in Re: Lillian P. Iannini v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, in trust for the registered…

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-2785
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IN RE: LILLIAN P. IANNINI,
Debtor
Lillian P. Iannini,
Appellant
v.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee,
in trust for the registered holders of AmeriQuest
Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-118
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-00055
D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-00101)
District Judge: Hon. Joy Flowers Conti
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 21, 2011
BEFORE: BARRY, AMBRO and COWEN , Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 6, 2011)
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OPINION
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COWEN, Circuit Judge.
Lillian P. Iannini appeals from the memorandum order of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania affirming the orders previously entered by
the Bankruptcy Court. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Iannini‟s adversary
action against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, in Trust for the
Registered Holders of AmeriQuest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed-Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004-118 (“Deutsche Bank”). It also granted Deutsche
Bank‟s motion for relief from stay with respect to Iannini‟s core bankruptcy case. While
this current appeal was pending, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the core bankruptcy
case because of Iannini‟s default. We accordingly will dismiss this appeal as moot.
I.
This appeal arises out of a mortgage purportedly held by Deutsche Bank on a
residence in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, which was jointly owned by Iannini and her son,
James Iannini. Claiming that the owners failed to make their monthly mortgage
payments, Deutsche Bank filed a foreclosure action in the Beaver County Court of
Common Pleas. On February 28, 2008, the state court granted its motion for summary
judgment. Following several postponements because of James Iannini‟s bankruptcy
filings, the sheriff‟s sale ultimately took place on November 17, 2008. Without objection,
Deutsche Bank purchased the property for $4,860.36. The deed was then dated and
recorded on January 2, 2009, and Deutsche Bank commenced an ejectment action in the
Beaver County Court of Common Pleas.

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Over the course of the foreclosure action, James Iannini filed for bankruptcy on
three separate occasions. Approximately a year after he filed for bankruptcy in November
2006, his case was dismissed without prejudice due to his default under the Chapter 13
plan. His second bankruptcy case was then dismissed on July 11, 2008 because he failed
to obtain credit counseling. Finally, his third bankruptcy case was dismissed with
prejudice on October 28, 2008 on account of his failure to make regular plan payments,
and he was specifically barred from filing for bankruptcy or invoking the provisions of
the automatic stay in connection with the property for a period of 180 days.
On March 26, 2009, Iannini filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13. On July 6,
2009, she filed an adversary complaint against Deutsche Bank, claiming, inter alia, that
the sheriff‟s sale constituted an unlawful fraudulent transfer of her property. Deutsche
Bank moved to dismiss the adversary action, and it also requested that the Bankruptcy
Court either dismiss the underlying core bankruptcy case or grant relief from the stay. On
December 2, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court, after hearing oral argument, concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that Iannini otherwise
failed to advance any viable claims against Deutsche Bank under 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 544,
or 548. It accordingly dismissed the adversary action and granted relief from the stay,
while also denying Deutsche Bank‟s motion to dismiss the core bankruptcy case itself.
Formal orders were entered on December 3, 2009, and Iannini then appealed to the
District Court.

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In a memorandum order entered on May 25, 2010, the District Court affirmed the
Bankruptcy Court‟s ruling in favor of Deutsche Bank, specifically concluding that
Iannini‟s adversary action was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that she failed
to bring a proper claim under §§ 522, 544, or 548. Iannini filed a timely notice of appeal.
However, while the current appeal was pending before this Court, the Chapter 13 Trustee
filed a declaration with the Bankruptcy Court on August 24, 2010 indicating that Iannini
was in default under her plan because of a failure to make monthly plan payments. The
Bankruptcy Court accordingly dismissed the core bankruptcy case without prejudice on
August 26, 2010 and then denied Iannini‟s motion for reconsideration in an order entered
on October 25, 2010.
II.
We agree with Deutsche Bank that this appeal must be dismissed as moot. We
therefore need not (and do not) reach the other issues raised in the parties‟ briefing.
“[I]f an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for
the court to grant „any effectual relief whatever‟ to a prevailing party, the appeal must be
dismissed.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)
(quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). It is undisputed that the core
bankruptcy case was dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court due to Iannini‟s default. In turn,
Iannini expressly “concedes the case is moot unless it is considered capable of repetition,
yet evading review.” (Appellant‟s Brief at 9.) According to her, this exception is
satisfied because, among other things, “Congress limited the time a Debtor may remain in

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a Chapter 13 bankruptcy to 5 years” and she purportedly could still file another
bankruptcy petition and pursue her claims against Deutsche Bank. (Id. at 9-10 (citing 11
U.S.C. § 1325).)
Nevertheless, Iannini does not meet this mootness exception. It is well
established that a court may consider the merits of an otherwise moot case when: (1) the
challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or
expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same party will be subject to
the same action again. See, e.g., Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2007).
This exception is a narrow one available “„only in exceptional situations.‟” Id. (quoting
City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)). At the very least, the issues presented
here, even if we assume arguendo that they are capable of repetition, do not actually
evade review. We note that this Court has ruled on the merits of the Rooker-Feldman
issue raised in this appeal on two prior occasions. See In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232
(3d Cir. 2009); In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 578-83 (3d Cir. 2005). We further observe
that it was Iannini‟s own default by failing to make the requisite monthly payments that
resulted in the dismissal of her core bankruptcy case and ultimately rendered her current
appeal moot.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss this appeal on mootness grounds.

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