United States v. Poole

24-1201
United States v. Poole
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2024
No. 24-1201
U NITED S TATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ISAAC POOLE ,
Defendant-Appellant.
On Appeal from a Judgment of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York.
S UBMITTED: J ANUARY 17, 2025
D ECIDED: APRIL 7, 2025
Before: L IVINGSTON, Chief Judge, N ARDINI and MENASHI , Circuit
Judges.
While Defendant-Appellant Isaac Poole was on supervised
release following his conviction for drug offenses, he tested positive
for cocaine, and probation officers found drugs and drug

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paraphernalia in his home. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York (Brenda K. Sannes, Chief Judge)
revoked Poole’s term of supervised release and sentenced him to
eight months of imprisonment followed by ninety-six months of
supervised release. As a condition of his supervised release, the
district court required Poole to submit to suspicionless searches by
probation officers or law enforcement officers assisting them. On
appeal, Poole argues that the search condition is unsupported by the
record and involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary. We disagree and therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
Thomas R. Sutcliffe, Assistant United States
Attorney, for John A. Sarcone, United States
Attorney for the Northern District of New
York, Syracuse, NY, for Appellee.
Melissa A. Tuohey, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Office of the Federal
Public Defender, Syracuse, NY, for
Defendant-Appellant.
WILLIAM J. N ARDINI , Circuit Judge:
This appeal calls for application of our Court’s recent holding
that a sentencing court may constitutionally subject a defendant to
suspicionless searches as a condition of supervised release if that
condition is sufficiently supported by the record. United States v.
Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298, 311 (2d Cir. 2024).

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Defendant-Appellant Isaac Poole was on supervised release
following his conviction for drug offenses when probation officers
found drugs and drug paraphernalia in his home. Poole’s supervised
release conditions had already been modified once, after he tested
positive for cocaine. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York (Brenda K. Sannes, Chief Judge) revoked Poole’s
supervised release and sentenced him to eight months of
imprisonment followed by ninety-six months of supervised release.
As a condition of supervised release, the district court required Poole
to submit to suspicionless searches by probation officers or law
enforcement officers assisting them. Poole now challenges that
condition on appeal. Given Poole’s pattern of illegal drug activity,
including while on supervised release, we conclude that the district
court acted well within its discretion in imposing a suspicionless
search condition in this case. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of
the district court.
I. Background
On August 27, 2012, Poole pleaded guilty in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina to two counts of
possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of, a controlled
substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B).
Poole’s charges stemmed from his sales of crack cocaine, including
while he was on state probation for other felony drug charges. The
district court (David C. Norton, District Judge) sentenced Poole to 156
months of imprisonment, followed by eight years of supervised
release.

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On February 6, 2023, after his release from prison, Poole began
serving his term of supervised release in Syracuse, New York, where
he was born and lived for part of his childhood before moving to
South Carolina. On May 23, 2023, Poole was tested for cocaine and
returned a presumptive positive result. He initially denied any drug
use, and his urine sample was sent to a lab for confirmation. After the
sample was confirmed positive, Poole admitted to using cocaine.
With Poole’s consent, the district court modified his supervised
release conditions to require him to complete community service and
submit to searches “with reasonable suspicion concerning a violation
of a condition of probation or supervised release or unlawful
conduct.” App’x at 31–34. On July 12, 2023, the District of South
Carolina transferred jurisdiction over Poole’s supervision to the
Northern District of New York.
In April 2024, the Probation Department sought revocation of
Poole’s term of supervised release, alleging that he had violated his
release conditions by: (1) unlawfully possessing a controlled
substance; (2) committing a state criminal offense by criminally using
drug paraphernalia; and (3) unlawfully using a controlled substance.
With respect to the first two violations, the probation officer
explained that after receiving information from a source that Poole
was selling drugs in the community, probation officers visited his
home to conduct a “routine home contact” and saw what appeared to
be synthetic marijuana. App’x at 55. They returned to Poole’s home
later that same day with supervisory approval to conduct a search,
which turned up cocaine, two scales, baggies, hypodermic needles,

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and Narcan. The third alleged violation was based on Poole’s positive
drug test in May 2023.
At a final revocation hearing on April 26, 2024, Poole admitted
to the first and third violations—that is, possessing and using illegal
drugs.1 As a result of his violations, the district court revoked Poole’s
supervised release and sentenced him to eight months of
imprisonment followed by ninety-six months of supervised release.
As relevant here, the district court imposed the following supervised
release condition over Poole’s objection:
[Y]ou must submit your person and any property, house,
residence, vehicle, papers, effects, computer, electronic
communication devices, and any data storage devices or
media to search at any time, with or without a warrant,
by any federal probation officer, or any law enforcement
officer from whom the probation office has requested
assistance, concerning a violation of a condition of
probation or supervised release or unlawful conduct by
you. Any items seized may be removed to the probation
office or to the office of their designee for a more
thorough examination.
App’x at 79–80.
The district court acknowledged that the suspicionless search
condition is “highly intrusive” and that it may be imposed only if it is
“based upon an individual assessment” and “supported by specific
1 The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss the second
violation.

