On the present record, we cannot agree with Defendants that the 7
alternatives Rodriguez has proposed meet the standard articulated in this 8
opinion. We thus vacate the district court’s order and remand for further 9
proceedings, including any additional development of the record. 10
A. The Need for Rodriguez to Appear at Trial 11
The district court’s first basis for closing the case was Rodriguez’s 12
unavailability to appear at trial. The court summarily concluded that the 13
alternatives provided in Muhammad, 849 F.2d at 112-13, which include making 14
provisions for the litigant to travel and attend the trial in person, trying the case 15
without the litigant’s presence through affidavits or depositions, or trying the 16
case without a jury where the litigant is located, were not “practical” in 17
Rodriguez’s case. App’x at 214. We agree that providing for Rodriguez to travel 18

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14
and moving the trial to the Dominican Republic may not be possible. But we 1
cannot conclude that the use of video depositions or videoconference at trial is 2
virtually impossible or so impractical as to significantly interfere with the 3
operations of the district court or impose an unreasonable burden on Defendants 4
in this case, and there is no other need for Rodriguez to appear. 5
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a), “the judge has discretion to 6
allow live testimony by video for good cause in compelling circumstances and 7
with appropriate safeguards.” Thomas v. Anderson, 912 F.3d 971, 977 (7th Cir. 8
2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). And circuit and lower courts alike have 9
found a witness’s immigration status to constitute good cause. See, e.g., El-Hadad 10
v. United Arab Emirates, 496 F.3d 658, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming the district 11
court’s decision to allow the witness to testify from Egypt by Internet video after 12
repeatedly being denied a visa to enter the United States); Lopez v. Miller, 915 F. 13
Supp. 2d 373, 396 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Diaz was deported in 2003 to Santo 14
Domingo . . . and may not legally reenter the United States, thus easily satisfying 15
Rule 43(a)’s requirement.” (citations omitted)). There is no evidence in the record 16
to suggest that appropriate safeguards would be unavailable or that testimony 17
by video would be infeasible, let alone virtually impossible. 18

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15
Nor are there any other reasons why Rodriguez’s physical presence at trial 1
would be required. The district court cited to Del Rio v. Morgado, No. 10-cv-8955, 2
2013 WL 5520218, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2013); Kuar v. Mawn, No. 08-cv-4401, 3
2012 WL 3808620, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012); and Brown v. Wright, No. 05-cv- 4
82, 2008 WL 346347, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2008), for the proposition that 5
“[c]ourts have regularly found that dismissal is appropriate in similar situations” 6
when a litigant is unavailable at trial. App’x at 214, 215. But whether a litigant’s 7
unavailability at trial is cause for administrative closure is a case-specific inquiry, 8
and thus any reliance on these cases requires some discussion of their 9
applicability when compared to the facts in the present case. 10
A review of the facts in these cases indicates that they are distinct from the 11
one at hand. Del Rio, Kuar, and Brown all involved pro se plaintiffs whose cases 12
could not be prosecuted at trial without their physical presence. As such, the 13
district courts in these cases recognized that the obstacle posed by these 14
plaintiffs’ unavailability could have been overcome with the assistance of 15
counsel. See Del Rio, 2013 WL 5520218, at *3; Kuar, 2012 WL 3808620, at *1; Brown, 16
2008 WL 346347, at *4. By contrast, Rodriguez here has able and dedicated 17
counsel, who the Magistrate Judge commended for “the excellent work they 18

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have done on Plaintiff’s behalf.” App’x at 150. At oral argument, Rodriguez’s 1
counsel committed to continuing litigating on his behalf. Rodriguez’s absence at 2
trial perhaps could have posed an insurmountable hurdle had he been 3
prosecuting the action pro se. Because Rodriguez’s counsel will be presenting his 4
claims, however, Rodriguez’s absence will be inconsequential. 5
Because there is no support for the conclusion that the alternatives to 6
Rodriguez’s appearance at trial are virtually impossible or so impractical as to 7
significantly interfere with the operations of the district court or impose an 8
unreasonable burden on Defendants, Rodriguez’s need to testify does not 9
provide sufficient grounds to justify the district court’s conclusion that the case 10
must be administratively closed. 11
B. The Need for Additional Rule 35 Examinations 12
The district court also found that gathering additional medical evidence 13
while Rodriguez is located in the Dominican Republic would be too burdensome 14
for Defendants. We agree with the district court that “the nature of Plaintiff’s 15
allegations and alleged injuries will more than likely require additional 16
examinations of Plaintiff by medical professionals hired by one or both parties.” 17

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17
App’x at 215.3 But based on this record, we cannot say that allowing the case to 1
continue without Rodriguez in the United States would unduly prejudice 2
Defendants. 3
Under Rule 35, “[u]sually [the] plaintiff will be required to come to the 4
place where he or she filed suit for the examination, in the absence of facts 5
showing substantial reasons for insisting upon examination at his or her 6
residence.” 8B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, 7
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2234 (3d ed. 2010); see also Williams v. Nguyen, 8
No. 16-cv-13983, 2017 WL 1177914, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2017) (“However, the 9
usual case may give way where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the trip would 10
be injurious to his health, or that there is any other compelling reason for his 11
reluctance.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added)); cf. 12
Romano v. Levitt, No. 15-cv-518A, 2017 WL 2544076, at *2 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. May 5, 13
2017) (citing cases requiring a showing of inability to pay for travel expenses or 14
other “unreasonable hardship or exceptional circumstances sufficient to 15
3 To be clear, the district court has not yet issued an order for a physical
examination, which “is not granted as of right.” 8B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur
R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2234.1 (3d ed.
2010).

