United States v. Lawrence

24-419
United States v. Lawrence
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term 2024
Argued: December 13, 2024
Decided: June 2, 2025
No. 24-419-cr
U NITED S TATES OF AMERICA
Appellee,
v.
A NDREW L AWRENCE , AKA S NACKS ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
No. 1:23-cr-228
Denise L. Cote, Judge.

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Before: P ARK, MENASHI, and K AHN, Circuit Judges.
Andrew Lawrence pleaded guilty to selling drugs, including
crack cocaine, and was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment and
a three-year term of supervised release. Lawrence now challenges the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of that sentence. First, he
claims that the district court failed to address the Sentencing
Guidelines’ differential treatment of crack and powder cocaine.
Second, Lawrence argues that a supervised release condition
permitting him to be searched upon reasonable suspicion is not
supported by an adequate on-the-record justification.
We reject Lawrence’s arguments. The district court acted
within its discretion in treating crack and powder cocaine offenses
differently, and it did not need to address the parties’ policy
arguments to the contrary. The district court also reasonably imposed
a limited search condition, which was justified by the court’s adoption
of the reasons provided in Lawrence’s Pre-Sentence Report. We thus
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
A NDREW JONES (with Nathan Rehn on the brief), Assistant
United States Attorneys, Of Counsel, for Damian
Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
D ANIEL HABIB , Of Counsel, Federal Defenders of New
York, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.

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PARK, Circuit Judge:
Andrew Lawrence pleaded guilty to selling drugs, including
crack cocaine, and was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment and
a three-year term of supervised release. Lawrence now challenges the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of that sentence. First, he
claims that the district court failed to address the Sentencing
Guidelines’ differential treatment of crack and powder cocaine.
Second, Lawrence argues that a supervised release condition
permitting him to be searched upon reasonable suspicion is not
supported by an adequate on-the-record justification.
We reject Lawrence’s arguments. The district court acted
within its discretion in treating crack and powder cocaine offenses
differently, and it did not need to address the parties’ policy
arguments to the contrary. The district court also reasonably imposed
a limited search condition, which was justified by the court’s adoption
of the reasons provided in Lawrence’s Pre-Sentence Report. We thus
affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
Over a four-month span, Lawrence made six drug sales to a
confidential government source. Each time, he used a cellphone to
text the source about the quantity and type of drug he was selling, as
well as when and where to meet. In total, Lawrence sold over five
grams of crack cocaine, 14 grams of powder cocaine, and one gram of
fentanyl and fentanyl analogues. A subsequent search of Lawrence’s
bedroom uncovered additional crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and

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fentanyl, as well as ammunition for a .32-caliber firearm and $1,800 in
cash.
Lawrence has three prior state convictions and a prior federal
conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm. He was still serving
the term of supervised release on his federal conviction when he
committed the offense at issue.
B. Procedural History
The government charged Lawrence with six counts of
distributing and possessing with intent to distribute a controlled
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). He
pleaded guilty.
The Probation Office then prepared a Pre-Sentence Report
(“PSR”) that calculated Lawrence’s recommended sentence under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. To do so, it combined the
various drugs Lawrence had possessed and distributed into a
“converted drug weight.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. 8(B). The Guidelines
specify that one gram of crack cocaine equals 3,571 grams of
converted drug weight, one gram of powder cocaine equals 200
grams of converted drug weight, one gram of fentanyl equals 2,500
grams of converted drug weight, and one gram of fentanyl analogue
equals 100,000 grams of converted drug weight. Id. cmt. 8(D).
Lawrence’s offense involved a total converted drug weight of 99.14
kilograms.1 Given his criminal history and offense characteristics,
1 Lawrence possessed and distributed 17.908 grams of crack cocaine
(63.95 kgs of converted drug weight), 14.92 grams of powder cocaine (2.98
kgs of converted drug weight), 11.412 grams of fentanyl (28.53 kgs of

