Parul Patel v. Attorney General of the United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 09-1281
PARUL PATEL,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A95-815-043)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Henry S. Dogin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 27, 2010
Before: BARRY, STAPLETON and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 29, 2010)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
Parul Patel, a native and citizen of India, entered the United States before 1992 as
a child. After the Government charged her with removability in 2006, she sought asylum,
withholding, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The

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Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained the charge of removability and denied the applications
for relief from removal. Specifically, he ruled that the asylum application was untimely,
and denied the other applications based on an adverse credibility finding and, assuming
credible testimony, a failure to satisfy the pertinent standards for relief.
Patel appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA agreed that
Patel was ineligible for asylum because of an untimely filing. The BIA reversed the
adverse credibility finding but dismissed the appeal. The BIA held that Patel had not
shown that she was entitled to withholding or CAT relief. Patel presents a petition for
review.
First, we address the scope of our jurisdiction over her petition. Although Patel
includes arguments relating to the timeliness of her asylum application and her
entitlement to asylum relief, we do not have jurisdiction over that question. See
Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006). To the extent that her
petition relates to that question, we will dismiss it. However, we otherwise have
jurisdiction over her petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
Because the BIA issued a decision separate from the IJ, we review only the BIA’s
ruling. See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006). We consider
questions of law de novo. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 302 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).
We review factual findings for substantial evidence. See Butt v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 430,
433 (3d Cir. 2005). On review, we conclude that the BIA did not err in denying Patel’s

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Although the Government argues to the contrary, we do not agree that Patel waived a1
challenge to the BIA’s decision on her CAT claim, and we will consider it.
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applications for relief.1
Patel and her husband were born in the same city in India, but to different
circumstances. R. 139 (Patel describing Ahmedabad as similar to New York City and her
part of the town as the place where the housekeepers for the rich residents live).
Although they were born into different castes, Patel and her husband met and married for
love in the United States, against the wishes of Patel’s husband’s parents. Patel testified
that her husband’s parents disapproved of her. For instance, when her husband’s mother
came to visit before the wedding, she expressed her disappointment and acted as if her
son could do better, R. 142, giving Patel a bad look and not responding to questions, R.
144. Patel also testified that she feared that her husbands’ parents, with whom she would
be obliged to live in India, R. 142, would “torture” or mistreat her because of her caste
and because her parents did not provide a dowry, R. 137, 139, 146. She also stated that
she feared being kicked out of her in-laws’ house and having to fend for herself without
knowing how to read or write Gujarati. R. 148-49.
Patel’s husband testified that his parents are not happy about his marriage, R. 170,
but that they tolerated it, R. 164. He also stated that his parents would not accept Patel
because she is from a lower caste, R. 172, and that she will be “out of society,” R. 173,
yet not free to live elsewhere in India, R. 174. Her husband would not accompany her to

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India, R. 176, and he would not be able to change his parents’ behavior, R. 180. He
speculated that his parents may beat his wife (because they used to beat him). R. 184.
Patel also put forth a claim of a pattern and practice of persecution against women
in India. She recollected witnessing, as a child, her aunt being beaten by her husband
while her aunt’s in-laws stood by unmoving. R. 134. She noted that her friend was
mugged on a visit to India in 2005 and expressed a general fear of crimes and riots. R.
150. She also submitted articles about the treatment of women, including information
about “dowry deaths,” the killing of a bride by a groom’s family for failure to pay a
dowry. The 2006 Country Report on Human Rights Practices is also in the record
(beginning at R. 374).
In India, Patel may be very uncomfortable living with her in-laws. In their
community, she may face social ostracism. However, even her husband could not say that
she would be tortured by his parents, who “tolerate” the marriage. Overall, Patel did not
show a clear probability that she would be singled out for persecution on account of a
protected ground. Nor did she prove her claim of a pattern or practice of persecution
tolerated by the Indian government. According to the Country Report, domestic violence,
including dowry deaths, remains a problem in India; however, new legislation addresses
this serious issue. R. 400-01. Furthermore, Patel did not prove that it is more likely than
not that she be tortured on her return to India.
For these reasons, the agency did not err in denying Patel’s withholding and CAT

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claims, see Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2008); Tarrawally v. Ashcroft,
338 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2003); cf. Wong v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 539
F.3d 225, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, to the extent that we have jurisdiction over
her petition, we will deny it.

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