United States v. Woods

24-2485-cr
United States v. Woods
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2024
(Argued: June 12, 2025 Decided: February 5, 2026)
Docket No. 24-2485-cr
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JONES J. WOODS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
Before:
LOHIER, CARNEY, and PÉREZ, Circuit Judges.
In June 2023 the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York found that defendant Jones J. Woods was incompetent to stand trial.
If a criminal defendant is found incompetent to stand trial, the district court must
order him hospitalized in federal custody for a “reasonable period of time, not to
exceed four months.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). For the criminal case to proceed,
the court must then find that there exists a “substantial probability that in the
foreseeable future” the defendant will be restored to competency. Id. And if the
court makes that finding, it can order that the defendant remain in custodial
hospitalization for “an additional reasonable period of time” until he becomes
competent. Id. § 4241(d)(2)(A). But in the event the district court finds that the
defendant likely cannot be restored to competency, the Government must then

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decide whether to release the defendant or, if it believes that release would pose
a danger to the community, seek the defendant’s civil commitment in a suitable
facility that can adequately treat his mental illness. Id. §§ 4241(d), 4246(a),
4248(a). Here, as the Government considered how to proceed, the District Court
ordered Woods’s custodial hospitalization for 45 days under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b)
after he had already been hospitalized for more than four months. This appeal
raises two questions: (1) whether any challenge to the District Court’s now-
expired order extending Woods’s hospitalization is moot; and (2) whether the
District Court could prolong Woods’s hospitalization for an additional
reasonable period past the initially authorized four months while the
Government weighed whether to seek his civil commitment.
We AFFIRM the District Court’s order as authorized by 18 U.S.C.
§ 4241(d)(2)(B) insofar as it compelled Woods’s continued hospitalization beyond
the four-month period. Because we conclude that the remainder of Woods’s
challenges to the District Court’s order are moot, the appeal is otherwise
DISMISSED.
MARTIN J. V OGELBAUM, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender for the
Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant-
Appellant.
S EAN C. E LDRIDGE , Assistant United States Attorney, for
Michael DiGiacomo, United States Attorney for the
Western District of New York, Rochester, NY, for
Appellee.
L OHIER , Circuit Judge:
If a criminal defendant is found incompetent to stand trial, the district
court must order him hospitalized in federal custody for a “reasonable period of
time, not to exceed four months.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). For the criminal case to

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proceed, the court must then find that there exists a “substantial probability that
in the foreseeable future” the defendant will be restored to competency. Id. And
if the court makes that finding, it can order that the defendant remain in
custodial hospitalization for “an additional reasonable period of time” until he
becomes competent. Id. § 4241(d)(2)(A). But the Government also plays an
important role in the event the district court finds that the defendant likely cannot
be restored to competency. The Government must then decide whether to
release the defendant or, if it believes that release would pose a danger to the
community, to seek the defendant’s civil commitment in a suitable facility that
can adequately treat his mental illness. See id. §§ 4241(d), 4246(a), 4248(a).
Here, as the Government was considering its options, the District Court
ordered that defendant Jones J. Woods be custodially hospitalized for 45 days
after it found that Woods likely could not be restored to competency and Woods
had already been hospitalized for more than four months. This appeal raises the
question whether the District Court could prolong Woods’s hospitalization for
an additional reasonable period past the initially authorized four months while
the Government weighed whether to seek his civil commitment.
We AFFIRM the District Court’s order insofar as it ordered Woods’s

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continued hospitalization beyond the four-month period. Because we conclude
that the remainder of Woods’s challenges to the order are moot, the appeal is
otherwise DISMISSED.
I
Woods was charged with depredation against federal property in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1361 for throwing rocks at the windows of the United States
Attorney’s Office in Buffalo, New York in January 2023. On January 31, 2023,
Woods entered an initial appearance before the Magistrate Judge in the United
States District Court for the Western District of New York, but his erratic
behavior during that and a later appearance prompted the court to order a
psychiatric evaluation. After a hearing in June 2023, the court found Woods
incompetent to stand trial and ordered him hospitalized in a suitable Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) facility for a period not to exceed four months to determine
whether he could be restored to competency. See id. § 4241(d)(1). After delays
that are not at issue on this appeal, Woods was finally hospitalized in January
2024 for evaluation at FMC Devens in Massachusetts.
Although Woods’s four-month period of custodial hospitalization lapsed
in May 2024, he remained in custody at FMC Devens. Some three months later,

