Juca v. Banks

25-2327
Juca v. Banks
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term 2025
Argued: April 15, 2026
Decided: August 20, 2026
No. 25-2327
J HOANA J UCA,
as Parent and Natural Guardian of K.A.
and Individually,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
D AVID C. B ANKS,
in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York
City Department of Education,
N EW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF E DUCATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
No. 24-cv-07154, Jessica G. L. Clarke, Judge.
Before: C HIN, S ULLIVAN, Circuit Judges, and V ACCA, District Judge. *
* Judge Meredith A. Vacca, of the United States District Court for the Western District of New
York, sitting by designation.

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Plaintiff-Appellant Jhoana Juca, the parent of a teenager with
developmental and physical disabilities, appeals from an order of the district court
(i) dismissing her claims against the New York City Department of Education (the
“DOE”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and
(ii) denying her motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. Upon review, we
conclude that (a) we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal, (b) the district court
did not err in dismissing Juca’s amended complaint for failure to exhaust her
administrative remedies under the IDEA, and (c) Juca’s claims related to the 2024–
25 school year are moot. We therefore AFFIRM in part the district court’s August
26, 2025 judgment and order and DISMISS the remainder of this appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND D ISMISSED IN PART .
N ICOLE L ANCIA (Rory J. Bellantoni, on the brief),
Liberty & Freedom Legal Group, New York,
NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
MACKENZIE FILLOW (Richard Dearing and
Claude Platton, on the brief), Assistant
Corporation Counsel, for Muriel Goode-
Trufant, Corporation Counsel of the City of
New York, New York, NY, for Defendants-
Appellees.
RICHARD J. S ULLIVAN, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Jhoana Juca, the parent of a teenager with
developmental and physical disabilities, appeals from an order of the district court
(i) dismissing her claims against the New York City Department of Education (the
“DOE”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and
(ii) denying her motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. Upon review, we

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conclude that (a) we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal, (b) the district court
did not err in dismissing Juca’s amended complaint for failure to exhaust her
administrative remedies under the IDEA, and (c) Juca’s claims related to the 2024–
25 school year are moot. We therefore AFFIRM in part the district court’s August
26, 2025 judgment and order and DISMISS the remainder of this appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2023, as required by the IDEA, the DOE developed an individualized
education plan (an “IEP”) for K.A. Juca disagreed with the plan and instead
enrolled her child in a private school called the International Institute for the Brain
(“iBrain”), a private school in New York City providing educational services for
children with special needs. Juca then filed an administrative complaint
pursuant to the IDEA alleging that the DOE had failed to provide her child with a
free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) during the 2022–23 and 2023–24
school years. Juca subsequently filed a similar complaint for the 2024–25 school
year.
As to the 2022–23 school year, the state’s first-level adjudicator – the
Impartial Hearing Officer (the “IHO”) – determined that the DOE did not provide
K.A. with a FAPE but held that equitable considerations weighed against

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reimbursing Juca for K.A.’s private-school tuition. After an appeal, the state’s
second-level adjudicator – the State Review Officer (the “SRO”) – reversed the
IHO’s ruling and ordered reimbursement in a decision handed down in July 2024
(the “SRO’s July 2024 Determination”).
As to the 2023–24 school year, the IHO determined that the DOE had offered
K.A. a FAPE, so no reimbursement was given to Juca for that school year. Juca
again appealed and the SRO again reversed, ruling that the DOE had not offered
K.A. a FAPE. But rather than ordering the DOE to reimburse Juca, the SRO
remanded for the IHO to weigh whether equitable considerations justified
reimbursement. In February 2025, the IHO ruled that those considerations
weighed against reimbursing Juca. There is no indication in the record that Juca
appealed that ruling to an SRO.
And finally, as to the 2024–25 school year, the IHO determined that the DOE
did not provide K.A. with a FAPE but ruled that equitable considerations weighed
against reimbursement. Juca again appealed, and the SRO again sided with Juca,
ordering the DOE to “directly fund the costs of the student’s full program at iBrain
during the 2024–25 extended school year, including tuition, related services,
special transportation services provided by Sisters Travel, and 1:1 nursing services

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provided by B&H Health Care at the contracted[-]for rates.” Application of a
Student with a Disability, SRO Dec. No. 24-610, at 30 (N.Y. Educ. Dep’t May 27, 2025)
(cited in Juca Br. at 31 n.4).
On December 3, 2024, Juca filed an amended complaint in the district court
alleging that the DOE failed to provide K.A. with a FAPE. She also moved for a
preliminary injunction to compel the DOE to comply with the terms of the SRO’s
July 2024 Determination for the 2023–24 and 2024–25 school years, even though
that determination applied on its face only to Juca’s claims for the 2022–23 school
year. The district court denied Juca’s motion and dismissed her complaint
because Juca (i) had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies required by the
IDEA for the 2023–24 and 2024–25 school years and (ii) did not allege a violation
of the IDEA’s so-called stay-put provision (which, as discussed below, will
ordinarily excuse a failure to exhaust). See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). Juca timely
appealed.
II. D ISCUSSION
A. We Have Appellate Jurisdiction.
We must determine, as a threshold matter, whether we have jurisdiction to
consider this appeal. Generally speaking, we lack jurisdiction to hear appeals of

