United States of America v. Michael Stradford, a/k/a Muff Michael Stradford

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-3251
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL STRADFORD,
a/k/a Muff
Michael Stradford, Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-08-cr-00007-001)
District Judge: The Honorable Jose L. Linares
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 1, 2009
BEFORE: McKEE, CHAGARES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 28, 2009)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

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Appellant Michael Stradford appeals his sentence of one hundred and eighty eight
months imprisonment, which he received for various drug-related offenses. On appeal,
Stadford raises numerous arguments challenging the District Court’s sentence. We will
affirm.
Appellant was charged in a one-count Information with violations of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 — distribution and possession with intent to
distribute more than five grams of crack cocaine. Stadford pleaded guilty to the charge.
On appeal, Stadford argues, first, that the District Court erred when it did not depart
downward under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.3 because his career
offender status overstated his criminal history and under United States Sentencing
Guidelines § 5k2.0 because the District Court failed to consider mitigation evidence.
Stadford did not move for a departure on these grounds before the District Court,
however. If Stadford had moved for the departure and the District Court had exercised its
discretion and denied the motion, we would lack jurisdiction to review that decision. See
United States v. Minutoli, 374 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2004). But, unfortunately for
Stratford, he did not ask the District Court for a departure. It would be a far stretch to say
that the District Court erred for failure to do something it was not requested to do. We
simply lack jurisdiction to review the District Court's failure to downward depart sua
sponte. Jurisdiction only arises if the District Court’s refusal to depart downward is
premised on the mistaken belief that it lacks discretion to do so.

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Stradford next argues that his sentence was unreasonable because he was a victim
of sentencing entrapment, and it would therefore be unfair to impose the crack cocaine
sentencing guidelines. This argument is baseless, however, because Stradford’s status as
a career offender was the basis for his sentencing calculation.
Stradford also maintains that his sentencing range was substantively unreasonable.
A fair reading of the record demonstrates that, in formulating and imposing sentence, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in any respect. The District Court evaluated
each of the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and imposed sentence at the bottom of
the Guidelines range. We therefore reject Stradford’s challenge to that sentence. See Rita
v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). We also reject Stradford’s argument that the
District Court failed to consider the conditions of his pre-trial confinement when passing
sentence. Here, the District Court acted well within its discretion and imposed a
sentence at the lowest end of the Guideline’s range. The record conclusively establishes
that the District Court struck a reasonable balance between the mitigating factors,
Stradford’s extensive criminal history, and the need for deterrence. Accordingly, we will
affirm Stradford’s sentence.

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