Lanesborough 2000, LLC v. Nextres, LLC

24-2211 (L)
Lanesborough 2000, LLC v. Nextres, LLC
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
August Term 2025
Argued: January 14, 2026
Decided: February 6, 2026
Nos. 24-2211(L), 25-662 (Con)
L ANESBOROUGH 2000, LLC,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
N EXTRES, LLC,
Respondent-Appellant.*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
No. 23-cv-07584
P. Kevin Castel, Judge.
* The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption
as set forth above.

-- 1 of 18 --

2
Before: C ARNEY , PARK , and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Lanesborough 2000, LLC brought claims against
Respondent Nextres, LLC under an arbitration agreement, alleging
that Nextres violated the parties’ loan agreement. The arbitrator
ruled for Lanesborough, and the district court (Castel, J.) confirmed
most of the arbitral award, enjoined a state-court proceeding to
effectuate that confirmation, and granted Lanesborough post-award
prejudgment interest. Nextres challenges those decisions on appeal.
But Lanesborough argues that we lack jurisdiction because the parties
waived the “right to appeal” in their arbitration agreement.
We conclude that the parties’ contractual waiver of the “right
to appeal” is not clear and unequivocal and thus cannot foreclose our
review of the district court’s judgment on the arbitral award. The
waiver provision is ambiguous because it fails to specify what is
meant by the “right to appeal.” We thus proceed to review the
district court’s judgment on the merits, without deciding whether a
clear waiver of the right to appeal a district court’s order confirming,
vacating, or otherwise ruling on an arbitration award would be
enforceable. On the merits, we conclude that the district court did
not err in partially confirming the arbitrator’s awards or in awarding
post-award prejudgment interest to Lanesborough. But the district
court erred by failing to consider whether its injunction of a state-
court foreclosure action was consistent with the Anti-Injunction Act,
which prohibits most injunctions of state-court proceedings. We
thus AFFIRM in part and VACATE in part the judgment of the
district court and REMAND for further proceedings.

-- 2 of 18 --

3
ZACHARY G. MEYER , Sutton Sachs Meyer PLLC, New York, NY,
for Respondent-Appellant.
D ANIEL L EVER , Clyde & Co. US LLP, New York, NY, for
Petitioner-Appellee.
PARK , Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Lanesborough 2000, LLC brought claims against
Respondent Nextres, LLC under an arbitration agreement, alleging
that Nextres violated the parties’ loan agreement. The arbitrator
ruled for Lanesborough, and the district court confirmed most of the
arbitral award, enjoined a state-court proceeding to effectuate that
confirmation, and granted Lanesborough post-award prejudgment
interest. Nextres challenges those decisions on appeal. But
Lanesborough argues that we lack jurisdiction because the parties
waived the “right to appeal” in their arbitration agreement.
We conclude that the parties’ contractual waiver of the “right
to appeal” is not clear and unequivocal and thus cannot foreclose our
review of the district court’s judgment on the arbitral award. The
waiver provision is ambiguous because it fails to specify what is
meant by the “right to appeal.” We thus proceed to review the
district court’s judgment on the merits, without deciding whether a
clear waiver of the right to appeal a district court’s order confirming,
vacating, or otherwise ruling on an arbitration award would be
enforceable. On the merits, we conclude that the district court did
not err in partially confirming the arbitrator’s awards or in awarding
post-award prejudgment interest to Lanesborough. But the district
court erred by failing to consider whether its injunction of a state-
court foreclosure action was consistent with the Anti-Injunction Act,

-- 3 of 18 --

4
which prohibits most injunctions of state-court proceedings. We
thus affirm in part and vacate in part the judgment of the district court
and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In July 2022, Nextres agreed to loan Lanesborough $2 million
to finance the construction of a self-storage facility in Corning, New
York. The deal was memorialized in a “Building Loan Agreement”
and an “Arbitration Agreement,” both of which are governed by New
York law.
Under the Loan Agreement, Nextres agreed to disburse $2
million to an escrow account at the closing. Lanesborough would
receive around $500,000 immediately and the rest in distributions
based on its construction progress. Nextres secured the loan with a
mortgage on the Corning property. The loan was also cross-
collateralized by the property securing another loan that Nextres had
made to Batchwood 1998, LLC, a company controlled by
Lanesborough’s owner and sole member, Rebecca Stayton. Cross-
default provisions in the Lanesborough and Batchwood loan
agreements allowed Nextres to foreclose on either property based on
a default on either loan.
In the Arbitration Agreement, the parties agreed that “any
Dispute involving the Loan . . . shall be resolved exclusively by
binding arbitration” under “the rules of the American Arbitration
Association” (“AAA”). App’x at 48. A “Dispute” included any
“claimed wrongdoing, such as misrepresentation, negligence, breach
of contract, . . . [and] breach of the covenant of good faith and fair