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in August 2024, after receiving an evaluation from an FMC Devens physician, the
Magistrate Judge found that there was no substantial probability that Woods
would be restored to competency and, over the objections of Woods’s counsel,
ordered that he remain hospitalized at FMC Devens for another 45 days under 18
U.S.C. § 4247(b) and also ordered the director of FMC Devens to evaluate
whether Woods posed a danger to others. Woods appealed the Magistrate
Judge’s order to the District Court, which affirmed the order in its entirety on
September 6, 2024.1
In late August 2024, with the Magistrate Judge’s order still in effect, the
Government filed a “certificate of dangerousness” as to Woods in the Western
District of New York. Such a certificate reflects the Government’s belief that a
defendant who is otherwise poised to be released from federal detention is
“presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his
release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or
serious damage to property of another.” Id. § 4246(a); see also id. § 4248(a). Filing
the certificate automatically “stay[s] the release of the [defendant] pending [the]
completion of” civil commitment procedures. Id. § 4246(a); see also id. § 4248(a).
1 We refer to the Magistrate Judge’s August order and the District Court’s September
affirmance collectively as “the August 2024 order” or “the District Court’s order.”

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The Government’s certificate of dangerousness ensured that Woods
remained committed at FMC Devens even after the August 2024 order’s 45-day
extension of custodial hospitalization lapsed. Shortly after certifying that Woods
continued to pose a danger, the Government filed a civil commitment petition
against Woods in the District of Massachusetts. See United States v. Woods, No.
24-CV-11524, 2025 WL 1489979, at *2 (D. Mass. May 23, 2025). That action
remains ongoing. On appeal to this Court, Woods challenges the District Court’s
statutory authority to enter the August 2024 order in the Western District of New
York.
II
We first address whether Woods’s challenge to the now-expired August
2024 order is moot in view of the fact that the Government completed its
psychiatric evaluation of Woods for dangerousness and Woods, though still
detained, is technically no longer subject to that order. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). As we explain below, we are persuaded
that the appeal is moot only in part.
“A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’
for purposes of Article III [of the United States Constitution]—when the issues

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presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quotation marks
omitted). So a case on appeal is moot if the possibility of relief is “too remote
and speculative to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”
United States v. Key, 602 F.3d 492, 494 (2d Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). But “the
availability of a partial remedy is sufficient to prevent a case from being moot”
even though that relief is less than “fully satisfactory.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S.
165, 177 (2013) (cleaned up). An appeal is moot, in other words, only when it is
“impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing
party.” Cnty. of Westchester v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 778 F.3d 412, 416
(2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted); see Knox v. Serv.
Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307–08 (2012). For that reason, a
defendant’s appeal from an expired detention order remains a live case or
controversy as long as “prevailing on appeal would relieve him of some concrete
and identifiable collateral effect of that” order. United States v. Hamdi, 432 F.3d
115, 118 (2d Cir. 2005).

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A
With these principles in mind, we conclude that Woods’s appeal from the
August 2024 order is moot insofar as the order authorized the Government to
evaluate Woods for dangerousness. The Government completed its evaluation
long ago, and Woods has not requested that the District Court order the
Government to conduct a reevaluation. Woods cannot show that he would
receive “any effectual relief” if we were to vacate this portion of the order. Knox,
567 U.S. at 307 (quotation marks omitted).
B
The District Court’s order is not moot, however, insofar as it committed
Woods to 45 additional days of custodial hospitalization after August 2. During
that 45-day period, the Government initiated civil commitment proceedings
against Woods in the District of Massachusetts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a).
For that statute to apply, Woods must have been lawfully “committed to the
custody of the Attorney General pursuant to [18 U.S.C. §] 4241(d)” at the time
that the Government filed its petition in the District of Massachusetts. 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246(a)2; see also id. § 4248(a). Woods contends that this precondition was not
2 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) provides in relevant part:

