Gary Lall v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES On Appeal…

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 20-2051
____________
GARY LALL,
Appellant
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGRATION SERVICES
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-19-cv-00048)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
_______________
No. 20-2477
_______________
GARY LALL,
Petitioner
v.

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ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1A029-802-117)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Alice Hartye
Argued
March 5, 2024
Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed August 27, 2024)
_______________
Robert E. Day, III [ARGUED]
Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads
1735 Market Street – 21st Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner
Christopher B. Buchanan [ARGUED]
Nancy Canter
Rodolfo D. Saenz
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

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Laura S. Irwin
Office of United States Attorney
700 Grant Street – Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellee/Respondent
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
In 1990, seventeen-year-old Gary Lall, who had been
born overseas, applied through his adoptive parents for a
Certificate of Citizenship to confirm that he was a U.S. citizen.
After he turned eighteen, the government approved the
application, and Lall received a certificate stating he “became
a citizen.” (D.I. 1-2 at 1.) As it turned out, however, the
government had erroneously issued the certificate because Lall
had not satisfied all the statutory requirements to obtain
citizenship. Government employees realized the error not long
after the certificate was issued, yet the government waited
twenty-one years to administratively cancel it. Lall, who was
incarcerated when the cancellation occurred, filed a
declaratory judgment action in the Western District of
Pennsylvania under 8 U.S.C. § 1503, seeking a declaration of
citizenship. Shortly thereafter, the government initiated
removal proceedings against him, and an Immigration Judge
(the “IJ”) ordered his removal. He fared no better in his
declaratory judgment action, which the District Court
dismissed.

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While we can readily appreciate how bitter this result is
for Lall, neither the District Court nor the Immigration Judge
erred. Because Lall never obtained citizenship, he was subject
to removal. And, for the reasons set forth below, our equitable
powers do not permit us to grant citizenship. We will therefore
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Lall’s declaratory
judgment pleading and deny his petition for review of the
Immigration Judge’s order of removal.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1988, at the age of fifteen, Lall came to the United
States from his native Trinidad and Tobago on a non-
immigrant visitor visa. He was legally adopted by Harrack and
Tara Lall, who were originally citizens of Trinidad and Tobago
and had become naturalized U.S. citizens in 1975 and 1979,
respectively.
In November 1990, after living with his adoptive
parents for two years, Lall became a lawful permanent resident
of the United States at the age of seventeen years and nine
months. The following month, he applied for a Certificate of
Citizenship, claiming derivative citizenship through his
adoptive parents. He used a form provided by an Immigration
and Naturalization Services (“INS”) clerk. [All of the
information provided on his application was accurate,
including Lall’s adoptive parents’ dates of naturalization.
In July 1991, after Lall turned eighteen, he was
interviewed by an INS examiner, and his application was
approved. He swore the Oath of Allegiance before the INS
examiner the same day. In addition, the INS examiner filled
out a Report and Recommendation stating that Lall “derive[d]

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or acquire[d] United States citizenship on [April 5, 1991]
through [his] Parents.” (D.I. 1-7 at 1.) Critically, however, the
INS examiner incorrectly recorded that Lall’s adoptive parents
were also naturalized on April 5, 1991, even though Lall’s
application reflected the accurate dates in 1975 and 1979. The
Report and Recommendation was approved and signed by the
then-INS District Director or Officer in Charge. The INS
issued Lall a Certificate of Citizenship the following week.
That Certificate stated that he “became a citizen” on April 5,
1991. (D.I. 1-2 at 1.)
A few months later, in August 1991, the INS sent the
State Department a memo raising questions about Lall’s
citizenship. The memo stated that Lall was “not entitled to the
certificate of citizenship issued to him” because he “was over
the age of 18 at the time of the interview.” (D.I. 1-12 at 1.) It
also said that “[a]ppropriate action is being taken at this time
to revoke his citizenship.” (D.I. 1-12 at 1.)
The mills of government at times grind very, very
slowly – appallingly so in this instance. Twenty-one years
passed, and, in December 2012, while Lall was serving a
sentence for a drug conviction,1 U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS” or the “agency”) finally
notified him that it intended to administratively cancel his
Certificate of Citizenship. The USCIS construed Lall’s 1990
application as one for derivative citizenship under the former
1 In 2006, Lall was convicted of conspiracy to import
five kilograms or more of cocaine and conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine, and was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment.

