Richard Roland Laird v. Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______
No. 17-9000
______
RICHARD ROLAND LAIRD,
Appellant
v.
SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS;
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE STATE CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTION AT GREENE; SUPERINTENDENT OF
THE STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT
ROCKVIEW; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE
COUNTY OF BUCKS;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
______
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-01916)
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois
______
Argued October 8, 2024
Before: RESTREPO, PHIPPS and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

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(Filed: February 26, 2025)
Lisa Evans Lewis, Chief Federal Defender
Cristi A. Charpentier
Joseph W. Luby ARGUED
Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania
Capital Habeas Unit
601 Walnut Street
The Curtis Center, Suite 545 West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellant
Jennifer M. Schorn, District Attorney
John T. Fegley, Chief of Appeals ARGUED
Bucks County Office of District Attorney
Bucks County Justice Center
100 N Main Street
Doylestown, PA 18901
Counsel for Appellees
______
OPINION OF THE COURT
______
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a denial of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising a Strickland v.
Washington claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Over
thirty years ago, Defendant-Appellant Richard Laird
committed a vicious murder with his friend and co-conspirator,

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Frank Chester, ending the life of Anthony Milano, a 26 year-
old homosexual man. Twice, Laird was tried for and convicted
of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Throughout the
past years, Laird has sought multiple forms of post-conviction
relief but presently has only a penalty-phase Strickland claim.
The claim asserts that Laird’s trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to retain and present an additional penalty-phase expert
witness to address the sexual abuse that Laird suffered as a
child. Like the District Court before us, we conclude that
Laird’s petition fails to entitle him to relief. We, therefore, will
affirm.
I.1
A. Factual History
1. Laird and Chester Murder Milano
In the early morning hours of December 15, 1987,
Milano was brutally murdered in a wooded area in Bristol,
Pennsylvania. He was beaten. His neck and throat were slashed
numerous times—to the point where his head was nearly
severed from his spinal cord. He sustained a hairline fracture
to the base of his skull. And he eventually died from aspirating
his own blood for between five and ten minutes.
The events leading up to the murder began around 11:30
1 The state-court record in this case spans over 15,000
pages. As this appeal covers both state and federal litigation,
we cite to the state-court record as it appears on this Court’s
federal appellate docket (Dkt.). We also reference the District
Court docket (Dist. Dkt.). For purposes of Factual History,
most facts are those underlying Laird’s 2007 retrial and first-
degree murder conviction, as summarized by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Laird,
988 A.2d 618 (Pa. 2010).

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p.m. on December 14, 1987, when Milano encountered Laird
and Chester at the Edgely Inn. Milano had never before met the
two men, so a few hours of interaction occurred between the
three, during which (as the bartender testified) Laird and
Chester taunted Milano about his masculinity—the taunts
centered on their contention that he was gay. The men used
homophobic slurs to refer to Milano and expressed generalized
laments as to the “infiltration” of homosexuals in modern
society. A151 (“[Laird] used derogatory terms such as ‘fag’
when speaking of Milano to others at the bar, and at one point
expressed to the bartender that he . . . was ‘sick and tired of
these people trying to infiltrate us.’”); see also Dkt. 116-37, at
216, 243. Laird and Chester also, in apparent mockery, slow
danced together while laughing. The bartender warned Milano
that the men “were just out to cause some trouble” and that he
should leave. Dkt. 116-37, at 214. After about three hours at
the bar, Milano, Laird, and Chester left the Inn together, with
Milano agreeing to Laird’s request to drive him home. After
driving around for an hour, Laird and Chester directed Milano
to drive into a wooded area, where he stopped along the side of
the road and got out of his car.
Once Milano exited the vehicle, physical violence
against him began. Chester punched or kicked Milano in the
head, knocking him to the ground. Then, Laird jumped on top
of Milano, wrestling and pinning him. Using a box-cutter,
Laird slashed Milano’s shoulder, neck, and throat—severing at
least two vertebrae in the process. Milano was found lying face
up with his left eye partially open, bruises to his facial area
(including a hairline fracture to the skull and flattening of the
brain consistent with blunt trauma and brain hemorrhaging),
and innumerable slashes on his neck and throat. The cuts were
so deep that Milano was nearly decapitated. He aspirated on a
tremendous amount of his own blood for five to ten minutes

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before he bled to death. His severe and rapid loss of blood was
caused and compounded by cerebral trauma. After Laird and
Chester slayed Milano, they fled the scene on foot to a nearby
friend’s house.
2. Laird Attempts to Hide the Murder
The day after the murder, Laird’s girlfriend saw him
place his blood-covered keychain as well as his previous day’s
clothing into a plastic bag, which he then discarded in a
dumpster in a nearby town. Testimony at trial revealed: Laird
kept his box-cutter with him at all times; Laird disposed of his
box-cutter in a creek after the murder; Laird asked his
girlfriend if she would “be an alibi”; Laird repeatedly advised
Chester not to discuss the incident with anyone and he stated,
“[N]o evidence, no crime.” A10, A152. During the
investigation, Chester cooperated with police by giving them
permission to intercept his calls with Laird. Laird was recorded
suggesting Chester leave town, indicating his intention to “hide
until this blows over,” recommending ways to pass a polygraph
test, commenting on the district attorney’s inability to prove a
case without evidence, and expressing his belief that criminal
homicide is subject to a seven-year statute of limitations. Id.
B. Procedural History
On December 22, 1987, two days after the recorded
phone call, Laird and Chester were arrested in connection with
the killing.
1. The First Trial and Direct Appeals (1988)
In May 1988, Laird was tried for multiple offenses in a
joint capital trial with Chester, in the Court of Common Pleas
of Bucks County. Both men testified and admitted to being
present at Milano’s murder, but they each blamed the fatal
wounds on the other. The jury found both men guilty of first-

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degree murder, second-degree murder, third-degree murder,
kidnapping, and other offenses. Laird presented only one
witness at the penalty phase, Barbara Parr, his then-girlfriend
and the mother of his infant child. Both Laird and Chester were
sentenced to death.
On appeal, in March 1991, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Commonwealth
v. Chester, 587 A.2d 1367, 1371–72 (Pa. 1991). The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Laird v. Pennsylvania,
502 U.S. 849 (1991).
2. Post-Conviction Relief Attempts after the First Trial
(1988–99)
Laird filed a collateral attack, seeking post-conviction
relief under 42 Pa. C.S. § 9546(d), Pennsylvania’s Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). From 1993 to 1997, the PCRA
Court held multiple evidentiary hearings on Laird’s claims,
including a contention that Laird’s trial counsel had been
ineffective in the investigation and presentation of penalty-
phase mitigating evidence. Among those who testified were:
Laird’s younger brother by four years, Mark Laird;
neuropsychologist Dr. Henry Dee; and psychiatrist Dr. Robert
Fox.
Mark’s testimony centered around his and Laird’s
upbringing. He shared details about the brothers’ relationship
with their father, Richard Laird Senior, an alcoholic who
verbally and physically abused his children and wife. Mark
recounted these instances of abuse—abuse he and his brother
both endured and witnessed. He described instances where he
would walk into a room to discover his father and his brother
naked, after which Laird Senior would throw Mark out of the
room. Also, Mark testified about the multiple head injuries that
Laird suffered as a child.

