Paul Gamboa Taylor v. Commissioner of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 14-9005
______________
PAUL GAMBOA TAYLOR,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS; SUPERINTENDENT OF SCI
PITTSBURGH;
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCI ROCKVIEW
______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 4:04-cv-00553)
U.S. District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
______________
Argued
June 25, 2025
______________
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges.

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(Filed: August 13, 2025)
______________
Samuel R. Welch [ARGUED]
Matthew C. Lawry
Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania
601 Walnut Street
The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellant
William R. Stoycos [ARGUED]
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Appeals & Legal Services
Strawberry Square, 16th floor
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Counsel for Appellees
______________
OPINION
______________
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Paul Gamboa Taylor, a Pennsylvania prisoner
sentenced to death, appeals the District Court’s order denying
his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion for relief

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from the order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Although Rule 60(b) provides an avenue to challenge a district
court’s decision not to hold a hearing, and Taylor’s motion was
timely, he fails to demonstrate he was entitled to reopen his
habeas proceedings to present evidence not in the state court
record and thus is not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief.
I
The relevant facts regarding Taylor’s guilty plea, death
sentence, and postconviction proceedings are described at
length in our opinion affirming the District Court’s order
denying him habeas corpus relief. Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d
416, 420-25 (3d Cir. 2007).
In Taylor, we considered and rejected Taylor’s due
process claims based on his argument that he was incompetent
during his guilty plea and sentencing proceedings. Id. at 435-
38. In so doing, we affirmed the District Court’s decision not
to consider expert evidence Taylor gathered in 1999 (the “1999
evidence”) 1 to support his assertion that he had not been
competent to plead guilty or waive his rights. Id. at 435-37.
As we explained, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), specifically 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2),
prevented the District Court from considering the 1999
evidence as it was not part of the state court record.2 Id. at 435-
1 In our prior decision, we referred to the 1999 evidence
as “newly-acquired” or “after-acquired evidence” of
incompetence. Taylor, 504 F.3d at 425, 430, 439 n.19.
2 Taylor presented the 1999 evidence for the first time
as part of his second state postconviction petition, which was
dismissed as untimely. Id. at 435.

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36, 444. We observed that (1) “[t]he only thing that prevented
Taylor from presenting [the 1999 evidence] before the first
[state postconviction] court was a lack of diligence,” and
(2) Taylor’s postconviction counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness
for failing to present the 1999 evidence during the first
postconviction proceedings was not a ground for creating “an
exception to § 2254(e)(2)’s requirements” to admit new
evidence in federal court.3 Id. at 437 & n.17.
We similarly declined to consider the 1999 evidence
when reviewing (and ultimately rejecting on the merits)
Taylor’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for “failing
to investigate, prepare, and present evidence of Taylor’s
incompetence” at the time of his plea and sentencing, id. at 425,
438-39, because Taylor “already had an evidentiary hearing on
[that] issue before the first [state postconviction] court, where
he failed to produce” the 1999 evidence, id. at 439 n.19.4
3 We did consider the 1999 evidence to determine
whether it would potentially advance his claim that his guilty
plea and other waivers were not knowing and voluntary. Id. at
444-46. We concluded that the 1999 evidence “shed[] no new
light on whether his plea and other waivers were knowing and
voluntary,” so the District Court’s denial of an evidentiary
hearing on the knowing and voluntary character of Taylor’s
plea or waivers was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 446.
4 At oral argument, Taylor challenged our observation
that he “already had an evidentiary hearing” relating to his
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate Taylor’s incompetence. Id. at 438-39 & n.19.
Assuming that argument was preserved, he may not use Rule
60(b) to challenge our prior holding, because we are not a
district court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (providing grounds for

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5
Several years later, Taylor filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion
in the District Court, asserting that the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), provides him a basis
to reopen his federal habeas proceedings. He argued that the
rationale of Martinez applies to his case. Martinez allows a
petitioner in federal court to present a procedurally defaulted
trial-counsel-ineffectiveness claim that has some merit upon a
showing that postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise such a claim. 566 U.S. at 14. Put simply, Martinez
focuses on a postconviction counsel’s failure to raise a claim
of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness as a basis to excuse a
procedural default. Taylor seeks to extend Martinez to allow
him to argue that postconviction counsel’s failure to introduce
certain evidence excuses him from satisfying the § 2254(e)(2)
requirements for presenting the 1999 evidence in support of his
trial counsel’s ineffectiveness claim because the failure to
present that evidence at the first state postconviction
proceedings was due to his postconviction counsel’s
ineffectiveness.
The District Court denied Taylor’s motion. It assumed
his argument could be pursued under Rule 60(b) but held that:
(1) his Rule 60(b) motion was untimely because it was filed
one year and one day after Martinez was issued; (2) no
extraordinary circumstances, including Martinez, justified
reopening the original habeas judgment to conduct a hearing
on the 1999 evidence; and (3) Martinez did not provide a basis
relief from a district court’s final judgment, order, or
proceeding); see also Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 679
F.2d 336, 337 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[A] district court is without
jurisdiction to alter the mandate of this court on the basis of
matters included or includable in [a] prior appeal.”).

