Miguel Nieves Garcia v. J. GRONDOLSKY, Warden F.C.I., Fort Dix On Appeal from the United States District…

093030np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third CircuitOct 28, 2009

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HLD-171 (September 2009) NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3030
___________
MIGUEL NIEVES GARCIA,
Appellant
v.
J. GRONDOLSKY, Warden F.C.I., Fort Dix
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00783)
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
Submitted September 30, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 28, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from the District Court’s dismissal of Miguel Nieves
Garcia’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We will

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summarily affirm. See I.O.P. 10.6.
In 1995 the United Stated District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin sentenced Garcia to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 360 months for
various drug charges. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his
conviction. United States v. Garcia, 89 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1996). Garcia then filed a
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The trial
court denied the motion and the Seventh Circuit denied his request for a certificate of
appealability.
On February 18, 2009, Garcia filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In the petition, Garcia challenged his classification as a
career offender, arguing that a 1972 conviction should not have counted as a predicate
offense. The District Court denied his petition and Garcia filed a timely notice of appeal
to this Court.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and
2253(a). We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and
apply a clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings. See Cradle v. United States ex
rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002). Upon review, we agree with the District
Court’s dismissal.

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A § 2255 motion is the presumptive means by which a federal prisoner can
challenge his conviction or sentence. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343
(1974). A federal prisoner may proceed under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by
§ 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997). “A § 2255 motion is
inadequate or ineffective only where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of
scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a full hearing
and adjudication of his wrongful detention claim.” Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538.
Here, as the District Court held, Garcia has not established that a § 2255
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Garcia raised the
career offender claim on direct appeal. See Garcia, 89 F.3d at 366. Further, he
apparently raised the claim in his § 2255 motion but he alleges that the Wisconsin District
Court “unreasonably held his § 2255 motion to the strict compliance with its procedural
rules.” (Petition at 12.) However, “[i]t is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal
inability to use it, that is determinative.” Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539. Neither the Seventh
Circuit’s rejection of that claim on direct appeal nor the District Court’s dismissal of the
claim for procedural violations renders § 2255 inadequate. Id.
Therefore, the District Court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction

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under § 2241 to hear Garcia’s claim. Further, the District Court also correctly construed
his petition as a second or successive § 2255 motion and held that it also lacked
jurisdiction over such a motion. We agree that the interests of justice did not require the
District Court to transfer the petition to the Seventh Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
order.

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