Hoffer v. Tellone

22-1377-cv
Hoffer v. Tellone
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
________
AUGUST TERM 2024
A RGUED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2024
D ECIDED: F EBRUARY 13, 2025
No. 22-1377
R ICHARD H OFFER ,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
POLICE O FFICER E LYSSA TELLONE , S HIELD #730387, POLICE O FFICER
T REVOR GOFF, S HIELD #731915, POLICE O FFICER L AMONT B ROWN,
S HIELD #734149, POLICE O FFICER D ARCY D RUMMOND, S HIELD #731907,
Defendants–Appellees,
C ITY OF YONKERS , CITY OF YONKERS POLICE D EPARTMENT, POLICE
O FFICER JOHN D OE 1, POLICE O FFICER JOHN D OE 2, POLICE O FFICER
JOHN D OE 3, POLICE O FFICER JOHN D OE 4, POLICE O FFICER JOHN
D OE 5, POLICE O FFICER JOHN DOE 6, POLICE O FFICER JOHN DOE 7,
POLICE O FFICER JOHN D OE 8,
Defendants.
________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York.
________

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Before: WALKER , PARK, and NATHAN, Circuit Judges.
________
Plaintiff–Appellant Richard Hoffer sued the City of Yonkers,
the City of Yonkers Police Department, and various individual police
officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used
excessive force when arresting him. After trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the officers. Hoffer now appeals the judgment of
the district court.
Hoffer’s appeal is a narrow one. He argues that the district
court (Krause, M.J.) erred in denying his request for an adverse
inference instruction, based on a missing video of him being tased,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2). On appeal,
Hoffer and Defendants-Appellees dispute the standard applicable to
requests for adverse inference instructions under Rule 37(e)(2).
We hold that to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e)(2), a
district court or a jury must find, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that a party acted with an “intent to deprive” another party of the lost
information. Consistent with this holding, we further hold that the
lesser “culpable state of mind” standard, which includes negligence,
see Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d
Cir. 2002), does not apply to the imposition of sanctions under
Rule 37(e)(2).
Applying the above standard, we conclude that the district
court did not err in denying Hoffer’s request for an adverse inference
instruction. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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________
C. MITCHELL H ENDY , Mayer Brown LLP, Los
Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
B RIAN D. G INSBERG , Harris Beach PLLC, White
Plains, NY, for Defendants–Appellees.
________
JOHN M. WALKER , JR ., Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff–Appellant Richard Hoffer sued the City of Yonkers,
the City of Yonkers Police Department, and various individual police
officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used
excessive force when arresting him. After trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the officers. Hoffer now appeals the judgment of
the district court.
Hoffer’s appeal is a narrow one. He argues that the district
court (Krause, M.J.)1 erred in denying his request for an adverse
inference instruction, based on a missing video of him being tased,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2). On appeal,
Hoffer and Defendants-Appellees dispute the standard applicable to
requests for adverse inference instructions under Rule 37(e)(2).
We hold that to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e)(2), a
district court or a jury must find, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that a party acted with an “intent to deprive” another party of the lost
information. Consistent with this holding, we further hold that the
lesser “culpable state of mind” standard, which includes negligence,
1 On January 15, 2019, the parties consented to jurisdiction by a magistrate judge.
On October 15, 2020, the case was reassigned from Magistrate Judge Lisa Margaret
Smith to Magistrate Judge Andrew E. Krause.