-- 4 of 18 --

5
dealing.” Id. But it did not include actions “for provisional
remedies such as a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction or for a permanent injunction based upon an arbitration
award.” Id. The Arbitration Agreement also stated that each
“party shall bear their own attorney[’]s fees” and that “[j]udgment on
the award may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction.”
Id.
Finally, a “Waivers” clause in the Arbitration Agreement
stated:
THE PARTIES HEREBY FREELY WAIVE THE RIGHT
TO TRIAL BY JUDGE OR JURY, THE RIGHT TO
APPEAL, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND
APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.
Id.
B. The Arbitration
Lanesborough brought an arbitration claim for damages and
injunctive relief, alleging that Nextres violated the Loan Agreement
by failing to disburse the loan funds. The AAA arbitrator held a
five-hour “emergency hearing” on Lanesborough’s claims for
injunctive relief and then ordered Nextres to disburse the loan funds
to Lanesborough in several emergency awards.
After a final hearing on the merits, the arbitrator issued an
Interim Award concluding that Nextres had breached the Loan
Agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The arbitrator granted Lanesborough declaratory and injunctive relief
and consequential damages. But the arbitrator denied
Lanesborough’s request for interest on the undisbursed loan funds
because he “regard[ed] an award of interest to be redundant” of his

-- 5 of 18 --

6
award of consequential damages, which included interest paid
during “the year long delay caused by Nextres.” App’x at 826.
The arbitrator also concluded that Lanesborough was entitled
to attorney’s fees based on an arbitration rule allowing for an award
of fees if both parties request such an award. Although the
arbitrator grounded his authority to award fees in the arbitration rule,
his rationale for awarding fees rested on Nextres’s “bad faith conduct
[which] continued throughout the arbitration.” Id. at 827. That
conduct included Nextres refusing to answer an interrogatory after
being ordered to do so, providing “irrelevant bank records” to
substantiate its (apparently false) claim that it had deposited the loan
funds into the escrow account, and arguing in bad faith that an
attachment to the Loan Agreement that Lanesborough offered into
evidence was falsified. Id. at 820-21. The arbitrator then denied as
moot Lanesborough’s request for an award of attorney’s fees as a
sanction.
After receiving further submissions on attorney’s fees, the
arbitrator issued a Final Award granting Lanesborough over $300,000
in attorney’s fees. The arbitrator explained again that Nextres’s
conduct had been “improper in the extreme” and “inexcusable,” he
recounted the litany of Nextres’s misconduct, and “[t]herefore,” he
awarded Lanesborough attorney’s fees. Id. at 2212. The arbitrator
also pointed to the arbitration rule as a “separate and independent
basis for awarding fees.” Id.
C. District Court Proceedings
Lanesborough and Nextres filed cross-petitions to confirm and
to vacate the Interim and Final Awards. The district court initially
concluded that the arbitrator exceeded his powers under the

