United States of America v. Carl Anthony Knight

DLD-006 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1477
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CARL ANTHONY KNIGHT,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 98-CR-00003)
District Judge Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted on a Motion for
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 9, 2009
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed : October 21, 2009
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Carl Anthony Knight appeals from an order of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania, which denied his motion for reduction of sentence,

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filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because no substantial question is presented by
the appeal, we will grant Appellee’s motion for summary action, and will affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
Knight’s motions and supplements in the District Court argued that his sentence
should be reduced due to Amendment 706 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”), which concerns sentencing for convictions involving crack
cocaine. He also argued that on resentencing, the District Court should consider the
Guidelines to be advisory, pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The
District Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to reduce Knight’s sentence, as
Amendment 706 would not lower Knight’s sentencing range. The District Court also
rejected Knight’s argument that on resentencing it would have discretion to impose a
sentence that varied from the Guidelines range, and noted that even if it had such
discretion, it would not exercise it to reduce Knight’s sentence.
The District Court properly found that it lacked jurisdiction to reduce Knight’s
sentence. Normally, a court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it is imposed.
However, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) creates a limited exception, noting that a court may
reduce a term of imprisonment “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by
the Sentencing Commission . . . after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)
to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable

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Knight does not appear to dispute the District Court’s calculations, see Dist. Ct. Op.1
at 4, that after adjustments, the final offense level would remain 43. Instead, Knight
disputes the District Court’s characterization of the drug quantity involved, and argues
that the District Court should consider the Guidelines advisory on resentencing.
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policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The District Court properly
held, citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B), that section 3582(c)(2) only applies if an
applicable amendment lowers a defendant’s sentencing range. Dist. Ct. Op., dkt. #211 at
2-3; see also United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009). As the District
Court noted, at the time Knight was sentenced, an offense involving greater than 1.5
kilograms of cocaine base (the highest amount listed in the Drug Quantity Table at the
time) would be assigned a base offense level of 38. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (1998). After
amendment, an offense involving at least 1.5 kilograms but less than 4.5 kilograms of
cocaine base is assigned a base offense level of 36, but an offense involving 4.5
kilograms or more of cocaine base is assigned level 38. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2008). As
Knight’s offense involved over 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base, the base offense level (and
the resulting final adjusted offense level) would not change.1
Knight argues that the only drug quantity the District Court should have considered
is the 1.8 kilograms of cocaine base, referenced in paragraph 30 of his presentence report
(PSR), which was the amount seized on the day of his arrest. He notes that the Guidelines
calculation portion of the PSR states that the drug quantity was “in excess of 1.5
kilograms of cocaine base,” see PSR ¶ 38, and then appears to conclude that this

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The superceding indictment charged a conspiracy taking place between January2
1993 and November 14, 1997. PSR ¶ 6.
As the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Knight’s motion, his argument3
regarding the application of Booker is moot. We note, however, that even if the District
Court could have considered a reduction of sentence, our decision in United States v.
Dillon, 572 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2009) forecloses Knight’s argument that Booker would
apply to render the Guidelines advisory on resentencing. Dillon, 572 F.3d at 149.
Knight’s motion to supplement the record is denied. We note that the material he4
submits was not before the District Court, and it is further irrelevant to the question of
whether the District Court had jurisdiction to consider Knight’s motion for a reduction of
sentence.
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paragraph must refer only to the 1.8 kilogram amount referenced in paragraph 30.
However, the PSR also notes that Knight “was responsible for the distribution of at least
three kilograms of cocaine base a month in Erie.” PSR § 41. Indeed, in an appeal after a
remand for further consideration based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
we stated that “the jury [that convicted Knight] credited testimony from coconspirators
including evidence that Knight bought approximately 2 kilograms of cocaine base for
between $21,000 to $25,000 per kilogram every ten days” over the course of the
conspiracy. United States v. Knight, C.A. No. 99-3667, 50 Fed. Appx. 565, 568, 20022
WL 31429873 (3d Cir. Oct. 31, 2002). Because Knight’s offense clearly involved over
4.5 kilograms of cocaine base, Amendment 706 did not change his sentencing range. The
District Court thus properly held that it lacked jurisdiction to reduce Knight’s sentence.3
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the Government’s motion and summarily
affirm the District Court’s judgment.4

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