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that translated into a recommended sentence of 33 to 41 months of
imprisonment.
The PSR also recommended a three-year term of supervised
release. Among other conditions of that term of supervised release,
the PSR proposed requiring Lawrence to “submit [his] person, and
any property, residence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic
communication, data storage devices, cloud storage or media, and
effects to a search . . . when there is reasonable suspicion concerning
violation of a condition of supervision or unlawful conduct.”
Lawrence Br. at 19.
Lawrence and the government both argued for a term of
imprisonment shorter than the PSR’s sentencing range calculation. In
particular, the parties objected to the Guidelines’ differential
treatment of crack and powder cocaine. As noted above, the
converted drug weight of one gram of crack cocaine is 3,571 grams,
but the converted drug weight of one gram of powder cocaine is only
200 grams. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. 8(D). In this sense, the Guidelines
punish crack-cocaine offenses almost 18 times more severely than
powder-cocaine offenses.
The parties asked the district court to disregard this disparity
by sentencing Lawrence as if the crack cocaine he possessed and
distributed were actually powder cocaine. If that were the case,
Lawrence’s offense would have involved a converted drug weight of
converted drug weight), and .368 grams of fentanyl analogue (3.68 kgs of
converted drug weight). 63.95 + 2.98 + 28.53 + 3.68 = 99.14 kgs of converted
drug weight.

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38.77 kilograms, rather than 99.14 kilograms. So his sentencing range
would have been 15 to 21 months of imprisonment, instead of 33 to
41 months.
At Lawrence’s sentencing hearing, the district court rejected
this proposal. It noted that the parties “are both arguing to me about
where the sentence should fall, as if we had a . . . conversion of the
amount of crack into what would be counted if it were instead
[powder] cocaine.” Joint App’x at 115. But the court sentenced
Lawrence to 36 months of imprisonment, which was within the
Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months, not the parties’ proposed range
of 15 to 21 months.
The district court explained that it was sending Lawrence “a
message that tells [him] you have to change the trajectory of your
life.” Joint App’x at 135. After his prior offenses, Lawrence “did not
take advantage of . . . opportunities to show that he can change his life
in a way that would comply with the requirements of the law,” id. at
119, so the court urged Lawrence “to use this time to think deeply
about the path you’re on,” id. at 135.
The district court also directed the parties’ attention to “the PSR
and the special conditions [it] recommended.” Joint App’x at 117.
The court said those conditions “seem[ed] appropriate,” so it required
Lawrence to “submit [his] person to a reasonable search as described
in the PSR.” Id. at 118, 136.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review sentences—including conditions of supervised
release—for procedural and substantive reasonableness. This

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“amounts to review for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Cavera,
550 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 2008).
Procedural reasonableness assesses “the procedure employed
in arriving at the sentence.” United States v. Johnson, 567 F.3d 40, 51
(2d Cir. 2009). For example, a “district court commits procedural
error where it fails to calculate the Guidelines range . . . or treats the
Guidelines as mandatory.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190.
Substantive reasonableness assesses whether a sentence,
“although procedurally correct, [is] . . . unsupportable as a matter of
law.” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). “[W]e
will not substitute our own judgment for the district court’s on the
question of what [sentence] is sufficient,” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189, so
substantive reasonableness “provide[s] relief only in the proverbial
‘rare case,’” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 123.
III. DISCUSSION
Lawrence argues that his 36-month term of imprisonment and
the search condition of his supervised release are procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. We reject both challenges.
A. Term of Imprisonment
1. Procedural Reasonableness
Lawrence argues that his term of imprisonment is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court did not (1) explain why it
imposed a 36-month sentence, or (2) address the parties’ argument for
sentencing him as if the crack cocaine he sold and distributed were
actually powder cocaine. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (requiring a court to

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“state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular
sentence”). Lawrence says these mistakes were magnified because
the court was “applying the crack Guideline,” which is especially
“dubious” and must be handled “with great care.” Lawrence Br. at
41 (quotation marks omitted).
“[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a
particular case,” no “lengthy explanation” is needed. Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). “Circumstances may well make clear
that the judge rests his decision upon the [Sentencing] Commission’s
own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence,” id.
at 357, so it is sufficient for the district court to “state[] simply that the
Guidelines sentence imposed was ‘appropriate,’” Chavez-Meza v.
United States, 585 U.S. 109, 117 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).
The district court here did more than that. It discussed
Lawrence’s criminal history, which showed he had “not take[n]
advantage of . . . opportunities to . . . change his life in a way that
would comply with the requirements of the law.” Joint App’x at 119.
In light of this history, the court explained that it was imposing a
sentence that would give Lawrence “time to think deeply about the
path you’re on” and send “a message that [says] you have to change
the trajectory of your life.” Id. at 135.
The district court did not need to address the sentencing
disparity between crack and powder cocaine. “We have time and
time again made it clear” that a district court need not “make specific