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non-final judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. And the record below makes clear
that the order from which Juca appeals was not a final judgment because the
complaint was dismissed without prejudice, and Juca was given leave to amend. 1
“However, an appellant can render such a non-final order ‘final’ and
appealable by disclaiming any intent to amend.” Slayton v. Am. Express Co.,
460 F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2006). And we have held that appellants can disclaim
such intention at oral argument or in their appellate briefing, either of which will
cure the “potential obstacle to appellate jurisdiction.” Jewish People for the
Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Vill. of Westhampton Beach, 778 F.3d 390, 394 (2d
Cir. 2015) (exercising appellate jurisdiction pursuant to section 1291 where the
“[p]laintiffs’ reply brief disclaim[ed] any intent to revive their dismissed claim”);
16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 254–55 (2d Cir. 2015) (treating the district
court’s order as final when appellant agreed to dismissal with prejudice at oral
argument); Goldberg v. Pace Univ., 88 F.4th 204, 209 n.7 (2d Cir. 2023) (explaining
that plaintiff’s submission of “a statement of his binding intention to abandon [the]
1 Juca did not assert jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, which permits interlocutory review
of a denial of an order for a preliminary injunction, and instead relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which
permits appeals only of final orders.

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claim” in response to an order to show cause issued by our Court “cleared the way
for our [Court’s] exercise of appellate jurisdiction” under section 1291).
Here, Juca disclaimed any intent to amend the complaint in her opening
brief. And at oral argument, Juca further disclaimed any intent to amend.
Consequently, we have jurisdiction to consider Juca’s challenge to the district
court’s dismissal of her IDEA claims. 2
B. Juca Failed to Exhaust Her Claim to Enforce the SRO’s July 2024
Determination as to the 2023–24 School Year.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true
and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Palmer v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 51 F.4th 491, 503 (2d Cir. 2022). To survive a motion to dismiss,
a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), which would “allow[] the
2 Although Juca has disclaimed any intention of amending her complaint, she nonetheless asserts
on appeal that the district court erred in limiting the scope of the allegations to be included in any
amended pleading. See Juca Br. at 31–33. But Juca cannot simultaneously contend that the
district court erroneously narrowed the scope of her amended pleading while also disclaiming
any intent to amend her pleadings in the first place. Given Juca’s representations that she wishes
to give up her ability to file an amended complaint, we deem her challenge to the scope of the
amended pleading to be waived. See supra at 6–7.

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court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Juca does not dispute that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies
under the IDEA. See Juca Br. at 21; App’x at 105. Instead, she alleges that the
DOE violated 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (the “stay-put provision”), which, if true, exempts
her from the requirement to exhaust her administrative remedies. See Ventura de
Paulino v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 959 F.3d 519, 536 (2d Cir. 2020) (“An action that
alleges a violation of the stay-put provision falls within one or more of the
exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement of the
[IDEA].”). Consequently, her complaint rises and falls on the question of whether
she plausibly alleged a violation of the stay-put provision. She has not.
“The IDEA contains a stay-put or pendency provision[,] which provides that
‘during the pendency of any proceedings,’ the child is entitled to ‘remain in her
then-current educational placement’ at public expense.” Mendez v. Banks, 65 F.4th
56, 59 (2d Cir. 2023) (alteration adopted) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)). “Parents
can also unilaterally change their child’s placement during the pendency of review
proceedings – for instance, by enrolling them in private school – but they do so at
their own financial risk.” Id. (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks

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omitted); see also Ventura de Paulino v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 959 F.3d 519, 531 (2d
Cir. 2020) (“We have interpreted this provision to require a school district to
continue funding whatever educational placement was last agreed upon for the
child until the relevant administrative and judicial proceedings are complete.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Juca argues that the SRO’s July 2024 Determination (which applied only to
the 2022–23 school year) necessarily covered the 2023–24 school year as well; she
therefore contends that the DOE’s refusal to reimburse her for the 2023–24 school
year violated the stay-put provision. In making this argument, she relies on our
decision in Mackey ex rel. Thomas M. v. Board of Education for Arlington Central School
District, 386 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004). But that case differs markedly from this one.
In Mackey, we exercised our “equitable authority” to order a prior year’s “SRO
decision [to] be applied retroactively” to a subsequent school year “[o]nly because
the SRO was derelict, through no fault of the parents,” in issuing his decision. Id.
at 164–65 (emphasis added). No such facts are pleaded here. Indeed, from our
review of the record, it seems clear that any delay is attributable to Juca, who did
not appeal the IHO’s February 2025 determination (on remand from the SRO)
concerning the 2023–24 school year. Because Juca has not alleged sufficient facts