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for relief because Taylor’s claim of trial counsel
ineffectiveness was decided on the merits in earlier
proceedings and thus was not procedurally defaulted. Taylor
v. Wetzel, No. 4:04-cv-00553, 2014 WL 5242076, *6-15 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 15, 2014). The District Court declined to issue a
certificate of appealability (“COA”). Id. at *15.
Taylor appealed, and we granted a COA.5 The appeal
was stayed to allow Taylor to present arguments based on new
5 We granted a COA on the following issues:
(1) whether a Rule 60 motion is the proper way
to challenge this Court’s “failure to develop”
basis for affirming the District Court’s
discretionary decision not to hold an evidentiary
hearing on the competency-related claims;
(2) whether [Taylor] brought his Rule 60 motion
within a “reasonable time”; (3) whether
Martinez . . . applies given that [the District
Court] did not hold that Taylor’s trial counsel
ineffectiveness claim was barred from federal
habeas review; and (4) whether trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to seek a competency
hearing. In briefing the fourth issue, counsel
should address whether Martinez allows a
petitioner to develop in a federal habeas court the
factual basis for his or her underlying ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim if ineffective
assistance of collateral review counsel resulted
in petitioner’s failure to develop the facts in state
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

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Supreme Court cases and to pursue relief in state court, which
the state courts subsequently denied. Among the cases he
argued affected his case is Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366
(2022). After Shinn was issued, the parties submitted
supplemental briefs articulating their views regarding the
effect of it and other cases on the issues presented in this
appeal.
II6
We consider in turn three issues: (1) whether Taylor
properly used Rule 60(b) as a vehicle to seek relief; (2) whether
the District Court abused its discretion in finding his Rule
60(b)(6) motion untimely; and (3) whether the District Court
erred in declining to reopen his federal habeas case under Rule
60(b)(6).
A
“Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision [that] allows a
court to relieve a party from the effects of an order for ‘any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment’” apart from those in Rule 60(b)(1)-(5). Coltec
App. 41-42.
6 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review a district court’s order
denying a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Cox v.
Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2014). “A district court
abuses its discretion when it bases its decision upon a clearly
erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous conclusion of law, or
an improper application of law to fact.” Id.

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Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)). A Rule 60(b) motion may
be used in federal habeas corpus proceedings unless it is
“inconsistent with applicable federal statutory provisions and
rules,” namely those detailed in AEDPA. Gonzalez v. Crosby,
545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
AEDPA imposes several requirements on a prisoner
seeking to file a second or successive federal habeas corpus
application. Id. First, it provides that “any claim that has
already been adjudicated in a previous petition [before the
District Court] must be dismissed.” Id. at 529-30 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)). Second, it provides that “any claim that
has not already been adjudicated [by the District Court] must
be dismissed unless it relies on either a new and retroactive rule
of constitutional law or new facts showing a high probability
of actual innocence.” Id. at 530 (emphasis removed) (citing
§ 2244(b)(2)). In the latter situation, a petitioner must obtain
permission from the court of appeals to file a second or
successive petition. § 2244(b)(3)(A). In light of these AEDPA
provisions, a prisoner previously denied federal habeas relief
may not use a Rule 60(b) motion to assert a federal
constitutional challenge to his state conviction or sentence
because such a motion is in substance a second or “successive
habeas petition merely masquerading as a Rule 60(b) motion.”
Bracey v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 986 F.3d 274, 282
(3d Cir. 2021).
Certain challenges, however, may be brought under
Rule 60(b) without running afoul of AEDPA. A movant, for
example, may invoke Rule 60(b) relief to remedy “some defect
in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings” or to attack
“the District Court’s failure to reach the merits” on procedural