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see Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d
Cir. 2002), does not apply to the imposition of sanctions under
Rule 37(e)(2).
Applying the above standard, we conclude that the district
court did not err in denying Hoffer’s request for an adverse inference
instruction. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
B ACKGROUND
On February 9, 2018, Plaintiff–Appellant Richard Hoffer
commenced a § 1983 suit against the City of Yonkers, the City of
Yonkers Police Department, and various individual police officers.
Hoffer alleged, among other things, that the officers used excessive
force during Hoffer’s arrest on November 20, 2016. In late 2021, the
district court held a trial on the claims against police officers Elyssa
Tellone, Trevor Goff, Lamont Brown, and Darcy Drummond
(collectively, the “Officer Defendants”).
At trial, the parties presented differing accounts of the arrest
that principally focused on Officer Goff’s use of a taser gun on Hoffer.
Hoffer testified that he was tased twice in the lower back while he was
incapacitated, lying face down with his hands underneath his
stomach, and being kicked and punched by eight to ten officers.
Officer Goff, however, testified that he first tased Hoffer while Hoffer
was struggling with two officers attempting to control him. Goff
explained that, after issuing a standard warning, he deployed his
taser from about ten feet away, and only after this point did Hoffer
and the two officers fall to the ground. Goff further testified that, after
the first deployment of the taser, Hoffer appeared to be “trying to
collect himself and get up to flee again,” so Goff performed a “drive
stun” maneuver, whereby he touched Hoffer’s lower back directly

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with the taser gun for five seconds to “incapacitate the muscles.”
App’x 424.
Officer Goff explained that the taser itself generates a log,
which reflects each use of the taser. The November 20, 2016 log for
Goff’s taser reflected two deployments: the first at 4:16 p.m., when
Goff tested the taser at the beginning of his shift, and the second at
8:02 p.m., lasting eight seconds, which Goff testified corresponded to
the second time he tased Hoffer. The log also reflected an event at
10:24 p.m. titled “USB Connected,” that apparently corresponded to
the taser syncing to an external device.
Officer Goff stated that each deployment of the taser generates
a video. He testified that he had only seen the video of the second
deployment, because the video of the first deployment “had
somehow been overwritten.” App’x 426. Goff did not provide any
further explanation as to the absence of the first video. Prior to Goff’s
testimony, however, Sandra Cuebas (who was, at the time of trial,
Hoffer’s girlfriend) had testified that, when she was at the police
station after Hoffer’s arrest, she saw Officer Tellone holding a USB
drive and heard her say to Goff: “It shows everything that we did and
nothing that he did.” App’x 389-90.
Following Goff’s testimony, Hoffer’s counsel orally requested
that the district court instruct the jury that it could draw an adverse
inference against the Officer Defendants based on the purported
spoliation of the first video. At the charge conference, the district
court, after assessing the request under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(e)(2), declined.2 The district court found that the
2 The record appears to contain a transcription error: it reflects the district court

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evidence before it was insufficient to establish that any defendant
“acted with an intent to deprive [Hoffer] of the use of the video.”
App’x 644. It reasoned that there was no “clear evidence” that the
first taser video existed in the first place, speculating that perhaps the
first taser deployment did not trigger a video recording or that the
first and second taser deployments happened within the same eight-
second period captured by the log. App’x 644. The court further
reasoned that it was not clear what Goff meant when he testified
about “something being overwritten,” and nothing in Goff’s
testimony suggested that he had any direct knowledge or experience
with the document management system for taser videos, let alone
with this video in particular. App’x 645. The district court observed
that the theory that the video was purposely destroyed was undercut
by officer testimony establishing that there were two taser
deployments and no effort by defendants to “cover up that fact.”
App’x 645. Finally, it advised that Hoffer’s counsel could address the
absence of the first video in closing arguments.
After the charge conference, the district court read aloud to the
jury its entire jury charge, which excluded an adverse inference
instruction. When the district court asked Hoffer’s counsel whether
she had any objections to the jury instructions, she responded, “No,
Judge.” App’x 719-20.
After deliberating for two days, the jury informed the district
court that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict with respect to
two of the defendants. The district court gave a modified Allen
having stated that no defendant had the “requisite intent to warrant an adverse
inference instruction under Rule 37(a)(2),” rather than (e)(2). App’x 646 (emphasis
added).