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responses to points argued by counsel in connection with
sentencing.” United States v. Bonilla, 618 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).2
We also reject Lawrence’s novel suggestion that certain within-
Guidelines sentences require more explanation than others. There is
no such distinction in the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), which merely
requires that the court “state . . . the reasons for its imposition of the
particular sentence.” If a defendant believes the reasons for the
sentence are “dubious,” that goes to whether the punishment is
“unsupportable as a matter of law.” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 123. But it does
not call into question “the procedure employed in arriving at the
sentence.” Johnson, 567 F.3d at 51.
2. Substantive Reasonableness
Lawrence argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable because the Guidelines’ differential treatment of crack
and powder cocaine “lacks empirical grounding, yields irrational
results, and, worst of all, visits disproportionately severe punishment
on Black defendants.” Lawrence Br. at 41.3 He thus compares his
2 See also, e.g., United States v. Salim, 690 F.3d 115, 127 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“While the district court did not directly reject Salim’s argument . . . we
have never required judges to [do so].”); United States v. Thomas, 628 F.3d
64, 72 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have rejected the notion that a district court
must respond specifically to even a non-frivolous argument concerning a
policy disagreement with [the] Guidelines.”); United States v. Villafuerte, 502
F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e do not insist that the district court
address every argument the defendant has made.”).
3 The Sentencing Commission has at times noted that “the
crack/powder sentencing disparity is generally unwarranted,” but it has

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sentence to one we found substantively unreasonable in United States
v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010). In Dorvee, we pointed to “serious
flaws in § 2G2.2,” id. at 182, and concluded that “application of the
Guidelines in Dorvee’s case led to an irrational result,” United States
v. Brown, 843 F.3d 74, 83 (2d Cir. 2016). Lawrence says the same is
true here: There are serious flaws in the Guidelines’ treatment of
crack-cocaine offenses, so his within-Guidelines sentence is
substantively unreasonable.
We reject this argument for two reasons. First, it overreads
Dorvee. “In Dorvee, we did not impose a heightened standard for the
application of § 2G2.2,” United States v. Clarke, 979 F.3d 82, 99 (2d Cir.
2020), or “require courts to disregard the guidelines entirely,” United
States v. Caraher, 973 F.3d 57, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2020). In fact, “[w]e have
never held that a district court is required to reject an applicable
Guideline.” Salim, 690 F.3d at 126. Dorvee merely held that
“straightforward application” of § 2G2.2 “‘can lead to unreasonable
sentences’” for the least culpable subset of eligible defendants—i.e.,
first-time offenders who were “not involved in production of child
pornography and had no contact with children.” United States v.
Muzio, 966 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 184).
Second, we have repeatedly rejected efforts to expand Dorvee’s
substantive-reasonableness holding beyond the “eccentric” § 2G2.2
never urged the “identical treatment of crack and powder cocaine” that
Lawrence seeks. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 98 (2007) (emphasis
added). “[C]rack is more addictive than powder, crack offenses are more
likely to involve weapons or bodily injury, and crack distribution is
associated with higher levels of crime.” Id.