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§ 321 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”), as
the application was made on the form designed specifically for
that purpose. But the agency explained that because Lall did
not enter or reside in the United States at the time that his
adoptive parents naturalized in the 1970s, he had not been
eligible for derivative citizenship under that provision. Thus,
the USCIS determined that Lall had never acquired citizenship,
and it intended to cancel his certificate pursuant to its authority
under § 342 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1453).
Pursuant to the agency’s process, Lall answered that
notice by asserting that the certificate should not be canceled
because, even if not eligible for citizenship under § 321, he was
eligible under former § 322 of the INA, which provided for
naturalization of children born outside of the United States.
The agency rejected his claim because § 322 required
applicants to take the oath before they turned eighteen, and Lall
took it after he reached that age.2 The USCIS then canceled
Lall’s Certificate of Citizenship.
Lall appealed that decision to the USCIS Administrative
Appeals Office (the “Appeals Office”), pressing his prior
arguments and contending further that the government should
be equitably estopped from canceling his Certificate of
2 The USCIS also noted that his parents did not file an
Application for Certificate of Citizenship on Behalf of an
Adopted Child (Form N-643), which could have expedited
processing time, potentially enabling him to swear the oath,
and therefore naturalize, before turning eighteen, but instead
filed the Application for Certificate of Citizenship (Form N-
600), which Lall asserts was provided by the INS clerk.

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Citizenship so long after it had been issued. The Appeals
Office considered Lall’s eligibility for citizenship under former
§§ 320, 321, and 322 of the INA. It determined that § 320 did
not apply because neither of Lall’s adoptive parents were U.S.
citizens at the time of his birth in 1973, which was required
under that statute.3 It also concluded that § 321, the provision
under which Lall’s application had been granted, did not apply
because he was not “residing in the United States, in his
adoptive parents’ custody, at the time of their naturalization.”4
3 Section 320 afforded citizenship to children “born
outside of the United States, one of whose parents at the time
of the child’s birth was an alien and the other of whose parents
then was and never thereafter ceased to be a citizen of the
United States[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (1988). It only applied
to an adopted child “if the child [was] residing in the United
States at the time of naturalization of such adoptive parent[.]”
§ 1431(b). That section did not apply to Lall because neither
one of his adoptive parents was a citizen when he was born in
1973. Moreover, he did not reside with them in the United
States as a permanent resident when they were naturalized.
4 Section 321, which granted citizenship to some
children of alien parents, also only applied to adopted children
if they were residing in the United States when their parents
were naturalized. 8 U.S.C. § 1432 (repealed 2000). This is the
section under which Lall was issued his Certificate of
Citizenship because the INS examiner incorrectly recorded
Lall’s parents’ naturalization date as April 5, 1991. However,
Lall did not meet the requirements of the section because, as
mentioned, his parents were naturalized in the 1970s, and he

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(D.I. 1-5 at 5.) And it said that § 322 did not apply because
Lall’s parents did not file the applicable form on his behalf
before he turned eighteen and so, regardless of the reason he
did not swear the oath of allegiance until after he had turned
eighteen, he was ineligible for citizenship under that section
too.5 The Appeals Office also concluded that it lacked the
authority to decide Lall’s equitable estoppel claim. In August
2015, it affirmed the agency’s decision to cancel Lall’s
Certificate of Citizenship, since he had never become a citizen.
Lall then moved for reconsideration, which the Appeals Office
denied four years later.
Meanwhile, in March 2019, while his motion for
reconsideration was still pending, Lall filed a federal suit
did not reside with them as a permanent resident in the United
States at that time.
5 Section 322 allowed parents to apply for their children
to become naturalized citizens, provided that they “compli[ed]
with all the provisions of this subchapter” before they turned
eighteen. 8 U.S.C. § 1433 (1990). “[C]ompliance with all the
provisions of this subchapter” included, by reference, then-
INA § 337(a), which required taking the oath of allegiance. 8
U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1988) (stating that “[a] person who has
petitioned for naturalization shall, in order to be and before
being admitted to citizenship, take in open court an oath”).
Unfortunately for Lall, he did not take the oath until July 1991,
after he had already turned eighteen. Because he did not take
the oath prior to turning eighteen, he did not satisfy all of the
conditions of § 322, so he did not become a citizen under that
provision.

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seeking a declaratory judgment of U.S. citizenship under 8
U.S.C. § 1503(a). The government filed a motion to dismiss
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Citing essentially
the same reasons as had been given by the Appeals Office, a
Magistrate Judge recommended granting the government’s
motion to dismiss because Lall had never obtained citizenship.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation, [and Lall has appealed.
As those proceedings were wending their way forward,
agents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) interviewed Lall in April 2020, while he was
incarcerated. They determined that he was a removable alien
with no proper claim to U.S. citizenship. The next month, Lall
was served with an alien arrest warrant, a Notice to Appear for
a removal hearing,6 and a Notice of Custody Determination
informing him that he would be detained by the Department of
Homeland Security during the removal proceedings.
Lall filed a motion to terminate those proceedings. He
argued that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over him
because he was still litigating his citizenship status in federal
court and that he could not lose his citizenship status unless and
6 The Notice to Appear alleged that he was neither a
citizen nor national of the United States and that he was
convicted of drug-related offenses in 2006, so he was subject
to removal under §§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of
the INA, which, respectively, authorize removal of noncitizens
who have been convicted of an aggravated felony or of a
violation of any law or regulation relating to a controlled
substance.

