Jeanne S. Di Loreto v. William F. Costigan, Esquire

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 09-1812
JEANNE S. DI LORETO
v.
WILLIAM F. COSTIGAN, ESQUIRE;
ERIC R. DINALLO; MARK J. PETERS;
ANDREW J.J. LORIN
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-08-cv-00989)
JEANNE S. DI LORETO
v.
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK;
WILLIAM F. COSTIGAN, ESQUIRE;
ERIC R. DINALO; MARK G. PETERS;
ANDREW J.J. LORIN
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-08-cv-00990)
Jeanne S. Di Loreto, Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Nos. 2-08-cv-00989 & 2-08-cv-00990)
District Judge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 5, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 6, 2009)
OPINION OF THE COURT
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Jeanne S. Di Loreto appeals from a February 19, 2009 order of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing her
complaints in two civil actions. She also appeals from an August 29, 2008 order of the
District Court refusing to remand her cases to the Court of Common Pleas. For the
following reasons, we will affirm.
I. Background
Mrs. Di Loreto and her husband controlled Ardra Insurance Company Ltd.
(“Ardra”), which purportedly provided reinsurance coverage for another company called
Nassau Insurance Company (“Nassau”). Nassau was at one time presided over by Mr. Di
Loreto as President, but it went into liquidation under the authority of the Insurance
Department of the State of New York (“NYSID”). Shortly thereafter, in 1985, the
NYSID Superintendent, in his capacity as Nassau’s Liquidator, sued Ardra in New York
state court for reinsurance moneys owed to Nassau. In the same suit, he sought recovery
from the Di Loretos in their individual capacities, on the theory that Ardra was their alter

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1At trial, the jury deadlocked on the issue of Mrs. Di Loreto’s liability. The trial judge
determined that once six of the eight deliberating jurors reached agreement, their decision
would constitute the jury’s verdict on the claims against Mrs. Di Loreto. On appeal, Mrs.
Di Loreto asserted that the verdict was rendered by a constitutionally defective jury
because the New York constitution requires agreement of at least five-sixths of the jurors
deliberating to render a civil verdict and six out of eight jurors equals less than five-
sixths. N.Y. Const. Art. 1, § 2 (“The legislature may provide ... that a verdict may be
rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case.”); NY. C.P.L.R. 4113
(“A verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jurors constituting a
jury.”). The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court concluded that the
argument was waived saying “[t]he record discloses that the [Di Loretos] consented to a
verdict rendered by six of eight jurors.” (App. at 281a.) The Appellate Division also
affirmed the judgment, concluding that “the proof showed that the DiLoretos, through
their control of Ardra, deprived it of the funds needed to meet its reinsurance
obligations.” (App. at 281a.)
3
ego. William Costigan was the attorney representing the Liquidator throughout those
proceedings. The Di Loretos were represented by attorneys from the Philadelphia office
of the law firm Pepper Hamilton, LLP.
The Liquidator finally prevailed at trial in April of 2002, obtaining a judgment for
approximately $20 million (the “New York judgment”), and he also prevailed on appeal.1
Serio v. Ardra Ins. Co., 801 N.E.2d 423 (N.Y. 2003) (denying leave to appeal); Serio v.
Ardra Ins. Co., 796 N.E.2d 477 (N.Y. 2003) (dismissing appeal). He then filed the New
York judgment in Chester County, Pennsylvania, as a lien against property that the Di
Loretos owned there, though he did not then seek to execute on the lien.
In 2005, Mrs. Di Loreto, unhappy with the outcome of the New York litigation,
sued Pepper Hamilton. She filed the malpractice action in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, and her lawyer in that case discussed with the Liquidator the

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possibility of satisfying the New York judgment out of the proceeds of the recovery Mrs.
Di Loreto hoped to obtain from Pepper Hamilton. Some time after that, the Liquidator
sought to execute on the Chester County lien through a sheriff’s sale, and also attempted
to garnish any proceeds from Mrs. Di Loreto’s malpractice suit.
Mrs. Di Loreto succeeded in having the sheriff’s sale stayed pending the resolution
of the malpractice suit. However, when the suit settled, progress towards a final
resolution of the Liquidator’s claims against Ardra and the Di Loretos hit another delay
when Pepper Hamilton refused to disburse the settlement moneys because of the
garnishment. There were further moves and countermoves in the Liquidator’s effort to
collect against Mrs. Di Loreto, which culminated in the filing by Mrs. Di Loreto of two
essentially identical lawsuits in Pennsylvania, one in the Court of Common Pleas for
Philadelphia County (the “Philadelphia lawsuit”) and one in the Court of Common Pleas
of Chester County (the “Chester County lawsuit”), naming as defendants the appellees in
the present appeal, who are certain employees of the NYSID (“NYSID employees”) and
Costigan. The Chester County lawsuit included the NYSID itself as a defendant, and the
NYSID is also an appellee in the present matter.
Mrs. Di Loreto’s substantively identical complaints sought to prevent execution on
the New York judgment because, she said, it “was obtained in violation of [her] due
process rights.” (App. at 2a-3a, 345a.) She also sought compensatory and punitive
damages. The complaints assert the following claims: (1) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for violation of Mrs. Di Loreto’s due process rights, based on Appellees’