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The doctors’ testimonies collectively span hundreds of
transcript pages, centering on Laird’s mental health—both Dr.
Dee and Dr. Fox had previously evaluated Laird, reviewed his
records, and interviewed witnesses. Dr. Dee testified about the
verbal, physical, and sexual abuse that Laird had suffered and
the effects of that abuse on him. He shared that although Laird
had not told him which male relative sexually abused him—
just that a male relative had—Mark had told him during his
interview that the abuser was their father. Dr. Dee explained
that Mark did not understand that sexual abuse was occurring
when he was a child, but “later understood from [Laird] that
[Laird] was forced to perform fellatio on his father many, many
times throughout childhood. Up until the age of nine.” Dkt.
116-51, at 89. Dr. Dee also testified about Laird’s long history
of alcohol and substance abuse, which had begun by the time
Laird was about nine years old.
Dr. Fox’s testimony addressed the same topics as Dr.
Dee’s testimony. Dr. Fox detailed Laird’s mental illness,
including his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Like Dr.
Dee, Dr. Fox had learned from Mark that Laird Senior sexually
abused Laird. Dr. Fox testified that when he had asked Laird,
“in the gentlest and least confront[ational] manner possible,”
whether he had been sexually abused, Laird became
“extremely distressed.” Dkt. 116-54, at 132–33. In light of
Laird’s reaction, “this part of [the] interview was relatively
brief and curtailed by [Dr. Fox] because [he] didn’t want to
cause [Laird] distress.” Id. at 133. Dr. Fox analogized his
questioning of Laird about the sexual abuse he endured to
“torturing an animal in a cage.” Id.
Ultimately, Laird’s attempts at state post-conviction
relief were unsuccessful. In September 1997, the PCRA Court
denied relief, and in March 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme

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Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Laird, 726 A.2d 346, 349–
51, 357–58 (Pa. 1999) (concluding that the PCRA Court erred
in reasoning that none of Laird’s penalty-phase claims were
cognizable but nevertheless holding that his mitigation-related
ineffective-assistance claim lacked merit).
3. Federal Habeas Attempts after the First Trial (1999–
2006)
In September 1999, after exhausting his avenues of
state-court collateral attack, Laird sought federal habeas relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Two years later, the District
Court granted relief in part. Laird v. Horn, 159 F. Supp. 2d 58,
67 (E.D. Pa. 2001). The claims on which relief was granted
included a guilt-phase claim and multiple penalty-phase
claims. To remedy what the Court determined to be violations
of Laird’s due process rights, the Court vacated without
prejudice Laird’s first-degree murder conviction and death
sentence but left his other convictions undisturbed. In July
2005, we affirmed, addressing only Laird’s guilt-phase claim.
Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419, 421 n.1, 430 (3d Cir. 2005). We
directed that the case be returned to the state court for the
Commonwealth to either retry Laird for first-degree murder,
followed by a new sentencing hearing, or to sentence Laird on
the second-degree murder conviction and remaining charges.
Id. at 430 n.9. In January 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court denied
review. Beard v. Laird, 546 U.S. 1146 (2006).
4. The Second Trial (2007–10)
In January and February 2007, the Commonwealth
retried Laird for first-degree murder in the Court of Common
Pleas of Bucks County. Attorneys John J. Kerrigan, Jr. and
Keith J. Williams were appointed to jointly represent Laird,
with Kerrigan as lead counsel during the guilt phase and

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Williams as lead counsel during the penalty phase. At the time
of appointment, both Kerrigan and Williams had been
practicing for decades and had previous experience defending
capital murder cases. Though the two attorneys split
responsibility between the phases of the trial, they “did help
out each other in each other’s areas.” Dkt. 116-35, at 139.
The defense strategy differed from Laird’s first trial
because Laird elected not to testify during his retrial.2 Instead,
he “admitted to having murdered Milano and sought only to
show he could not have formed a specific intent to kill”
necessary to convict him of first-degree murder.
Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618, 631 (Pa. 2010). To
prove Laird lacked the requisite mental state, his trial counsel
asserted a defense of diminished capacity, which they alleged
resulted from combined effects of Laird’s extreme intoxication
on the night of the offense and his preexisting brain damage.
During the guilt phase, Laird called four expert
witnesses to support his defense—Dr. Dee, Dr. Fox,
psychiatrist Dr. John O’Brien, and toxicologist Dr. Gary Lage.
The testimony mainly concerned Laird’s history of alcohol and
substance abuse, supporting defense counsel’s theory that
Laird experienced diminished capacity at the time of the
murder. See Dkt. 119-1, at 9 (Dr. Lage estimated that Laird’s
blood-alcohol level at the time of the murder was about 0.45).
2 Laird’s and Chester’s testimony from the original trial
was read to the jury as part of the Commonwealth’s case-in-
chief. Partway through the reading of Chester’s testimony, the
trial judge ordered the testimony be read but not re-transcribed,
to which the parties did not object. Therefore, the remainder of
Chester’s testimony was not transcribed, nor was any of
Laird’s testimony. Accordingly, we cite to the first trial’s
transcript when referring to their testimony.