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until his appeals were decided against him. An Immigration
Judge denied the motion to terminate, observing that Lall’s
Certificate of Citizenship was only evidence of citizenship and
not itself a citizenship-conferring instrument. The IJ also held
that, because Lall was not a naturalized citizen, judicial
proceedings to revoke naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451
were unnecessary. Ultimately, the IJ concluded that the USCIS
had not erred in holding that Lall never obtained citizenship.
Having found in favor of the government, the IJ ordered that
Lall be removed to Trinidad and Tobago, and he was deported
in January 2021. Lall has filed a petition asking us to review
that order of removal.
The petition and his appeal of the District Court’s
decision against him in his declaratory judgment action are
now consolidated before us for decision.
II. DISCUSSION7
A. Lall Never Obtained U.S. Citizenship.
Both Lall’s appeal from the District Court and his
petition for review are based on his claim to citizenship. As
7 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
8 U.S.C. § 1252. While petitioners must typically exhaust all
administrative remedies available as of right before we may
review a final order of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), the
“exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional[]” and “is subject
to waiver and forfeiture.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S.
411, 423 (2023). The government has forfeited any exhaustion
argument here. As for the appeal from the District Court, we
exercise plenary review of the decision on Lall’s citizenship
claim. Dessouki v. Att’y Gen., 915 F.3d 964, 967 (3d Cir.

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we observed nearly seventy years ago in Delmore v. Brownell,
236 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir. 1956), the plaintiff in an action
seeking a declaration of citizenship bears the burden of proving
his citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence. In
Delmore, we held that a government-issued letter confirming
plaintiff’s status as a U.S. citizen was “a determination of [his]
status” and “established his prima facie case.” Id. And “[o]nce
the United States has determined that an individual is a citizen,
it should be required to disprove its own determination by
‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence[.]’” Id.
Lall argues that, in like manner, his Certificate of
Citizenship demonstrates his status as a U.S. citizen and serves
as prima facie evidence that he is a citizen. Accordingly, he
argues, both the District Court and the IJ erred in not holding
the government to its burden of refuting his citizenship – errors
which he argues amount to violations of his rights to due
process and equal protection. Unfortunately for Lall, however,
his allegations, even when accepted as true, demonstrate that
he was never a U.S. citizen.
2019). The District Court granted the government’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, and so “we must accept the
allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable
factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Turbe v. Gov’t of
Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). And as for
the petition for review, because there is no BIA opinion, we
review the IJ’s conclusion of law de novo and his findings of
fact under the substantial evidence standard. Cf. Toussaint v.
Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying the
standard to BIA decisions).

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“The [INA] confers citizenship on children born outside
of the United States to alien parents when certain statutory
conditions are met.” Morgan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 226, 229
(3d Cir. 2005). We apply the law as it was in 1991, when Lall’s
application was processed and he was issued his Certificate of
Citizenship. Dessouki v. Att’y Gen., 915 F.3d 964, 967 (3d Cir.
2019) (“The law in effect at the time [of] the critical events
giving rise to his claim governs our review.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)). At that time,
there were three potentially relevant pathways for Lall to
become a citizen: §§ 320, 321, or 322 of the INA, as it existed
then. Lall fails all three. He never satisfied the statutory
requirements to derive citizenship under §§ 320 and 321, and
he did not become naturalized nor obtain citizenship by
application under § 322. Indeed, during oral argument Lall
conceded that “it remains the case” that he did not meet the
statutory requirements to obtain citizenship (Oral Arg. at 2:45-
3:00, https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/20-
2051;20-
2477GaryLallv.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,etal.mp3),
and so he loses under a straightforward application of the
statutes. That ends the matter. As the relevant statutory
conditions were never met, citizenship was never conferred.
Morgan, 432 F.3d at 229.
The fact that Lall was issued a Certificate of Citizenship
does not change that fact. A certificate does not confer
citizenship.8 Although it is prima facie evidence that the holder
8 A person who claims to have derived
citizenship through the naturalization of a parent
… may apply to the Attorney General for a
certificate of citizenship. Upon proof to the