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satisfied at the time the Government initiated civil commitment proceedings
against him because the Western District of New York’s August 2024 detention
order is invalid.
In the District of Massachusetts, where Woods moved on that basis to
dismiss as untimely the Government’s petition to have him civilly committed,
the Government did not dispute that it can initiate civil commitment proceedings
only against a person who is already in lawful custody pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 4241(d). See Woods, 2025 WL 1489979, at *4. But the Government requested
that the District of Massachusetts hold Woods’s motion in abeyance pending our
(a) Institution of Proceeding.—If the director of a facility in which a person
is hospitalized certifies that a person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons
whose sentence is about to expire, or who has been committed to the
custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d), or against
whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely for reasons related
to the mental condition of the person, is presently suffering from a mental
disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial
risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of
another, . . . he shall transmit the certificate to the clerk of the court for the
district in which the person is confined. The clerk shall send a copy of the
certificate to the person, and to the attorney for the Government, and, if the
person was committed pursuant to section 4241(d), to the clerk of the court
that ordered the commitment. The court shall order a hearing to determine
whether the person is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as
a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury
to another person or serious damage to property of another. A certificate
filed under this subsection shall stay the release of the person pending
completion of procedures contained in this section.

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resolution of the validity of the August 2024 order in this appeal. Id. at *3.
Because the legal basis for Woods’s § 4241(d) detention was on appeal before this
Court, the District of Massachusetts denied Woods’s motion to dismiss the
Government’s petition but did so without prejudice to refiling the motion,
depending on the outcome of this appeal. Id. at *4, *6. The District of
Massachusetts described its reasoning as follows:
Between May 16, 2024, and September 16, 2024, Woods was
committed pursuant to orders from the Western District of
New York. The court denies consideration of the motion to
dismiss the petition as to Woods’[s] commitment during that
period, where the matter is pending in the Second Circuit. If
the Second Circuit affirms those orders, there will be no further
matter for this court to consider as to that period. If the Second
Circuit vacates those orders, Woods may renew his motion to
dismiss based on his detention prior to September 16, 2024.
Id. at *4.
As this complicated set of proceedings in competing fora shows, the
federal civil commitment scheme contemplates a role for both the district court
that initially “ordered the commitment” of the defendant pending the initiation
of civil commitment proceedings—here, the Western District of New York—and
“the court for the district in which the [defendant] is confined” pursuant to that
order—here, the District of Massachusetts. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). The latter court

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typically eventually presides over the defendant’s civil commitment proceedings.
Which court, though, is best positioned to evaluate whether the timing
deadlines of § 4241(d) and § 4246(a) were violated?
Consider, as in this case, the defendant who is subject to district court civil
commitment proceedings in Circuit B but first challenges his detention order on
direct, expedited appeal in Circuit A. By the time Circuit A hears the appeal, the
detention order will likely have expired and the defendant’s release
automatically “stay[ed]” pending the completion of civil commitment
proceedings in Circuit B. See id. The stay may compel Circuit A to dismiss the
appeal as moot on the ground that a “new statutory bas[i]s superseded the
original bas[i]s for [the] order[] challenged on appeal,” such that vacatur would
not lead to the defendant’s release. United States v. Alhindi, 124 F.4th 869, 874
(11th Cir. 2024); see id. at 875 (“Because Alhindi’s current commitment is
authorized by section 4246, not section 4241(d), this appeal is moot.”).
Or, flipping the storyline, suppose the defendant challenges the lawfulness
of his detention order in the district court in Circuit B that presides over his civil
commitment proceedings, rather than on appeal to Circuit A from the district
court that entered the order—in effect, an improper horizontal appeal from one

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district court to another. See Klayman v. Rao, 49 F.4th 550, 552–53 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
Circuit B may then conclude that the defendant “waived his right to challenge
the alleged[ly]” unlawful order because he failed to raise his argument “at the
proper time and place”—that is, by challenging the order on appeal to Circuit A.
United States v. Ryan, 52 F.4th 719, 722–23 (8th Cir. 2022).
Both scenarios illustrate the vexing procedural dilemma that a defendant
in Woods’s position faces. Whether the District of Massachusetts decides to
dismiss the Government’s civil commitment proceedings as untimely depends
on this Court’s resolution of the lawfulness of the August 2024 order entered in
the Western District of New York. Yet whether the appeal in this Court remains
alive or is moot depends on the likelihood that the District of Massachusetts will
dismiss the civil commitment proceedings if we find the order to be invalid. An
added complication is that Woods raised his challenge to the timeliness of the
proceedings in both this Court and the District of Massachusetts. As the District
of Massachusetts’s order suggests, both courts facing that situation risk engaging
in a never-ending “gastonette,” each “awaiting a first move by the other,” while
leaving Woods “consign[ed] . . . to a jurisdictional limbo.” In re McLean Indus.,
Inc., 857 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (Newman, J.).

