Ronald Isler v. Keystone School District

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3853
___________
RONALD ISLER,
Appellant
v.
KEYSTONE SCHOOL DISTRICT; JEAN A. GOOL, Individually and in her official
capacity as Superintendent of the Keystone School District; JOHN R. SLAGLE,
Individually and in his capacity as President of the Keystone School District Board of
Education; TERRI KAHLE, Individually and in her official capacity as Vice-President of
the Keystone School District Board of Education; GREGORY A. BARRETT,
Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Keystone School District
Board of Education; JAMES A. BEARY, Individually and in his official capacity as a
member of the Keystone School District Board of Education; R. JEFFREY KLINE,
Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Keystone School District
Board of Education; THOMAS MCCOY, Individually and in his official capacity as a
member of the Keystone School District Board of Education; MARILYN STEMPECK,
Individually and in her official capacity as a member of the Keystone School District
Board of Education; KENNETH SWARTFAGER, Individually and in his official
capacity as a member of the Keystone School District Board of Education; VERNON
LAUFFER, Individually and in his official capacity
as Business Manager of the Keystone School District
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-01335)
District Judge: The Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
___________

-- 1 of 5 --

The District Court also dismissed without prejudice the remaining claim brought1.
under the Pennsylvania Whistle-Blower Act. Isler did not appeal that claim.
2
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 21, 2009
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 29, 2009)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Because our opinion is wholly without precedential value, and because the parties
and the District Court are familiar with its operative facts, we offer only an abbreviated
recitation to explain why we will affirm the order of the District Court.
Ronald Isler appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Keystone School District et al. on his claims that the School District violated the First
Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Isler1
complained that the School District’s refusal to renew his bus driver contract was
retaliation for his advocacy on behalf of a student with disabilities. We disagree.

-- 2 of 5 --

3
I.
Isler’s First Amendment, ADA and Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims rest
solely on his assertion that the School District did not renew his contract because he
approached the School District to “advocate” for a student with special needs who rode
on his bus. There is agreement that Isler contacted some School District officials late in
February 2007 about the student’s conduct on the bus. Isler attempts to characterize these
communications as “advocacy.” Yet, we agree with the District Court that, whatever label
Isler ascribes to his words, objectively, he did not engage in protected speech.
Isler had an affirmative, contractual duty to report to the School District any
student incidents that occurred on his bus. Where, as here, an employee speaks in a way
that is wholly within the scope of his employment and responsibilities, such speech is not
protected from disciplinary actions under the First Amendment. Therefore, we will
affirm summary judgment in favor of the School District et al. on Isler’s First
Amendment claim.
II.
With regard to Isler’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims, we do not
find any evidence of protected activity by Isler. As stated above, Isler was acting within
the scope of his employment responsibilities as a bus driver to discuss the situation
arising from the student’s conduct on the bus. Moreover, an ADA or Rehabilitation Act

-- 3 of 5 --

4
retaliation claim is premised upon an underlying violation of a disabled individual’s
rights. 42 U.S.C. §12203(a).
Isler attempts to create a dust-up with allegations of the School District’s failure to
provide the student with adequate and safe transportation. Yet, at summary judgment a
non-moving party may not rest on mere allegations. Trap Rock Industries, Inc. v. Local
825, Intern. Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 982 F.2d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1992),
quoting Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 376
(1991). He has completely failed to produce any evidence, beyond his vague unsupported
testimony, that would raise even a reasonable inference about the existence of
discriminatory behavior by the School District toward the student.
Finally, Isler did not demonstrate any causal connection between his alleged
“advocacy” and the School District’s decision, five months later, to not renew his
contract. The amount of time between the incident and the employment action, a complete
absence of any evidence of animus toward Isler, and the uncontested legitimacy of a non-
discriminatory reason for the employment action lead us to conclude that Isler did not
raise any reasonable inference that the School District retaliated against him.
Due to Isler’s utter lack of supporting evidence to create any question about the
credibility of the School District’s evidence, we will affirm the District Court’s decision
to grant summary judgment in favor of the School District, dismissing the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims.

-- 4 of 5 --

5
III.
For the above stated reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.

-- 5 of 5 --