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Guideline. Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 187; see, e.g., United States v. Perez-Frias,
636 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2011) (illegal reentry); Salim, 690 F.3d 115
(terrorism); Bonilla, 618 F.3d 102 (crime of violence). This is because
“the relevant flaw we identified in Dorvee” was unique—namely, that
“Congress ignored the Commission and directly amended the
Guideline” itself. Perez-Frias, 636 F.3d at 43. Dorvee described this as
the single “most significant effort to marginalize the role of the
Sentencing Commission in the federal sentencing process since the
Commission was created by Congress.” 616 F.3d at 185 (quotation
marks omitted).4
Section 2G2.2 is a limited and singular exception to the rule
“that in the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence
will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that [are]
reasonable.” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006).
That rule reflects the fact that when we consider “a within-Guidelines
sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing
4 In passing, Dorvee compared § 2G2.2 to “the Guidelines’ treatment
of crack cocaine convictions,” 616 F.3d at 188, but we have recognized that
this comparison was dicta, see, e.g., United States v. Cox, 458 F. App’x 79, 83
(2d Cir. 2012). Unlike § 2G2.2, the Sentencing Commission “chose” to “key
the Guidelines to the statutory mandatory minimum sentences that
Congress established for [drug] crimes.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
46 n.2 (2007). And Congress’s mandatory minimums have also been
shaped by the Commission’s input. The crack-powder sentencing
differential was once 100 to 1, but after the Commission “recommended
lowering the ratio at least to 20 to 1,” Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 99 (quotation
marks omitted), Congress adopted the 18 to 1 ratio in place today, see Dorsey
v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 269 (2012).

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Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper
sentence in the particular case.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.5
B. Search Condition
1. Procedural Reasonableness
“[F]or the imposition of special conditions of supervised release
to be procedurally reasonable, a District Court must make an
individualized assessment” that includes “findings specific to the
defendant.” United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2024)
(quotation marks omitted). The court must also “state on the record
the reason for imposing” the condition by “connecting those findings
to the . . . factors that would justify including the special condition.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted).6
Lawrence argues that the district court did not follow this
procedure when it imposed the search condition. He says the court
5 To be sure, “district courts are entitled to reject and vary
categorically from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on a policy
disagreement with those Guidelines.” Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261,
265-66 (2009). But when as here a district court opts not to vary, it does not
abuse its discretion in doing so.
6 If a condition of supervised release “implicates a constitutional
right” in an “unusual and severe” way, that goes only to the substantive
reasonableness of the condition. United States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88, 95 (2d
Cir. 2019). It does not affect the procedural reasonableness of the court’s
explanation. Cf. United States v. Kunz, 68 F.4th 748, 760 (2d Cir. 2023)
(finding justification for computer monitoring condition procedurally
reasonable despite “brusque and generalized explanation”).

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noted only that the condition “seems appropriate,” which is an
insufficient explanation.
We reject Lawrence’s argument because it overlooks that the
district court adopted the search condition from the PSR.7 See Joint
App’x at 136 (requiring Lawrence to “submit [his] person to a
reasonable search as described in the PSR”). When a court adopts
recommendations in the PSR, it satisfies its obligation to make
findings as long as the PSR “state[s] enough facts to permit
meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455,
476 (2d Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted). Adopting the PSR also
states the court’s reasons in open court because the PSR provides the
grounds for the sentence imposed. See United States v. Molina, 356
F.3d 269, 277 (2d Cir. 2004). For these reasons, our assessment of the
procedural reasonableness of a condition of supervised release looks
to “[t]he district court’s comments, as well as the PSR’s . . . justifications
for the application of [the] condition.” United States v. Bryant, 976 F.3d
165, 184 (2d Cir. 2020) (emphasis added).
Lawrence’s PSR contained a lengthy discussion of his criminal
history, personal background, and offense conduct. At the sentencing
hearing, the district court directed the parties’ attention to the special
conditions recommended in the PSR, “effectively incorporating them
by reference.” United States v. Arguedas, 134 F.4th 54, 69 (2d Cir. 2025).
That satisfied the district court’s obligation to make an individualized
7 We find no procedural error in the district court’s explanation, so
we need not consider whether any error was harmless because “the court’s
reasoning is self-evident in the record.” Sims, 92 F.4th at 124 (quotation
marks omitted).

