United States of America v. Syeed Briggs

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-1956
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SYEED BRIGGS,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-06-cr-00715-001)
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. Dubois
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 14, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 1, 2009)
OPINION

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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Syeed Briggs was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit armed bank
robbery (Count 1), two counts of armed bank robbery (Counts 2 and 4), and two counts of
aiding and abetting the carrying and use of a firearm during a crime of violence (Counts 3
and 5). After Briggs timely filed a notice of appeal, his appointed appellate counsel filed
a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, our recitation of the facts is brief. This
case arises out of two bank robberies in the fall of 2006. First, on September 28, 2006,
Briggs, Alfreddie Postell and two other conspirators planned and executed an armed
robbery of the American Heritage Federal Credit Union in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.
(PSR ¶ 11.) Briggs supplied and drove the getaway car; the conspirators divided the
proceeds of the robbery at Briggs’ apartment. (PSR ¶ 11.) Second, on October 16, 2006,
Briggs, Postell and two other conspirators planned and executed an armed bank robbery
of the Nova Savings Bank in Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania. (PSR ¶ 12.) Briggs again
provided the getaway car and use of his apartment.
On October 23, 2006, agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”)
interviewed Postell regarding the robbery of the Nova Savings Bank. Postell told the
agents that he planned and executed the robbery of the Nova Savings Bank with three
others, including Briggs. Armed with search warrants for Briggs’ residence and car, the

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FBI agents knocked on the door of Briggs’ apartment on October 25, 2006. They waited
about forty-five seconds before entering the apartment. The agents’ search uncovered
about $2,700 in currency and three bank straps consistent with those used by the
American Heritage Federal Credit Union. After discovery of the straps, Briggs was told
that he was being detained and was read his Miranda rights.
Briggs was thereafter transported to the Plymouth Township Police Department,
where he was again advised of his Miranda rights. Briggs signed a waiver form stating
that he understood his rights and agreed to speak to the agents, and he then gave a
detailed statement to the agents regarding his role in the bank robberies. Briggs also
signed a typewritten record of his statement, including a verification that he was not
coerced, threatened or promised anything to give the statement.
Thereafter, the agents executed the search warrant of his car and found a money
wrapper under the driver’s seat, a green canvas bag consistent with one used during the
robberies, and a demand note with the words “$10,000 Right Now; You got 1 min; No
Dye; No Cops; No False Movement” written on it. App. at 14. The agents then
interviewed Briggs a second time, again reading him his Miranda rights, which Briggs
again waived in a signed writing. Briggs admitted that he wrote the demand note and that
the bank straps found in his apartment came from the American Heritage Federal Credit
Union robbery. After the interview, Briggs again signed a written record of his statement
and verified that he was not coerced, threatened, or promised anything in exchange for his
statement.

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1 Briggs was sentenced to a statutory mandatory minimum
of seven years imprisonment on Count 3 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and a statutory mandatory minimum of twenty-five
years imprisonment on Count 5 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(C)(i). These sentences must run consecutively pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Briggs also faced a Guidelines
sentencing range of 70 to 87 months for the conspiracy and bank
robbery charges. (PSR ¶ 97.) In light of the length of
imprisonment on the weapons offenses, the District Court, with the
agreement of the Government, sentenced Briggs to one day
imprisonment on those charges.
4
After two of his co-conspirators pled guilty, Briggs was ultimately charged in a
Superseding Indictment with conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (Count 1), two counts of aiding and abetting bank robbery with a dangerous
weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) and 2 (Counts 2 and 4), and two counts of
aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and 2 (Counts 3 and 5). Briggs moved to suppress
the physical evidence found at his apartment and in his car as well as his statements to the
FBI agents, but the District Court denied suppression of that evidence after a hearing.
The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found Briggs guilty on all counts. The
District Court then imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 384 months and one day
imprisonment.1
Briggs timely filed a notice of appeal. Appellate counsel was then appointed for
Briggs, and counsel subsequently moved to withdraw, and filed a brief in support of that
motion, pursuant to Anders. After Briggs filed a pro se brief in opposition to his

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2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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counsel’s Anders motion, the Government filed a brief supporting counsel’s motion to
withdraw and seeking to affirm the conviction and sentence.2
II.
“Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that the
appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a motion to withdraw
and supporting brief pursuant to Anders . . . .” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2 (2008). Accordingly,
appellant’s counsel must “satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured the
record in search of appealable issues” and then “explain why the issues are frivolous.”
United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted.). “The
Court’s inquiry when counsel submits an Anders brief is thus twofold: (1) whether
counsel adequately fulfilled [Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2’s] requirements;
and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”
United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).
Here, Briggs’ counsel has identified several potential non-frivolous issues and has
concluded that all lack merit. First, counsel agrees that the District Court correctly
rejected Briggs’ suppression motion. Both before the District Court and in his pro se
brief to this court, Briggs has raised a number of challenges to the introduction of the
physical evidence found in his home and car as well as his statements to the police.

