David J. Czapinski, an individual v. Iron City Industrial Cleaning Corp., a Pennsylvania Corporation, doing business as…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 09-2002
DAVID J. CZAPINSKI, an individual
v.
IRON CITY INDUSTRIAL CLEANING CORP.,
a Pennsylvania Corporation, doing business as
IRON CITY UNIFORM RENTAL
David J. Czapinski,
Appellant
On Appeal From the United States
District Court
For the Western District of Pennslyvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-07-cv-00717)
District Judge: Hon. Terrence F. McVerry
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 2, 2009
BEFORE: FISHER, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: December 8, 2009)

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OPINION OF THE COURT
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant David Czapinski filed this case against his employer, Iron City Industrial
Cleaning Corp. (“Iron City”), alleging violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), the Age Discrimination In Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). Czapinski appeals from a summary judgment entered
in favor of Iron City.
Because we write solely for the parties, we will assume familiarity with the record
and the proceedings in the District Court. We will affirm essentially for the reasons set
forth in the Report and Recommendations adopted by the District Court as its opinion.
I.
In order to make out a prima facie case under the ADA or the PHRA, the plaintiff
must tender evidence which, if credited, would establish that he has a “disability” within
the meaning of the ADA. The ADA defines “disability” as a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Czapinski insists that he
tendered evidence to the District Court supporting a finding that he has a physical
impairment that substantially limits the major life activities of lifting and working. With

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respect to the major life activity of working, the Secretary’s regulations provide that:
[t]he term [‘]substantially limits[’] means significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
Czapinski argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether he is
substantially limited in his ability to lift and perform truck duties. As he points out, the
record establishes that he is subject to lifting restrictions and that he has been ordered by
his treating physicians not to return to truck duty. However, his evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to him, would not support a finding that he was “disabled” within the
meaning of the ADA. The lifting restriction reflected in this record “does not render him
sufficiently different from the general population such that he is substantially limited in
his ability to lift.” Marinellli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d 354, 364 (3d Cir. 2000). Nor will
this record support a finding that Czapinski’s inability to perform his truck duties
rendered him unable to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities.
Ibid.
II.
The District Court held that Czapinski was unable to establish a prima facie case
under the ADEA because he was unable to show that he was qualified for the position he

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held prior to termination. Citing Detz v. Greiner Industries, Inc., 346 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.
2003), the District Court reasoned as follows:
Here, Plaintiff is bound by judicial admissions that he was unable to
perform his former job responsibilities because they required “heavy lifting
on a regular basis.” See discussions supra. In appearing before the
Worker’s Compensation Judge, Plaintiff’s purpose, by definition, was to
convince the Judge he was unable to engage in his prior work due to a
vocation-related injury. Plaintiff “succeeded in convincing the [Judge] that
his physical limitations actually prevented him from continuing” his job,
and these circumstances preclude a demonstration by Plaintiff that he was
“qualified” to perform his former positions under the ADEA.
App. at 15. The District Court correctly concluded that our decision in Detz required the
conclusion it reached.
III.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

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