Safdieh v. Comm’r 1 In the

25-501-cv
Safdieh v. Comm’r
1
In the 1
United States Court of Appeals 2
For the Second Circuit 3
________ 4
AUGUST TERM 2025 5
No. 25-501-cv 6
7
J OSEPH S AFDIEH, 8
Petitioner-Appellee, 9
10
v. 11
12
C OMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , 13
Respondent-Appellant. 14
________ 15
16
Appeal from the United States Tax Court. 17
________ 18
19
ARGUED: D ECEMBER 17, 2025 20
D ECIDED: FEBRUARY 27, 2026 21
________ 22
23
Before: J ACOBS, C ABRANES, and L OHIER , Circuit Judges. 24
25
________ 26
27
Respondent-Appellant, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 28
appeals from a December 5, 2024, order of the United States Tax Court 29

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(Mark V. Holmes, Judge) granting summary judgment to Petitioner- 1
Appellee Joseph Safdieh. 2
The Commissioner assessed Safdieh $50,000 in penalties for 3
allegedly failing to report control of a foreign business in tax years 4
2005–09. See I.R.C. § 6038(b). But the Tax Court granted Safdieh 5
summary judgment, reasoning that Congress did not empower the 6
Commissioner to collect the penalties through assessment, an 7
administrative process. If the Commissioner wanted to collect the 8
penalties, the Tax Court ruled, he had to go to federal district court. 9
Seeing things differently, we hold that the Commissioner may 10
assess penalties under § 6038(b). Accordingly, we VACATE the Tax 11
Court’s order granting Safdieh summary judgment and REMAND 12
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 13
________ 14
15
ROBERT J. WILLE (Jennifer M. Rubin, on the brief), 16
Tax Division, Department of Justice, Washington, 17
DC, for Respondent-Appellant. 18
19
PARKER RIDER -L ONGMAID (Shay Dvoretzky, 20
Armando Gomez, Sylvia Tsakos, Eman Cuyler, 21
Sherry M. Tanious, on the brief), Skadden, Arps, 22
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Washington, DC, 23
and New York, NY, for Petitioner-Appellee. 24
25

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3
A UDREY PATTEN, Legal Services Center of 1
Harvard Law School, Jamaica Plain, MA, for 2
Amicus Curiae Center for Taxpayer Rights. 3
________ 4
5
J OSÉ A. C ABRANES, Circuit Judge: 6
The question presented is whether Respondent-Appellant, the 7
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, can collect penalties under 8
Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 6038(b)1 through administrative 9
assessment, or instead must obtain a judgment in federal district 10
court. 11
The Commissioner appeals from a December 5, 2024, order of 12
the United States Tax Court (Mark V. Holmes, Judge) granting 13
Petitioner-Appellee Joseph Safdieh summary judgment.2 14
Safdieh allegedly failed to report control of a foreign business 15
in violation of I.R.C. § 6038. That provision carries a $10,000 penalty 16
for each year during which such a reporting failure exists.3 For 17
Safdieh, who allegedly failed to report in tax years 2005–09, the 18
penalties add up to $50,000. 19
1 I.R.C. § 6038 requires “[e]very United States person [to] furnish, with
respect to any foreign business entity which such person controls, such
information as the Secretary may prescribe . . . .” I.R.C. § 6038(a). Though the
statute speaks of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary has delegated his
authority to administer and enforce the I.R.C. to the Commissioner. See generally
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-9, 301.6201-1(a), 301.7601-1.
2 Safdieh v. Comm’r, No. 11680-20L (T.C. Dec. 5, 2024).
3 I.R.C. § 6038(b)(1).