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charge, and, after further deliberation the next day, the jury returned
a unanimous verdict, finding in favor of the Officer Defendants.
Following the trial, Hoffer moved to set aside the excessive
force verdict in Goff’s favor and to enter a verdict in Hoffer’s favor,
arguing that no reasonable juror could have concluded that Goff’s
actions did not constitute excessive force. The district court denied
Hoffer’s motion and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hoffer argues that the district court erred by failing
to instruct the jury that it could draw an adverse inference based on
the purported spoliation of the first taser video. To decide that issue,
we must first resolve the parties’ dispute regarding the showing
required for an adverse inference instruction under Rule 37(e)(2). For
the reasons that follow, we hold that to impose sanctions pursuant to
Rule 37(e)(2), a district court or a jury must find, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that a party acted with the “intent to deprive” another
party of the lost information. Further, upon application of
Rule 37(e)(2), we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to give an adverse inference instruction in this
case.
I. Waiver
As a threshold matter, we first address the Officer Defendants’
contention that Hoffer waived or forfeited his right to challenge the
district court’s denial of an adverse inference instruction because after
the jury charge was read to the jury, his counsel did not object to it.
We find this argument to be without merit.

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Because the district court, before it read aloud the jury charge,
had definitively denied the request for an adverse inference
instruction, Hoffer’s counsel was not required to object to the charge
to preserve Hoffer’s right to appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(1) (“A
party may assign as error . . . a failure to give an instruction, if that
party properly requested it and--unless the court rejected the request in
a definitive ruling on the record--also properly objected.” (emphasis
added)); cf. Tirreno v. Mott, 375 F. App’x 140, 141 (2d Cir. 2010)
(summary order) (concluding that challenge to jury instruction was
unpreserved where court did not definitively rule on the record with
respect to plaintiffs’ requested instruction and plaintiffs did not object
to charge).
Hoffer’s challenge, therefore, is preserved for appeal.
II. Rule 37(e) Requirements
The parties dispute (A) whether the district court erred in
requiring a showing that the spoliating party acted with “intent to
deprive” for an adverse inference instruction under Rule 37(e)(2);
(B) whether the requirements of Rule 37(e)(2) must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence; and
(C) whether the district court erred in resolving factual questions
itself rather than submitting them to the jury. We address each
question in turn.
A. State of Mind Required for Sanctions Under
Rule 37(e)(2)
Before 2015, a party seeking an adverse inference instruction
based on lost evidence—electronic or otherwise—had to establish that
a party obligated to preserve or produce such evidence who failed to

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do so acted with “a culpable state of mind.” See Residential Funding
Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We held that this requirement could be
satisfied when a party acted knowingly or negligently—in other
words, an intentional act was not required to establish a “culpable
state of mind.” Id. at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Then, in 2015, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) was
amended to specify the measures a court could employ if
electronically stored information (“ESI”) was wrongfully lost and the
findings required to order such measures. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2)
advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.3 Rule 37 was split
into two subsections. The first subsection allows a court, upon a
finding of prejudice to another party arising from the loss of ESI, to
order “measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1). The second subsection enumerates certain
sanctions—namely, presuming that the lost information was
unfavorable to the spoliating party, giving an adverse inference
instruction to the jury, dismissing the action, or entering default
judgment—that the court may impose “only upon finding that the
party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the
information’s use in the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).
The Advisory Committee notes to the 2015 Amendment
explicitly state that subdivision (e)(2) rejects cases such as Residential
Funding that authorize adverse inference instructions upon a finding
3 Before the 2015 Amendment, Rule 37(e) provided in full: “Absent exceptional
circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for
failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine,
good-faith operation of an electronic information system.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2)
advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.