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reasons.” Id. at 78. But, referencing our recent decision in United
States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024), the district court found
the condition to be appropriate in this case based on Poole’s positive
cocaine test and possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia while on
supervised release. App’x at 78–79. The district court also discussed
the offense conduct underlying Poole’s conviction, which involved
selling cocaine while on state probation. Id. at 79. The district court
concluded that the search condition would “serve[] the statutory
sentencing purposes of deterrence, public protection, and
rehabilitation” and “enable the probation officer to satisfy the
statutory requirements to keep informed as to [Poole’s] conduct and
condition, to report [Poole’s] conduct and condition to [the district
court], and to aid [Poole] and bring about . . . improvements to his
conduct and condition.” Id.
On April 29, 2024, the district court entered its written
revocation judgment, which included the search condition as it was
set forth on the record at the revocation hearing. Poole now appeals,
challenging only the validity of the suspicionless search condition.
II. Discussion
We generally review the imposition of supervised release
conditions for abuse of discretion. Oliveras, 96 F.4th at 304. When,
however, “a condition of supervised release implicates a
constitutional right, we conduct a more searching review in light of
the heightened constitutional concerns presented in such cases.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).

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In accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(d), the United
States Sentencing Guidelines provide that a district court may impose
“discretionary” supervised release conditions to the extent they:
(1) are reasonably related to (A) the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (B) the need for the
sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; (C) the need to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant; and (D) the need to
provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner; and (2) involve
no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary for the purposes set forth above and are
consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b). “Notwithstanding the use of the conjunctive in
the Guidelines, a condition may be imposed if it is reasonably related
to any one or more of the specified factors.” Oliveras, 96 F.4th at 314
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“District courts possess broad discretion in imposing
conditions of supervised release.” United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198,
202 (2d Cir. 2018). This discretion, however, is not “untrammeled,”
and “we will carefully scrutinize unusual and severe conditions.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The imposition of supervised
release conditions, like other sentencing decisions, must be
procedurally and substantively reasonable. United States v. Eaglin, 913

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F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2019). In general, “[t]he procedural inquiry looks
to whether the sentencing judge has properly accounted for the
factors that constrain its sentencing discretion.” United States v. Kunz,
68 F.4th 748, 759 (2d Cir. 2023). Our procedural inquiry focuses on
whether the district court has made “an individualized assessment
when determining whether to impose a special condition of
supervised release” and “state[d] on the record the reason for
imposing [the condition].” Eaglin, 913 F.3d at 94 (quoting Betts, 886
F.3d at 202). Absent such an explanation, “we may uphold the
condition imposed only if the district court’s reasoning is self-evident
in the record.” Betts, 886 F.3d at 202 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Substantive reasonableness examines whether, after
accounting for the factors that constrain the district court’s discretion,
the imposition of the supervised release condition “can be located
within the range of permissible decisions.” Kunz, 68 F.4th at 759
(internal quotations marks omitted).
In Oliveras, we explained that a “convicted person serving a
court-imposed term of federal supervised release” has “a diminished
expectation of privacy during his period of supervision.” 96 F.4th at
309 (internal quotation marks omitted). Recognizing this diminished
privacy expectation, as well as “the special needs of probation officers
to fulfill their supervisory roles,” we held that “the Fourth
Amendment permits, when sufficiently supported by the record, the
imposition of a special condition of supervised release by the district
court that allows the probation officer conducting the supervision to
search the defendant’s person, property, vehicle, place of residence,

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or any other property under his control, without any level of
suspicion.” Id. at 311–13. In other words, a district court may impose
“a special condition of supervised release that allows for searches
without individualized suspicion” if the condition is “sufficiently
supported by the record under the factors set forth in Section
3583(d).” Id. at 311.
Here, the record amply supports the district court’s imposition
of the suspicionless search condition. As the district court explained
at the revocation hearing, the offense conduct underlying Poole’s
conviction involved selling cocaine while on state probation; then,
while on supervised release, Poole tested positive for cocaine and was
found to be in possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. App’x at
79. Under the circumstances, the district court found that the search
condition would serve the sentencing purposes of deterrence, public
protection, and rehabilitation. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(d).
The district court acted well within its discretion in making this
determination; indeed, it was entirely reasonable to find that the
search condition was an appropriate measure for discouraging Poole
from engaging in further illegal drug activity and, in turn, protecting
the public from such activity while helping Poole rehabilitate himself
as a member of society. See United States v. Monteiro, 270 F.3d 465, 469
(7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that permitting warrantless searches
“upon demand,” after the defendant had exhibited a pattern of
repeated fraudulent conduct, “clearly relate[d] to the goals of
rehabilitation and protection” and “deter[red] [the defendant] from
engaging in identity fraud after his release”).