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procurement of the allegedly defective New York judgment; (2) a § 1983 claim for
violation of Mrs. Di Loreto’s equal protection rights; (3) a claim for abuse of process,
based on, among other things, the filing of the garnishment suit for the alleged purpose of
harassing Mrs. Di Loreto and pressuring her into settlement; (4) a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress; and (5) a claim for declaratory judgment that the New
York judgment is invalid.
On January 25, 2008, Mrs. Di Loreto initiated the Chester County lawsuit by filing
a summons and a complaint. Two of the NYSID employees and the NYSID itself were
served on January 29, 2008, and the remaining NYSID employee was served on February
11, 2008. Those defendants had also been served with the Philadelphia lawsuit as of the
same dates. Di Loreto attempted to serve Costigan in the Chester County lawsuit by
serving an attorney who had entered an appearance on his behalf in the Philadelphia
lawsuit, but the attorney refused to accept service for Costigan.
On February 26, 2008, Costigan emailed counsel for Mrs. Di Loreto stating:
I refer to the Philadelphia and Chester County actions you have commenced
on behalf of Jeanne S. DiLoreto against me and other defendants. I
understand you have asked [my attorney] to accept service on my behalf.
Be advised that I will be appearing pro se in the cases and that I
acknowledge service of both complaints effective today. I [sic] you require
something more formal, just send it to me.
(App. at 930a.) That same day, the NYSID employees removed both cases to federal
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Although both notices of removal asserted that all

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defendants had consented to removal, neither notice included proof of Costigan’s consent,
and the Chester County notice did not include proof of the NYSID’s consent.
On March 7, 2008, Mrs. Di Loreto’s counsel sent Costigan a letter enclosing an
acceptance of service form for Costigan to complete “as a more formal record that [he
had] officially been served.” (App. at 931a.) On March 27, 2008 Di Loreto filed motions
to remand both cases to the state courts. Four days later, on March 31, 2008, Costigan
signed the acceptance of service form and returned it to counsel. He also filed a “consent
to removal” in the Philadelphia lawsuit and a notice of removal in the Chester County
lawsuit which included as an exhibit the NYSID and NYSID employees’ consent to
removal.
After much argument from the parties, the District Court denied the motions to
remand. With respect to the Chester County lawsuit, the District Court concluded that
Costigan did not waive service until he signed the acceptance of service form. The Court
further decided that the matter had been properly removed because Costigan was the last
defendant served and his notice of removal was timely, as measured from the time he was
served. As to the Philadelphia lawsuit, the District Court concluded that the NYSID
employees properly removed the case because Costigan had not been served with the
complaint at the time the NYSID employees petitioned for removal, rendering his consent
unnecessary.
While the motions to remand were outstanding, the NYSID employees and
Costigan filed separate motions to dismiss the Philadelphia and Chester County lawsuits.

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2Although it did not explicitly say so, the District Court’s conclusion that the New
York judgment is valid clearly disposed of Mrs. Di Loreto’s request for declaratory
judgment in addition to her due process claim.
3The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.
Jurisdiction also depended upon the validity of removal, which is discussed herein. Our
jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4In her opening brief, Mrs. Di Loreto asserts that the District Court’s refusal to remand
was erroneous, however, she only discusses the Court’s analysis with respect to the
Chester County lawsuit. Accordingly, she has waived any arguments as to the
Philadelphia lawsuit, despite her attempts to revive them in her reply brief. See Laborers’
Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)
(“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a
passing reference to an issue ... will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
7
The NYSID also moved to dismiss the Chester County lawsuit. The District Court
ultimately dismissed both actions, concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the
NYSID and the Liquidator to the extent he was sued in his official capacity, that it lacked
personal jurisdiction over Costigan, that the New York judgment was entitled to full faith
and credit, which precluded Mrs. Di Loreto’s due process claim, and that Mrs. Di Loreto
failed to state a claim on all remaining counts.2 Mrs. Di Loreto timely appealed.
II. Discussion3
On appeal, Mrs. Di Loreto challenges the District Court’s refusal to remand the
Chester County lawsuit to the Court of Common Pleas.4 She further asserts that the
District Court’s conclusions that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the NYSID and
Costigan were erroneous. Finally, she contends that the District court erred in extending
full faith and credit to the New York judgment, thereby disposing of her due process