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of negligence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee’s note to
2015 amendment (citing Residential Funding, 306 F.3d 99). The notes
reason that only the intentional loss or destruction of evidence gives
rise to an inference that the evidence was unfavorable to the party
responsible for that loss or destruction; negligent—or even grossly
negligent—behavior does not logically support that inference. Id.
Hoffer acknowledges that the plain language of Rule 37(e)(2)
requires a finding of “intent to deprive,” but argues that this court has
continued to apply the lesser “culpable state of mind” standard
articulated in Residential Funding even after the 2015 Amendment
went into effect. Hoffer is correct that various decisions by this court,
issued after the 2015 Amendment, have referenced or used the lesser
“culpable state of mind” standard in the context of lost ESI. See, e.g.,
Rossbach v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 81 F.4th 124, 139–42 (2d Cir. 2023);
Klipsch Grp., Inc. v. ePRO E-Com. Ltd., 880 F.3d 620, 628 (2d Cir. 2018);
Johnson v. Perry, 763 F. App’x 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order);
but see Mazzei v. Money Store, 656 F. App’x 558, 560 (2d Cir. 2016)
(summary order) (stating that adverse inference instruction may only
issue under Rule 37(e)(2) upon finding intent to deprive).
None of these decisions, however, expressly held that the state
of mind required for a sanction under Rule 37(e)(2) could be less than
“intent to deprive.” Indeed, not one decision directly addressed the
question presently before us: whether the 2015 Amendment
abrogated the lesser “culpable state of mind” standard in the context
of lost ESI. To the extent that these decisions implied that a
Rule 37(e)(2) sanction could issue upon a finding of a state of mind
other than “intent to deprive,” any such implication was mistaken
after the 2015 Amendment.

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Today, we make clear that the imposition of a sanction under
Rule 37(e)(2) requires a finding of “intent to deprive another party of
the information’s use in the litigation.” Thus, the 2015 Amendment
to Rule 37(e)(2) abrogated the lesser “culpable state of mind”
standard used in Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108 (internal
quotation marks omitted), in the context of lost ESI. A party’s acting
negligently or knowingly will not suffice to justify the sanctions
enumerated in Rule 37(e)(2).
In holding that the requisite state of mind to impose a sanction
under Rule 37(e)(2) is “intent to deprive,” we join the majority of our
sister circuits. See Jones v. Riot Hosp. Grp. LLC, 95 F.4th 730, 735 (9th
Cir. 2024); Ford v. Anderson Cnty., Texas, 102 F.4th 292, 323–24 (5th Cir.
2024); Skanska USA Civ. Se. Inc. v. Bagelheads, Inc., 75 F.4th 1290, 1312
(11th Cir. 2023) (specifying that “intent to deprive” means “more than
mere negligence”); Wall v. Rasnick, 42 F.4th 214, 222–23 (4th Cir. 2022);
Auer v. City of Minot, 896 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2018); Applebaum v.
Target Corp., 831 F.3d 740, 745 (6th Cir. 2016) (“A showing of
negligence or even gross negligence will not do the trick.”).
We note that, in deciding the foregoing, we do not call into
question the applicability of Residential Funding to cases that fall
outside the province of Rule 37(e)(2)—namely, cases evaluating the
loss of non-electronic evidence.
B. Burden of Proof for Rule 37(e)(2) Determination
The parties dispute whether Rule 37(e)(2)’s requirements must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of
the evidence. Although Hoffer did not raise this issue in his opening
brief, we nevertheless have discretion to address it. See Patterson v.
Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]his [c]ourt has

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discretion to decide the merits of a forfeited claim or defense where
the issue is purely legal and there is no need for additional fact-
finding.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, we think it
necessary to address the issue in light of the varying approaches taken
by district courts within this circuit. See, e.g., Chepilko v. Henry, 722 F.
Supp. 3d 329, 338 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (reasoning that “intent to
deprive” must be shown by clear and convincing evidence “given the
severity of the sanctions permitted under” Rule 37(e)(2)
(quoting Lokai Holdings LLC v. Twin Tiger USA LLC, No. 15-CV-9363
(ALC) (DF), 2018 WL 1512055, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2018))); Europe
v. Equinox Holdings, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 3d 167, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)
(applying “clear and convincing” burden to “intent to deprive”); In re
Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2481 (KBF), 2016
WL 11727416, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2016) (applying preponderance
burden to “intent to deprive” finding).
We think that the preponderance standard is appropriate for a
number of reasons. First, the preponderance standard is the “usual
rule in civil cases.” In re Plaza Shoe Co., 15 F.2d 278, 279 (2d Cir. 1926).
Indeed, we have already stated outside the context of Rule 37(e)(2)
that a party seeking discovery sanctions on the basis of spoliation
must show the requisite elements by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Klipsch Grp., 880 F.3d at 628; see also ComLab, Corp. v. Tire, 815 F.
App’x 597, 600 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order). Adhering to this
usual rule furthers the goal of uniformity.
Second, the nature of the sanctions authorized by Rule 37(e)(2)
does not justify venturing above the preponderance default. The
Supreme Court has observed that “we presume that [the
preponderance-of-the-evidence] standard is applicable in civil actions
between private litigants unless particularly important individual