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The Commonwealth presented testimony that Laird was not
staggering or swaying when he left the bar, nor was he
stumbling or slurring his words at his friend’s house following
the murder. The jury was not persuaded by Laird’s defense—
it returned a unanimous guilty verdict after less than two hours
of deliberation.
In mid-February 2007, the penalty phase began. The
Commonwealth relied on the evidence presented during the
guilt phase to present two aggravating factors: (1) murder in
the course of committing a felony (kidnapping) under 42 Pa.
C.S. § 9711(d)(6), and (2) commission of the offense by means
of torture under 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(d)(8). The parties stipulated
to the felony aggravating factor because Laird’s original
conviction on kidnapping was left undisturbed by the federal
court’s grant of habeas relief.
During the two-day hearing, Laird called six witnesses
to support his mitigation case. Three of those witnesses’
testimonies are directly relevant to this appeal.
Mark testified about the brothers’ shared childhood—
recalling in detail the abuse their father inflicted on their
mother and them, as well as the events that led to Laird’s
serious head injuries. He discussed Laird’s struggles with
alcohol and substance abuse—recounting times when he would
go out looking for Laird and find him “shit-faced, either passed
out or just sitting there.” Dkt. 116-46, at 234–37. Mark also
testified about the circumstances surrounding what he later (in
adulthood) understood to be their father’s sexual abuse of
Laird. When asked whether there was sexual abuse going on in
the household, Mark responded:
Yeah. I remember crying because I would be
knocking on the door wanting to play with my
brother and my father and I wasn’t allowed in.

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Of course, they were naked at the time and I
didn’t really understand it at the time what was
going on but I do remember that. I don’t know
the specifics of what happened. I just remember
wanting to go into the room and not
understanding why I wasn’t allowed in.
Id. at 220–21. When asked whether Mark’s relationship with
his father or brother changed after this experience, Mark
responded: “This was the norm for me, so I didn’t notice any
difference . . . . Eventually, the beatings and shit got so bad that
my mother got the balls to leave him.” Id. at 231–32.
Dr. Dee and Dr. Fox again testified about Laird’s life
history and mental impairments and diagnoses. They explained
their preparation for Laird’s interviews—which included
reviewing his school records, military records, and court
records—and details of their interviews with Laird’s brother,
his mother, and Laird himself.
Dr. Fox testified that collecting Laird’s history revealed
that he “was raised in a very chaotic and abusive family.” He
explained that he interviewed Laird a decade earlier in 1996,
in preparation for Laird’s first trial, as well as more recently,
the week before the retrial’s penalty phase. Dr. Fox noted that
what Laird revealed to him during the more recent interview
“was, essentially, the same as what he had said to [him] ten
years ago.” Dkt. 116-36, at 8. For example, the interviews
revealed that Laird Senior was “physically, psychologically
and sexually abusive to [Laird] and physically abusive and
psychologically abusive to [Laird’s mother and brother].” Id.
at 6–7. On direct examination, Dr. Fox testified that the
culminating circumstances of Laird’s difficult childhood—the
abuse, alcohol and drug issues, and head injuries—led him to
diagnose Laird with ADHD, PTSD, polysubstance

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dependence, mood disorder due to head trauma, alcohol
dependence, and extreme mental disturbance. Dr. Fox
explained each of these diagnoses in detail, including his
opinion of how they affected Laird.
Dr. Fox also testified about the sexual abuse that Laird
endured and its effects on him. Dr. Fox answered in the
affirmative—both on direct and cross-examination—to the
question of whether it was his opinion that Laird was a victim
of sexual abuse. On cross, Dr. Fox conceded that Laird was not
willing to describe his sexual abuse during his 1996 interview,
which lasted “for a long, long period of time [two and a half
hours].” Id. at 27. At that time, Laird became agitated and
responded with “emotionality,” id., declining to answer
questions about details. This response differed from Laird’s
more recent interview, during which Laird admitted “that he
was sexually abused by his father when he was a boy[,]
[describing] that his father [had] forced him to perform oral
sexual acts on him.” Id. at 17. Dr. Fox also answered questions
about the psychological effect of abuse on “children who have
been systematically abused,” like Laird. Id. at 29.
Dr. Dee testified about his interviews with Laird, too.
Like Dr. Fox, he had interviewed Laird in preparation for the
first trial and again, shortly before the retrial’s penalty phase
began. Dr. Dee’s testimony covered the same general topics as
Dr. Fox’s—noting, “[Laird’s] childhood was marked by quite
severe abuse of all kinds—physical abuse, emotional abuse and
sexual abuse.” Id. at 59. Regarding the issue of sexual abuse,
Dr. Dee testified that Laird told him that a male family member
had sexually abused him, but Laird did not disclose the identity
of the male family member, Laird Senior. So, Dr. Dee did not
learn that Laird’s abuser was his father until he later
interviewed Mark. Dr. Dee recounted Laird’s description of the
abuse. Laird Senior would force Laird to perform fellatio, after

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which he “would humiliate him and further emotionally abuse
[Laird] by telling him he was a filthy, he was a nasty boy, to
go wash out his mouth and [he] shouldn’t be doing things of
that sort, which, of course, is terribly confusing to anybody.”
Id. at 61. While Laird Senior physically and emotionally
abused the other members of the family, his sexual abuse was
apparently restricted to Laird.
Dr. Dee also testified about the sources he relied on in
forming his professional opinion. On cross, he was asked about
a part of his interview report where he “noted that . . . Laird
had a long[-]smoldering antagonism toward persons identified
as homosexuals, and that might have been why [he] fastened
upon Anthony Milano.” Id. at 97–98. Further, the
Commonwealth refreshed Dr. Dee’s recollection of Dr. David
Silverman’s report, which Dr. Dee had reviewed when
diagnosing Laird. In the report, Dr. Silverman stated that Laird
“hated homosexuals.” Id. at 98. On redirect, Dr. Dee stated
about his work as an expert: “[A] significant part of my
practice is child welfare cases where children are abused.” Id.
at 107. The defense rested shortly after.
Laird’s penalty-phase defense was, like his guilt-phase
defense, unpersuasive to the jury, which returned a verdict of
death. The jury unanimously found that the Commonwealth
had proven the kidnapping aggravating factor but not the
torture aggravating factor. At least one juror found the
following mitigating factors: physical abuse, sexual abuse,
emotional abuse, witness to the abuse of others, psychological
consequences of abuse, substance abuse, alcohol abuse, and
conduct in prison. The only proposed mitigator that no juror
found was that Laird stipulated to having participated in the
murder. Still, the jury unanimously concluded that the
aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors.