-- 6 of 18 --

7
Arbitration Agreement when he awarded Lanesborough injunctive
relief and attorney’s fees, citing the Arbitration Agreement’s
provisions that actions for “provisional remedies” were not arbitrable
and that each “party shall bear their own attorney[’]s fees.” App’x
at 2601, 2606, 2608. The court also rejected Lanesborough’s
argument that Nextres had waived this objection by requesting
attorney’s fees under the Arbitration Agreement because Nextres had
requested fees under the Loan Agreement. So it confirmed the
portions of the Interim Award granting Lanesborough consequential
damages and declaratory relief, vacated the portions of the Interim
Award granting Lanesborough injunctive relief, and vacated the Final
Award granting Lanesborough attorney’s fees. The district court
also invited Lanesborough to “move for permanent injunctive or
equitable relief based on the declaratory relief that the Court has
confirmed,” reasoning that the parties “have the right to bring such a
claim in court” under the Arbitration Agreement. Id. at 2613-14.
After Lanesborough moved for reconsideration of the district
court’s judgment, the district court reversed its vacatur of the Final
Award and confirmed the award of attorney’s fees to Lanesborough.
It determined that the Arbitration Agreement’s fee provision did not
curtail an “arbitrator’s inherent power to award attorney’s fees for
bad faith conduct,” and explained that the arbitrator had “explicitly
found that Nextres acted in bad faith.” Id. at 3213.
The district court also granted Lanesborough’s motion for new
injunctive relief to be issued by the district court. It ordered Nextres
to send Lanesborough over $1 million in loan proceeds and otherwise
to comply with the Loan Agreement. It also enjoined Nextres “from
the institution or continued maintenance of any foreclosure action,”

-- 7 of 18 --

8
including a foreclosure action Nextres had brought against
Batchwood, Nextres, LLC et al. v. Batchwood 1998 LLC, et al., No.
EFCA2024-000708 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the “Batchwood Foreclosure
Action”). App’x at 3221. The district court reasoned that
Lanesborough would “suffer irreparable harm” without that
injunction because the “continued existence of Nextres’ foreclosure
proceedings is an impediment to [Lanesborough] securing alternate
financing” for its self-storage facility in Corning. Id. at 3220-21.
Finally, the district court granted Lanesborough pre- and post-
judgment interest.
Nextres timely appealed. The district court stayed the
enforcement of its judgment pending our review.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
Lanesborough moves to dismiss Nextres’s appeal, arguing that
we lack jurisdiction on the ground that Nextres waived the “right to
appeal” in the Arbitration Agreement. Nextres argues that the
parties waived the AAA’s arbitration appeals process “without
placing any limitation upon the scope of post-arbitral judicial
proceedings.” Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 4.
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) permits parties to appeal
an order “confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial
award” and “a final decision with respect to an arbitration” subject to
the FAA, so we have statutory jurisdiction over this appeal. 9
U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(D), (a)(3). The “normal construction of the
jurisdiction rules includes a presumption that, where jurisdiction
exists, it cannot be ousted or waived absent a clear indication of such

-- 8 of 18 --

9
a purpose.” John Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki
Importers & Distribs. Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1994) (quotation marks
omitted). Relying on this principle, we have held that “[f]orum
selection clauses lacking any clear exclusionary or obligatory
language” will not be construed to deprive courts of jurisdiction.
Glob. Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 659 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir.
2011). And we have reviewed a district court’s vacatur of an arbitral
award even though the parties agreed to a vague waiver of appellate
review. See Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 2003),
abrogated on other grounds by Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552
U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008) (resolving appeal when arbitration agreement
said arbitrator’s decision shall not be subject to “any type of review or
appeal whatsoever” (emphasis added)).
We thus conclude that a contractual waiver of the right to
appeal that is not clear and unambiguous cannot foreclose our review
of a district court’s judgment on an arbitral award. That conclusion
is consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s holding that “contractual
provisions limiting the right to appeal from a district court’s
judgment confirming or vacating an arbitration award” must be
“clear and unequivocal.” MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 830
(10th Cir. 2005). Here, the scope of the waiver of the “right to
appeal” in the Arbitration Agreement is ambiguous, so it cannot bar
our consideration of the merits of this appeal. We thus need not
decide whether a clear and unambiguous waiver of appellate review
of the district court’s judgment on an arbitral award would be
enforceable under the FAA. Cf. Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 64 (declining to
enforce an agreement that “bar[red] all judicial review” of an arbitral
award (emphasis added)).

