In re ALBA Petróleos de El Salvador S.E.M. de C.V.

22-317-cv
In re ALBA Petróleos de El Salvador S.E.M. de C.V.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
August Term 2022
Submitted: March 17, 2023
Decided: September 18, 2023
No. 22-317
IN RE ALBA PETRÓLEOS DE E L S ALVADOR S.E.M. DE C.V.*
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut
Before: PARK and LEE , Circuit Judges, and STEIN, District Judge.†
This case involves a dispute between two law firms, each of
which claims the right to represent a Salvadoran company in its
efforts to stave off a transnational judgment-collection effort.
Specifically, the two firms are vying to defend ALBA Petróleos de El
Salvador S.E.M. de C.V. (“ALBA”) in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut from the enforcement of a $45 million default
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption
accordingly.
† Judge Sidney H. Stein of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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judgment obtained against Colombian narco-terrorist organizations.
Marcos D. Jiménez appeared to represent ALBA. White & Case LLP
moved to substitute itself as ALBA’s counsel. Both purport to
represent ALBA. White & Case argued that the political-question
doctrine, the act-of-state doctrine, and Venezuelan law required the
district court (Meyer, J.) to allow it to represent ALBA. Jiménez
responded that he had the right to represent ALBA under Salvadoran
law. The district court denied White & Case’s motion, holding that
the issue was governed by Salvadoran law, which authorized
Jiménez’s representation. White & Case filed an interlocutory
appeal and, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of mandamus.
We lack appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal of
the denial of a third-party motion to substitute counsel. Such an
appeal fails to satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine
because the denial of a motion to substitute counsel is effectively
reviewable after final judgment and does not implicate an important
issue separate from the merits of the underlying action. White &
Case also does not meet the demanding standard required to obtain a
writ of mandamus. We thus DISMISS the appeal and DENY the
petition for a writ of mandamus.
Claire A. DeLelle, Nicole Erb, Susan Grace, White & Case
LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellant.
Marcos D. Jiménez, León Cosgrove Jiménez, LLP, Miami,
FL, for Appellee.
PARK, Circuit Judge:
This case involves a dispute between two law firms, each of
which claims the right to represent a Salvadoran company in its
efforts to stave off a transnational judgment-collection effort.

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Specifically, the two firms are vying to defend ALBA Petróleos de El
Salvador S.E.M. de C.V. (“ALBA”) in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut from the enforcement of a $45 million default
judgment obtained against Colombian narco-terrorist organizations.
Marcos D. Jiménez appeared to represent ALBA.1 White & Case
LLP moved to substitute itself as ALBA’s counsel. Both purport to
represent ALBA. White & Case argued that the political-question
doctrine, the act-of-state doctrine, and Venezuelan law required the
district court (Meyer, J.) to allow it to represent ALBA. Jiménez
responded that he had the right to represent ALBA under Salvadoran
law. The district court denied White & Case’s motion, holding that
Salvadoran law governed and authorized Jiménez’s representation.
White & Case filed this interlocutory appeal and, in the alternative, a
petition for a writ of mandamus.
We lack appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal of
the denial of a third-party motion to substitute counsel. Such an
appeal fails to satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine
because the denial of a motion to substitute counsel is effectively
reviewable after final judgment and does not implicate an important
issue separate from the merits of the underlying action. White &
Case also does not meet the demanding standard required to obtain a
writ of mandamus. We thus dismiss the appeal and deny the
petition for a writ of mandamus.
1 Jiménez was a sole practitioner during the trial court proceedings
but joined León Cosgrove Jiménez, LLP during the pendency of this appeal.

