Jaime Abraham Baltazar-Sanchez v. Attorney General United States of America

191051np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third CircuitDec 20, 2019

Full text

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-1051
___________
JAIME ABRAHAM BALTAZAR-SANCHEZ,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A213-090-941)
Immigration Judge: Immigration Judge Kuyomars Q. Golparvar
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 20, 2019
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 20, 2019)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Baltazar-Sanchez, a Guatemalan citizen, entered the United States in September
2015 and overstayed his visa. In October 2017, the Government served him with a notice
to appear charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Baltazar-
Sanchez sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture (CAT), claiming that he would be persecuted and tortured at the hands of the
MS-13 gang if forced to return to Guatemala. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief
and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Baltazar-Sanchez’s appeal.
Baltazar-Sanchez moved the BIA for reconsideration. He argued that the IJ lacked
jurisdiction to decide his removability because his notice to appear had been defective
under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113-14 (2018). The BIA rejected this
argument and denied the motion for reconsideration. Baltazar-Sanchez petitions for
review.1
We will deny relief. In Pereira, the Supreme Court held that a notice to appear
that omits the time and place of a hearing does not qualify as a “notice to appear under
section 1229(a)” for purposes of the cancellation-of-removal statute’s stop-time rule. 138
S. Ct. at 2113–14. Baltazar-Sanchez contends that because his notice to appear omitted
the same information, it is invalid and thus does not qualify as a ‘charging document,’
vesting jurisdiction in the IJ under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14. He further argues that a
subsequent notice of hearing containing that information is insufficient to cure the
1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Because Baltazar-Sanchez’s
jurisdictional challenge is a purely legal one, our review is plenary. See Chiao Fang Kuv.
Att’y Gen., 912 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2019).

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jurisdictional defect. But we addressed and rejected these precise arguments in Nkomo v.
Attorney General, 930 F.3d 129, 133-34 (3d Cir. 2019). For the reasons set forth in that
opinion, the omission of the date and time from a notice to appear does not deprive an IJ
of jurisdiction to decide removability. Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.

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