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As to the physical evidence, Briggs contends that the search warrants for his home
and car were based on affidavits that included false information, that the warrant was not
supported by probable cause and failed to state with sufficient particularity the items to be
searched and seized, and that the evidence found in his home should be suppressed
because the agents violated the knock-and-announce rule when they executed that
warrant. These arguments lack merit. The District Court heard testimony regarding the
affidavits of probable cause and concluded that Briggs failed to uncover any evidence of
misrepresentations. The search warrants were supported by probable cause, particularly
Postell’s statement to the investigators. Briggs points us to no evidence to the contrary.
Briggs did not raise before the District Court his argument that the search warrants were
invalid because they lacked a sufficient description of the items to be searched and seized,
and therefore he has waived that argument. See United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 182
(3d Cir. 2008). Briggs also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise this argument before the District Court, but that claim is not cognizable on this
record on direct appeal. See United States v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191, 198 (3d Cir. 2008).
Finally, as to Briggs’ claim that the agents that executed the search warrant of his home
violated the knock-and-announce rule, even assuming that they did so, suppression would
not be appropriate. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
As to the suppression of his statements to the police, Briggs contends that the FBI
agents lacked probable cause to arrest him following execution of the search warrant, that
his statements were coerced, and that the police continued questioning him after he

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invoked his right to counsel. Briggs argues that he was seized without probable cause as
soon as the agents entered his home, but the District Court credited the testimony of FBI
Agent Kenneth Vincent that he told Briggs that he was free to leave during the execution
of the search warrant and noted that Briggs conceded during his testimony at the
suppression hearing that he was told at the beginning of the search that he was not under
arrest. Briggs points us to nothing to undermine these findings. Moreover, we agree with
the District Court that the agents had probable cause to arrest Briggs after the search of
his home based on Postell’s earlier statement as well as the bank money straps and
significant amount of cash found in Briggs’ home.
The record also demonstrates that Briggs was read his Miranda rights on three
separate occasions and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights and agreed
to speak to the investigating agents, as evidenced by the two written waiver forms that he
signed. Briggs argues that his statements were the result of coercion, but the District
Court credited the testimony of one of the FBI agents who interviewed Briggs that the
agents interviewing him did not makes any promises or threats to induce his statements.
Again, Briggs offers nothing to undermine this finding.
Finally, Briggs contends that he told the investigating agents that he did not want
to answer any questions until he found out if his mother obtained counsel for him, but
they impermissibly continued to question him after that invocation of his right to counsel.
However, the District Court did not credit Briggs’ testimony on this point, instead finding
credible FBI Agent Andrew Lash’s testimony that Briggs never asked for an attorney.

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Moreover, we agree with the District Court that, even assuming that Briggs’ version of
the events is accurate, Briggs’ statement was not a sufficiently clear and unambiguous
invocation of his right to counsel so as to require the agents to cease questioning. See
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994) (“[A]fter a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until
and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.”).
The remaining issues raised by Briggs (and noted by his appellate counsel) require
little discussion. First, Briggs contends that the Government violated Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986), by striking all four African-American members of the jury venire
panel. However, the Government simply did not strike any African-American members
of the panel, whether by peremptory challenge or for cause. There is no such evidence.
Second, Briggs contends that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the American Heritage Federal Credit Union was federally insured, as required for a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(f) on Count 2. However, the Government introduced
records of the National Credit Union Administration showing that the credit union at
issue was federally insured at the time of the bank robbery. Finally, we agree with
Briggs’ appellate counsel that the sentence imposed by the District Court was reasonable.
Indeed, the District Court imposed the mandatory minimum sentences for the weapons
offenses and a substantially below-Guidelines sentence of one day on the conspiracy and
bank robbery counts in light of the severity of the sentences on the weapons offenses.
III.

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For the above-stated reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and
affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.

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