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I. BACKGROUND
A. ALBA
ALBA is a Salvadoran corporation that distributes Venezuelan
oil in El Salvador. ALBA has two shareholders. The majority
shareholder, with sixty percent ownership, is a subsidiary of
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), the national oil company of
Venezuela. The minority shareholder is a nonprofit organization
owned by a group of Salvadoran municipalities. The minority
shareholder appointed Jaime Alberto Recinos Crespin, a Salvadoran
national, to the ALBA board, and Crespin also serves as ALBA’s legal
representative.
B. The Caballero Litigation
The plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit is Antonio Caballero,
whose father, a former Colombian ambassador to the United Nations,
was kidnapped, tortured, and assassinated by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”). See Caballero v. Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, No. 18-cv-25337, 2020 WL
7481302, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2020). Caballero sued FARC and the
Norte de Valle Cartel in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, and
obtained a default judgment of over $45 million. See id. at *7.
Caballero alleges that ALBA is an agency or instrumentality of
FARC due to its connection to PDVSA. He sued ALBA in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Connecticut, seeking to enforce the
default judgment from the Southern District of Florida against
ALBA’s account at Interactive Brokers, LLC of Greenwich,

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Connecticut. Initially, no parties appeared to oppose Caballero, so
the district court entered a default judgment.2
Following the entry of default judgment, ALBA sought to
intervene, represented by Jiménez and his local counsel. White &
Case and its local counsel then moved to substitute themselves for
Jiménez as ALBA’s counsel. The district court held its decision on
the motion to intervene pending its ruling on the motion to substitute
counsel. It ordered the attorneys to brief their authority to act for
ALBA.
Developments in Venezuela provide context for the
disagreement. Beginning in 2019, two groups claimed control of the
Venezuelan government: one affiliated with Nicolás Maduro and the
other with Juan Guaidó. The United States and El Salvador both
recognized the Guaidó government.3 White & Case alleges that the
Maduro faction “seized and maintained unlawful control of” PDVSA,
after which the Guaidó faction established an “ad hoc administrative
board to manage PDVSA’s affairs.” Appellant’s Br. at 2, 7.
Neither side questioned the factual basis of the other’s
authorization:
2 The case was originally assigned to Judge Robert N. Chatigny.
Following the default judgment, the case was reassigned to Judge Jeffrey A.
Meyer.
3 The Guaidó government was apparently dissolved in early 2023.
See, e.g., Kejal Vyas, Venezuela’s U.S.-Backed Opposition Removes Juan Guaidó
as Its Leader, WALL ST . J. (Dec. 30, 2022). The parties have not indicated that
these events have impacted the litigation, and “we ordinarily do not
consider material not included in the record on appeal.” Keepers, Inc. v.
City of Milford, 807 F.3d 24, 29 n.14 (2d Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

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• Jiménez claimed that Crespin, ALBA’s legal
representative, hired him to defend ALBA. No
party disputes that Crespin was ALBA’s legal
representative or that, under Salvadoran law, ALBA’s
legal representative was responsible for retaining
counsel.
• White & Case claimed the Guaidó-backed ad hoc
board of PDVSA, the parent of ALBA’s majority
shareholder, hired it to defend ALBA. It argued that
under Venezuelan law, the ad hoc board had the
authority to retain counsel for ALBA.4
The district court reasoned that “the dispute is ultimately about
whether the law of El Salvador or the law of Venezuela should
control.” Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,
579 F. Supp. 3d 315, 321 (D. Conn. 2022). It held that the law of El
Salvador governs based on the “presumption that the law of a
company’s state of incorporation governs . . . issues involving the
internal affairs of a corporation.” Id. (cleaned up). The district
court rejected White & Case’s argument that “the act of state doctrine
require[d] [it] to defer to the law of Venezuela.” Id. at 325. It thus
concluded that Jiménez was ALBA’s rightful counsel and later
granted ALBA’s motion to intervene.
4 Neither the ad hoc board of PDVSA nor any other entity affiliated
with White & Case moved to intervene.

