Timothy A. Hale v. Deputy McMILLEN

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 09-2737
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TIMOTHY A. HALE,
Appellant
v.
Deputy McMILLEN; Capt. LYNN EATON;
Lt. VANCE; Lt. DALE; Mr. DAVY
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-001701)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable J. Andrew Smyser
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 1, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: February 2, 2010
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM.
In this civil rights action, Timothy A. Hale, proceeding pro se, appeals from
orders of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying

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his pre-trial motion in limine and entering judgment on the jury’s verdict. We will affirm.
In September 2007, Hale, a Pennsylvania inmate incarcerated at SCI-
Rockview, filed a complaint against five prison officials, alleging that he was removed
from his prison law library job in retaliation for filing grievances and civil rights actions,
for assisting other prisoners with their grievances and lawsuits, and for challenging a
“Cease Communications Order.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties agreed to proceed
before a Magistrate Judge. After unsuccessfully moving to dismiss the case under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing, inter alia, that they removed Hale from his job because a confidential
informant indicated that Hale had stolen photocopy paper from the law library. The
Magistrate Judge denied the summary judgment motion, noting that the evidence did not
support the defendants’ contention that Hale was fired under suspicion of stealing paper.
In particular, the Magistrate Judge noted that “this case . . . [is] one in which a serious
allegation of misconduct was raised as to prisoner Hale, an investigation was conducted,
he was not disciplined (nor determined in any explained manner to have committed
misconduct) but he lost his prison library job . . . and is now labeled a ‘security risk.’”
Prior to trial, Hale filed a motion in limine, seeking to preclude the
defendants from arguing that “the plaintiff’s job suspension was a disciplinary sanction
[for] . . . stealing the paper.” Hale contended that defendants could not present such an
argument because “any claims or defenses not preserved by and through the prison

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grievance system . . . would be procedurally defaulted pursuant to the requirements of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),” and must be excluded from trial. The Magistrate
Judge denied the motion, holding that the “PLRA does not require prison defendants to
exhaust their defenses to a prisoner’s allegations in a civil suit before raising them at
trial.” At trial, two of the defendants testified that Hale had been removed from his
prison library job based on the confidential informant’s indication that Hale had stolen
copy paper. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. This timely appeal
followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(3), which provides, in part, that “an aggrieved party [who filed the consent
referred to in § 636(c)(1)] may appeal directly to the appropriate United States court of
appeals from the judgment of the magistrate judge in the same manner as an appeal from
any other judgment of a district court.” This Court reviews an evidentiary ruling for an
abuse of discretion, reversing only if the ruling is arbitrary or irrational. See McKenna v.
City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 460 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Williams, 458
F.3d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 2006).
The District Court properly denied Hale’s motion in limine. Contrary to
Hale’s assertion, evidence that the defendants removed Hale from his prison library job
because they suspected that he was stealing copy paper was certainly relevant to their
defense. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that even if “a

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prisoner demonstrates that his exercise of a constitutional right was a substantial or
motivating factor in the challenged decision, the prison officials may still prevail by
proving that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for
reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”); see also Colon v.
Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 234-35 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding admission of prison disciplinary
record in § 1983 action alleging retaliation because the “information was part of the
reason for the penalty . . . assessed” by the Hearing Officer). In this connection, there is
no merit to Hale’s assertion that the Magistrate Judge improperly permitted the
defendants to testify about statements made to them by the confidential informant. While
hearsay, those statements were not offered for their truth (i.e., that Hale stole the paper);
rather, the informant’s statements were introduced to demonstrate that the defendants had
a legitimate penological motive for removing Hale from his prison library job (i.e., their
belief that he was stealing paper). See Citizens Financial Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat.
Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110, 133 (3d Cir. 2004) (under the hearsay exception in
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), statements that otherwise would be hearsay are
admissible to show the declarant’s state of mind).
Finally, Hale did not cite, and we have been unable to locate, any authority
supporting his contention that the defendants were required to administratively exhaust
specific “claims or defenses” before raising them in the subsequent civil lawsuit. Cf.
Talamantes v. Leyva, 575 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009) (“join[ing] our sister circuits in

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holding that only those individuals who are prisoners (as defined by 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(h)) at the time they file suit must comply with the exhaustion requirements of 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a).”).
Because the District Court’s evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of
discretion, we conclude that it did not err in entering a verdict in favor of the defendants.
Indeed, Hale essentially concedes that if “the [defendants’] claim[] that [he] was believed
to be stealing copy paper from work” was properly admitted into evidence, “[t]he action
would be frivolous as a clear penological interest existed for job suspension absent the
asserted protected conduct.”
For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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