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Even with these complexities, the circumstances of this case persuade us
that the appeal is not moot. If we were to vacate the August 2024 order, the
District of Massachusetts has already telegraphed that it will grant Woods leave
to refile his motion to dismiss the Government’s civil commitment petition as
untimely. See Woods, 2025 WL 1489979, at *4. To be sure, Woods’s motion in
Massachusetts, “like any” motion, “might prove fruitless” on the merits.
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 463 (2017). “[B]ut the mere
possibility of failure does not eliminate the value of the [motion] or [Woods’s]
injury in being unable to bring it.” Id. at 463–64. So we cannot say that it is
“impossible” for us to “grant any effectual relief whatever” to Woods. Knox, 567
U.S. at 307 (quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, the appeal of an expired
detention order survives as long as vacatur could partially redress an injury by
creating an opportunity for relief in another court. See, e.g., Janakievski v. Exec.
Dir., Rochester Psychiatric Ctr., 955 F.3d 314, 324 (2d Cir. 2020) (challenge to state
civil commitment orders was not moot because vacatur would provide
opportunity to challenge state conditions of release); see also Hamdi, 432 F.3d at
120 (appeal of expired sentence was not moot because “a sentence reduction
presents a reasonable and sufficient probability of affecting a favorable outcome

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in a future application for . . . relief” under § 212(d)(3) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which allows for re-entry into the United States at the Attorney
General’s discretion).
For these reasons, we conclude that the appeal is not moot insofar as it
challenges the District Court’s order committing Woods to 45 additional days of
custodial hospitalization.
III
Turning to the merits of that challenge on appeal before us, Woods’s sole
argument is that a district court has no statutory authority to order his continued
custodial hospitalization (in Woods’s case, for 45 days) if, as here, the
defendant’s initial four-month period of custodial hospitalization has lapsed
without a finding of a substantial probability that he can be restored to
competency in the foreseeable future, and the Government has not yet filed a
certificate of dangerousness. We disagree and hold that the complex web of
statutory provisions in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(d), 4246, and 4247 permits a district
court to order a defendant’s continued commitment after an initial four-month

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period of custodial hospitalization has lapsed, even if it finds that there is no
substantial probability that the defendant would be restored to competency.
Under § 4241(d)(1), a defendant must be committed to BOP custody for a
“reasonable” period of time after a district court finds him incompetent to stand
trial. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). Before the criminal case can proceed, the court must
determine that there exists “a substantial probability that in the foreseeable
future” the defendant will be restored to competency. Id. The statute limits this
initial period of custodial hospitalization to “four months.” Id.
As the first four-month period expires, however, § 4241(d)(2) provides that
the district court may commit the defendant for “an additional reasonable period
of time until” one of two events takes place: (A) “his mental condition is so
improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there is a substantial
probability that within such additional period of time he will attain the capacity
to permit the proceedings to go forward,” or (B) “the pending charges against
him are disposed of according to law,” “whichever is earlier.” Id.
§§ 4241(d)(2)(A), (B). In United States v. Magassouba, we explained that
§ 4241(d)(2)(B) “is most obviously construed to permit additional custodial
hospitalization of incompetent defendants who are not expected to regain

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competency until the criminal charges against them are dismissed in favor of
civil commitment proceedings.” 544 F.3d 387, 405 n.9 (2d Cir. 2008). So where,
as here, a defendant’s charges have not been “disposed of according to law”3 and
the district court determines that there is no substantial probability that the
defendant will regain competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future,
§ 4241(d)(2)(B) authorizes the defendant’s continued custodial hospitalization for
“an additional reasonable period of time” to permit the Government to decide
whether to seek his civil commitment. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(B); see also United
States v. Wayda, 966 F.3d 294, 305 (4th Cir. 2020).
To be sure, the District Court did not rely on § 4241(d)(2)(B) when it
entered its August 2024 order. It relied instead on § 4247(b), which permits a
court, “for the purposes of an examination pursuant to an order under . . .
[§ 4246],” to commit a defendant “for a reasonable period, but not to exceed
forty-five days, to the custody of the Attorney General for placement in a suitable
facility.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b). That statutory provision, however, applies only
after the government has filed a certificate of dangerousness, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246(a), and the government had not yet done so when the Magistrate Judge
3 Woods’s charges had not yet been dismissed at the time of the District Court’s August
2024 order.