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White & Case filed this interlocutory appeal and petitioned for
a writ of mandamus, putatively on behalf of ALBA. Jiménez moved
to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.5
II. DISCUSSION
Before considering the merits of an appeal, “we are obliged to
assure ourselves that appellate jurisdiction exists.” Uniformed Fire
Officers Ass’n v. de Blasio, 973 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2020). We lack
jurisdiction over the appeal and deny the petition for a writ of
mandamus.
A. The Collateral Order Doctrine
We have appellate jurisdiction over “appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision
is typically one by which a district court disassociates itself from a
case,” “terminat[ing] an action.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558
U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (cleaned up). In other words, the statute
“disallow[s] appeal from any decision which is tentative, informal or
incomplete.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949). The final-judgment rule ensures “efficient judicial
administration” and respects “the prerogatives of district court
judges.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 106.
5 To be clear, neither White & Case LLP nor Marcos D. Jiménez is
formally a party to this appeal. Instead, both claim to represent ALBA,
their mutual putative client, and have each filed briefs on its behalf. We
refer to Appellant as White & Case and Appellee as Jiménez for ease of
reference and for the sake of clarity. But when the distinction between
counsel and client is important, we refer to Appellant as “White & Case’s
client” and Appellee as “Jiménez’s client.”

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But final decisions also include “a ‘small class’ of collateral
rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately
deemed ‘final.’” Id. (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545-46). “That
small category includes only decisions that are conclusive, that
resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that are
effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the
underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42
(1995). “All three of the requirements for appeal under the collateral
order doctrine must be met.” Fischer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 812
F.3d 268, 274 (2d Cir. 2016).
The Supreme Court has “repeatedly stressed” that the collateral
order doctrine must not “swallow the general rule that a party is
entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment.”
Digit. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)
(internal citation omitted). “This admonition has acquired special
force in recent years with the enactment of legislation designating
rulemaking, ‘not expansion by court decision,’ as the preferred means
for” regulating interlocutory appeals. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 113
(quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at 48); accord Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S.
23, 39-40 (2017).
We apply the collateral order doctrine to “the entire category to
which a claim belongs,” ignoring the “particular injustice[s]” alleged
in “the litigation at hand.” Digit. Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868
(cleaned up). Cases do not receive “individualized jurisdictional
inquiry.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107.
Here, White & Case appeals from the district court’s denial of
its third-party motion to substitute counsel. The Supreme Court has
categorized similar collateral orders according to the orders’

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functions, rather than their rationales. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v.
Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 426 (1985) (“orders disqualifying [opposing]
counsel in a civil case”); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 260
(1984) (“pretrial disqualification of defense counsel in a criminal
prosecution”); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 369
(1981) (“order[s] denying a motion to disqualify counsel for the
opposing party in a civil case”).
White & Case argues, however, that the relevant “category” of
order is the “authoriz[ation] [of] representatives of an unrecognized
government to appear in U.S. courts.” Appellant’s Br. at 52. There
are two problems with this argument. First, it refers to the
“particular injustice” White & Case alleges, not “the entire category
to which [its] claim belongs.” Digit. Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868.
Indeed, the unusual posture of this case may make White & Case’s
proposed category—i.e., authorizations of representatives of
unrecognized governments—a category of one. Second, it would
require us to put the merits cart before the jurisdictional horse. The
premise of White & Case’s framing—that Jiménez is “a known
representative of the . . . interests of the illegitimate Maduro
regime”—is itself a contested issue. Appellant’s Br. at 2-3.6
Jiménez concedes that the district court conclusively resolved
the substitution-of-counsel issue. So we must determine whether
district court denials of third parties’ motions to substitute a party’s
counsel (1) are effectively unreviewable after final judgment and (2)
6 For the same reason, it would be difficult to say that the question
whether Jiménez is a “representative[] of an unrecognized government,”
Appellant’s Br. at 52, is “completely separate from the merits of the action,”
Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 105, as the collateral order doctrine requires.

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present important issues separate from the merits. See Mohawk
Indus., 558 U.S. at 106.
B. Reviewability After Final Judgment
First, denials of third-party motions to substitute counsel are
effectively reviewable after final judgment. For this “class of claims,
taken as a whole,” interlocutory review is not “necessary to ensure
effective review.” Id. at 107-08. This conclusion incorporates “a
judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through
rigorous application of a final judgment requirement,” Digit. Equip.
Corp., 511 U.S. at 878-79, and in particular, “whether delaying review
until the entry of final judgment ‘would imperil a substantial public
interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order,’” Mohawk Indus.,
558 U.S. at 107 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352-53 (2006)).
White & Case’s client may appeal from a final judgment. The
client is not a party, but we “have long allowed appeals by a nonparty
when the nonparty has an interest that is affected by the trial court’s
judgment.” Rothstein v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 837 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir.
2016) (cleaned up). “And we have not required that a nonparty prove
that it has an interest affected by the judgment; rather, stating a
plausible affected interest has been sufficient.” Id. (cleaned up).
“A nonparty may not appeal, however, when it is clear that it has no
interest affected by the judgment.” Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
of Worldcom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2006).7
7 It bears noting that White & Case did not need to rely on the
collateral order doctrine—“the better practice is for such a nonparty to seek
intervention for purposes of appeal; denials of such motions are, of course,
appealable.” Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988). White & Case’s

