Kenneth T. Deputy v. Deputy Atty General John Williams

BLD-97 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3517
___________
KENNETH T. DEPUTY,
Appellant
v.
DEPUTY ATTY GENERAL JOHN WILLIAMS;
JUDGE ROBERT B. YOUNG; JUSTICE CAROLYN BERGER;
JUSTICE RANDY HOLLAND; JUSTICE JACK B. JACOBS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. No. 08-cv-00265)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 5, 2009
Before: McKEE, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 27, 2009 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Kenneth Deputy appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint
as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

-- 1 of 6 --

2
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The District Court also denied Deputy’s motion for recusal and
declined to grant Deputy leave to file an amended complaint. Because we determine that
the appeal is lacking in arguable legal merit, we will dismiss it under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
In his complaint, Deputy alleged that the defendants violated his civil and
constitutional rights during habeas corpus proceedings he initiated in 1997. In particular,
Deputy alleged that the defendants engaged in conspiracy to interfere with civil rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986 by neglecting to prevent and
aiding in wrongful acts that resulted in the denial of relief; violated the Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by concealing corrupt practices and the individuals
involved in the conspiracy; and forged and fabricated documents in violation of several
federal statutes. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and
punitive damages. He also requested that the court order his release and make a
declaratory finding on whether his commitment for attempt to commit a crime was in
accordance with Delaware law.
Before this Court, Deputy alleges that the District Court “incorrectly decide(d) the
facts in his case and misapplied applicable law.” In particular, he claims that his
commitment was “irregular” because the arrest warrant and complaint were “not filed or
processed by the Court as required by the Constitution.” He also states that he is entitled
to relief because “[c]ourt officials had to conspire and cover-up official misconduct by

-- 2 of 6 --

3
fellow colleagues” and that “the defendants are clearly of knowledge of the wrongs
conspired to be continually done to appellant.” He also alleges, without support, that all
defendants “acted in complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Finally, Deputy alleges that
Judge Robinson should have recused herself because of her involvement in a previous
habeas petition he filed.
We have appellate jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
review it for possible dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An appeal must be
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it has no arguable basis in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
As the District Court correctly noted, Deputy’s claims fail from the outset because
all of the named defendants are protected by either judicial or prosecutorial immunity.
The named defendants are Judge Robert B. Young of the Superior Court of Delaware;
Justice Carolyn Berger, Justice Randy Holland, and Justice Jack Jacobs of the Delaware
Supreme Court; and Delaware Deputy Attorney General John Williams. Judicial
immunity is “immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages” and is
only overcome in two circumstances. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). First, “a judge is not immune from
liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity”;
second, “a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.219, 227-29

-- 3 of 6 --

We note the recent Supreme Court decision of Van De Kamp v. Goldstein,1
__S. Ct.__, 2009 WL 160430 (2009), which further broadened the scope of immunity for
state prosecutors. The Court concluded that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity
in respect to claims that their “supervision, training, or information-system management
was constitutionally inadequate.”
4
(1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351
(1871)).
Prosecutors are entitled to similar immunity from suit. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court held that “in light of the immunity historically
accorded prosecutors at common law, state prosecutors are absolutely immune from
liability under § 1983 for actions performed in a quasi-judicial role.” Light v. Haws, 472
F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427, 431). Actions shielded by
judicial immunity include “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation
of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an
advocate for the State[.]” Id. (quoting Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 135
(3d Cir. 2006).1
The District Court noted that Deputy fails to provide “more than labels and
conclusions and . . . formulaic recitation of the law” of judicial and prosecutorial
immunity. Deputy’s allegations against the judge and justices are based solely on their
denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Likewise, Williams’ involvement is
limited to the motion he submitted asking the Supreme Court to affirm the decision of the
Superior Court denying Deputy’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. All of these actions

-- 4 of 6 --

5
are clearly within the scope of their respective judicial and prosecutorial duties, and thus
all defendants are immune from suit.
The District Court also correctly identified that, to the extent Deputy attempts to
challenge his conviction and confinement, the sole federal remedy available is habeas
corpus. See Wright v. Cuyler, 624 F.2d 455, 457 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Moreover, in order to recover damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff “‘must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.’” Gibson v. Superintendent, 411 F.3d 427, 435 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). At no point does Deputy make such a
showing. As a result, his complaint fails on this basis as well.
The District Court also properly dismissed Deputy’s allegations that the defendants
committed forgery and fabricated documents. The federal criminal code does not contain
the statutes referred to by Deputy in his complaint. Furthermore, Deputy makes nothing
more than blanket assertions that such fabrication took place, and is required to make a
“showing” rather than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief. Phillips v. County of

-- 5 of 6 --

6
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). The District Court properly dismissed these
claims.
Finally, the District Court correctly denied Deputy’s motion for recusal.
According to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must recuse himself “in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Deputy’s recusal motion is based
solely on Judge Robinson’s involvement in a previous habeas petition that was denied.
However, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States., 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (citing United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)). As a result, the District Court
properly denied the motion.
In conclusion, Deputy’s appeal is lacking in arguable legal merit, and we will
dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In light of our disposition, Deputy’s
motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

-- 6 of 6 --