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from which we can infer that the DOE violated the stay-put provision, the district
court did not err in concluding that Juca failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies and dismissing her complaint.
C. Juca’s Claim to Enforce the SRO’s July 2024 Determination as to the 2024–
25 School Year is Moot.
Juca’s claims related to the 2024–25 school year are moot both because Juca
has already obtained the relief she requested for that year and, in any event, the
complained-of school year has long since ended. It is well settled that a claim
becomes moot when a claimant gets everything she could have gotten on that
claim. See Ruesch v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 25 F.4th 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2022)
(dismissing claims as moot because “no live controversy remains where a party
has obtained all the relief she could receive on the claim through further litigation”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., Ramos v. Samuels, No. 25-1321,
2026 WL 1346852, at *3 (2d Cir. May 14, 2026) (“Because the 2024–2025 school year
has ended, Plaintiffs-Appellants cannot now claim that any child’s placement at
iBrain for that school year is at risk.”). Accordingly, we need not address this
issue on appeal if Juca has already obtained complete relief.
We conclude that she has. On May 27, 2025 – about six months after Juca
filed her amended complaint – an SRO again sustained Juca’s administrative

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appeal and ordered the DOE to “directly fund the costs of [K.A.]’s full program at
iBrain during the 2024–25 extended school year, including tuition, related services,
special transportation services provided by Sisters Travel, and 1:1 nursing services
provided by B&H Health Care at the contracted[-]for rates.” Application of a
Student with a Disability, SRO Dec. No. 24-610, at 30 (N.Y. Educ. Dep’t May 27, 2025)
(cited in Juca Br. at 31 n.4). With respect to the 2024–25 school year, Juca’s
amended complaint sought “[a]n order that DOE fund the pendency placement at
iBRAIN with transportation and nursing services for the 2024–2025 year,” App’x
at 117, and “[a] preliminary injunction or other order finding that the July 2024
SRO Decision is the basis of K.A.’s pendency relative to the 2024–2025 Case,” id.
The first request for relief has now been fully achieved by virtue of the SRO’s May
2025 decision. See supra at 10. And the second is now legally irrelevant because
the DOE is already required – by a subsequent, unchallenged order from the SRO
– to pay for K.A.’s placement. See Radha Geismann, M.D., P.C. v. ZocDoc, Inc., 909
F.3d 534, 541 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that “a lawsuit – or an individual claim –
becomes moot when a plaintiff actually receives all of the relief he or she could
receive on the claim” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., Scheff v.
Banks, No. 23-1006, 2024 WL 3982986, at *3 (2d Cir. Aug. 29, 2024) (dismissing

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appeal because “now that the underlying IDEA proceedings have ended in [the
Appellant]’s favor, we can no longer grant [the Appellant] any effectual relief”).
Because Juca has already achieved the relief that she sought, we must dismiss this
aspect of her appeal as moot.
But Juca’s claim is doubly moot. Regardless of whether she had “obtained
all the relief she could receive on the claim through further litigation,” Ruesch,
25 F.4th at 70, her claim became moot once the school year ended. That is so
because “the IDEA’s stay-put provision does not create an entitlement to
immediate payment or reimbursement.” Mendez, 65 F.4th at 63 (2d Cir. 2023).
Rather, “[p]arents or guardians may . . . obtain such relief if they establish that a
delay or failure to pay has jeopardized their child’s [current] educational placement.”
Id. (emphases added). Because the failure to pay for a since-ended school year –
without more – is insufficient to permit the inference that “the then-current
educational placement of the child” is in any way at risk, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)
(emphasis added), we hold that the IDEA’s stay-put provision does not provide
an avenue for recovery against DOE for school years that have ended. Of course,
if a parent or guardian can make the rare “showing” that DOE’s “delay or failure
to pay” for a past school year “has jeopardized their child’s educational placement”

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in the current school year, then the IDEA’s stay-put provision springs back to life.
Mendez, 65 F.4th at 63. But because Juca does not come close to alleging such facts
here, we must again conclude that her claim is moot. See App’x at 20 (alleging in
conclusory manner that DOE’s “failure to fund K.A.’s pendency jeopardizes her
placement because, without timely funding, iBRAIN, the transportation provider,
and the nursing provider will not be able to continue to provide her with services,
and she will lose her placement.”).
Finally, in a post-argument submission, Juca urges us to resuscitate this
moot claim because the DOE has yet to pay for K.A.’s “nursing and transportation
services . . . totaling at least $807,753” for the 2024–25 school year. App. Doc. No.
49 at 1 (Juca’s Rule 28(j) Letter). But as we have previously said, unless plaintiffs
“establish that a delay or failure to pay has jeopardized their child’s educational
placement,” they may not invoke “the IDEA’s stay-put provision” as a shortcut to
get “the DOE to automatically fast-track funding for the educational placements.”
Mendez, 65 F.4th at 63 (emphasis omitted). And since Juca’s Rule 28(j) Letter does
not even purport to specify how or why this delay in paying a past-year’s bill
“jeopardize[s] [her] child’s educational placement,” we so no reason why “the
IDEA’s stay-put provision” applies here. Id.

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III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment and order of the district court
with respect to the 2023–24 school year and DISMISS the appeal with respect to
the 2024–25 school year.

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