Feng Chen v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES On

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-4356
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FENG CHEN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A078 733 112)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Daniel Meisner
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 16, 2012
Before: RENDELL, VANASKIE, GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 17, 2012)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Feng Chen, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of an order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
denying her motion to reopen, we will deny the petition for review.
Chen entered the United States without inspection in 2003 and was placed in

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removal proceedings several months later. She applied for asylum and related relief
based on her allegation that she had suffered a forced abortion in China and that she
feared persecution because she had two U.S.-born children in violation of Chinese
population policies. An Immigration Judge denied her application, and on March 24,
2006, the BIA dismissed the appeal, upholding the Immigration Judge’s decision.
Chen filed a motion to reopen on May 9, 2011. The motion was based on her
allegation that she had become a Jehovah’s Witness, and her allegation of changed
country conditions in China (increased persecution of Christians) since her last hearing.
The BIA denied the motion, finding that it was untimely and did not meet an exception to
the time limits. The BIA further declined to exercise its authority to reopen proceedings
sua sponte
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review the BIA’s denial of
Chen’s motion to reopen, and we apply the abuse of discretion standard to our review.
. Chen filed a timely petition for review.
See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2002). Under that standard, Chen
must show that the BIA’s decision was somehow arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.
See id. Motions to reopen are reserved for only “compelling circumstances.” See Guo v.
Ashcroft
There is no dispute that Chen’s motion to reopen was untimely, as it was not filed
with the BIA within ninety days of the BIA’s 2006 decision.
, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004).
See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1229a(c)(7) (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the ninety-day requirement
does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the

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country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would
not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, Chen would have to show that
she is eligible to file a second asylum application in reopened proceedings based on her
new Christian faith and on changed country conditions since the time of her first asylum
hearing. See Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) (change in country
conditions is measured from time of proceedings before immigration judge). We have
recognized that an alien who has been ordered removed can file an untimely or
successive asylum application based on changed personal conditions if the alien can also
show changed country conditions in the motion to reopen. See Liu v. Att’y Gen.
Chen contends that the BIA did not meaningfully consider the evidence she
presented in denying her motion to reopen. As we have acknowledged, the BIA is
required to consider the evidence of changed country conditions presented by a party, but
it need not “parse or refute on the record each individual . . . piece of evidence offered by
the petitioner.” Nevertheless, it “should provide us with more than cursory, summary or
conclusory statements, so that we are able to discern its reasons for declining to afford
relief to a petitioner.”
,
555 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009).
Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)). The BIA noted here that it had
compared the exhibits submitted with the motion to reopen at tabs O-OO (A.R. 88-285—
comprised of all of Chen’s exhibits on country conditions) with Exhibit 4 from the

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previous proceedings (A.R. 444-48--U.S. Department of State’s June 2004 Profile of
Asylum Claims and Country Conditions for China), and found that the newly-submitted
evidence did “not reflect a material change in circumstances, but rather a continuation of
past practices in China.” A.R. 3.
We believe the operative word here is “material.” While the record evidence
might support a finding that conditions regarding religious persecution have changed in
some respects in some parts of the country since Chen’s hearing before the Immigration
Judge, Chen does not explain how the evidence she presented is material to her situation.
None of the background evidence refers to the treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses in
China, nor is there record support for her contention that her religion is classified as a
“cult” by the Chinese government. Further, we agree with the BIA that the personalized
information she included does not establish that it is likely that she will be persecuted in
China. Chen’s mother’s unsworn letter simply states that she received a warning letter
from the village committee, and that they will have to be more careful in avoiding being
detected. A.R. 55. The notice from the village committee states that if Feng Chen does
not “stop spreading cults . . . she will be subject to criminal sanctions and will face the
consequences.” A.R. 49. We do not agree with Chen’s contention that the record
compels a conclusion that the “criminal sanctions” will be detention, and that her
treatment in such detention will constitute persecution.
Because Chen did not present material evidence of changed country conditions,
the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reopen.

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