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The district court’s judgment will affect White & Case’s client.
The client contends that the district court denied it the opportunity to
proceed with its authorized counsel. Moreover, if the client is
correct that it is ALBA, any judgment adverse to ALBA is necessarily
also adverse to the client. These interests are less speculative than
others we have held suffice to permit a nonparty to appeal. See
WorldCom, 467 F.3d at 78-79 (collecting cases).8
An appeal from final judgment will also adequately protect the
interests of White & Case’s client. After final judgment, we may
“vacat[e] [the] adverse judgment and remand[] for a new trial”—the
standard way to remedy erroneous rulings. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S.
at 109.
The Supreme Court has recognized that such review suffices
for similar categories of district court orders. First, an “order
refusing to disqualify counsel” on the motion of an opposing party is
“reviewable on appeal after final judgment.” Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 449 U.S. at 377. Should “the Court of Appeals conclude after the
trial has ended that permitting continuing representation was
prejudicial error, it would . . . vacate the judgment . . . and order a
new trial,” a “plainly adequate” remedy. Id. at 378. So too here.
client has not moved to intervene, and we express no opinion on the merit
of such a motion.
8 For the same reasons, we reject Jiménez’s argument that White &
Case lacks standing to bring this interlocutory appeal. Jiménez argues that
White & Case “has no right to file an appeal to vindicate the interests” of
ALBA, which “does not wish to appeal the Order” and did not retain White
& Case. Appellee’s Br. at 47-48. Those arguments conflate the merits and
standing and simply assume that Jiménez is correct in its assertion that only
he represents ALBA.

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Second, when a district court actually disqualifies a party’s
counsel in a civil case, “the propriety of the trial court’s
disqualification order can be reviewed as effectively on appeal of a
final judgment as on an interlocutory appeal.” Richardson-Merrell,
472 U.S. at 438. This is so even though such an order could require
a party to litigate to judgment without the counsel to which it is
legally entitled. See id.
Third, the same principle applies to disqualifications of counsel
in criminal cases. See Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 267. The requirement
that a party defend against a prosecution to judgment, and potentially
conviction, with the wrong counsel—a heavier burden than White &
Case’s here—is simply “one of the painful obligations of citizenship.”
Id.9 In light of these precedents, we see no basis for treating this case
differently.10
9 We have similarly held that appeal from final judgment suffices in
other types of disputes over the control of litigation. See, e.g., Ashmore v.
CGI Grp., Inc., 860 F.3d 80, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2017) (substitution of bankruptcy
trustee for natural person as plaintiff); Metro Servs. Inc. v. Wiggins, 158 F.3d
162, 165 (2d Cir. 1998) (appointment of lead plaintiff under Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act); Schwartz v. City of New York, 57 F.3d 236,
238 (2d Cir. 1995) (withdrawal of counsel over client’s objection); Welch v.
Smith, 810 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1987) (denial of party’s motion to appoint
counsel to pursue a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim); see also, e.g., Tracy v. Lumpkin,
43 F.4th 473, 475 (5th Cir. 2022) (denial of a pro se motion to substitute
federal habeas counsel); Crain v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 918 F.3d 1294, 1296
(11th Cir. 2019) (same).
10 White & Case claims only case-specific prejudice, arguing that the
district court caused “irreversible harm” to “the legitimacy and primacy of
Venezuelan acts of state, the Ad Hoc Board’s authority under those
sovereign acts,” and “the Executive Branch’s recognition of the Interim