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In February 2010, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed Laird’s retrial conviction and sentence.
Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618 (Pa. 2010). In
November 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Laird v. Pennsylvania, 562 U.S. 1069 (2010).
5. Post-Conviction Relief Attempts after the Retrial
(2011–Present)
In November 2011, Laird began federal habeas corpus
proceedings, which were stayed in March 2012 for Laird to
expeditiously exhaust his state court remedies. He initiated
proceedings under the PCRA and moved for a stay of
execution, which was granted.
a. The Second PCRA Case—Hearing Testimony &
PCRA Court Decision
Among Laird’s claims was an argument that “trial
counsel unreasonably failed to investigate and present
compelling mitigating evidence,” Dkt. 116-23, at 425,
including “testimony from an expert in male sexual abuse,” id.
at 427. According to Laird, such an expert would have “been
able to educate jurors on the devastating implications of abuse
by a family member[]” and “been equipped to explain how and
why men process such abuse and if and when victim[]s are able
to reveal the abuse and the identity of the abuser.” Id. at 427–
28. Laird’s amended petition notes that he had recently been
interviewed by Dr. David Lisak, “a clinical psychologist with
almost 25 years of experience in the field of [effects of]
childhood physical and sexual abuse on later development,
especially in men.” Id. at 428. Laird said he provided new
details of his experience during this interview, including his
age during the abuse (five to eleven years old) and that his
father would ejaculate into his mouth and routinely anally rape
him. The amended petition claims, “To this day, [Laird]

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experiences ‘body memories’ from the abuse, including gag
impulses, sharp rectal pain and other tactile memories.” Id. at
429. Laird argued that, had the jury been provided with these
“powerful details” of his life story, there was a reasonable
probability that at least one juror would have weighed the
aggravating and mitigating factors differently. Id. at 425.
From April through September 2012, the Court held
multiple evidentiary hearings on Laird’s PCRA claims. Several
witnesses testified, including Mark, Dr. Lisak, and Williams,
among others. Mark’s testimony included details of the abuse
from his and Laird’s childhood. Mark provided one new piece
of information about the sexual abuse: He recalled “[p]retty
regular” instances “where it would be just [Laird Senior] and
[Laird] after a shower, laying there in a towel with an ashtray,
a pack of Winstons.” Dkt.116-46, at 46. On cross, Mark again
conceded that he never actually saw Laird Senior sexually
abuse Laird.
Dr. Lisak’s testimony reviewed his opinion of Laird’s
childhood trauma—based on his two meetings with Laird, his
interview of Mark, and his analysis of relevant records
(including Laird Senior’s military records). Mark told Dr.
Lisak about the “very routine occurrence” of Laird Senior
emerging from his morning shower in a towel and pulling
Laird out of the boys’ bedroom or telling Mark to get out of the
bedroom and closing the door. Dkt. 119-3, at 77. Years later,
Mark understood these instances as the routine which preceded
Laird’s sexual abuse.
Describing his interviews with Laird, Dr. Lisak testified
that, when he would begin to ask Laird questions about his
sexual history, Laird would turn pale and start sweating; his
breathing rate would increase as his body went rigid; and he
would avert his gaze. When Dr. Lisak asked about Laird

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Senior, Laird responded, “[T]he sick fuck would rub his dick
between my cheeks.” Id. at 93. Laird recounted two routine
ways his father would sexually abuse him—one of which was
consistent with Mark’s description—telling Dr. Lisak that
Laird Senior orally and anally raped him for years.
Dr. Lisak explained the methodology he employed
while questioning Laird about sexual abuse, which involves
“difficult and sensitive information.” Id. at 81. He testified that,
when Laird was interviewed by other experts five years prior
in 2007, there was a common understanding among
practitioners—Dr. Lisak called it the “dominant culture”—that
direct questions would probably not elicit information from a
victim of alleged sexual assault. Id. at 88–89. Rather than
asking point-blank if an individual had been sexually abused,
Dr. Lisak’s approach was to ask about the person’s “sexual
history” and “sexual experience.” Id. at 81. When pressed, Dr.
Lisak explained that:
Most people who were sexually abused don’t
think of it that way [as assault]. They very often,
people who have been severely abused, whether
it’s sexually or physically, simply don’t walk
around with that kind of a scheme about what
happened to them. So if you ask the question that
way, they’re quite likely to say no, even though
they’ve had experiences that absolutely were
sexual abuse or physical abuse.
Id. at 88–89. Dr. Lisak’s opinion was that Laird would have
provided more details in response to an indirect form of
questioning, had Dr. Lisak been the one to interview him in
2007. Id. at 185.
Dr. Lisak also opined about the effects of the abuse on
Laird’s development. Laird described to Dr. Lisak extreme

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feelings of inferiority, as if “something [was] profoundly
wrong with him . . . a symptom referred to as internalization.”
Id. at 115. Dr. Lisak testified that these feelings led Laird to
develop “a kind of a persona of hyper-masculinity to counter
what he really felt about himself.” Id. Additionally, Dr. Lisak
noted that “Laird described a life-long reaction, negative
reaction to any touch from a male,” to the point where Laird
could not even tolerate having a man cut his hair. Id. at 201–
02.
Attorney Williams’s testimony covered his and
Kerrigan’s qualifications as well as details of Laird’s refusal to
discuss his allegations of sexual abuse during preparation for
the 2007 retrial. Williams explained he had “represented many
defendants on capital cases, but [he had] handled the guilt
phase[s] in all the other [cases].” Dkt. 116-35, at 139–40. His
first experience as penalty-phase counsel was for Laird.
Williams testified that, before the retrial, there was “some
feeling that there had been sexual abuse, but that . . . Laird was
reluctant to talk about it.” Id. at 156. Then, “the sexual abuse
was only an allegation” that Laird “wouldn’t even talk to
[Williams] about.” Id. at 158. Still, Williams testified that he
looked for further corroborative evidence of the sexual abuse,
including by searching for more information about Laird
Senior. When asked if he could have hired experts specifically
trained in eliciting sexual abuse history, Williams responded:
I guess, sure. I mean I had experts, I was using
the experts I had, I didn’t – never crossed my
mind to go out and find some new special expert
who could more – was more capable of getting
under Mr. Laird’s skin and finding it out. No, we
had experts. I relied on those experts, I relied on
what Mr. Laird told me, I relied on what his
brother told me, I relied on the other witnesses

