Marva Baez, Individually and As Administratrix of the Estate of Luis Villafane, Deceased v. Lancaster County

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-4174
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MARVA BAEZ,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF LUIS VILLAFANE, DECEASED,
Appellant
v.
LANCASTER COUNTY; VINCENT GUARINI, WARDEN LANCASTER COUNTY
PRISON; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BYRD; CORRECTIONALOFFICER SHEPPO;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER PLUMBER; DOE 1-10, CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS;
JACOBS, CORRECTIONAL SERGEANT; PRIMECARE MEDICAL INC., CARL A.
HOFFMAN, JR., D.O., CCHP, PRESIDENT AND CORPORATE
MEDICAL DIRECTOR; DR.ROBERT DOE; NURSE CINDY DICKERT
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 5-09-cv-02745)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
_______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 8, 2012
BEFORE: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR. and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 2, 2012)

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OPINION
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COWEN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of her brother,
Luis Villafane, who took his own life while in pretrial detention at Lancaster County
Prison (“LCP”) from September 22, 2008 through November 19, 2008. Plaintiff alleges
that defendants violated Villafane‟s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because
they were deliberately indifferent to Villafane‟s serious medical condition, which led to
his suicide, and used excessive force on Villafane while he was in custody. The district
court granted defendants‟ motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff‟s claims.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as
the district court. Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2004). Under that standard,
we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and will affirm the district
court‟s judgment. Id.
(A) To establish a claim for deliberate indifference on the basis of Villafane‟s
suicide, plaintiff must show “(1) the detainee had a „particular vulnerability to suicide,‟
(2) the custodial officer or officers knew or should have known of that vulnerability, and
(3) those officers „acted with reckless indifference‟ to the detainee‟s particular
vulnerability.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991). Even
assuming that Villafane had a “particular vulnerability to suicide,” no reasonable juror

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could conclude, based on the evidence, that the likelihood of suicide was “so obvious” or
“easily recognized” to a layperson that the officers “knew or should have known” of that
vulnerability. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2005). Here,
Villafane expressed a suicidal ideation to Officer Jacob while being taken to the medical
unit. The following day he was evaluated by the psychologist who did not think that
Villafane was suicidal. Nevertheless, Villafane remained in the medical unit and under
suicide watch for approximately a week. He showed signs of improvement and was taken
off suicide watch, given access to sheets and his possessions, and remained in the medical
unit for approximately another ten days. His psychologist observed that he had improved
and Villafane asked to go back to general population. The day before Villafane was
transferred back to general population by Officer Byrd, he had been evaluated by the
psychologist who confirmed that Villafane was not suicidal. Byrd testified that Villafane
seemed in good spirits. Considering that no suicide attempt was ever made while in
detention and Villafane had been given access to bed sheets and his possessions while
still in the medical unit, the possibility that he might commit suicide as evidenced by his
suicidal ideations 18 days earlier does not support a “„strong likelihood of suicide . . . so
obvious that a lay person would easily recognize‟” it. Id. (quoting Colburn, 946 F.2d at
1025). Indeed, the likelihood that Villafane would harm himself was not obvious to the
psychologist, let alone a layperson.
There is also no evidence of “reckless indifference.” “Reckless indifference” has
been treated synonymously with “deliberate indifference” and “gross negligence,” and

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requires “„a level of culpability higher than a negligent failure to protect from self-
inflicted harm.‟” Id. at 321 (quoting Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1025). When Villafane
expressed his suicidal thoughts to Jacob, Jacob alerted the nurse and Villafane was
subsequently put on suicide watch. He was under the care and evaluation of the
psychologist for the entire 18 days that he was in the medical unit, and taken off suicide
watch after 7 days. For the brief time Villafane was under Byrd‟s charge, the evidence
suggests that Byrd was sensitive to his mental state of mind and checked in with him to
ensure that he was okay. He told Villafane to talk to him if he needed anything. Nothing
in Byrd‟s interactions with Villafane suggested that Villafane was suicidal.
Even in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence suggests that all
those in charge of Villafane were sensitive to a potential that Villafane was suicidal and
took more than necessary precautions based on the available information and
circumstances as they appeared. Indeed, the only evidence that suggests that defendants
were anything less than sensitive to Villafane‟s state of mind was a speculation by one of
the inmate witnesses that Officer Shepos told Villafane to kill himself on the day of the
incident; the parties agree that Officer Shepos was not working that day. Even if he had
been, since there is no other evidence that Shepos knew or should have known of a
substantial risk that Villafane would harm himself, this potential comment by Shepos is
not sufficient for plaintiff to succeed on her deliberate indifference claim. And nothing
suggests who else heard that comment and could be considered to have been deliberately
indifferent to it. See Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 466 (3d Cir.

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1989) (plaintiffs had adduced some circumstantial evidence tending to show deliberate
indifference, but it was not enough to survive summary judgment). In light of the
foregoing, the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Villafane‟s medical needs.
(B) The only actions implicated by plaintiff‟s excessive force claim are those of
Sergeant Jacob. Jacob used an Electronic Body Immobilization Device (“EBID”) to
subdue Villafane when he refused to return to his cell after several requests and a physical
struggle. To establish a claim for use of excessive force in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff must show that the force used was applied
“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” and not “in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). In making this inquiry,
the Supreme Court has highlighted five factors: “(1) the need for the application of the
force;” (2) “the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used;” (3)
“the extent of the injury inflicted;” (4) “the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and
inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of facts known to
them;” and (5) “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).
Here, Sergeant Jacob used the EBID only after repeated attempts to get Villafane
to return to his cell and the use of less force did not work. He used the EBID for
approximately ten seconds, subdued Villafane, and took him to the medical unit for
treatment of his injuries. There is no evidence that malice instigated the use of force. In
light of the necessity to maintain order and Villafane‟s disobedience, Sergeant Jacob‟s

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conduct does not “shock[ ] the conscience.” Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 349 (3d
Cir. 2000).
(C) Plaintiff must establish an underlying constitutional violation to attribute
liability to the County pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S.
658 (1978). For the foregoing reasons, she has not done so. The claim against Warden
Guarini in his official capacity is duplicative of the suit against the County. As a result,
summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the County and Warden Guarini in
his official capacity.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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