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Lastly, we note that White & Case has other ways to protect its
interests beyond an appeal from final judgment. It can attempt to
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which allows a district court to
certify that its order turns on a substantial question of law and that
interlocutory review is efficient. See id.11 It can also petition for a
writ of mandamus, as it did here. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706
F.3d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 2013); cf. United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd.,
839 F.3d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (granting mandamus in a
disqualification dispute). “While these discretionary review
mechanisms do not provide relief in every case, they serve as useful
safety valves for promptly correcting serious errors,” mitigating the
risk of “severe hardship” and thus the need for early appeal.
Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 111-12 (cleaned up); accord Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 378 n.13.
We hold that denials of third-party motions to substitute
counsel are effectively reviewable from final judgment.
C. Importance and Separation from the Merits
Second, denials of third-party motions to substitute counsel do
not implicate “an important issue completely separate from the merits
of the action.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
Government.” Appellant’s Br. at 56. These do not relate to “the class of
claims, taken as a whole.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107.
11 Indeed, White & Case filed a belated § 1292(b) motion after filing
this appeal. The district court denied the motion “without prejudice to
prompt reconsideration in the event that the Second Circuit may request
the issuance of an indicative ruling or in the event that the Second Circuit
rules that it does not have appellate jurisdiction over the already-filed
appeal.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 202. White & Case does not request that we seek
an indicative ruling before disposing of this appeal.

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An issue is not separate from the merits if its resolution requires the
courts of appeals “to review the nature and content of [the merits]
proceedings.” Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 439. The parties
agree that disputes about which counsel should rightfully represent a
client do not turn on the merits.
But this requirement also “insists upon important questions
separate from the merits,” ensuring that “[t]he justification for
immediate appeal [is] . . . sufficiently strong to overcome the usual
benefits of deferring.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107.12 In other
words, an “important” issue is one “weightier than the societal
interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final judgment
principles.” Digit. Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 879. Moreover, early
appeals are unlikely “to bring important error-correcting benefits”
unless they turn on “purely legal matters” within the “comparative
expertise” of appellate courts. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 316
(1995); see also Banque Nordeurope S.A. v. Banker, 970 F.2d 1129, 1131
(2d Cir. 1992) (contrasting “important question[s] of law whose
12 White & Case suggests that Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd.,
718 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2013), abrogated the collateral order doctrine’s
importance requirement. This is incorrect. Liberty Synergistics merely
clarified that we “simply cop[y] the Supreme Court’s formulation and [do]
not attempt[] to craft some additional element that the Supreme Court has
not yet recognized.” Id. at 149 n.10. And the Supreme Court
unambiguously requires the appealed issue to be important. See Mohawk
Indus., 558 U.S. at 107; Will, 546 U.S. at 351-53; Digit. Equip. Corp., 511 U.S.
at 878-79. We thus continue to assess importance when applying the
collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Bescond, 24 F.4th 759,
767-68 (2d Cir. 2021). Liberty Synergistics itself did so. See 718 F.3d at 148-
49.

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resolution will guide courts in other cases” with “merely the
application of well-settled principles of law to particular facts”).
Substitution-of-counsel disputes do not present “neat abstract
issues of law” that “need only be answered once.” Liberty
Synergistics, 718 F.3d at 148. The right to represent a client is likely
to turn on case-specific, idiosyncratic facts, such as the client’s internal
procedures for selection of counsel, the course of the litigation, and
the history of communications between the parties. Cf. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 377 (noting that the “decision whether to
disqualify an attorney ordinarily turns on the peculiar factual
situation of the case then at hand”). It may also involve the
application of idiosyncratic law, as in this case, in which the parties
appeal to the laws of El Salvador and Venezuela in addition to those
of the United States. The interest in early resolution of these fact-
intensive questions does not outweigh “the usual benefits of
deferring” review, Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107, nor would it “guide
courts in other cases” given the “particular facts,” Kensington Int’l Ltd.
v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).
Moreover, a district court’s order denying substitution of
counsel does not implicate sufficiently important “value[s] of a high
order.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107 (cleaned up). To be sure,
immediate review of the district court’s order would protect ALBA’s
putative interest in controlling the litigation. It may also protect
White & Case’s interest in representing its client. But we apply the
collateral order doctrine categorically, and as explained above, the