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we talked to during the whole investigation.
Id. at 158. Williams noted that “Kerrigan took the lead on the
experts because he was using them first in the guilt phase.” Id.
at 168.
Williams also discussed the strategy behind the
defense’s witness presentation. He explained that Mark’s
testimony during the 1997 PCRA proceedings was longer than
his 2007 penalty-phase testimony because “between the time
of the PCRA and the time of trial, Mark Laird was no longer a
cooperative witness for us. He really didn’t want to be there
and was not going to be as forthcoming as he was at the prior
hearing.” Id. at 170. When asked about this same difference in
the testimony of Dr. Dee and Dr. Fox, Williams explained that
the goal of the guilt phase was to show “some kind of
diminished capacity,” which required evidence of Laird’s
history of substance abuse, but the goal of the penalty phase
was to show “the abuse and the long-term effects of the abuse.”
Id. at 173–74. Williams also testified that he “didn’t want [Dr.
Dee and Dr. Fox] on the stand too long” during the penalty
phase because the jury had not “believed” them during the guilt
phase. Id. at 193–94.
In orders entered in May 2012 and August 2013, the
PCRA Court denied relief. It determined that Laird failed to
show that his trial counsel was unreasonable for failing to
retain an additional expert to testify regarding his sexual abuse.
The PCRA Court held that Dr. Lisak “uncovered . . . details of
physical, emotional, and sexual abuse from [Laird’s] father”
that were “similar” to what was presented at the penalty phase
but altogether not significantly new or different. Dkt. 116-23,
at 320. The PCRA Court opined:
[Laird] also argues that counsel were ineffective
in failing to retain an expert to testify regarding

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19
sexual abuse. [Laird’s] current counsel met with
a Dr. David Lisak, a clinical psychologist.
However, [Laird] assert[ed] no significantly new
information or diagnoses that were not presented
at the penalty phase. Certainly, doctor after
doctor could evaluate [Laird] and likely uncover
additional details from [his] past with different
theories about how those events in his life
impacted him. Nonetheless, trial counsel
presented testimony directly from a family
member and through two different experts who
conducted multiple interviews. The experts
presented opinions that [Laird] suffered from
physical, sexual, emotional, and psychological
abuse, had diagnoses of brain damage, memory
impairment, drug and alcohol dependence,
ADHD, and PTSD. Trial counsel were not
ineffective for failing to present additional
details that would have been insignificant
considering the evidence as a whole.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
b. The Second PCRA Case—Laird’s Appeal &
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Decision
In 2015, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed the PCRA Court’s denials of relief, and the U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Commonwealth v. Laird, 119
A.3d 972, 1012 (Pa. 2015), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1069 (2010).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion addressed
Laird’s contention that “an expert such as Dr. Lisak could have
described how [Laird Senior’s] actions in sexually abusing him
over a period of years led to an emotional state that included
confusion, self-loathing, guilt, shame, and humiliation.” Id. at

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997. But it did not find persuasive Laird’s argument that “there
is a meaningful distinction between the ‘almost bald assertions
of abuse and impairment that jurors heard and a detailed and
corroborative narrative that would have been offered by
effective counsel.’” Id. (quoting Laird’s Brief at 20). Instead,
the Court held “that the experts who testified at the penalty
hearing provided significant, detailed information concerning
[Laird’s life history].” Id. The Court recognized that:
Dr. Lisak was . . . able to provide some
additional perspective concerning the level of
vulnerability felt by children who are abused . . .
and the tendency of abused boys to deal with
such feelings of vulnerability by adopting what
the expert termed a hyper-masculine persona as
they progress into adolescence. Still, the factual
information Dr. Lisak could have supplied about
[Laird’s] childhood would have been largely
cumulative of that provided by Drs. Dee and Fox,
as well as Mark Laird, all of whom informed the
jury about the nature and severity (and several
examples) of the physical and sexual abuse
[Laird] suffered at the hands of his father.

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Id. at 998 (internal citations omitted).3
Though the Court did not agree with the PCRA Court
that “Dr. Lisak’s testimony would have been ‘insignificant,’”
it nevertheless did not believe that the testimony would have
been reasonably likely to convince a juror to alter the balancing
of the mitigating and aggravating factors. Id. (rejecting Laird’s
contention that the aggravating factor of kidnapping is “weak,”
as kidnapping is a serious crime, which the record amply
showed). Thus, the lack of an additional expert did not
prejudice Laird. Id. at 997–99.
c. The Second Habeas Case—District Court Decision
and This Appeal
After the state-court proceedings concluded, Laird’s
federal habeas case was reactivated. In February 2016, Laird
filed an amended habeas petition asserting ten claims for relief.
Among them was the same mitigation-related ineffective-
assistance claim he had raised in his second PCRA petition. In
August 2016, the District Court denied the petition in its
entirety and denied Laird’s request for a certificate of
appealability. Laird v. Wetzel, 11-cv-1916 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19,
3 Earlier in its opinion, where analyzing another of
Laird’s claims, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed
Mark’s testimony and determined “the essential points
regarding the severity of . . . the sexual abuse . . . all formed
part of [his] testimony at the penalty hearing.” Id. at 992. The
Court concluded that anything Mark omitted was covered in
the testimony of Dr. Fox and Dr. Dee. Id. at 993. The jury
found seven mitigating factors relating to this information,
including “physical abuse; sexual abuse; emotional abuse;
witnessed the abuse of others; psychological consequences of
abuse; substance abuse; and alcohol abuse.” Id.

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22
2016) (Dist. Dkt. 52, 53).
In September 2016, Laird filed a motion to alter or
amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), which the District Court denied. The District Court
concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
“reasonably” ruled that Laird was not prejudiced by the
evidence presented during the penalty phase that described his
experience of childhood sexual abuse and its effects. The Court
also ruled that trial counsel performed effectively despite not
consulting a specialist expert on sexual abuse. In June 2017,
Laird filed a notice of appeal.
In March 2020, we partially granted Laird’s motion for
a certificate of appealability. The sole issue before us is:
[W]hether counsel was ineffective at the 2007
penalty hearing, in violation of the Sixth
Amendment, in failing to present an additional
mitigation expert to investigate and diagnose the
psychological effects of childhood sexual abuse
on male victims and the impact of the sexual
abuse inflicted on [Laird] by his own father as it
may have related to the murder he committed.
Dkt. 89 at 1–2. We consider only that which appears in the
record as relevant to this question.
II.
Our review of this petition is governed by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
which substantially limits a federal court’s power to grant relief
on claims adjudicated on the merits by a state court. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). A federal court may only consider habeas
petitions where a defendant is being held in state custody “in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

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States.” Id. § 2254(a). Where a state court has adjudicated the
merits of a claim, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief
unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(1)–(2); see also Brown v.
Superintendent Green SCI, 834 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 2016).
Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary
to” clearly established federal law if the state court “arrives at
a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court
on a question of law” or “confronts facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent”
and reaches an opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 405, 413 (2000). The petitioner has the burden to “show
far more than that the state court’s decision was ‘merely
wrong’ or ‘even clear error.’ The prisoner must show that the
state court’s decision is so obviously wrong that its error lies
‘beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Shinn
v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118 (2020) (quoting Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)) (internal citations omitted).
Under § 2254(d)(2), “a state court decision is based on
an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts’ [where] the state
court’s factual findings are ‘objectively unreasonable in light
of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.’”
Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 281 (3d Cir.
2016) (en banc) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
340 (2003)). This review requires us to analyze “whether there
was sufficient evidence to support the state court’s factual
findings.” Id. Those findings, implicit and explicit, are subject
to AEDPA deference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). They are
“presumed to be correct” unless the habeas petitioner rebuts