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assessment and state on the record the reason for imposing the search
condition.
To be sure, the PSR did not discuss why Lawrence’s criminal
history called for a search condition in particular, or why the
condition should allow for searches of Lawrence’s computer
specifically. But the explanation for a special condition need not be
so precise. See Kunz, 68 F.4th at 760 (“The court was under no
obligation to . . . pick through every condition and explain, point-by-
point, how each was responsive to the offending conduct.”). The
specific obligation to state on the record the reason for imposing a
special condition is merely a subset of the broader requirement to
“state in open court the reasons for . . . the particular sentence.” 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c). And that requirement leaves the “appropriateness
of brevity or length” to “the judge’s own professional judgment.”
Rita, 551 U.S. at 356; see also United States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181, 194
(2d Cir. 2017) (“[A] district court is under no obligation to provide
elaborate reasons for the sentence it imposes.”).8
8 The PSR’s discussion of Lawrence’s criminal history also provided
an “individualized assessment.” Sims, 92 F.4th at 123 (quotation marks
omitted). A “district court fail[s] to make an individualized assessment”
only when it relies “on broad statements . . . untethered to any specific
consideration to the facts and circumstances.” United States v. Oliveras, 96
F.4th 298, 314 (2d Cir. 2024). Here, the PSR described Lawrence’s
background and offense conduct, which were “case-specific reasons,” that
offered “precisely the type of individualized assessment our precedent
requires.” United States v. Poole, 133 F.4th 205, 212 (2d Cir. 2025) (quotation
marks omitted).

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2. Substantive Reasonableness
Lawrence argues that the search condition is an “extraordinary
invasion of [his] constitutional privacy” that must be “narrowly
tailored.” Lawrence Br. at 22, 48 (quotation marks omitted). And he
says the search condition fails to meet that standard because it allows
for searches of his computer, even though he used only a cellphone to
sell drugs.
We reject Lawrence’s argument for three reasons. First, we
require “narrow tailoring” only when a “special condition implicates
a fundamental liberty interest.” United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117,
126 (2d Cir. 2005). A search condition that requires reasonable
suspicion does not implicate such a fundamental interest because “an
offender on supervised release has a diminished expectation of
privacy that is inherent in the very term ‘supervised release.’” United
States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69, 77 (2d Cir. 2025) (cleaned up); see also Mont
v. United States, 587 U.S. 514, 523 (2019) (“Supervised
release . . . permits a defendant a kind of conditional liberty.”).
Second, even when a supervised release condition must be
narrowly tailored, “the overarching inquiry is as to reasonableness,”
United States v. McLaurin, 731 F.3d 258, 262 (2d Cir. 2013), and “we
will not substitute our own judgment for the district court’s,” Cavera,
550 F.3d at 189. In that sense, our review of narrowly tailored
conditions is comparable to our review of terms of imprisonment,
which, in their own right, must be “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Just as we would not second-guess
why Lawrence’s term of imprisonment was 36 months and not 35, our
assessment of whether Lawrence’s search condition is narrowly

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tailored likewise “should exhibit restraint, not micromanagement.”
United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). Otherwise,
narrow tailoring would “be an invitation to mischief by tinkering
with any sentence that appellate judges simply do not like.” Rigas,
583 F.3d at 123.9
Finally, the search condition did not need to have a direct
relationship to Lawrence’s offense. A district court may impose a
condition unrelated to “the nature and circumstances of the offense”
if (1) it is “reasonably related” to “the history and characteristics of
the defendant” or “the need . . . to afford adequate deterrence,”
“protect the public from further crimes,” and “provide the defendant
with . . . correctional treatment”; and (2) the condition “involve[s] no
greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.” U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.3(b). Given this flexibility, “we have never held that an
electronic search term would only be appropriate . . . if [a
defendant’s] convictions involved . . . the use of electronics.” United
States v. Robinson, 134 F.4th 104, 112 (2d Cir. 2025). So although
Lawrence used only a cellphone to sell drugs, “we cannot conclude
that this is the rare case that cannot be located within the range of
9 In United States v. Oliveras, we noted “we have not hesitated to
remand . . . where a less intrusive condition appeared to be a viable
option.” 96 F.4th at 316 (quotation marks omitted). But Oliveras was
referring to a case in which the district court changed the conditions of a
defendant’s supervised release, see Eaglin, 913 F.3d at 88, so by “viable
option,” we merely meant “the earlier . . . restriction,” id. at 98. Beyond this
limited context in which a court changes a condition of supervised release,
we have never suggested that it is appropriate to compare the special
conditions a district court actually imposed to those it hypothetically could
have.

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permissible decisions.” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 124 (quotation marks
omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
Lawrence’s term of imprisonment and conditions of supervised
release are procedurally and substantively reasonable. We thus
affirm the judgment of the district court.

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