United States of America v. Robert Hudson

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 07-3133
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
ROBERT HUDSON,
Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 05-cr-0229)
District Judge: Honorable James T. Giles
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on September 29, 2009
Before: RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and McVERRY,* District Judge
(Filed: September 30, 2009)
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OPINION
__________
__________________
* Honorable Terrence F. McVerry, Judge of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

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Hudson pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (“crack”), in1
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A); possession with intent to distribute
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B); possession of a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
It is unclear which orders Hudson intends to appeal. The notice of appeal filed by2
defense counsel solely references the judgment of sentence–not the judgment of
conviction; however, counsel’s Anders brief analyzes the District Court’s disposition of
Hudson’s motion to suppress, and the cover page of the brief states, “Appeal from the
Judgment of Conviction and Sentence Entered in the United States District Court.”
Because Hudson did not file a pro se brief, we cannot conclusively determine whether he
intended to confine the appeal to his sentence. Giving Hudson every benefit of the doubt,
and finding no prejudice to the government, which has addressed the validity of the
District Court’s suppression order in its brief, we will consider both arguments.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise3
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. United States v. Tannis, 942 F.2d 196, 197 (3d Cir.
1991).
2
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Robert Hudson pled guilty to drug and firearm-related offenses, and was sentenced
to eight years’ imprisonment. After Hudson filed a notice of appeal, defense counsel1
moved to withdraw, filing a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
indicating that no non-frivolous issues exist. Because we agree that Hudson does not2
present a colorable claim on appeal, we will affirm the Judgment and Commitment Order
of the District Court.3
The salient facts are not disputed. Officers Younger and Williams noticed that the
vehicle Hudson was driving did not have a required registration sticker displayed on
either the rear windshield or license plate. The officers subsequently observed Hudson

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Hudson also moved to suppress unwarned inculpatory statements made to police after4
his arrest. The District Court granted the motion and suppressed the statements. The
government did not cross-appeal this ruling.
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change lanes without signaling and park on the right side of the street. Officers Williams
and Younger then approached the driver and passenger side of Hudson’s car, respectively.
Standing outside his vehicle, the officers observed a plastic sandwich bag with a red
marking in the center cupholder of the car. Inside the bag were numerous smaller tinted
baggies, containing a white chunky substance. Suspecting that the powdery substance
was cocaine, Officer Younger reached into the vehicle to retrieve the baggies, whereupon
he glimpsed a firearm between the center console and the passenger seat. The officers
immediately placed Hudson under arrest and retrieved the firearm.
Hudson moved to suppress the firearm and narcotics seized, arguing that the
officers lacked probable cause to search his vehicle. After a hearing, the District Court
denied the motion, and Hudson entered a conditional plea agreement, in which he4
preserved his right to appeal the District Court’s suppression ruling. The District Court
sentenced Hudson to eight years’ imprisonment; Hudson appealed.
Defense counsel moved to withdraw as counsel, filing an Anders brief indicating
that no non-frivolous issues exist for appeal. When presented with an Anders brief, our
inquiry is two-fold: (1) whether counsel’s Anders brief is adequate on its face; and (2)
whether our independent review of the record reveals any issues that are not frivolous.
United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Marvin,

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Counsel did not address two potential issues in his brief—the validity of Hudson’s5
guilty plea and the legality of his sentence. Because these issues were “patent[ly]”
frivolous, counsel was not required to analyze them. Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781. The guilty
4
211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)). An Anders brief will be deemed adequate if the Court
is satisfied that counsel has “thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable
issues” and explained why the issues are frivolous. Id. Counsel, however, need not
address every conceivable claim. Id. Where counsel’s Anders brief is adequate, we will
confine our inquiry to issues raised by counsel and by the defendant in his pro se brief.
Id. at 301 (citing United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 552-53 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Although Hudson did not file a pro se brief, defense counsel’s Anders brief
appears adequate on its face. Counsel addresses the single issue preserved for appeal in
Hudson’s guilty plea: whether the District Court erred in not suppressing the gun and
narcotics seized from Hudson’s car. Counsel concludes that it is a frivolous issue on
appeal because police lawfully stopped Hudson for two traffic infractions—driving
without a proper registration sticker and changing lanes without signaling—and the
presence of narcotics in the officers’ plain view provided probable cause to believe that
Hudson was engaged in criminal activity. Accordingly, defense counsel reasons that
police were entitled to conduct a warrantless search of Hudson’s car, and that seizure of
the narcotics and gun was permissible. We conclude that counsel’s Anders brief reflects
conscientious examination of the record, and that counsel identified the pertinent issues
on appeal. Accordingly, we will confine our analysis to the single issue raised in5

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plea offered by defense counsel was accepted by the government; there is no indication
that the plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Further, Hudson waived his
right to appeal his sentence, which, in any event, was below the applicable guidelines
range of 135 to 168 months. Accordingly, counsel’s omission of these issues from his
brief was not inadequate to assist us in our review. See L.R. 109.2(a); see also Youla, 241
F.3d at 302.
See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 733-34 (1983) (finding probable cause to arrest6
defendant and search his vehicle, where police observed a white powdery substance,
small plastic vials, and knotted, uninflated plastic party balloons–commonly used
narcotics packaging–in his car); United States v. Green, 560 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2009)
(finding probable cause to believe that “clear plastic bag containing a white powdery
substance” discovered in defendant’s kitchen was illegal drugs); United States v. Rosario,
638 F.2d 460, 462 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding probable cause for arrest where defendant
furtively carried a plastic bag containing a substance that looked like cocaine to a car
5
counsel’s brief—whether the District Court properly admitted the gun and drugs
recovered during the warrantless search of Hudson’s vehicle.
At the outset, we note that police lawfully stopped Hudson’s vehicle based on
separate traffic violations—his failure to display a registration sticker on his windshield
or license plate, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1332(a), and his failure to signal before changing lanes, 75
Pa. C.S. § 3334A. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“As a general
matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”). Further, once the officers, who
had substantial experience with drug-related arrests, glimpsed multiple marked plastic
baggies containing a white chunky substance in the center cupholder, they possessed
probable cause to believe that the baggies contained illegal drugs, and that Hudson was
involved in criminal activity. At that point, police were entitled to arrest Hudson and to6

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containing two men at 11:00 p.m. and displayed the bag for their inspection); see also
United States v. Garner, 907 F.2d 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Probable cause demands . . .
only that the facts available to a reasonably cautious man would warrant a belief that
certain items may be contraband . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620-22 (2004); Brown, 460 U.S. at 733-7
34; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (“[W]hen a policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.”); see also
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 465-66 (1999) (upholding warrantless search of
vehicle where police possessed probable cause to believe it contained illegal drugs);
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1985) (finding probable cause to conduct
warrantless search of mobile home where police possessed evidence that defendant was
distributing a controlling substance from the vehicle); United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d
91, 100 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The automobile exception to the warrant requirement permits
law enforcement to seize and search an automobile without a warrant if ‘probable cause
exists to believe it contains contraband.’”) (internal citation omitted).
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search the passenger compartment of his vehicle. Because the search of the vehicle was7
lawful, contraband recovered from the car, including the narcotics and firearm, was
admissible. Hence, we conclude that the District Court properly denied defendant’s
motion to suppress, and that Hudson’s Fourth Amendment challenge is meritless.
Concluding that Hudson fails to raise a non-frivolous argument on appeal, we will
AFFIRM the Judgment and Conviction Order of the District Court and, in a separate
order, will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

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