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the presumption “by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.; see
also Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 111 (3d Cir. 2009).
AEDPA’s deferential standard of review applies only to
claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Cone v. Bell,
556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009). If a state court decides only part of
a federal claim (e.g., only the prejudice component of an
ineffective-assistance claim), then only the part ruled on
receives AEDPA deference. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S.
30, 39 (2009) (per curiam) (applying AEDPA deference to just
one element of a court’s Strickland analysis).
AEDPA’s standard is “difficult to meet.” Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Richter, 562
U.S. at 102). The high bar “reflects the view that habeas corpus
is a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal
justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction
through appeal.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment)). A petitioner can overcome AEDPA’s high
burden only by showing there was no reasonable basis for the
state court’s decision. Id. at 98. In other words, “a state prisoner
must show that the state court’s ruling . . . was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415,
419–20 (2014) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103).
A federal court may not grant habeas relief simply
because it “concludes in its independent judgment that the
state-court decision applied a Supreme Court case incorrectly.”
Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 417 (3d Cir. 2011). Nor may
the court determine the state court’s factual determinations are
unreasonable “merely because the federal habeas court would
have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt

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v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18 (2013) (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558
U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). Rather, it “determine[s] what arguments
or theories supported or . . . could have supported . . . the state
court’s decision; and then . . . ask[s] whether it is possible
fairminded jurists could disagree” that they are inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. This
is “the only question that matters under § 2254(d)(1).” Id.
(quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003)).
AEDPA’s deferential standard applies “with full force
even when reviewing a conviction and sentence imposing the
death penalty.” White v. Wheeler, 577 U.S. 73, 81 (2015).
III.
Laird’s ineffective-assistance claim is governed by
clearly established federal law that “consists of the rules for
determining when a criminal defendant has received
inadequate representation as defined in Strickland.” Premo v.
Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 121 (2011) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)). Under Strickland,
a habeas petitioner must show (1) that trial counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) that the performance resulted in
prejudice. Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 2014).
The Supreme Court has instructed that “counsel should
be ‘strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.’” Titlow, 571 U.S. at 22 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). There is “[n]o particular set of
detailed rules for counsel’s conduct [that] can satisfactorily
take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense
counsel or the range of legitimate decisions.” Pinholster, 563
U.S. at 195 (quoting Strickland, 688 U.S. at 688–89). So,
“[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.”

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26
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
The Pennsylvania ineffective assistance standard is
materially identical to Strickland. Commonwealth v. Pierce,
527 A.2d 973, 976 (Pa. 1987) (holding that Strickland and the
Commonwealth’s leading case address “identical textual and
policy considerations,” and in fact “constitute the same rule”).
Because the standards created by Strickland and
AEDPA are both highly deferential, review of an ineffective-
assistance claim under AEDPA is “doubly” so. Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In the first instance,
“the state court was obligated on post-conviction review to
view [counsel’s] performance deferentially,” and then, guided
by AEDPA, “we must give wide deference to the state court’s
conclusions, disturbing them only if the state court
unreasonably applied either of the prongs of Strickland.”
Collins v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 546–47 (3d
Cir. 2014).
A. Jurisdiction
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241 and 2254. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. When a district court has not held an evidentiary
hearing, as it did not here, we exercise de novo review of its
habeas decisions, including its application of AEDPA.
Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009). We
review state-court determinations under the same standard that
the district court applied. Blystone, 664 F.3d at 416–17.
B. Laird’s Claim
Laird argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for
unreasonably failing to investigate and present at his 2007
penalty phase compelling mitigating evidence of the sexual
abuse that he suffered during childhood as well as the impact

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27
of that trauma on his development and on the offense. He
argues that defense counsel’s presentation of the evidence
failed to convey the magnitude of his abuse, thus failing to
connect it to the crime. Laird calls the District Court’s ruling
“manifestly wrong” and an unreasonable application of
Strickland. Appellant’s Br. 17–18. Although the District Court
did not adopt the state court’s ruling that testimony of Dr.
Lisak’s report would have been “cumulative” of the trial
mitigation evidence, it nevertheless accepted the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s holding that Laird was not prejudiced
because at least one juror found a mitigating factor present.
Laird argues that Dr. Lisak’s testimony would have
dramatically upgraded the mitigation evidence in quality and
quantity, potentially causing more jurors to have weighed
mitigation more favorably. Therefore, he claims, he was
prejudiced by the exclusion of the testimony. He requests that
we reverse the District Court’s judgment and remand with
instructions to grant his petition and vacate his death sentence.
In opposition, the Commonwealth argues that defense
counsel’s performance did not fall below the standard
guaranteed to Laird under the Sixth Amendment. It argues that
counsel reasonably investigated by consulting multiple mental
health experts who, through their testimony, adequately
“present[ed] the evidence of Laird’s childhood abuse,
including sexual abuse, its effect on his life, and the connection
between that abuse and Anthony Milano’s murder.” Appellee’s
Br. 22. Further, the Commonwealth contends that the state
court’s analysis is entitled to our deference, as it reasonably
interpreted Strickland where it determined that Laird was not
prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Concluding, the
Commonwealth recognizes that although further details of
Laird’s sexual abuse came to light after his retrial, those details
were not sufficiently different from the details already

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28
presented to the jury so as to cause the jury to weigh the
mitigating and aggravating factors differently. It requests we
affirm.
We will begin our review by addressing which state-
court decision requires deference under AEDPA. We will then
examine the state-court analyses, which we will determine
were reasonable. Finally, we will ask whether fair-minded
jurists could disagree as to the Courts’ ultimate holdings and
will answer in the negative.
1. Last Reasoned Decision
When applying AEDPA deference to a Strickland
claim, a federal court reviews the “last reasoned” state-court
decision that addressed that claim. Abdul-Salaam v. Sec’y, Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 895 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Bond
v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289 (3d Cir. 2008)). This decision is
often the state’s highest court’s opinion, where the petitioner
exhausted their claim. However, in Laird’s case, the “last
reasoned” decision for each Strickland prong, respectively,
was made by different courts. See, e.g., Porter, 558 U.S. at 39–
40 (applying AEDPA deference to the lone Strickland prong
addressed by the state court); Abdul-Salaam, 895 F.3d at 266
(same).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Laird’s
additional-expert claim on Strickland’s prejudice prong, but it
did not address Strickland’s performance prong. Therefore, its
opinion is the “last reasoned” decision for but half of the
Strickland analysis. See Laird, 119 A.3d at 1012; see also Dkt.
116-23, at 207 (notice of appeal). In light of the Court’s failure
to reach the performance prong, Laird asserted—and the
District Court erroneously concluded—that this prong ought to
be reviewed de novo. Rather, we must move backward in the
case timeline to the PCRA Court’s decision, which is the “last

