Melvin M. Marin v. Tom Leslie

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-4018
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MELVIN M. MARIN,
Appellant
v.
TOM LESLIE; ARTISIA FOSTER; LAWRENCE COUNTY, PA
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:06-cv-00690)
District Judge: Honorable David Stewart Cercone
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 6, 2009
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 8, 2009)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Melvin Marin, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his
complaint for lack of standing. For the reasons that follow, we will modify the District

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Court’s order and affirm the order as modified.
I.
As we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and
procedural history of this case, we only briefly discuss the events leading to this appeal.
In 2006, Marin initiated this lawsuit by filing a pro se complaint against Appellees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In doing so, he attempted to proceed both as trustee for
“Happy Trust Three” – his father’s purported self-settled, revocable trust – and as a
beneficiary of that trust. He argued that Appellees violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment when they sold real property belonging to the trust at a tax sale
without notice and in violation of a bankruptcy stay order. In 2008, the Appellees moved
for summary judgment, arguing that, because the tax sale had since been voided, Marin’s
claims had become moot.
While the summary judgment motion was pending, the District Court dismissed
the case sua sponte for lack of standing. The court held that Marin lacks standing as a
beneficiary because he has only a contingent interest in the trust res, and that he lacks
standing as trustee because a pro se litigant cannot pursue a claim in a representative
capacity in federal court. Marin now appeals the District Court’s order to this Court.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing.

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Goode v. City of Philadelphia, 539 F.3d 311, 316 (3d Cir. 2008). We may affirm the
District Court’s order on any ground supported by the record. See Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
To have standing to bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must show, inter alia,
that he has “suffered an injury in fact – an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations and
internal quotations omitted). Because standing is jurisdictional in nature, a court is
required to raise questions of standing if not done so by the parties. See Addiction
Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 2005).
The District Court correctly concluded that Marin lacks standing as a beneficiary
of Happy Trust Three. His entitlement as a beneficiary is contingent upon not only the
death or incapacity of his father, but also the continued existence of the trust, which
apparently can be revoked at any time. Even if his contingent interest ultimately matures
into a primary interest, it is uncertain whether that interest would even include the real
property at issue. Indeed, because the trust names multiple contingent beneficiaries and
does not identify how the trust res would be divided amongst these beneficiaries, Marin’s
share may very well not include the real property at issue here. Accordingly, because the
viability and scope of his interest is uncertain, any alleged injury to that interest is too
conjectural to confer standing upon him.

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Marin alleges that, pursuant to the terms of the trust, he is owed trustee’s fees,1
apparently for his work on this case. Even if this claim is legitimate, his personal claim
would be against the trust, not Appellees. If the trust, in turn, were to seek damages from
Appellees, Marin, as trustee, could assert this claim on the trust’s behalf, but not without
the benefit of counsel.
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Marin does, however, have standing as trustee of Happy Trust Three, for the trust
is the true party in interest and the trustee may sue on its behalf. In ruling to the contrary,
the District Court conflated standing with the rule of law prohibiting a pro se litigant from
pursuing claims on another’s behalf. Yet the District Court did not err in dismissing
Marin’s claims on behalf of the trust, for the court correctly held that he cannot pursue
these claims pro se. See Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993)1
(“It has been the law for the better part of two centuries . . . that a corporation may appear
in the federal courts only through licensed counsel. As the courts have recognized, the
rationale for that rule applies equally to all artificial entities.”) (citations omitted); see also
Knoefler v. United Bank of Bismarck, 20 F.3d 347, 348 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
trustee cannot proceed pro se on behalf of a trust); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United
States, 818 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (same). To assert these claims on behalf of
the trust, Marin would need to retain counsel.
The District Court’s order did not specify whether its dismissal was with or
without prejudice. We therefore modify the order so that the case is dismissed without
prejudice. See Goode, 539 F.3d at 313 (modifying district court’s order dismissing action
for lack of standing so that dismissal was without prejudice); Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll.,

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937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991) (remanding case in which pro se plaintiff filed
complaint in representative capacity, and noting that if plaintiff did not obtain counsel
upon remand, the district court could dismiss the case without prejudice). As so
modified, we will affirm the District Court’s order. Appellant’s motion to supplement the
record is denied.

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