Deborah Willett, Administratrix of the Estate of David P. Willett, Deceased v. Allstate Insurance Company Appeal From the United States District Court for the…

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 09-1853
DEBORAH WILLETT, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF DAVID P. WILLETT, DECEASED,
Appellant
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-08-cv-05411)
District Judge: Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr.
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 15, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: 31 December 2009)
OPINION
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Deborah Willett, Administratrix of the Estate of David P.
Willett, her son, appeals an order granting summary judgment to the defendant, Allstate
Insurance Company, which had denied the plaintiff’s claim for underinsured motorist

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1 Under Pennsylvania law, court approval is required for settlement of
death claims. Pa. R.C.P. 2206(a).
2 See Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1328 (3d Cir. 1991) (denial of
summary judgment appealable when “raised in tandem with an appeal of an order
granting a cross-motion for summary judgment”). The District Court had diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§1291.
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benefits. Finding no error, we will affirm.
David Willett, age 18 and a resident of Pennsylvania, died as a result of an
auto accident on June 29, 2006, in Waldo, Maine. He was a passenger in the car operated
by Maine resident Thomas Piersiak, whose negligence was the sole cause of the crash.
Plaintiff settled the claim with Piersiak’s auto insurance carriers for $454,249. That
settlement was approved by the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,
Pennsylvania, the decedent’s domicile, after a hearing on July 9, 2007.1
Plaintiff then filed this suit, seeking to recover $100,000 in underinsured
motorist benefits under Mrs. Willett’s auto insurance policy with Allstate. Contending
that the estate had already received all damages to which the decedent was entitled under
the policy and, therefore, Piersiak was not an “underinsured motorist,” Allstate denied the
claim. Both parties moved for summary judgment, which was entered in favor of
Allstate. Plaintiff timely appealed.2
The parties stipulated that, although Piersiak had over $795,000 in
additional liability coverage, the settlement of $454,249 represented the maximum

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3 See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A § 2-804(b) (2000) (in action for
wrongful death, “jury may give damages not exceeding $400,000 for the loss of comfort,
society and companionship of the deceased”).
4 See 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1731(c) (“[u]nderinsured motorist coverage shall
provide protection for persons who suffer injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle and are legally entitled to recover damages therefor from owners or
operators of underinsured motor vehicles”).
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recoverable damages under Maine law.3 Allstate also conceded that the decedent was an
insured under Mrs. Willett’s policy.
That policy’s underinsurance provision satisfies the requirements of the
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), 75 Pa. C.S.A.
§1701 et seq. Specifically, the policy provides, “we will pay damages . . . for bodily
injury which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of
an underinsured auto.” An underinsured auto is defined in the policy as “[a] motor
vehicle which has bodily injury liability protection . . . but its limit for bodily injury
liability is less than the damages the insured person is legally entitled to recover.” This
language essentially mirrors the MVFRL.4
The Allstate policy was issued in Pennsylvania to a Pennsylvania resident.
The interpretation of its contractual provisions is a matter of Pennsylvania law. See, e.g.,
McMillan v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am., 922 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“[W]e look to the law of Pennsylvania, the state where the policy of insurance was
contracted and delivered, for guidance in construing [the] policy.”).
The issue in this case is, therefore, the meaning of the policy language

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limiting recovery to damages that decedent was “legally entitled” to recover from
Piersiak. This phrase clearly and unambiguously states that coverage depends upon the
decedent’s legal right to damages from Piersiak. If decedent has no right to recover
damages from Piersiak, then Allstate has no responsibility under its policy. If decedent
has a right to recover only partial damages from Piersiak, then Allstate is required to pay
only that amount. In short, Allstate’s contractual liability, as established by the
provisions of its policy, is derivative of Piersiak’s tort liability.
Piersiak’s tort liability is determined by Maine law. See Cipolla v.
Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1970) (Delaware law would determine amount of tort
damages where Pennsylvania resident was injured in Delaware by negligence of
Delaware driver while riding in car registered in Delaware). The fact that decedent was
domiciled in Pennsylvania neither permits plaintiff to invoke Pennsylvania law to resolve
Piersiak’s liability in tort, nor defeats damage limitations imposed by Maine law. And,
nothing in Allstate’s policy provides for the determination of Piersiak’s tort liability based
on Pennsylvania contractual law.
No conflict of laws issue bears on this question because Piersiak was not a
party to any suit filed by the decedent in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, Maine tort law
controls the “legally entitled” limitation in Allstate’s policy.
The plaintiff’s reliance on Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,788 A.2d 955 (Pa. 2001), is misplaced. In that case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the MVFRL overrode a Pennsylvania statutory

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limit on damages recoverable from an accident caused by a government-owned vehicle.
Consequently, in Pennsylvania, a government bus was “underinsured” because the
amount of damages recoverable by plaintiffs was restricted by Pennsylvania statute.
However wide-ranging its discussion, Kmonk-Sullivan’s holding is limited
to the effects of statutory damages caps imposed by Pennsylvania law for injuries
incurred in Pennsylvania due to the negligence of a Pennsylvania agent. It did not purport
to affect, nor could it affect, the tort law of any other state. See id. at 962 (summarizing
its holding that “the insurance policies, which purported to apply a more restrictive
definition of underinsured motor vehicles, are inconsistent with the [MVFRL].
Consequently, the government vehicle exclusion [in the policy] cannot stand.”). Kmonk-
Sullivan is irrelevant to the issues in the case before us.
As plaintiff concedes, the estate has already recovered the maximum
amount of damages available from the tortfeasor, Piersiak. That the estate might have
been “legally entitled” to additional non-economic damages had the accident happened
elsewhere than Maine does not, under the MVFRL or the terms of the Allstate policy,
entitle plaintiff to underinsurance motorist benefits here. Accordingly, the District Court
was correct in holding that plaintiff was not “legally entitled” to underinsurance motorist
benefits.
The order granting summary judgment to Allstate will be affirmed.

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