United States of America v. William D. Edgar

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-1394
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM D. EDGAR,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-07-cr-00154-001
District Judge: The Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 10, 2011
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 13, 2011)
_____________________
OPINION
_____________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Pursuant to the terms of a written plea agreement, William D. Edgar waived
his right to an indictment and pleaded guilty to a three-count information in the

-- 1 of 4 --

2
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The
information charged Edgar with a conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, wire
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1344. The charges were based on Edgar’s participation in a scheme to defraud
federally insured financial institutions by submitting materially false statements in
mortgage loan applications. The plea agreement contained a broad waiver of
Edgar’s right to appeal his conviction or sentence. In addition, the agreement set
forth stipulations by the parties regarding the calculation of Edgar’s offense level
based on the amount of the loss, his role in the offense, and his acceptance of
responsibility. At sentencing, after noting the applicable stipulations, the District
Court determined that Edgar’s offense level was 21 and that his criminal history
score was I, yielding a sentencing guidelines range of 37 to 46 months. At the
conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, the District Court imposed, inter alia,
concurrent sentences of 37 months of imprisonment on each count.
Edgar appealed.1
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
He contends that the District Court abused its discretion
because it failed to adequately consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and to grant a downward variance. In a second argument Edgar
asserts that the Court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a downward

-- 2 of 4 --

3
departure or variance on the basis that the stipulated amount of loss overstated the
actual loss. The government invokes the appellate waiver contained in the plea
agreement and submits that it should be enforced. In the alternative, the
government asserts that Edgar’s arguments lack merit.
The issues that Edgar raises on appeal fall within the scope of the appellate
waiver. Because Edgar acknowledges that his appellate waiver was knowing and
voluntary, we consider “whether enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of
justice.” United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 244 (3d Cir. 2008). Edgar
acknowledges that his sentencing guideline was correctly calculated and that his
sentence is within the guideline range. Nonetheless, he contends that the waiver
should be set aside because the District Court’s failure to give any meaningful
consideration to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors constitutes a miscarriage of
justice. According to Edgar, the Court merely listed the § 3553(a) factors and did
not explain the weight it accorded the evidence Edgar adduced to mitigate his
sentence.
In United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001), we declined to
invalidate appeal waivers based on any particular legal or factual claim, choosing
instead to consider several factors in deciding whether to vacate an otherwise valid
waiver. Id. at 563 (endorsing the approach in United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14,
25-26 (1st Cir. 2001)). Central to this inquiry is whether the District Court erred.

-- 3 of 4 --

4
We find no error. It is clear from a review of the record before us that the District
Court did more than simply list the factors. It specifically noted the circumstances
Edgar cited in support of a downward variance. It chose, however, after noting,
inter alia, the ongoing nature of the offenses, the elaborate scheme used to defraud
the mortgage brokers, the significant loss Edgar caused to several institutions, and
the seriousness of the offenses, to impose a sentence at the bottom of the
sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no basis for setting
aside the valid appellate waiver and we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.2
2 Inasmuch as we have concluded that the appellate waiver is valid and effective, we do
not reach Edgar’s arguments on the merits. For that reason, we deny as moot defense
counsel’s motion to file a supplemental reply brief citing new authority to address one of
Edgar’s substantive arguments. We also deny Edgar’s pro se motions to proceed pro se
and to amend the appellate brief in order to raise the same authority.

-- 4 of 4 --