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Supreme Court has rejected the suggestion that controlling litigation
is sufficiently important to justify the costs of interlocutory appeal.13
In the civil disqualification context, for example, the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that an interlocutory appeal is needed
“to vindicate the client’s choice of counsel” or “the interest of the
attorneys.” Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 433 (cleaned up).
Although not having counsel of choice imposes “significant hardship
on litigants,” the costs of “piecemeal appeal” are too high. Id. at 434,
440. Early appeals would “delay proceedings on the merits until the
appeal is decided,” even “when counsel appeals an entirely proper
disqualification order.” Id. at 434. Plus, the attorney’s interest
makes interlocutory review less desirable: the “personal and
financial” element would incentivize attempts at obtaining such
review. Id. The same costs and benefits are present here. In the
criminal disqualification context too, the Supreme Court found that
“[t]he costs of . . . expansion [of the collateral order doctrine] are
great, and the potential rewards are small.” Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 269.
And White & Case, unlike a criminal defendant, has no Sixth
Amendment interests at stake. See Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151,
154 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that criminal defendants have a “qualified
13 White & Case argues that the order is important because it
“implicates important questions of State sovereignty and separation of
powers” related to “the political question and act of state doctrines.”
Appellant’s Br. at 54. Even if true, those issues are idiosyncratic to this
appeal, and do not exist in “the class of claims, taken as a whole.” Mohawk
Indus., 558 U.S. at 107. “That a fraction of [adverse] orders . . . harm[s]
individual litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable does not
justify making all such orders immediately appealable.” Id. at 112
(cleaned up).

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[Sixth Amendment] right to be represented by the counsel of [their]
choice”).
In short, “[w]e routinely require litigants to wait until after final
judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central to our
adversarial system,” such as civil choice of counsel. Mohawk Indus.,
558 U.S. at 108-09 (citing Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 426; Flanagan,
465 U.S. at 260). The interest in controlling litigation is impeded as
much by decisions disqualifying counsel as by denials of motions to
substitute counsel. It thus follows that denials of motions to
substitute counsel do not implicate “important questions” of a “high
order.” Id. at 107. So we conclude that a denial of a motion to
substitute counsel is not immediately appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. We thus lack appellate jurisdiction and must dismiss
the appeal.
D. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus
We also deny White & Case’s alternative arguments petitioning
for a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is “drastic and extraordinary,”
requiring that there are “no other adequate means to attain the relief,”
the petitioner has a “clear and indisputable” right to the writ, and “the
writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct.
for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004). White & Case cannot meet this
high standard.
First, as explained above, White & Case has “other adequate
means to attain the relief [it] desires,” id. at 380 (cleaned up), namely,
“obtain[ing] relief through the regular appeals process,” United States

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v. Manzano (In re United States), 945 F.3d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 2019).14
Second, we are satisfied that the district court’s resolution of the
representation dispute did not amount to “a judicial usurpation of
power, or a clear abuse of discretion.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380
(cleaned up). White & Case conceded the foundations of the district
court’s order—that ALBA is a Salvadoran corporation governed by
Salvadoran law, that legal representatives direct litigation under
Salvadoran law, and that ALBA’s legal representative hired Jiménez.
White & Case’s argument that the internal-affairs doctrine does not
apply in the unique circumstances of this case is not so self-evident as
to warrant granting mandamus.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS the appeal and DENY
the petition for a writ of mandamus. We otherwise DENY all
pending motions as moot.
14 The rare cases in which we have granted mandamus as a
substitute for collateral order appeal typically implicate extraordinary
confidentiality interests such that waiting for final judgment would “let the
cat out of the bag.” In re Roman Cath. Diocese of Albany, N.Y., Inc., 745 F.3d
30, 35 (2d Cir. 2014); see Prevezon Holdings, 839 F.3d at 237-38; SEC v.
Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2010); In re City of New York, 607
F.3d 923, 933-94 (2d Cir. 2010). No such circumstances exist here.

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