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When Safdieh did not pay the penalties, the Commissioner 1
filed notice of a federal tax lien. Safdieh challenged the lien before the 2
Independent Office of Appeals in a Collection Due Process hearing.4 3
When he lost that appeal, he petitioned the Tax Court for relief. 4
The Tax Court sided with Safdieh, granting him summary 5
judgment. Its rationale was purely legal. It held that Congress had 6
not statutorily authorized the Commissioner to collect the § 6038(b) 7
penalty through assessment, the administrative process that records 8
a taxpayer’s liability and triggers the Internal Revenue Service’s 9
collection powers.5 If the Commissioner wished to penalize Safdieh’s 10
reporting failures, the Court held, he had to go to federal district 11
court. 12
In this Court, whether the Commissioner may assess the 13
penalty for failure to report control of a foreign business under 14
§ 6038(b) is a new question. Like the D.C. Circuit,6 the only other 15
court of appeals to have decided the issue, we hold that he can. 16
DISCUSSION 17
The IRS normally does not have to go to federal district court 18
to take taxpayers’ money, though some might wish it did. Only in 19
4 See generally Farhy v. Comm'r, 100 F.4th 223, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2024). A
Collection Due Process hearing gives the taxpayer a chance for a highly “informal
oral or written conversation with the IRS before he must pay.” Id. (citation
omitted).
5 See Safdieh, No. 11680-20L at 1–2.
6 Farhy, 100 F.4th at 223.

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rare instances is a lawsuit necessary.7 The agency can instead usually 1
collect taxpayers’ liabilities through “assessment.” The power of 2
assessment is vital, handing the Commissioner the tools needed to 3
collect “all taxes.”8 As such, assessment is commonplace in tax 4
collection. 5
Take the familiar example of a taxpayer adding up how much 6
she owes Uncle Sam and mailing off her return with the payment due. 7
This process is “self-assessment,”9 which one Commissioner called a 8
“marvel of the world.”10 The Commissioner will normally accept the 9
taxpayer’s self-assessment. But if the taxpayer does not file a tax 10
return or misstates what she owes, the Commissioner will calculate 11
the tax liability on her behalf and record it in the government’s 12
books.11 13
Assessment does much more than keep the IRS’s books in good 14
order. It plays the singular role of triggering an all-important process: 15
collection. “[I]t is the assessment, and only the assessment, that sets 16
in motion the collection powers of the IRS.”12 Those powers allow the 17
7 Id. at 226.
8 I.R.C. § 6201(a) (emphasis added).
9 United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114, 122 (2004).
10 Bob Kuttner, The Taxing Trials of I.R.S., N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1974,
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/01/06/archives/the-taxing-trials-of-irs-white-
house-heat-and-artful-dodging.html.
11 Galletti, 541 U.S. at 122.
12 Phila. & Reading Corp. v. United States, 944 F.2d 1063, 1064 n.1 (3d Cir.
1991).

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IRS to seize assets, freeze bank accounts, and create liens—all without 1
setting foot in a courtroom.13 2
We have noted that these tools, “which quite obviously place 3
the Government in a better position to collect on alleged tax debts 4
than individuals seeking to collect on private debts, are said to be 5
necessary because . . . ‘taxes are the life-blood of government, and 6
their prompt and certain availability an imperious need.’”14 7
Critical to this case, the Commissioner’s assessment power 8
extends beyond “all taxes” to include “assessable penalties.”15 There 9
is no question that the dollar amount at issue here is a “penalty”: the 10
statute says so outright.16 The only doubt is whether this penalty is 11
“assessable.” Though the great Professor Boris Bittker and his 12
coauthors observed that “[v]irtually all civil penalties are assessed,”17 13
Safdieh contends that § 6038(b) is an exception. 14
Section 6038(b)’s text is silent as to whether the penalty is 15
assessable.18 In this sense, it is unlike the provisions in the I.R.C. that 16
13 Id. That said, the IRS may have to go to court if the taxpayer challenges
the assessment. See generally Farhy, 100 F.4th at 226–28.
14 United States v. Forma, 42 F.3d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Bull v.
United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935)).
15 I.R.C. § 6201(a).
16 Id. § 6038(b) (“such person shall pay a penalty of $10,000”).
17 Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMahon & Lawrence Zelenak, Federal Income
Taxation of Individuals ¶ 50.03 (3d ed. 2002).
18 The core of the penalty provision reads:

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expressly allow, or bar, assessment.19 Section 6201(a), which covers 1
the Commissioner’s assessment authority, is likewise silent. That 2
ambiguity has not stopped the parties from claiming the texts of these 3
provisions for themselves. But because their arguments struggle to 4
make sense out of silence, we do not parse them here. 5
We instead focus on § 6038(b)’s history, purpose, and 6
structure20—including the text of a key coordination clause—which 7
lead us to hold that the penalty is assessable.21 There are three reasons 8
why. 9
I. 10
First, the history of § 6038(b) strongly suggests that the penalty 11
is assessable. 12
If any person fails to furnish, within the time
prescribed under paragraph (2) of subsection (a),
any information with respect to any foreign business
entity required under paragraph (1) of subsection
(a), such person shall pay a penalty of $10,000 for
each annual accounting period with respect to
which such failure exists.
I.R.C. § 6038(b)(1). Despite the parties’ attempts at exegesis, the text simply does
not say whether the penalty is, or is not, assessable.
19 Contrast, e.g., I.R.C. § 527(j)(1) (“shall be assessed”), with id. § 7269 (“to be
recovered . . . in a civil action”).
20 Accord, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension
Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 627 & n.16 (1993).
21 Our review is de novo. Maier v. Comm’r, 360 F.3d 361, 363 (2d Cir. 2004).

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Start by understanding the reason for § 6038(b)’s existence. At 1
the time of its enactment in 1982, there already existed a penalty for a 2
taxpayer’s failure to report control of a foreign business: a 10-percent 3
reduction of the violator’s foreign tax credit.22 This provision was 4
assessable, meaning that the Commissioner did not have to go to 5
court to collect it.23 6
Even so, the provision was too hard to use. As a Senate report 7
put it, “penalties generally are not imposed.”24 This was partly 8
“because the penalty is complicated.”25 It was “unduly harsh” to 9
taxpayers who “could incur a substantial penalty for a minor 10
failure.”26 And it was toothless in the cases of taxpayers who paid no 11
foreign taxes, and so had no foreign tax credit to reduce.27 12
Under-enforcement resulted, and the Senate heard “complaints 13
about inadequate reporting with respect to controlled foreign 14
corporations.”28 In other words, even though the Commissioner did 15
not have to go to district court and could assess the penalty, the 16
22 Farhy, 100 F.4th at 228 (citing Act of Sept. 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-780,
§ 6(a), 74 Stat. 1010, 1014–16; Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 20(a), 76
Stat. 960, 1059–60)). This provision is now codified at I.R.C. § 6038(c).
23 Farhy, 100 F.4th at 231; see also Appellee’s Letter (Jan. 7, 2026) at 2
(conceding that the § 6038(c) penalty is assessable). That the existing penalty was
assessable may explain why Congress did not specify that the new, supplemental
penalty was also to be assessable.
24 S. Rep. No. 97-494(I), at 299 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781,
1042.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.