-- 9 of 18 --

10
The ambiguity in the Arbitration Agreement arises from a
tension between the text and the context of the waiver provision.
The text states broadly that the parties waived the “right to appeal,”
with no limitation. App’x at 48. Lanesborough thus argues that
the waiver applies to all actions between the parties, including
arbitrations and suits brought in court. But that broad reading is
inconsistent with the context of the waiver, which suggests a
narrower interpretation. The parties waived the “right to appeal” in
a clause that also waives “the right to trial by judge or jury, . . . pretrial
discovery and application of the rules of evidence.” Id.
Collectively, these waived rights represent procedural protections of
the court system, which the parties waived for “Disputes” subject to
arbitration. In context then, the waiver of the “right to appeal” can
be understood to encompass only potential appeals of the merits of
arbitrators’ decisions. Cf. Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S.
26, 36 (1990) (“The traditional canon of construction, noscitur a sociis,
dictates that words grouped in a list should be given related
meaning.” (cleaned up)).
Nextres’s appeal to our court illustrates the incompatibility of
these two interpretations, and the resulting ambiguity in the waiver.
A waiver of all appeals would include Nextres’s appeal of the district
court’s grant of post-award prejudgment interest and injunctive
relief. But if the parties waived only appeals of arbitral awards, the
waiver would not include those grants, which the district court made
in the first instance. It is also unclear whether a waiver of appeals of
arbitral awards would include Nextres’s appeal of the district court’s
confirmation order because an appeal of a confirmation order
typically considers the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitral
award, not the substance of the award. See Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC,

-- 10 of 18 --

11
450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006) (Federal courts “are not” “engaged in
judicial review of arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration
Act.”); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). The waiver of the “right to appeal” is thus
“susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation”: first, it
could mean that the parties waived all appeals, and second, it could
mean that the parties waived only appeals of the substance of arbitral
awards. Brad H. v. City of New York, 951 N.E.2d 743, 746 (N.Y. 2011).
That renders the waiver ambiguous, id., and thus unenforceable.
This conclusion is consistent with other Circuits’
interpretations of appellate waivers in arbitration agreements. The
Arbitration Agreement is unlike waivers that other Courts of Appeals
have construed to bar appellate review of district courts’ orders
confirming arbitral awards, which were explicit about the “right to
appeal” at issue. For example, the Tenth Circuit enforced an
appellate waiver stating that “[j]udgment upon the award rendered by the
arbitrator shall be final and nonappealable.” MACTEC, 427 F.3d at
827 (emphasis added). And the Fourth Circuit enforced a waiver
stating that an arbitral award was “enforceable in any court of
competent jurisdiction without any right of judicial review or appeal.”
Beckley Oncology Assocs., Inc. v. Abumasmah, 993 F.3d 261, 262 (4th Cir.
2021) (quotation marks omitted). In contrast, the waiver of the
“right to appeal” here does not identify which appeals the parties
waived.
Lanesborough responds that we should construe any
ambiguity in the Arbitration Agreement against Nextres, which
drafted it. See Albany Sav. Bank, FSB v. Halpin, 117 F.3d 669, 674 (2d
Cir. 1997) (“New York contract law includes the rule that ambiguities
in contracts should be construed against the drafter.”). But that rule

-- 11 of 18 --

12
applies “only as a matter of last resort after all aids to construction
have been employed without a satisfactory result.” Id. (citation
omitted). The Supreme Court has thus declined to apply this canon
of construction when “the FAA provides the default rule for
resolving . . . ambiguities in arbitration agreements” through a clear-
statement requirement. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176, 186,
189 (2019). So too here. Applying the rule that appellate waivers
must be clear and unequivocal means that we need not consider the
rule that ambiguous contractual language should be construed
against the drafter.
B. Confirmation of Arbitral Awards
Nextres argues that the district court erred in partially
confirming the Interim Award and in confirming the Final Award.
“We review a district court’s decision to confirm an arbitration award
de novo to the extent it turns on legal questions, and we review any
findings of fact for clear error.” A&A Maint. Enter., Inc. v. Ramnarain,
982 F.3d 864, 868 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). We afford “strong
deference” to “arbitral awards and the arbitral process”—we do not
conduct “de novo review of an arbitral award.” Scandinavian
Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 71-72
(2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).
1. Interim Award
The district court correctly rejected Nextres’s argument that the
arbitrator was guilty of misconduct and exceeded his authority in
issuing the Interim Award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3)-(4) (awards may
be vacated when an arbitrator “exceeded [his] powers” or is “guilty
of . . . misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced”).