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5Mrs. Di Loreto does not appeal the District Court’s dismissal of her equal protection
claim, which asserted that Costigan pursued the Liquidator’s claim against Mrs. Di Loreto
“based on her status as a woman,” nor does she appeal the dismissal of her intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim. (App. at 24a-25a, 368a.) In addition, although she
vaguely references her abuse of process claim in her discussion of the District Court’s
analysis of its personal jurisdiction over Costigan, she does not confront the Court’s
dismissal of that claim. Thus, she has also waived that issue on appeal.
6“[A] federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first
determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter
jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction).” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007). In this case, two of the five defendants –
the NYSID and Costigan – asserted lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense to Mrs. Di
Loreto’s lawsuits. Since we have jurisdiction over the remaining three defendants, we
can dispose of these matters without addressing personal jurisdiction as to the other two,
as we would have to address the merits of Mrs. Di Loreto’s claims regardless of our
jurisdiction over the NYSID and Costigan. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 721-
22 (1975) (declining to address jurisdictional issue because “the substantive issue decided
by the District Court would have been decided by that court even if it had concluded that
the Secretary was not properly a party to the suit, since appellant Philbrook was clearly a
proper party ... and the statutory issues raised by appellees’ claim against Philbrook were
indistinguishable from those raised by their claim against the Secretary.”), superseded by
statute on other grounds, Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
94-566, 90 Stat. 2667.
8
claim.5 We agree with the District Court that Costigan’s notice of removal was timely
filed and that the removal of the Chester County lawsuit was therefore appropriate. We
further conclude that Mrs. Di Loreto’s due process claim was properly dismissed because
the New York judgment is entitled to full faith and credit.6
A. The Chester County Lawsuit was Properly Removed
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s determination that removal was
proper. Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2005). A notice of
removal in a civil action must be filed “within thirty days after receipt by the defendant,

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through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for
relief upon which such action or proceeding is based ... .” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). In
Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., the Supreme Court interpreted this
provision to mean that “a named defendant’s time to remove is triggered by simultaneous
service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, ‘through service or
otherwise,’ after and apart from service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the
complaint unattended by any formal service.” 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999). Thus, the
removal period for a defendant does not begin to run until that defendant is properly
served or until that defendant waives service. See id. at 350 (“In the absence of service of
process (or waiver of service by the defendant), a court ordinarily may not exercise power
over a party the complaint names as a defendant.”)
When there is more than one defendant, the “rule of unanimity” requires that all
defendants consent to the removal. Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
Moreover, it has been accepted that “the last-served defendant may remove within thirty
(30) days of service, and other defendants may consent to the later-served Defendant’s
removal even if their own removal periods have expired.” Cmiech v. Electrolux Home

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7Although the law is not entirely settled, recent authority supports the last-served
defendant rule. See, e.g., Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1205
(11th Cir. 2008) (noting, in adopting the rule, that “the trend in recent case law favors the
last-served defendant rule”); Marano Enters. of Ks. v. Z-Teca Restaurants, L.P., 254 F.3d
753, 757 (8th Cir. 2001) (“We hold that the later-served defendants in this case had thirty
days from the date of service on them to file a notice of removal with the unanimous
consent of their co-defendants, even though the first-served co-defendants did not file a
notice of removal within thirty days of service on them.”); Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible
Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e hold that a later-served
defendant has 30 days from the date of service to remove a case to federal district court,
with the consent of the remaining defendants.”) (footnote omitted); CHARLES A LAN
W RIGHT ET AL ., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3731 (4th ed. 2009) (“Other
courts of appeals, as well as many district courts, also now have rejected the first served
defendant rule in construing Section 1446(b)”) (footnotes omitted). In addition to
Cmiech, other decisions from courts in our circuit have followed this approach. See
Shadie v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 2d 509, 515 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (adopting last-
served defendant rule); Orlick v. J.D. Crton & Son, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (D.N.J.
2001) (same). The parties in this case accept that the rule is applicable and, while we will
leave a definitive decision on the issue for another day, for purposes of this case at least,
we agree.
10
Prods., Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 671, 676 (M.D. Pa. 2007).7 The parties do not challenge the
application of this “last-served defendant” rule by the District Court.
Since Costigan was never officially served in accordance with the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure, we must determine when he waived service so as to trigger his
removal period. See Fleehr v. Mummert, 857 A.2d 683, 685 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)
(“[E]ffective service of process may be obtained through waiver or consent.”). Di Loreto
asserts that Costigan’s February 26, 2008 email constituted a waiver of service, rendering
untimely his removal of the matter more than thirty days later. Appellees assert that the
District Court correctly concluded that waiver of service did not occur until March 31,