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overcome plaintiff’s general obligation to travel at own expenses to examination 1
by defense in district where plaintiff filed suit”). 2
Rodriguez has established a compelling or substantial reason for his 3
inability to appear in New York for an examination: he is legally barred from 4
reentering the United States absent special permission from the Attorney 5
General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2). Similar to medical conditions or financial 6
hardship, Rodriguez’s immigration status impedes his ability to travel to the 7
United States. Thus, Rodriguez has ample justification for a waiver of the general 8
requirement of appearing in the venue of jurisdiction for an examination. Indeed, 9
district courts in our Circuit generally find that an individual’s immigration 10
status is “good cause” to waive the typical requirement that trial testimony be 11
provided in person. See, e.g., Lopez, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 396 n.9 (noting that a 12
witness’s deportation and inability to reenter under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) is good 13
cause “easily satisfying” Rule 43(a)’s requirement). We fail to see why this 14
reasoning should not apply here. 15
Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. As Defendants 16
acknowledge, they have options in the event that Rodriguez needs to be 17
examined—such as sending a physician from the United States to the Dominican 18

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Republic or hiring a local physician to examine Rodriguez. At oral argument, 1
other options like using telemedicine or hiring a United States-based physician 2
already planning travel to the Dominican Republic for unrelated reasons, such as 3
vacationing, were discussed as well. Defendants argue in their briefing that 4
sending a physician would be cost-prohibitive and that they should not be 5
required to use a local physician who is unfamiliar to them.4 But the record is 6
devoid of any evidence to support the assertions made in the brief as to cost, and 7
there is likewise no apparent reason why Defendants could not find and vet a 8
local physician to conduct the examination or use the alternatives raised at oral 9
argument. On remand, the district court is directed to allow the parties to 10
develop the record on the possible alternatives to an in-person appearance before 11
reconsidering the issue. 12
C. The Need for Additional Depositions 13
4 We note here as well that there is no absolute right for the moving party to
choose the physician. 8B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L.
Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2234.2 (3d ed. 2010). But we assume for
purposes of addressing Defendants’ argument that they would be allowed to
choose the physician.

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The third basis the district court relied on in administratively closing 1
Rodriguez’s case is the need for additional depositions. Although the district 2
court stated “that there are mechanisms through which depositions can be taken 3
remotely,” it found that “Defendants would not have a reasonable opportunity” 4
to depose Rodriguez’s overseas physicians on ongoing treatments. App’x at 214- 5
15. 6
Many courts allow depositions by videoconference when the deposed 7
individuals live abroad. See, e.g., United States v. One Gulfstream G-V Jet Aircraft 8
Displaying Tail No. VPCES, 304 F.R.D. 10, 17-18 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Ample case law 9
recognizes that a videoconference deposition can be an adequate substitute for 10
an in-person deposition, particularly when significant expenses are at issue or 11
when the deposition will cover a limited set of topics.”). This is true even when 12
there have been “claims that the difficulty of ‘coordination of document review’ 13
is one reason why a video deposition would be inappropriate” as “such issues 14
are regularly satisfied by exchanging the documents in advance.” U.S. Sec. & 15
Exchange Comm’n v. Aly, 320 F.R.D. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). Other courts permit 16
depositions to occur in a third, mutually accessible location distinct from the 17
forum district. See Republic of Turkey v. Christie’s, Inc., 326 F.R.D. 402, 406 18

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(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (ordering depositions of witnesses for the Republic of Turkey 1
take place in London). If necessary, a court may shift the costs so that they are 2
borne by the moving party. See Packard v. City of New York, 326 F.R.D. 66, 68 3
(S.D.N.Y. 2018). 4
Nothing in the record suggests that one of the above-mentioned 5
alternatives would be virtually impossible or so impractical as to significantly 6
interfere with the operations of the district court or impose an unreasonable 7
burden on Defendants in the circumstances of the present case. Absent such 8
evidence, we must reject the district court’s conclusion that the need for 9
additional depositions justifies the administrative closure. 10
CONCLUSION 11
Based on the record before us, the district court exceeded the bounds of its 12
discretion in administratively closing this case, which should only be done as a 13
“last resort[].” Muhammad, 849 F.2d at 112-13. Numerous alternatives to the 14
issues identified by the district court exist, and on the present record, none seems 15
virtually impossible or so impractical as to significantly interfere with the 16
operations of the district court or impose an unreasonable burden on the party 17
opposing the plaintiff’s claim. We therefore vacate the district court’s order 18

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administratively closing Rodriguez’s case and remand for further proceedings, 1
including additional development of the record, consistent with this opinion. If 2
upon remand the district court once more administratively closes Rodriguez’s 3
case and this matter returns to this Court, in light of the history of this litigation 4
and the panel’s familiarity with the matter, we respectfully direct the Clerk of 5
this Court to return the matter to this panel for further review and adjudication. 6
Cf. United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994). 7

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