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grounds. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 & n.4, 538 (holding “a
Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a § 2254 case is not to be treated as a
successive habeas petition if it does not assert, or reassert,
claims of error in the movant’s state conviction”); see also
Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 727-28 (3d Cir. 2004)
(holding trial court “properly exercised jurisdiction” over a
Rule 60(b) motion, without the movant having first obtained
approval under § 2244(b), where movant’s argument was “an
attack on the habeas proceeding, rather than on [his]
underlying state conviction”). A Rule 60(b)(6) motion that
attacks the federal habeas court’s proceeding for failing to hold
an evidentiary hearing is akin to a claim of procedural error and
is thus not barred by § 2244(b).
Applying these principles, to the extent Taylor’s Rule
60(b) motion seeks to relitigate the merits of his trial counsel
ineffectiveness claim, that portion of his motion is a second or
successive petition over which the District Court lacked
jurisdiction. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530-31. Accordingly,
the District Court should have dismissed that portion of his
motion. See id.; see also § 2244(b)(1). However, to the extent
that his motion challenges the District Court’s decision not to
hold a hearing on the 1999 evidence, that portion of the motion
challenges the integrity of the federal court’s habeas
proceeding itself and thus may be raised under Rule 60(b)(6).
See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532. The District Court therefore
did not err in considering this latter portion of Taylor’s Rule
60(b)(6) motion.
B
Having concluded that Taylor may use Rule 60(b)(6) to
challenge the District Court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary
hearing, we next consider whether his motion was timely filed.

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Unlike other parts of Rule 60(b), a Rule 60(b)(6) motion has
no explicit deadline but rather must be filed within “a
reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). “What constitutes
a ‘reasonable time’ . . . is to be decided under the circumstances
of each case.” Delzona Corp. v. Sacks, 265 F.2d 157, 159 (3d
Cir. 1959). In evaluating reasonableness, we consider, among
other things, the interest in finality, the reason for the delay, the
movant’s diligence, and prejudice to other parties. Kagan v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 795 F.2d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 1986);
Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981).
Here, the District Court found that the Rule 60 motion
was filed one year and one day after the United States Supreme
Court issued Martinez. Taylor, 2014 WL 5242076, at *8. That
is incorrect. The motion was filed, albeit on the incorrect
docket, 364 days after Martinez was issued. Cf. Shuler v.
Garrett, 715 F.3d 185, 186 (6th Cir. 2013) (observing that
several sister courts of appeals have concluded that
“electronically-filed motions received by the clerk of the court
within the specified time period should be considered timely,
even when they contain the wrong docket number”). This
constitutes an erroneous fact finding, which weakens the basis
for the exercise of discretion in denying relief.
Furthermore, using the correct time calculation, and
under the circumstances of this case, Taylor’s motion based on
Martinez was filed “within a reasonable time” after Martinez
was issued. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); see Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d
113, 116 (3d Cir. 2014) (assessing the timeliness of a habeas
petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion based on how long it was filed
after the issuance of Martinez, which served as the basis for the
motion, rather than the judgment’s date). Taylor, a capital
defendant, had pending state court proceedings challenging his

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conviction when Martinez was issued. It was not unreasonable
for him to wait some period of time before filing his Rule 60(b)
motion to see whether the state proceedings would be resolved
in his favor because such a ruling may have rendered
unnecessary further proceedings in federal court.7 Finally, the
Commonwealth does not claim it suffered any prejudice from
the delay.
Although many years have passed since his 1992
conviction, and finality is certainly important, we cannot say
under these circumstances that the filing here was
unreasonably delayed. As a result, the District Court did not
act within its discretion in holding Taylor’s Rule 60(b)(6)
motion untimely.
C
Having concluded that Taylor properly and timely
invoked Rule 60(b)(6) to challenge the District Court’s denial
of an evidentiary hearing, we finally consider whether
Martinez provides a basis for Taylor to reopen his federal
habeas case to offer the 1999 evidence in support of his
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.
1
Martinez does not offer Taylor relief. By its terms, its
exception provides only an avenue for a district court to hear a
7 Moreover, although a one-year delay is not per se
reasonable, filing within one year tracks Rule 60(c)(1)’s one-
year window for filing the Rule 60(b) motion based on mistake,
newly discovered evidence, or fraud.