-- 12 of 18 --

13
Nextres says that the arbitrator engaged in “prejudicial
misconduct” and exceeded his authority by (1) “improperly
accord[ing] ‘law of the case’ treatment to the ‘emergency’” injunctive
awards he issued, (2) “allowing [Lanesborough’s] attorney to testify”
at the merits hearing and “utilizing such testimony as the basis for his
finding of liability,” (3) awarding Lanesborough consequential
damages when Lanesborough’s witness had inadequate “knowledge
or information” about liability and damages, and (4) awarding
consequential damages when Lanesborough “failed to prove the
underlying liability.” Appellant’s Br. at 39, 46, 49, 52. These points
do not support Nextres’s claim that the district court should have
vacated the Interim Award.
First, arbitral awards may be vacated for “prejudicial
misconduct” only “where fundamental fairness is violated,” such as
when an arbitrator fails to give each party “to the dispute an adequate
opportunity to present its evidence and argument.” Tempo Shain
Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997) (quotation marks
omitted). Nextres cannot satisfy that standard because, as the
arbitrator observed, “Nextres had the right and opportunity to call
and cross any witness it wished,” including “anyone affiliated with
Lanesborough,” at the final hearing. App’x at 824. And the
arbitrator concluded that Lanesborough’s claims were “well
substantiated by the evidence, including the documentary evidence
submitted by both parties” and “the testimony of Nextres’ own
witness.” Id.1 So “fundamental fairness” was not “violated” at the
final hearing. Tempo Shain, 120 F.3d at 20.
1 As Nextres admits, the arbitrator said he was considering
Lanesborough’s attorney’s statements “as an opening argument.”

-- 13 of 18 --

14
Second, courts vacate arbitral awards for “excess of authority”
only when an arbitrator lacks “the power, based on the parties’
submissions or the arbitration agreement, to reach a certain issue.”
A&A Maint., 982 F.3d at 868 (quotation marks omitted). This inquiry
does not consider “whether the arbitrator[] correctly decided that
issue.” Id. (cleaned up). The district court confirmed only the
portions of the Interim Award that granted Lanesborough’s claims for
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and that awarded Lanesborough declaratory relief
and damages. Those decisions fell within the arbitrator’s powers
under the Arbitration Agreement, which subjected claims for “breach
of contract” and “breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing” to mandatory arbitration, and withdrew from arbitration
only actions for injunctive relief. App’x at 48. So the district court
did not err in partially confirming the Interim Award.
2. Final Award
The district court correctly rejected Nextres’s argument that the
arbitrator exceeded his powers in granting attorney’s fees to
Lanesborough. In ReliaStar Life Insurance Co. of New York v. EMC
National Life Co., 564 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2009), we held that an arbitration
agreement stating that “each party will bear its own attorney’s fees”
did not limit an arbitrator’s authority to award fees to “sanction bad
faith conduct.” Id. at 88. So too here. The Arbitration Agreement
states that “[e]ach party shall bear their own attorney[’]s fees.”
App’x at 48. We interpret that language “to reflect the parties’
agreement that the arbitrator[] may not factor attorney’s . . . fees into
Appellant’s Br. at 47 (quotation marks omitted). We see no reason to
doubt that representation.

-- 14 of 18 --

15
awards that result from the parties’ expected good faith arbitration of
a dispute,” not to “preclud[e] an award of attorney’s . . . fees [based
on] a party’s bad faith dealings.” ReliaStar, 564 F.3d at 88.
The arbitrator’s discussion makes it clear that he awarded
attorney’s fees to Lanesborough based on Nextres’s “bad faith
conduct [which] continued throughout the arbitration.” App’x at
827; see also id. at 2212.2 As the arbitrator found, and the district court
reiterated, that conduct included Nextres refusing to answer an
interrogatory, providing irrelevant documents to substantiate false
claims, and objecting in bad faith to documents Lanesborough offered
into evidence. Nextres offers no explanation for that conduct, and
instead broadly claims that it “exhibited no ‘bad faith’ either prior to
or after commencement of the arbitration.” Appellant’s Br. at 33.
Even if Nextres disputed the arbitrator’s specific findings of bad faith,
that challenge would fail because an “arbitrator’s factual findings”
generally “are not subject to judicial challenge.” Westerbeke Corp. v.
Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 214 (2d Cir. 2002). So the district
court also did not err in confirming the Final Award.
C. Injunction of Batchwood Foreclosure Action
Nextres argues that the district court’s injunction of the
Batchwood Foreclosure Action is inconsistent with the Anti-
2 The fact that the arbitrator considered Lanesborough’s separate
request for arbitral fees as a sanction to be moot does not negate this
conclusion. Neither does the arbitrator’s reference to an arbitral rule
allowing him to award fees when both parties request them—which he
described as a “separate and independent” basis in the Final Award.
App’x at 2212. The arbitrator explained that Nextres’s “unfair,”
“inexcusable,” and “bad faith conduct” warranted its award. Id. at 827,
2212.