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interests or rights are at stake.” Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286
(1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has
listed as examples of such “important individual interests or rights”:
proceedings to terminate parental rights, involuntary commitment
proceedings, and deportation, while noting that other “severe civil
sanctions” can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389–90 (1983)
(collecting cases). The issuance of an adverse inference instruction, or
even the dismissal of an action, does not invoke interests or rights of
the same caliber as those proceedings listed above. See Ramirez v.
T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 2016) (“The interests
implicated by the dismissal of a suit as a sanction for misconduct
occurring in civil litigation (including discovery) are not so important
as to demand that the facts underlying the dismissal be established by
clear and convincing evidence.”).
Third, the specific intent required to impose sanctions under
Rule 37(e)(2) sets a sufficiently high bar such that a “clear and
convincing” burden of proof is unnecessary. As district courts have
recognized, the “intent to deprive” standard is “both stringent and
specific,” and contemplates “not merely the intent to perform an act
that destroys ESI but rather the intent to actually deprive another
party of evidence.” Karsch v. Blink Health Ltd., No. 17-CV-3880 (VM)
(BCM), 2019 WL 2708125, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2019) (quoting
Leidig v. Buzzfeed, Inc., No. 16-CV-542 (VM) (GWG), 2017 WL 6512353,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2017)). Proving such specific intent is not
easy and frequently depends upon circumstantial evidence. See
Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 390 n.30 (“If anything, the difficulty of proving
the defendant’s state of mind supports a lower standard of proof.”).

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Fourth, neither the language of Rule 37(e)(2) nor the Advisory
Committee notes to the 2015 Amendment suggests an intent to
impose a heightened burden of proof. Indeed, if the Rule’s drafters
had sought to deviate from the default preponderance standard, they
could have done so explicitly, just as they explicitly rejected certain
severe sanctions in cases of mere negligence.
Finally, the default preponderance standard is preferable
because, as we have previously observed, imposing “too strict a
standard of proof” in the context of establishing entitlement to an
adverse inference instruction risks “subvert[ing] the prophylactic and
punitive purposes of the adverse inference.” Kronisch v. United States,
150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1998).
For all these reasons, we hold that a party seeking sanctions
under Rule 37(e)(2) must establish the requisite elements—including
that the party act with “intent to deprive”—by a preponderance of the
evidence.
C. Whether the Jury Must Find Facts and Make
Credibility Determinations for a Rule 37(e)(2) Ruling
Hoffer argues that it should be left to the jury to resolve
disputed questions of fact relating to whether the prerequisites for
issuing an adverse inference instruction have been met. We disagree.
Rule 37(e) plainly contemplates that findings relevant to the
imposition of sanctions, including the finding of an “intent to
deprive,” be made by courts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (“[T]he court . . .
only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive
another party of the information’s use in the litigation may . . .
instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was

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unfavorable to the party . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment
(“Subdivision (e)(2) limits the ability of courts to draw adverse
inferences based on the loss of information in these circumstances,
permitting them only when a court finds that the information was lost
with the intent to prevent its use in litigation.” (emphasis added)).
And, although Rule 37(e)(2) allows courts to delegate the intent
finding to the jury, whether to do so is left to the court’s discretion.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2015
amendment (“If a court were to conclude that the intent finding
should be made by a jury, the court’s instruction should make clear
that the jury may infer from the loss of the information that it was
unfavorable to the party that lost it only if the jury first finds that the
party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the
information’s use in the litigation.”).
Finally, this court has observed that “one of the district court’s
roles in resolving a motion for sanctions is to act as factfinder.”
Rossbach, 81 F.4th at 139–40 (holding that Rule 37(e) sanctions “do[]
not implicate the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial guarantee” and that
district court was entitled to make findings of fact and credibility
determinations). That a district court would make factual findings to
resolve a motion affecting the admission of evidence as a sanction is
routine. A comparable example is a motion to suppress evidence.4
4 In contending that the district court should have left any factual questions to the
jury, Hoffer chiefly relies on Van Winkle v. Rogers, which held, in the context of
spoliation of non-ESI, that “[i]f a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to bad
faith, a jury should make that determination.” 82 F.4th 370, 378 (5th Cir. 2023).
Van Winkle, however, does not bind this court, does not address Rule 37, and
appears to contradict our decision in Rossbach.