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procedurally defaulted claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.8
566 U.S. at 13-14. Taylor’s claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to seek a competency hearing or
otherwise investigate his competency was decided on the
merits and thus was not procedurally defaulted.9 See App. 92-
94 (the District Court denying on the merits Taylor’s claim that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and
present evidence on his competence); Taylor, 504 F.3d at 425,
438-39.
Furthermore, the rationale underlying Martinez does not
support expanding it to Taylor’s situation. Martinez provides
a narrow and “highly circumscribed” exception concerned
chiefly with “ensur[ing] that meritorious claims of trial error
receive review by at least one state or federal court.” Davila v.
Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 529-30, 532 (2017). Taylor has obtained
that review in federal court, so he cannot obtain relief based on
Martinez. The District Court thus did not abuse its discretion
in declining to reopen these proceedings under Rule 60(b)(6).
2
Even if Martinez provided Taylor with a way to reopen
his case, AEDPA limits a federal habeas court’s ability “to
8 As the District Court explained, Taylor’s due process
claims based on his argument that he was incompetent during
his guilty plea and sentencing proceedings do not come within
the ambit of Martinez.
9 Moreover, the state postconviction counsel’s
purported “shoddy advocacy” does not constitute attorney
error that would excuse procedural default. Norris v. Brooks,
794 F.3d 401, 405 (3d Cir. 2015).

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develop and consider new evidence” not presented in the state
court proceedings. Shoop v. Twyford, 596 U.S. 811, 819
(2022). Under § 2254(e)(2), if a state prisoner “‘failed to
develop the factual basis of a claim in State court . . . ,’ a federal
court may admit new evidence, but only in two quite limited
situations.” 10 Id. (quoting § 2254(e)(2)). Specifically, a
10 AEDPA provides:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual
basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the
court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the
claim unless the applicant shows that—
(A) the claim relies on—
(i) a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme
Court, that was previously
unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could
not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of
due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would
be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for
constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.

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prisoner’s claim must rely on either: (1) “a ‘new’ and
‘previously unavailable’ ‘rule of constitutional law’ made
retroactively applicable by” the Supreme Court, or (2) “‘a
factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.’” Id.
(quoting § 2254(e)(2)). Even if one of these exceptions is met,
a prisoner is still not entitled to introduce new evidence unless
he can show that “the desired evidence would demonstrate, ‘by
clear and convincing evidence,’ that ‘no reasonable factfinder’
would have convicted him of the charged crime.” Id. (quoting
§ 2254(e)(2)(B)).
AEDPA’s evidentiary bar only applies when a state
prisoner fails “to develop the factual basis of a claim.” Shinn,
596 U.S. at 382 (quoting § 2254(e)(2)). A prisoner “fail[s] to
develop the factual basis of a claim” when “there is lack of
diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or
the prisoner’s counsel.” Id. at 383 (internal quotation marks
and emphasis omitted). In other words, a prisoner “bears
responsibility” for failing to develop the factual basis for his
federal claim when he is “at fault for the underdeveloped
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Although AEDPA mentions only
“evidentiary hearings” and not the admission of evidence, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the Supreme Court has stated that the
AEDPA restrictions apply “when a prisoner seeks relief based
on new evidence without an evidentiary hearing.” Holland v.
Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653 (2004) (per curiam) (emphasis
omitted); Shinn, 596 U.S. at 389 (reaffirming “that
§ 2254(e)(2)’s restrictions apply a fortiori when a prisoner
seeks relief based on new evidence without an evidentiary
hearing” (quoting Holland, 542 U.S. at 653)).

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record in state court.” Id. at 382 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Shinn Court held that a prisoner bears such
responsibility even when his state postconviction counsel was
negligent in developing the state court record. Id. at 382-83.
In sum, when a prisoner is at fault for failing to develop
the state court record to support his federal claim, including
when that failure was due to his postconviction counsel’s
negligence, he must satisfy the § 2254(e)(2) requirements to
introduce new evidence. Id. If he is not at fault for the
underdeveloped record in support of his claim, however, “he
will be excused from showing compliance with”
§ 2254(e)(2)’s requirements and may present the new evidence
to the District Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437
(2000).
Taylor argues he is not at fault for failing to develop the
1999 evidence in state court and should be excused from
satisfying § 2254(e)(2)’s requirements because his failure to
develop the factual basis for his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
claim in the first state postconviction proceedings was due to
his initial state postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Shinn forecloses Taylor’s attempt to bypass
§ 2254(e)(2)’s requirements. The Supreme Court held that
even when Martinez applies to excuse the procedural default
of an ineffectiveness claim, Martinez does not permit “a federal
court to dispense with § 2254(e)(2)’s narrow limits because a
prisoner’s state postconviction counsel negligently failed to
develop the state-court record.” 596 U.S. at 371. Indeed, as
the Supreme Court affirmed, a “state postconviction counsel’s
ineffective assistance in developing the state-court record is
attributed to the prisoner.” Id. at 382; see also Williams v.