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reasoned” analysis of the performance prong. The PCRA Court
denied Laird’s claim on both Strickland’s prejudice and
performance prongs. Since the performance-prong analysis
was not displaced on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, it remains intact.
We have previously reviewed different state courts’
analyses of Strickland’s prongs as the “last reasoned”
decisions. In two instances, we were presented with the reverse
of this case: we reviewed the PCRA courts’ prejudice-prong
analyses as the last reasoned decisions because the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court only addressed the performance
prong. See Saranchak v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 802 F.3d
579, 597 (3d Cir. 2015); Bond, 539 F.3d at 289. There is no
compelling reason to distinguish Laird’s case from those two.
Our responsibility to adhere to AEDPA remains,
regardless of the parties’ interpretations. The Commonwealth
asserts that AEDPA deference applies, but it does not argue
that this deference applies to the PCRA Court’s performance-
prong analysis, nor does it take issue with the District Court’s
and Laird’s application of de novo review to this prong.
However, “[e]very court of appeals to consider the question . . .
has held a State’s lawyers cannot waive or forfeit § 2254(d)’s
standard.” Langley v. Prince, 926 F.3d 145, 162 (5th Cir. 2019)
(en banc); see also id. at 162 n.8 (collecting cases).
Accordingly, we will review the PCRA Court’s performance-
prong analysis. While we will not reach the prejudice prong,
we recognize the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis to be
the last reasoned decision on that prong. AEDPA deference
applies to both decisions.
2. Deficient Performance
To establish the first prong of Strickland, deficient
performance, a challenger must show that “counsel’s

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representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. There is no
specific guideline. “The question is whether an attorney’s
representation amounted to incompetence under prevailing
professional norms, not whether it deviated from best practices
or most common custom.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689 (A court must make “every effort . . . to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate
the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”).
In capital cases specifically, counsel must undertake a
“thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”
Williams, 529 U.S. at 396. “[C]ounsel’s general duty to
investigate takes on supreme importance . . . in the context of
developing mitigating evidence to present to a . . . jury
considering the sentence of death . . . .” Marshall v. Hendricks,
307 F.3d 36, 99 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
706 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Even so, “strategic choices made after less than complete
investigation are reasonable . . . to the extent that reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91). As a threshold,
“Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every
conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely
the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing.” Id.
True, “defense counsel should try to discover all reasonably
available mitigating evidence, regardless of whether all of that
evidence will ultimately be introduced at trial.” Abdul-Salaam,
895 F.3d at 269 (internal quotation marks omitted). But “[i]n
assessing the reasonableness of [counsel’s] investigation . . . a
court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already

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known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would
lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 527.
Though any number of hypothetical experts may have
been available for the defense, “[c]ounsel was entitled to
formulate a strategy that was reasonable at the time and to
balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics
and strategies.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 107. Thus, the question of
how much investigation and how many experts were
reasonable is, like any other Strickland performance inquiry,
case- and fact-specific. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 690. The
selection of an expert witness is an example of counsel’s
strategic choice that, when made “after thorough investigation
of law and facts,” is “virtually unchallengeable.” Hinton v.
Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 275 (2014) (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690).
Here, the performance of defense counsel is at issue
where they did not retain and present a specialist on childhood
sexual abuse—namely, one like Dr. Lisak—in the 2007 retrial
penalty phase. Essentially, the PCRA Court determined that
Dr. Lisak would have provided no significantly new
information or diagnoses that were not presented at the penalty
phase. “Certainly,” the PCRA Court observed, “doctor after
doctor could evaluate [Laird] and likely uncover additional
details from [his] past with different theories about how those
events in his life impacted him.” Dkt. 116-23, at 320. But the
PCRA Court faithfully applied Strickland in concluding that it
was sufficient that “two different experts[,] who conducted
multiple interviews [of Laird,] presented opinions that [Laird]
suffered from physical, sexual, emotional, and psychological
abuse, had diagnoses of brain damage, memory impairment,
drug and alcohol dependence, ADHD, and PTSD.” Id. The
testimony of Laird’s brother also helped to paint the picture.

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Id. In sum, the PCRA Court held that, “Trial counsel were not
ineffective for failing to present additional details that would
have been insignificant considering the evidence as a whole.”
Id.
This was a merits determination of the claim of
ineffectiveness related to experts, and thus § 2254(d) governs
our review. As we will now explain, this determination was not
“contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States” in Strickland and its progeny. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1). Furthermore, in the case before us, it is not
possible for fairminded jurists to disagree with the PCRA
Court’s reasoning. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. As the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted, “[w]hen § 2254(d) applies, the
question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable,” but
“whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel
satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. at 105. Here,
we answer in the affirmative.
Laird contends that the omission of Dr. Lisak’s
testimony meant that a “critical component” of his mitigation
case was not presented. He argues that Dr. Lisak would have
testified about two “unrebutted fact[s:] that Laird was
repeatedly orally and anally raped by his father over a period
of years, and . . . that Laird’s murder of a man he perceived as
gay was linked to his own experience of brutal and horrific
sexual abuse.” Appellant’s Br. 36–37. But those facts would
not have been new. Testimony by Mark, Dr. Dee, and Dr. Fox
can only be fairly read as indicating to the jury that sexual
abuse was a regular occurrence, just as physical abuse was, and
that Laird’s life history could have been related to the murder.
See, e.g., Dkt. 116-24, at 220–21.
The PCRA Court disagreed with Laird, and its analysis