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process was cumbersome. To supplement this assessable tax-credit 1
penalty, Congress enacted § 6038(b)’s dollar penalty. 2
As the Senate report makes clear in noting the problem of 3
under-enforcement, Congress wanted to make it easier, not harder, 4
for the IRS to penalize reporting failures. If an assessable penalty was 5
too “complicated” to impose (as the Senate report said), a non- 6
assessable one would be even more so. 7
Yet Safdieh argues that Congress made the new dollar penalty 8
non-assessable anyway. In his view, Congress required the tax 9
collector to make a detour to the nearest federal district court to wage 10
a legal battle for the money. That seems implausible. It is unlikely 11
that Congress would have wished to put even more logs in the way 12
of the tax harvester when its stated aim was to clear the road.29 13
Indeed, the IRS got the message from the start and has assessed 14
the penalty ever since its enactment in 1982.30 Given Congress’s aim 15
29 This conclusion finds further support in a Committee Print
accompanying the Tax Compliance Act of 1982, a bill which contained the same
language that would work its way into § 6038(b). Compare Tax Compliance Act
of 1982, H.R. 6300, 97th Cong. § 411(b) (1982), with Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, H.R. 4961, 97th Cong. § 338(b) (1982). The Committee
Print indicates that the fixed dollar penalty was meant to “simplify the penalty
for failure to furnish information” by “giv[ing] Internal Revenue Service agents a
simple straight-forward penalty to impose where reports . . . are not filed or are
inadequate.” Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Comparative Description of H.R.
6300 and H.R. 5829 at 30 (Comm. Print 1982). Safdieh asks us to conclude that
the § 6038(b) penalty can be collected only through a civil suit filed by the
Department of Justice. This is hardly a “simple straight-forward penalty” that
“Internal Revenue Service agents” can “impose.”
30 Farhy, 100 F.4th at 229–30, 236.

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in enacting the provision, the IRS’s early (and consistent) view of the 1
statute is unsurprising. As evidence of the statute’s original meaning, 2
it deserves substantial weight.31 3
What is more, in the forty-three years since enacting the 4
provision, Congress has never, to our knowledge, questioned the 5
IRS’s practice. In fact, it has acquiesced. “The failure of Congress to 6
alter or amend [a statute], notwithstanding this consistent 7
construction by the department charged with its enforcement, creates 8
a presumption in favor of the administrative interpretation, to which 9
we should give great weight.”32 Congress has amended § 6038 seven 10
times since first enacting the dollar penalty in 1982, most recently in 11
2017.33 Yet, on each amendment, it has done nothing to curb the use 12
of assessment. 13
31 To be clear, we cannot and do not “defer” to the IRS’s interpretation of
the provision. Contra Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984), overruled by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). Rather,
in our de novo quest to say what the law is, we look to the IRS’s contemporaneous
understanding of the statute as evidence of its original meaning. To ask what the
law meant to its intended audience at the time of enactment is a well-worn
interpretive tool in the face of textual ambiguity, one that predates Chevron. See,
e.g., F.T.C. v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 391 (1959) (collecting cases); Shen v.
Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293, 301–02 (2d Cir. 1970). It is not unique to administrative law,
either. See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass'n of Am., Ltd.,
601 U.S. 416, 432 (2024) (constitutional law); Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United
States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943) (treaty law); Clark v. Carolina & Yadkin River Ry.
Co., 122 N.E. 453, 454 (N.Y. 1919) (contract law). Nothing in Loper Bright forecloses
courts from considering this kind of evidence.
32 Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932); accord, e.g., Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986).
33 I.R.C. § 6038; see also Farhy, 100 F.4th at 236.

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And contrary to Safdieh’s claim, Congress’s acquiescence was 1
not born of ignorance. The legislature knew of the Commissioner’s 2
view that he could assess penalties under § 6038(b).34 Congress’s 3
decision not to challenge the Commissioner’s assessment power over 4
the course of four decades and seven amendments thus seems to be a 5
choice. 6
Other historical context backs up our conclusion that the 7
penalty is assessable. At the time of the penalty’s enactment, the 8
backlog of pending civil cases in federal district court had surged to a 9
record high.35 The same year that § 6038(b) became law, Congress 10
enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act with the overriding aim 11
of clearing that pileup.36 It seems improbable that amid this crisis 12
Congress required the Commissioner to mount a potentially 13
protracted federal case to stand any chance of collecting a modest 14
penalty. 15
That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the penalty was 16
magnitudes lower then than now, both in real and nominal terms. 17
34 See, e.g., Treasury and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1998: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 254
(1998) (discussing a proposal to “allow taxpayers an administrative appeal prior to
the payment of the penalty”) (emphasis added). An administrative appeal before
payment would make sense if the administrative agency, and not an Article III
court, were to impose the penalty.
35 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Report of the
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States: March 11–12, 1982, at 4
(1982), https://share.google/SWT3p20gILYLEDsfT [https://perma.cc/XN5Q-
BT3V].
36 R. Anthony Howard, Jr., Note, The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982:
No Relief for the Disappointed Bidder, 11 J. Legis. 403, 418 (1984).