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Consistent with our decision in Oliveras, the district court also
explained that the search condition would enable probation officers
to fulfill their statutory obligation to remain informed of Poole’s
conduct and condition, report such information to the district court,
and assist in Poole’s rehabilitation. App’x at 79; see 18 U.S.C. § 3603
(setting forth the duties of probation officers). We agree. The
“governmental interest in supervision, rehabilitation, and societal
reintegration supports a suspicionless search of an individual by his
probation officer under the special needs doctrine during a term of
supervised release because such a search is reasonably related to the
probation officer’s duties.” Oliveras, 96 F.4th at 310 (alteration
adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). District courts have
discretion to equip probation officers with appropriate tools and
instruments to exercise “the considerable investigative leeway they
need to monitor an individual on supervised release, such that they
can act as the eyes and ears for the court.” Id. at 311 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Schiff v. Dorsey, 877 F. Supp. 73, 78
(D. Conn. 1994) (Cabranes, J.) (“The federal probation officer serves
as the court’s eyes and ears not only during the presentencing phase,
but also while the offender is serving his sentence of probation.”).
Here, Poole’s pattern of illegal drug activity, including while on
supervised release, provided a basis for the district court to conclude
that constant vigilance would be required to properly supervise him.
See Monteiro, 270 F.3d at 469 (concluding that the district court “acted
well within its discretion” by imposing a suspicionless search
condition when it explained that the defendant’s “history of
fraudulent endeavors demonstrated the need for ‘exceptional

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vigilance’ on the part of law enforcement officials to discourage
recidivism”). Accordingly, this case falls squarely within the category
of cases in which the Fourth Amendment’s “special needs” doctrine
permits the imposition of a suspicionless search condition. See
Oliveras, 96 F.4th at 301–02.
Oliveras also directs courts to address whether the imposition
of a suspicionless search condition constitutes a “greater deprivation
of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of
sentencing,” id. at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted), a mandate
the district court adequately fulfilled here. In reaching this
conclusion, we reject Poole’s argument that, given the probation
officers’ discovery of his previous release violations without a
suspicionless search, less restrictive conditions would adequately
serve the statutory sentencing objectives. We have previously
suggested, and we now make clear, that probation officers need not
“rely on the occurrence of an extraordinary circumstance to properly
supervise” a defendant. See United States v. Dority, No. 23-7696-CR,
2024 WL 4634938, at *3 (2d Cir. Oct. 31, 2024) (summary order).
Probation officers discovered that Poole was in possession of drugs
and drug paraphernalia only after they received information from a
source regarding his drug activity and then coincidentally observed
synthetic marijuana in plain view at Poole’s residence, which
permitted a broader search. App’x at 55. This fortuitous chain of
events is unlikely to occur again. A district court need not leave its
supervision of an offender to the vagaries of chance. Rather, Poole’s
pattern of repeated drug infractions, which continued while he was

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under supervision, provided a sufficient basis for the district court to
conclude that less restrictive conditions would be inadequate and that
the imposition of a suspicionless search condition would not effect a
greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary.
Nor was it improper, as Poole suggests, for the district court to
rely on his drug offenses when deciding to impose the challenged
search condition. In Oliveras, we explained that district courts may
not presume “that a suspicionless search condition is warranted in
every drug case unless a defendant can demonstrate otherwise.” 96
F.4th at 315. In explaining that district courts may not rely exclusively
on “generalized considerations” to impose the condition in drug
cases, id. at 314, we did not suggest (much less hold) that drug-related
infractions can never serve as a basis for doing so. To the contrary,
we recognized that there are “valid reasons . . . why a suspicionless
search could be reasonably related to the relevant factors . . . in cases
involving drug offenses.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Here, far from
relying on a general presumption that the search condition was
appropriate simply because this is a drug case, the district court
provided case-specific reasons why Poole’s conduct warranted
imposition of the condition; this is precisely the type of
“individualized assessment” our precedent requires, see id. at 315;
Eaglin, 913 F.3d at 94, 100.
In short, the district court adequately explained why the
circumstances of this case warranted subjecting Poole to suspicionless
searches as a condition of his supervised release, and its reasoning is
well supported by the record. Accordingly, we hold that the

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imposition of the search condition was both procedurally and
substantively reasonable.
III. Conclusion
The case at hand provides an example of how and when a
district court may properly subject a defendant to suspicionless
searches as a condition of supervised release. We do not suggest that
the facts of this case present a threshold below which a suspicionless
search condition may not be imposed. Nor do we suggest that a
district court’s discretion to impose such a condition extends only to
cases in which a defendant has previously violated the terms of his
supervised release. Rather, this case illustrates one scenario in which
all the prerequisites for imposing a suspicionless search condition, as
set forth in Oliveras, have been met.
In sum, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in subjecting Poole to suspicionless searches as a condition
of his term of supervised release. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment
of the district court.

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