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We conclude, therefore, that although a district court may
reserve for the jury questions of fact related to adverse inference
instructions under Rule 37(e)(2), it is also proper for a district court to
make those factual determinations—including a finding of “intent to
deprive”—itself.
* * *
In sum, we hold that to impose sanctions pursuant to
Rule 37(e)(2), a district court (or a jury, if authorized by the district
court) must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a party
acted with the “intent to deprive” another party of the lost ESI. The
lesser “culpable state of mind” standard articulated in Residential
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002), does
not apply to the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2).
III. Application of Rule 37(e)(2) to This Case
We review the grant or denial of a motion for Rule 37 discovery
sanctions for abuse of discretion. See Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d
127, 174 (2d Cir. 2012). We accept a district court’s factual findings in
determining whether to impose sanctions unless they are clearly
erroneous. See Rossbach, 81 F.4th at 139. With the above-stated Rule
37(e)(2) framework in mind, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury that it could
infer that the purportedly lost taser video was unfavorable to the
Officer Defendants.
In denying Hoffer’s request for an adverse inference
instruction, the district court, applying the correct “intent to deprive”
standard, concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish
that any defendant acted with the intent to deprive Hoffer of the use

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of the first taser video. The district court reasoned that it did not
“know what to make of” the taser report, which reflected only one
use of the taser during the arrest, and that there was “just not enough
evidence for [the court] to be even convinced” that there ever existed
a video of the first taser deployment. App’x 644–45. The district court
further observed that it was “not at all clear” what Officer Goff meant
by information being “overwritten,” and that “nothing about
Sergeant Goff’s testimony suggested that he had any direct
knowledge or experience with the document management system for
these taser videos, let alone anything having do with this particular
video.” App’x 645. These findings were not clearly erroneous.
Even assuming that there were sufficient evidence of the first
video’s existence, the district court did not clearly err in finding
insufficient evidence that any defendant acted with intent to deprive
Hoffer of the video. The strongest evidence of such intent was Ms.
Cuebas’s testimony that she saw Officer Tellone holding a USB drive
and heard her say that “[i]t shows everything that we did and nothing
that he did.” App’x 389–90. Although the district court did not
discuss this evidence in its ruling, it was entitled to make its own
credibility determinations and to discount Ms. Cuebas’s testimony, as
discussed above. Indeed, the district court had previously registered
its skepticism of Ms. Cuebas’s credibility. See App’x 500 (noting that
Ms. Cuebas had a relationship with Hoffer). Additionally, the district
court reasonably noted that “the notion that the Yonkers Police
Department went to such lengths to destroy a video and manipulate
this taser record” was undercut by officer testimony establishing that
there were two deployments, and that “if there was an effort to cover
up that fact,” such testimony would be “surprising.” App’x 645–46.

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Although the district court did not specify what burden of
proof it applied, it does not appear that it improperly applied a
heightened “clear and convincing” standard. The district court’s
statement that there was no “clear evidence” that a first video existed,
App’x 644, does not alone indicate that it applied the “clear and
convincing” standard to the intent analysis. In any event, the district
court’s assessment of the evidence demonstrates that the evidence
would readily fall short of the preponderance threshold, as it did not
find “any direct or circumstantial evidence that the City of Yonkers or
any of the individual defendants had the requisite intent to warrant
an adverse inference instruction under Rule 37([e])(2).” App’x 646
(emphasis added).
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Hoffer’s request for an adverse inference
instruction under Rule 37(e)(2).
C ONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.

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