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entered its order affirmed by the District Court. But we affirm the District
Court’s order on the basis that the District Court had the authority to continue
Woods’s hospitalization under § 4241(d)(2)(B). See Metzler Inv. Gmbh v. Chipotle
Mexican Grill, Inc., 970 F.3d 133, 148 (2d Cir. 2020).
Our interpretation of § 4241(d)(2)(A) and § 4241(d)(2)(B) fits neatly within
the constitutional limits identified in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In
Jackson, the Supreme Court held that due process prohibited the indefinite
detention of a defendant “on the ground of incompetency alone,” but permitted
his continued detention for no more than a “reasonable period of time” as
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable
future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the
[Government] must either institute the customary civil
commitment proceeding that would be required to commit
indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant.
Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant
probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued
commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal.
Id. at 738. Congress enacted § 4241 specifically “in response to the due process
concerns identified in Jackson.” United States v. Brennan, 928 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir.
2019) (quotation marks omitted). Section 4241(d)(2)(B) accordingly offers the
Government a reasonable period to decide whether to initiate civil commitment

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proceedings against a defendant whose incompetency establishes the lack of
substantial probability “that he will ever be able to participate fully in a trial.”
Jackson, 406 U.S. at 739.
Urging a contrary conclusion, Woods contends that the District Court
relinquished its statutory authority to order his continued custodial
hospitalization, regardless of its restorability finding, when it failed to act within
the initial four-month period of custodial hospitalization contemplated by
§ 4241(d)(1). We cannot square that argument with our holding in Magassouba
that § 4241 “does not affirmatively require a district court to issue a § 4241(d)(2)
commitment order before the expiration of [the] § 4241(d)(1) hospitalization
order, nor does it strip a district court of the authority to do so thereafter.”
Magassouba, 544 F.3d at 409. Although Magassouba related to an order entered
pursuant to § 4241(d)(2)(A), its rationale applies with equal force to commitment
orders entered under § 4241(d)(2)(B).
IV
To be clear, today we hold only that § 4241(d) authorizes district courts to
subject a defendant to an additional reasonable period of custodial
hospitalization after the initial four-month hospitalization period and after

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finding that there is no substantial probability that he will be restored to
competency. Because Woods did not raise further issues on appeal, we do not
address whether Woods’s entire period of pretrial custody can be cast as
“reasonable” within the meaning of § 4241(d) or the Due Process Clause. Nor do
we resolve whether the 45 day-period authorized in this case itself reflects a
“reasonable” period of continued hospitalization within the meaning of
§ 4241(d)(2).
Finally, we expect that “when dealing with incompetent defendants,
district courts will, in fact, generally strive to avoid breaks in custodial
hospitalization by entering § 4241(d)(2) orders, whenever possible, before the
expiration of § 4241(d)(1) orders.” Magassouba, 544 F.3d at 409. As for the
Government’s obligations, we agree with the following observation of the Fourth
Circuit:
When the government has in its custody an individual whose
incapacity renders him unable to stand trial and therefore
eventually subject either to possible release or civil
commitment, we expect the government to “strive to certify”
individuals in a time frame that eliminates or at least minimizes
the time spent as an incompetent, unrestorable person waiting
for a § [4246 or §] 4248 determination. This principle aligns
with the § 4241(d) commitment provisions because it suggests
a limiting principle for the § 4241(d)(2)(B) “until the pending
charges against him are disposed of according to law” period.

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That “reasonable period of time” should not be so short as to
not accord the government reasonable time to seek and file
certification of a person pursuant to [§] 4246 . . ., but it should
only be so long as to allow for reasonable explainable
administrative delays in that certification process.
Wayda, 966 F.3d at 308 (cleaned up).
We have considered Woods’s remaining arguments and conclude that they
are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the District Court’s
order insofar as it committed Woods to custodial hospitalization for 45 days, and
we otherwise DISMISS the appeal.

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