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2008, when Costigan signed and returned the acceptance of service form sent to him by
counsel for Mrs. Di Loreto.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 402(b) allows a defendant or his agent to
waive service of process by completing an acceptance of service form. A defendant may
also waive process if he “manifests an intent to submit to the court’s jurisdiction ... [by]
tak[ing] ‘some action (beyond merely entering a written appearance) going to the merits
of the case, which evidences an intent to forego objection to the defective service.’”
Fleehr, 857 A.2d at 685 (quoting Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493, 499
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)). For example, in Fleehr v. Mummert, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court concluded that defense counsel’s appearance in court on a motion to consolidate
the plaintiff’s case with a related arbitration evidenced the defendant’s intent to waive
formal process and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. 857 A.2d at 685 (“Counsel’s
actions were taken on Appellant’s behalf and must be seen as a recognition of the ...
complaint, for absent such there was nothing to consolidate.”).
By contrast, in Cmiech v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., counsel for plaintiff
sent an acceptance of service form to defense counsel, but never followed up on the
matter. 520 F. Supp. 2d at 673, 676. Thereafter, defense counsel engaged in discussions
with plaintiff’s counsel regarding extensions of time and, according to the plaintiff,
represented that they had authority to accept service for the defendant in question. Id. at
673. The District Court concluded that, despite counsels’ discussions, service was not
waived until defense counsel completed the acceptance of service form. See id. at 676.

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Since counsels’ behavior was directed at plaintiff’s counsel, and not at the court itself as
in Fleehr, it was insufficient to waive service. 520 F. Supp. 2d at 675.
Although Costigan’s email message of February 26, 2008 can be read as evincing
an intent to forego an objection to formal service, we cannot say that the District Court
erred in concluding that the email was insufficient to constitute a waiver of service.
Costigan’s informal email does not mention anything regarding the merits of the
Philadelphia lawsuit or Chester County lawsuit. In addition, as in Cmeich, Costigan was
not interacting with the court so as to permit an inference that he was submitting to the
court’s jurisdiction without challenge. Accordingly, the first clear indication that
Costigan would forego any challenge to the defective service was when he signed the
acceptance of service form on March 31, 2008. Since he removed the Chester County
lawsuit to federal court that same day, with proof of the other defendants’ consent,
removal was proper under the last-served defendant rule.
B. The New York Judgment is Enforceable
On appeal, Mrs. Di Loreto challenges the dismissal of her due process claim,
asserting that, when the District Court concluded that the New York judgment is entitled
to full faith and credit, it “fail[ed] to examine the circumstances surrounding the New
York Judgment and fail[ed] to give Mrs. Di Loreto all reasonable inferences in her favor.”
(Appellant’s Op. Br. at 36.) A court confronted with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must accept
the truth of all factual allegations in the complaint and must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-movant. Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 549

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F.3d 605, 610 (3d Cir. 2008). In determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court
may consider exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record. Pension
Ben. Guaranty Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1197 (3d Cir. 1993).
“We exercise plenary review over a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss
... .” DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2004).
The key question is whether there is any flaw in the New York judgment that gives
rise to a due process claim, for, in the absence of such a flaw, we “must give the same
preclusive effect to a state court judgment as another court of that state would ... .”
Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Augusta, 178 F.3d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 1999); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1738; Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982) (“Section 1738
requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that
those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments
emerged.”). “Due process requires that a party have a full and fair opportunity to litigate
their case.” Peduto v. City of N. Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 728 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 480-81). Although the requirements of due process are context-
specific, due process is generally comprised of:
(1) notice of the basis of the governmental action; (2) a neutral arbiter; (3)
an opportunity to make an oral presentation; (4) a means of presenting
evidence; (5) an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or to respond to
written evidence; (6) the right to be represented by counsel; and (7) a
decision based on the record with a statement of reasons for the result.
Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 694 (3d Cir. 1980).

