Patricia Williams v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY On Appeal from the United States…

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 09-1471
PATRICIA WILLIAMS,
Appellant
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-07-cv-01832)
District Judge: Hon. Eduardo C. Robreno
Argued November 5, 2009
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, JORDAN and COWEN,
Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 04, 2009)

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Robert Savoy, Esq. (Argued)
3 Neshaminy Interplex
Suite 301
Trevose, PA 19053
Counsel for Appellant
Allyson Jozwik, Esq. (Argued)
Eric P. Kressman, Esq.
Social Security Administration
SSA/OGC/Region III
P.O. Box 41777
Philadelphia, PA 19101
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION
COWEN, Circuit Judge
Patricia Williams appeals an order denying her request
for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. We will affirm.
I. Background
Patricia Williams applied for disability insurance
benefits, which the Social Security Administration denied. She
appealed and attended a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”). She testified as did an independent Vocation
Expert (“VE”). At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ

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denied her claim, which the Appeals Council affirmed.
Williams sought review in the District Court asserting that
several of the ALJ’s findings were not supported by substantial
evidence. The District Court rejected each of Williams’
arguments with the exception of one, and remanded for further
findings on that issue. The District Court agreed with Williams
that the ALJ’s findings with respect to Williams’ ability to
perform her past relevant work were not supported by the
substantial evidence.
To properly evaluate Williams’ EAJA fee application,
some background on this issue is necessary. In denying
benefits, the ALJ determined that Williams was able to perform
light duty and that her past relevant work consisted of positions
requiring light duty. The ALJ supported this conclusion with
testimony purportedly from the VE. According to the ALJ, the
VE’s testimony indicated that “based upon the claimant’s
residual functional capacity, the claimant could return to her past
relevant work as an automobile service advisor, retail store
manager, and/or office clerk . . . .” (App. 21.) The VE’s
testimony varies remarkably from the ALJ’s recollection. The
VE indicated that the statutory definition of the positions that
Williams previously held constituted light work; however, the
VE noted that if Williams’ testimony regarding her actual duties
was fully credited, the positions required medium-duty work.
Further, the VE indicated that if Williams’ testimony regarding
pain and limitations was fully credited, Williams could not
perform any work.
Williams asserted in the District Court that the ALJ
misstated the VE’s testimony and failed to address the
discrepancy between the exertional levels required of her past

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relevant work, as set forth in the statutory definitions of those
positions, and as the VE testified. The government conceded
that the ALJ misstated the VE’s testimony, but asserted that
remand was unnecessary, as the ALJ’s finding could be affirmed
under an alternative theory. According to the government, the
VE’s testimony was not essential to the ALJ’s conclusion as the
ALJ could support her finding entirely by other evidence in the
record, which would yield the same result—that Williams was
able to perform her past relevant work.
The District Court concluded that a “remand is warranted
. . . for the ALJ to explain her conclusion that the plaintiff is
capable of performing past relevant work” as the ALJ offered no
explanation as to the discrepancy between her recollection and
the VE’s actual testimony. (App. 102.) Additionally, the court
noted that the VE’s definition of plaintiff’s past relevant work
required an exertional level that was higher than that contained
in the statutory definitions. The statutory description states that
light duty is required of automotive service advisors and retail
managers; however, the vocation expert testified that an
automotive service advisor position required a level of duty
“above light” and a retail manager position required “at least
medium” duty. (Id.) The court concluded that “the ALJ’s
failure to identify this conflict or recognize that she had rejected
the VE’s description of the exertional levels of these
occupations warrants remand.” (Id.)
Williams then moved for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the
EAJA. The sole issue before the court was whether the
government’s position was “substantially justified” as Williams
met the other requirements for an award of fees. The District
Court found that the under the “totality of the circumstances”

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the government’s position was substantially justified. The
District Court denied Williams’ request for attorneys’ fees and
this appeal followed. The sole issue on appeal is whether the
District Court erred in finding that the government’s position
was substantially justified.
II. Standard of Review
“The district court’s determination of substantial
justification in a suit under the EAJA is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” See Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 682 (3d Cir.
1998) (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1988)).
“An abuse of discretion arises when ‘the district court’s decision
rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.’”
Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d
Cir. 1993) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Frazier, 966 F.2d 812, 815 (3d
Cir. 1992)).
III. Discussion
Under the EAJA, a prevailing party in a litigation against
the government shall be awarded “fees and other expenses . . .
incurred by that party . . . unless the court finds that the position
of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(A). A position is substantially justified if it is
“justified in substance or in the main—that is, justified to a
degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce, 487 U.S.
at 565. Stated differently, a government position is substantially
justified “if it has a reasonable basis in both law and fact.”
Hanover Potato, 989 F.2d at 128. To defeat a prevailing party’s
application for fees, the government must establish that there is

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substantial justification for its position by demonstrating “(1) a
reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable
basis in law for the theory it propounded; and (3) a reasonable
connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory
advanced.” Morgan, 142 F.3d at 684 (citing Hanover Potato,
989 F.2d at 128).
It is well-settled in this circuit that “a court cannot
assume that the government’s position was not substantially
justified simply because the government lost on the merits.”
Morgan, 142 F.3d at 685. “The EAJA is not a ‘loser pays’
statute”; rather, courts should limit their inquiries to whether the
government’s position was reasonable under the facts and the
law. Id. (“The inquiry into reasonableness for EAJA purposes
may not be collapsed into the antecedent evaluation of the
merits, for EAJA sets forth a distinct legal standard.”).
The government’s position consists of both its
prelitigation agency position and its litigation position. As
other circuits have recognized, when determining whether the
government’s position is substantially justified, “we must . . .
arrive at one conclusion that simultaneously encompasses and
accommodates the entire civil action.” Jackson v. Chater, 94
F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming the denial of fees as
the government’s position on the whole was substantially
justified); see also Roanoke River Basin Assoc. v. Hudson, 991
F.2d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e conclude that when
determining whether the government’s position in a case is
substantially justified, we look beyond the issue on which the
petitioner prevailed to determine, from the totality of the
circumstances, whether the government acted reasonably in
causing the litigation or in taking a stance during the

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litigation.”). Moreover, “a party’s success on a single claim will
rarely be dispositive of whether the government’s overall
position was substantially justified.” Stewart v. Astrue, 561
F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2009).
The District Court properly concluded that the
government’s position was substantially justified. The District
Court found just one error with the ALJ’s decision and that
particular error is inconsequential, as the ALJ had the ability to
reach the same conclusion on remand based on other evidence
in the record. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
government’s position was substantially justified.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the District Court’s order denying attorneys’
fees under the EAJA.

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