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The original penalty was $1,000 (that’s $3,400 in today’s money).37 For 1
perspective, at that time a diversity case could get into federal court 2
only if it was worth at least ten times the penalty’s amount—a floor 3
that, in just six years, Congress would raise to fifty times the 4
amount.38 Saddling the Commissioner with a federal case over such 5
a small sum would hamper the federal courts and the Commissioner 6
at a time when the evidence suggests that Congress wished to relieve 7
both.39 8
Safdieh responds that going to federal court for the penalty, 9
which now stands at $10,000 a year, could nonetheless be worth the 10
Commissioner’s trouble, since “[r]eporting failures across several 11
years can result in penalties of more than $100,000.”40 But Safdieh 12
points to no evidence showing that Congress meant to make it 13
worthwhile to pursue only serial offenders. Such an approach would 14
37 See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 338, 96 Stat. 324, 631 (1982); CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
38 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 201(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988) (raising the amount-in-controversy
requirement for diversity jurisdiction from $10,000 to $50,000).
39 At first glance, it seems that the Internal Revenue Code makes lesser
penalties recoverable in a civil action only. See I.R.C. § 5761(a) ($1,000); § 7269
($500). First glances mislead. When Congress set those penalties in 1954, they
were, in inflation-adjusted terms, 3.6 and 1.8 times higher respectively than the
original $1,000 § 6038(b) penalty that Congress enacted in 1982. See Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 3, 736, 865 (1954); CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
40 Appellee’s Br. at 63; cf. Mukhi v. Comm'r, 163 T.C. 150, 173 (2024).

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allow tax-reporting failures—so long as there were not too many of 1
them. We have no reason to believe that was Congress’s intent.41 2
II. 3
Second, requiring the Commissioner to sue for § 6038(b) 4
penalties would badly disrupt the section’s overall enforcement 5
scheme, defeating Congress’s design. 6
To see why, understand that Congress expected § 6038(b) to 7
work in concert with another provision, § 6038(c). That provision, 8
briefly noted above, penalizes failure to report control of a foreign 9
business with a 10-percent reduction of the taxpayer’s foreign tax 10
credit.42 But that penalty does not work in isolation. A coordination 11
clause reduces “[t]he amount of the reduction . . . by the amount of 12
the penalty imposed by subsection (b)”—that is, by the yearly dollar 13
penalty.43 14
The coordination clause suggests that Congress meant for the 15
Commissioner to be able to impose the subsection (b) and (c) penalties 16
41 Similarly, we are not swayed by Safdieh’s claim that the Department of
Justice “generally collects” another $10,000 penalty by suing in district court. See
Appellee’s Br. at 64 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(i)). To start, this other penalty
is in fact also assessable, as Safdieh concedes. See id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b)). It
is thus undisputed that Congress gave the Executive a choice between assessing
that penalty or going to court. And while it is true that the Executive sometimes
does go to court, the cases in which it does so routinely have more than $10,000 at
stake. See Mukhi, 163 T.C. at 174 n.12 (collecting cases). A federal case may not be
worthwhile when lesser amounts are in controversy. See Farhy, 100 F.4th at 232.
42 I.R.C. § 6038(c)(1).
43 Id. § 6038(c)(3).

