Lafayette Brown v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western…

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DLD-137 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-3947
LAFAYETTE BROWN,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF PITTSBURGH
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:08-cv-01121)
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 19, 2009
Before: BARRY, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed April 21, 2009)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
Appellant Lafayette Brown appeals from a District Court order dismissing his
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Because Brown’s appeal does not present a

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1 The doctrine takes its name from two United States Supreme Court cases: Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983).
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substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Brown, proceeding pro se, initiated a civil rights action against the City of
Pittsburgh. Brown apparently suffered multiple serious injuries as a result of an accident
that took place in 1977. Although his allegations are unclear, Brown appears to argue
that the City, Brown’s former employer, violated Brown’s civil rights by interfering with
Brown’s ability to recover the full amount of workers’ compensation benefits to which he
believes he is entitled as a result of the accident.
The District Court referred the matter to a Magistrate Judge, who granted Brown
permission to proceed in forma pauperis. The Magistrate Judge also filed a Report and
Recommendation recommending that Brown’s complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Magistrate Judge stated that she was unable to identify
any basis for federal jurisdiction. She concluded that, to the extent Brown was attempting
to contest the state court judgment concerning his workers’ compensation benefits, the
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.1
Brown objected to the Report and Recommendation. On September 15, 2008,
after conducting a de novo review, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s

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Report and Recommendation and dismissed the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Brown filed a timely appeal.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Upon
review, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Brown’s complaint.
Brown alleges that the City of Pittsburgh has been “lobbying” and “collaborating”
with various individuals since 1977, and asserts that he therefore is receiving less than
what he believes to be the appropriate amount of workers’ compensation benefits. To the
extent that Brown is attempting to argue that the state courts wrongly decided his
workers’ compensation claim, we agree with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that
Brown’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine divests federal courts of jurisdiction where a federal action “would be the
equivalent of an appellate review” of a state court judgment. FOCUS v. Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996).
However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only where “the losing party in
state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended, complaining of an
injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that
judgment.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 291
(2005). It is not clear to us whether Brown’s claims are limited to the issues addressed by
the state court in his workers’ compensation action. For example, Brown also alleges that
the City has “blocked” him from receiving medical care and “rescind[ed]” his “true

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2 In addition, it appears that Brown’s § 1983 claims, which are largely based upon
events taking place in the 1970s and 1980s, are barred by the applicable two-year statute
of limitations. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5524; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-267 (1985).
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medical records.” To the extent he attempts to raise independent federal claims against
the City for injuries separate from those related to the workers’ compensation decision,
we conclude that Rooker-Feldman does not apply. However, as to those allegations,
Brown has failed to state a claim entitling him to relief.
To proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Even construing Brown’s pro se complaint liberally, Alston v.
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004), Brown’s allegations are inadequate to state a
§ 1983 claim against the City. Although Brown cites to the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, Brown fails to set forth any facts supporting a constitutional deprivation.
His vague allegations do not provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955,
1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
Brown failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and the District
Court properly dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 2
Brown’s appeal does not present a substantial question. We will therefore summarily
affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

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