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Superintendent Mahanoy SCI, 45 F.4th 713, 722-23 (3d Cir.
2022) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that prisoners, like
himself, are not “at fault for failing to develop the record when
their state postconviction counsel was negligent”).
Accordingly, Taylor is at fault for his postconviction counsel’s
alleged failure to develop the factual basis for his claim that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a competency
hearing or otherwise investigate his competency.11 As a result,
even if this case were reopened, Taylor would have to satisfy
§ 2254(e)(2)’s requirements to introduce the 1999 evidence in
federal court.
11 At oral argument, Taylor’s counsel argued that Taylor
should be able to present the 1999 evidence to support his
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
his competency because no state court ruled on the merits of
this claim, and as such, Taylor was never afforded an
opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim in the
state court proceedings. Assuming his claim was procedurally
defaulted for not being presented in state court, Taylor would
still be barred from presenting new evidence to support his
claim under Shinn because he cannot satisfy the § 2254(e)(2)
requirements. 596 U.S. at 389 (“when a federal habeas court
convenes an evidentiary hearing for any purpose, or otherwise
admits or reviews new evidence for any purpose, it may not
consider that evidence on the merits of a negligent prisoner’s
defaulted claim unless the exceptions in § 2254(e)(2) are
satisfied”); see also Taylor, 504 F.3d at 437 (“The only thing
that prevented Taylor from presenting [the 1999 evidence]
before the first [state postconviction] court was a lack of
diligence.”).

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Perhaps realizing that Shinn forecloses his argument,
Taylor presents new arguments in his post-Shinn supplemental
briefing and at oral argument to avoid being tagged with his
postconviction counsel’s purported negligence and avoid
§ 2254(e)(2)’s requirements. Those arguments are forfeited, as
they were not presented before the District Court.12 See Simko
12 At most, Taylor asserted before the District Court that
his postconviction counsel was negligent, and his trial counsel
abandoned him. Even if Taylor preserved his argument that his
postconviction counsel’s failure to develop the state court
record should not be imputed to him because his counsel
abandoned him and therefore severed the attorney-client
relationship, it fails. The Supreme Court has identified
attorney abandonment where counsel is not “operat[ing] as [a
petitioner’s] agent in any meaningful sense of that word.”
Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 287 (2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Other examples include when
counsel ends her representation without notifying the client, id.
at 283-84, or counsel fails to file applications on the
petitioner’s behalf and ceases all communications with him for
several years, Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 659-60 (2010)
(Alito, J., concurring in judgment). Nothing in the record here
approaches those scenarios. The state court record reflects that
Taylor’s initial state postconviction counsel took actions on his
behalf and, contrary to his complaints, those actions were not
so minimal to be deemed nonexistent. In short, Taylor’s
dissatisfaction with this advocacy does not mean he was
abandoned. Because his postconviction counsel continued to
act as his agent, that counsel’s negligence for failing to present
the 1999 evidence in the initial postconviction proceedings is
imputed to him. See Shinn, 596 U.S. at 382.

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v. U.S. Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021)
(“[A]rguments raised for the first time on appeal are not
properly preserved for appellate review.”).
Because Taylor is deemed responsible for failing to
develop the factual basis for his claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective as it relates to his competency, if this case were
reopened, he would be required to satisfy the § 2254(e)(2)
requirements to present the 1999 evidence. See Shoop, 596
U.S. at 819-20. He would be unable to do so. First, Taylor has
not identified “a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,
that was previously unavailable.” § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i). Second,
we have already concluded that the 1999 evidence could have
been discovered through due diligence. Taylor, 504 F.3d at
437; cf. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) (permitting a district court to hear
new evidence to support a claim if that claim relies on “a
factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence”). Taylor
therefore cannot satisfy § 2254(e)(2)’s requirements. Thus,
even if the District Court could have reopened Taylor’s case on
the basis of Martinez, Taylor could not have presented the 1999
evidence for the District Court’s consideration.
In addition, Taylor’s request for a hearing on whether
his mental health impeded his ability to assist postconviction
counsel, such that he may be deemed not at fault for the failure
to develop the state court record, was forfeited, as it was first
raised in his March 2025 supplemental brief before us.

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III
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s order in part to the extent Taylor’s Rule 60(b) motion
challenged the District Court’s decision not to hold a hearing,
and vacate in part and remand for the District Court to dismiss
Taylor’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion to the extent he challenged the
ruling on his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness claim on the merits,
as that constitutes a second or successive petition that he did
not receive permission to file under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).

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