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at the same time. Under Safdieh’s argument, however, that would be 1
impossible. Before the Commissioner could coordinate the two 2
penalties, he would have to await a federal district court’s entry of 3
judgment for the subsection (b) penalty. Only then could he know 4
“the amount of the penalty imposed by subsection (b)” and reduce 5
the subsection (c) penalty accordingly. 6
“To agree with that reading, we would have to conclude that, 7
in enacting subsection (b), Congress not only failed in its avowed 8
quest to streamline, but also counterproductively threw sand in the 9
gears of section 6038’s existing enforcement scheme.”44 We give 10
Congress more credit than that. 11
Safdieh’s view of the law would greatly complicate the 12
penalty’s collection. If the Commissioner were to seek penalties 13
under subsections (b) and (c), there might be proceedings in federal 14
district court for the former and in the Tax Court for the latter.45 Both 15
courts might have to address the same questions. Did the taxpayer 16
really control the business during the relevant years? Did the 17
business count as a “foreign business entity”? Were there any 18
defenses, such as reasonable cause?46 The duplication of effort would 19
be wasteful. 20
44 Farhy, 100 F.4th at 232–33.
45 Id. at 234. Safdieh argues that it is unlikely that the Commissioner would
use subsections (b) and (c) at once. But likelihood is beside the point since
Congress intended the dual option to be available.
46 Id.

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Once one of the two relevant courts resolves the issues, 1
questions of preclusion may arise. It has long been the law that 2
“where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated 3
and determined in the first tax proceeding, the parties are bound by 4
that determination in a subsequent proceeding.”47 Taking note of 5
this, parties may try to game the proceedings by rushing to judgment 6
in the “right” court and erecting barriers to judgment in the “wrong” 7
one. 8
All this complicates the penalization of tax-reporting failures 9
and promotes gamesmanship. Could that have been the known effect 10
of a provision that aimed to simplify things—to make a penalty less 11
“complicated” and the tools of enforcement easier to wield? We 12
doubt it. 13
III. 14
Third, if the Commissioner cannot assess the § 6038(b) penalty, 15
what litigation authority does he have to sue for it? 16
Safdieh cites 28 U.S.C. § 2461(a) as the Commissioner’s “only” 17
collection authority.48 This provision provides that “[w]henever a 18
civil fine, penalty or pecuniary forfeiture is prescribed for the 19
47 Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601 (1948) (citing The Evergreens v. Nunan,
141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J.)); see also Farhy, 100 F.4th at 234 (citing
Burrows v. United States, 945 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision)).
48 Appellee’s Br. at 38.

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violation of an Act of Congress without specifying the mode of 1
recovery or enforcement thereof, it may be recovered in a civil action.” 2
One problem with this argument is that § 2461(a) is not in the 3
I.R.C. Congress instead directed that it be codified in Title 28, which 4
concerns the judiciary.49 That placement is telling.50 5
Even more revealingly, in the thirty-four years between this 6
provision’s enactment in 1948 and the dollar penalty’s enactment in 7
1982, the provision was never used to collect a tax or tax penalty.51 It 8
is doubtful that Congress silently meant to require the Commissioner 9
to look for the first time to this provision outside the I.R.C. to be able 10
to do his job. 11
In sum, § 6038(b)’s history, purpose, and structure all point in 12
the same direction: the penalty is assessable. 13
CONCLUSION 14
For the reasons set out above, we hold that the Commissioner 15
can assess penalties incurred under § 6038(b). Accordingly, we 16
49 An Act to revise, codify, and enact into law title 28 of the United States
Code entitled “Judicial Code and Judiciary,” Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 2461(a), 62 Stat.
869, 974 (1948).
50 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 541–42 (2015) (plurality
opinion).
51 Neither the Court nor the parties have been able to find any such
example. Appellant’s Letter (Jan. 7, 2026) at 1; Appellee’s Letter (Jan. 7, 2026) at
2.

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VACATE the judgment of the Tax Court and REMAND for further 1
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 2

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