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Mrs. Di Loreto does not complain that New York state court procedures, or a lack
thereof, failed to provide her the protections safeguarded by the Due Process clause of the
United States Constitution. She instead argues that the New York judgment was rendered
without due process because “the Liquidator brought a lawsuit against [her] with virtually
no evidence,” and because “the case was decided by an unconstitutionally defective jury,
... defended by a negligent attorney who was representing both Di Loretos, and ... was
pursued by a manipulative prosecutor.” (Appellant’s Op. Br. at 38.) According to Mrs.
Di Loreto, the District Court’s failure to account for these factors rendered erroneous its
conclusion that the judgment was enforceable.
Despite those protestations, we find no error in the District Court’s analysis. Mrs.
Di Loreto had a full and fair opportunity to defend against the Liquidator’s claims. Her
complaints and the attached exhibits conclusively establish that she was represented by
counsel, had an opportunity to conduct discovery and present evidence and argument at
trial, received a trial before a neutral judge and jury, and had the opportunity to challenge
the jury’s verdict on appeal with the assistance of counsel. Moreover, on appeal to the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, Mrs. Di Loreto argued for reversal
of the judgment on grounds that there was insufficient evidence against her and that only
six of eight jurors had rendered the verdict—the very arguments she advances in this
case. The Appellate Division reviewed the record and considered those arguments,
concluding that sufficient evidence supported the judgment and that Mrs. Di Loreto had
waived any objection to the manner in which the verdict was rendered. In short, the New

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8Furthermore, whether Mrs. Di Loreto’s attorneys were negligent in representing her in
the New York action – a matter as to which we neither state nor imply any conclusion at
all – has no bearing on the validity of the judgment against her. There is no right to
effective assistance of counsel in a civil case, as there is in a criminal case. See Kushner
v. Wintherthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 1980) (“An aggrieved party in a
civil case, involving only private litigants unlike a defendant in a criminal case, does not
have a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. The remedy in a civil
case, in which chosen counsel is negligent, is an action for malpractice.”) (internal
quotations omitted). Mrs. Di Loreto had and took the opportunity to sue her attorneys for
legal malpractice. Her settlement of that claim compensates her to the extent that any
malpractice might have tainted the New York proceedings. Also irrelevant is the fact that
the Liquidator vigorously pursued his case against Mrs. Di Loreto. The Liquidator was
entitled to prosecute a legitimate claim to the extent provided by the law and subject to
the rulings of the trial judge.
15
York proceedings bear all of the hallmarks of due process. That Mrs. Di Loreto lost her
case does not mean her constitutional rights were violated.8
Her assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, it is clear that Mrs. Di Loreto seeks
to use the present proceedings as a vehicle for rearguing claims that have been
extensively litigated in New York and fairly passed upon by the courts of that state. As is
evident from the voluminous attachments to her complaints in the Philadelphia lawsuit
and the Chester County lawsuit, including deposition testimony and trial transcripts from
the New York litigation, Mrs. Di Loreto is inviting us to function as a state appellate court
and overturn the New York judgment. That, however, is something we cannot do. Cf.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005) (complaints
that “invite[] federal courts of first instance to review and reverse unfavorable state-court
judgments” are “out of bounds”).

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9Even if Mrs. Di Loreto had preserved her abuse of process claim on appeal, our
conclusion that the New York judgment is valid would also dispose of that claim, since
use of process for a legitimate reason – to secure collection on a valid judgment – does
not constitute abuse of process. See Rosen v. Am. Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 193-94
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (bank’s subpoena of plaintiff during discovery in aid of execution
on a valid judgment did not constitute abuse of process, regardless of whether subpoena
was properly served, because plaintiff had information relevant to bank’s attempt to
execute).
16
Mrs. Di Loreto has had over two decades of legal process that more than comports
with the dictates of our Constitution. The New York judgment is enforceable,9 which
requires us to affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the removed cases. We therefore
need not address the remaining arguments on appeal.
III. Conclusion
Costigan’s notice of removal was timely filed and the Chester County lawsuit was
therefore properly removed pursuant to the last-served defendant rule. The New York
judgment was not procured in violation of Mrs. Di Loreto’s due process rights and it is
therefore entitled to full faith and credit. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the
District Court.

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