-- 15 of 18 --

16
Injunction Act (“AIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2283. We review a district court’s
decision to grant or deny injunctive relief for abuse of discretion but
review legal questions, including the interpretation of the AIA, de
novo. Wyly v. Weiss, 697 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 2012). The AIA
prohibits federal courts from granting “an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court” unless an injunction is “expressly
authorized by Act of Congress,” “necessary in aid of [the court’s]
jurisdiction,” or necessary “to protect or effectuate its judgments.”
28 U.S.C. § 2283.
The parties dispute whether the injunction of the Batchwood
Foreclosure Action falls under the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception
or the exception for federal courts to “protect or effectuate” their
judgments, often called the “relitigation” exception. Id. The “in aid
of jurisdiction” exception applies “where the effect of a state court
proceeding would be to defeat or impair the jurisdiction of the federal
court.” Wyly, 697 F.3d at 137 (cleaned up). The “relitigation”
exception “authorizes a federal court to enjoin state litigation of a
claim or issue that previously was presented to and decided by the
federal court.” Id. at 139 (quotation marks omitted). These
“exceptions are narrow and are not to be enlarged by loose statutory
construction.” Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988)
(cleaned up). So any “doubts as to the propriety of a federal
injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor
of permitting the state courts to proceed.” Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v.
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970).
The district court did not assess whether its injunction of the
Batchwood Foreclosure Action fell under these narrow exceptions.
Instead, it issued that injunction on the ground that the “continued

-- 16 of 18 --

17
existence of Nextres’ foreclosure proceedings is an impediment to
[Lanesborough] securing alternate financing” for its construction of
the Corning self-storage facility. App’x at 3220. That rationale
appears to have no basis in the AIA, so we vacate the injunction and
remand for the district court to assess whether it comports with the
AIA or requires reformulation.
D. Prejudgment Interest
The district court awarded Lanesborough prejudgment interest
from the date of the Interim Award “through the date of the entry of
the judgment in this action.” App’x at 3223. Nextres argues that
this award was barred by the law of the case. “We review a district
court’s award of prejudgment interest for an abuse of discretion.”
Fed. Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 639 F.3d 557, 566 (2d Cir. 2011).
“New York recognizes two distinct periods of ‘prejudgment
interest’”: pre-award and post-award. ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. TIG
Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 163, 179 (2d Cir. 2022). Unlike pre-award
prejudgment interest, “post-award prejudgment interest is a statutory
requirement that falls inherently outside an arbitrator’s authority and
within the authority of the courts.” Id. at 180. District courts
generally grant post-award prejudgment interest. Cf. Waterside
Ocean Navigation Co. v. Int’l Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 154 (2d Cir.
1984) (recognizing “presumption in favor” of such interest for
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards).
Nextres’s “law of the case” argument conflates pre-award
prejudgment interest with post-award prejudgment interest. The
arbitrator determined that Lanesborough was not entitled to the
former, and the district court awarded the latter. The “doctrine of

-- 17 of 18 --

18
law of the case comes into play only with respect to issues previously
determined.” Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n.18 (1979). It has
no application here because the arbitrator did not, and could not,
decide whether Lanesborough was entitled to post-award
prejudgment interest.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Lanesborough’s motion to
dismiss and affirm the district court’s partial confirmation of the
Interim Award, its confirmation of the Final Award, and its award of
prejudgment interest. But we vacate the injunction of the
Batchwood Foreclosure Action and remand for the district court to
consider whether the AIA permits that injunction.

-- 18 of 18 --