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was reasonable. The Court analyzed counsel’s preparation for
the retrial; noted that the witnesses who testified during the
guilt phase provided information and diagnoses no different
from what Dr. Lisak would have said; and concluded that Dr.
Lisak’s additional testimony “would have been insignificant
considering the evidence as a whole.” Dkt. 116-23, at 320. The
record supports this reasoning because, by the time the trial
advanced to the penalty phase, the jury had already heard
testimony during the guilt phase that Laird “suffered from
physical, sexual, emotional, and psychological abuse, had
diagnoses of brain damage, memory impairment, drug and
alcohol dependence, ADHD, and PTSD.” Id.
Laird points to no evidence that suggests either Dr. Dee
or Dr. Fox believed they were hampered in their ability to
interview and evaluate Laird, which would have potentially
required defense counsel to seek an additional expert. Even
assuming a younger Laird would have trusted a specialist like
Dr. Lisak with further details of his abuse, these details still
would not have presented anything new or different—they
would have been, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded, “largely cumulative.” Laird, 119 A.3d at 997–98.
The PCRA Court recognized defense counsels’
presentation of several types of mitigating evidence as a
strategic choice they made to counteract and downplay the
weight of the two serious aggravating circumstances that were
on the table: kidnapping and torture. But Laird argues that
Williams’s decision to not retain a specialist was not
strategic—Williams admitted it did not cross his mind to find
a specialist more capable of eliciting further details of the
sexual abuse.
Such an argument ignores that Laird was the only
source that could provide additional information about his own

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sexual abuse, and Laird likewise was the only limitation on
defense counsel’s ability to uncover information. For example,
there are no records from any school, medical facility, mental
health facility, court proceeding, or police investigation to
corroborate or detail Laird’s sexual abuse that counsel failed to
uncover. Mark was the only witness who corroborated that
Laird was sexually abused, and he could only testify as to
indicia of abuse, the significance of which he did not
understand until he was an adult. Laird himself never testified
at the PCRA hearings that followed the retrial, so there was no
first-hand support for the notion that he would have revealed
more information in 2007, had counsel retained a different type
of expert who would have employed different techniques.
Laird’s claim that he would have been more willing to share
details of his abuse with a special expert is merely one-sided
speculation. As our sister circuits have recognized, complaints
of uncalled witnesses are not favored in federal habeas corpus
review because allegations of what a witness would have
testified to are largely speculative. See, e.g., Coble v.
Quarterman, 496 F.3d 430, 436 (5th Cir. 2007); Wallace v.
Lockhart, 701 F.2d 719, 727–28 (8th Cir. 1983). Crediting this
kind of second-guessing would allow hindsight to improperly
undermine trial strategy decisions.
Laird’s case is distinguishable from the ones cited in his
briefing. In those cases, there were gaping holes in the
mitigation investigations. For example, Rompilla v. Beard
requires capital counsel “to make reasonable efforts to obtain
and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will
probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing
phase of trial.” 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005). Laird’s counsel did
just this—they presented a thorough mitigation case, as
evidenced by the jury’s finding of seven mitigating factors.
They not only presented evidence of Laird’s good character in

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prison but also relied on all relevant records; the testimony of
the only living family member who could attempt to
corroborate the sexual abuse; and two expert witnesses who
testified about Laird’s abusive childhood and its impact.
Furthermore, counsel argued in closing that the very fact that
Laird and his brother only reluctantly discussed their painful
history proved the abuse occurred. This was a reasonable trial
strategy to counter the suggestion that the sexual abuse had
been belatedly fabricated.
Other cases where we have concluded counsel was
ineffective concern behavior far below the level exhibited by
Laird’s trial counsel. Counsel were ineffective in the
presentation of mitigation evidence where they performed only
a cursory investigation, failing to acquire available records
regarding the defendant’s background. Outten v. Kearney, 464
F.3d 401, 415–18 (3d Cir. 2006). Counsel were ineffective for
failing to obtain school and juvenile court records, failing to
interview family members with documented mental health
issues, and failing to obtain any expert testimony at all
regarding the defendant’s mental health. Abdul-Salaam, 895
F.3d at 268; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 382. We have even found
counsel ineffective for failing to timely prepare for the penalty
phase. Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 306–08 (3d Cir. 2001)
(counsel was ineffective where they had only two years of legal
experience, did nothing to investigate and corroborate
allegations of abuse through readily-available witnesses and
documentary evidence, and did not begin preparation for the
penalty phase until the night before). Williams’s and
Kerrigan’s performance is simply not comparable to those
cases.
If we were to adopt Laird’s argument, we would pervert
the Strickland standard by impermissibly raising the bar for
counsel effectiveness. Holding Williams’s performance to be

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ineffective would essentially ensure that no trial counsel can
ever be effective enough, as there may always be other experts
who could prompt survivors to reveal more information about
their sexual abuse. In fact, our sister circuits have cautioned
against the dangers of this very type of hindsight. See Davis v.
Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1475 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that
the “mere fact a defendant can find, years after the fact, a
mental health expert who will testify favorably for him does
not demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
produce that expert at trial”).
We will not second-guess the state court’s legitimate
reasoning. “[W]hen the state court pens a clear, reasoned
opinion, federal habeas courts may not speculate as to theories
that ‘could have supported’ the state court’s decision.” Dennis,
834 F.3d at 283. Likewise, “[w]e will not gap-fill when the
state court has articulated its own clear reasoning.” Id. at 284.
Here, the PCRA Court articulated its reasoning clearly. We
defer to the PCRA Court’s review of the performance prong
because it faithfully applied Strickland to the merits of Laird’s
claim and reasonably concluded that Williams’s decision to not
hire an additional expert for the penalty phase was strategic.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, viewed “[u]nder
the doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a
Strickland claim evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard,”
Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123, we agree. The PCRA Court’s
application of Strickland’s performance prong was not
contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal law
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court.
3. Prejudice
Even where counsel’s performance was objectively
unreasonable, we do not set aside a state-court criminal
judgment unless the error had an effect on the trial’s outcome.

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Both prongs of Strickland must be met for a petitioner to
receive relief for an ineffective-assistance claim. Workman v.
Superintendent Albion SCI, 915 F.3d 928, 938 (3d Cir. 2019).
Logically, prejudice is absent where counsel’s performance did
not objectively fall short of professional standards. In Laird’s
case, because the PCRA Court’s Strickland performance prong
analysis was reasonable and is subject to our deference, we
need not address the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling on
the prejudice prong.
IV.
We are not callous about the anguish caused by a
traumatic upbringing like Laird’s. Nor do we forget the
anguish of Anthony Milano, who unfairly bore the brunt of
what can only graciously be considered a gruesome and
altogether avoidable manifestation of that trauma. Grave
circumstances aside, “the only question that matter[ed]” here,
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71—the only one the law authorizes us to
consider—is whether the Pennsylvania courts left a Sixth
Amendment violation unaddressed by wrongly applying
federal law. They did not, and jurists of reason would not
disagree. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s
denial of the habeas petition.

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