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is a citizen, see Delmore, 236 F.2d at 600; United States v.
Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2013), citizenship is
lawfully conferred only when the statutory requirements for
citizenship have been met, Morgan, 432 F.3d at 229, regardless
of whether a certificate is issued. Accordingly, because Lall
admits that he never met the statutory requirements, he
necessarily concedes that he never became a U.S. citizen. And
since the conceded facts overcome the prima facie evidence of
his canceled Certificate of Citizenship, there is no due process
concern about the government failing to meet a burden of
proof.
Lall’s equal protections arguments fail for the same
reasons. He compares his case to those subject to
satisfaction of the Attorney General that the
applicant is a citizen, and that the applicant’s
alleged citizenship was derived as claimed …
and upon taking and subscribing before a
member of the Service within the United States
an oath of allegiance … such individual shall be
furnished by the Attorney General with a
certificate of citizenship[.]
8 U.S.C. § 1452(a). A certificate may be administratively
cancelled because it does not itself confer citizenship. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1453 (“The Attorney General is authorized to cancel any
certificate of citizenship[ or] certificate of naturalization, … if
it shall appear to the Attorney General’s satisfaction that such
document or record was illegally or fraudulently obtained[.]”).
Any such cancellation, however, “affect[s] only the document
and not the citizenship status of the person in whose name the
document was issued.” Id.

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denaturalization proceedings, arguing that “persons who are
similarly situated should be treated in the same manner.”
(Opening Br. at 45 (quoting Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Corr.
Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 423 (3d Cir. 2000)).) But because he
was never a naturalized citizen, he was not entitled to
denaturalization proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (requiring
“proceedings in any district court of the United States … [to]
revok[e] and set[] aside the order admitting [a naturalized]
person to citizenship”). A denaturalization action affects
citizenship status, not just the certificate. Xia v. Tillerson, 865
F.3d 643, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Rather, the “cancellation …
of any document purporting to show the citizenship status of
the person to whom it was issued shall affect only the
document and not the citizenship status of the person in whose
name the document was issued.” 8 U.S.C. § 1453.
Consequently, those subject to denaturalization proceedings
are not similarly situated to those, like Lall, who are non-
citizens to begin with.
It is nevertheless true, however, that the government’s
facilitation of the confusion in the first place and then, having
detected the resulting problem, its failure to take prompt
corrective action are deeply troubling. The staggering
ineptitude in leaving Lall and his parents under the impression
(for twenty-one years) that he is a U.S. citizen when in fact the
government has known practically from the start that there was
a mistake is what we turn to next.
B. Equitable Estoppel Cannot Be Used to Confer
Citizenship.
Ultimately, Lall relies on equitable estoppel to save his
claim to citizenship. “[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel can

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apply to the government in the immigration context[.]” Mudric
v. Att’y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2006). To prevail on
such a claim, the plaintiff “must establish (1) a
misrepresentation; (2) upon which he reasonably relied; (3) to
his detriment; and (4) affirmative misconduct.” Id. Lall argues
that because equitable estoppel is available in the immigration
context, it applies here and allows us to confer citizenship. But
that is a step too far, as it would circumvent the strict statutory
requirements for obtaining citizenship.
Citizenship itself is not a remedy like other relief in
immigration cases. See Mustanich v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1084,
1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting instances in which estoppel was
ordered in the context of immigration “to confer a status other
than that of citizen[,]” and recognizing that a conferral of
citizenship would “interfere with Congress’s exclusive
constitutional authority to establish rules for naturalization”).
Indeed, in I.N.S. v. Pangilinan, the Supreme Court made it
clear that courts cannot use their equitable powers to confer
citizenship:
[T]he power to make someone a citizen of the
United States has not been conferred upon the
federal courts, like mandamus or injunction, as
one of their generally applicable equitable
powers. Rather, it has been given [to] them as a
specific function to be performed in strict
compliance with the terms of an authorizing
statute which says that “[a] person may be
naturalized … in the manner and under the
conditions prescribed in this subchapter, and not
otherwise.”

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486 U.S. 875, 883-84 (1988) (third and fourth alterations in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1421(d)
(emphasis added by the Supreme Court)). The Court
concluded, “Neither by application of the doctrine of estoppel,
nor by invocation of equitable powers, nor by any other means
does a court have the power to confer citizenship in violation
of these limitations.”9 Id. at 885. In short, no matter how
compelling a plaintiff’s case may be, our powers do not extend
to conferring citizenship in a manner contrary to the statutory
requirements.10 Because Lall did not satisfy the established
statutory requirements, his claim to citizenship must fail.
9 During oral argument, Lall emphasized that
Pangilinan positively cites to United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973), which he
contends supports the availability of equitable estoppel. Hibi,
however, did not hold that we may confer citizenship using
equitable powers. It left that question open and instead held
that, assuming equitable estoppel might be available, the
government’s conduct in that case did not amount to
affirmative misconduct. Id. at 8 (“While the issue of whether
‘affirmative misconduct’ on the part of the Government might
estop it from denying citizenship was left open in [an earlier
Supreme Court case], no conduct of the sort there adverted to
was involved here.”). Consequently, Lall overstates the import
of Pangilinan’s favorable reference to Hibi, and, more
importantly, he points to nothing that would overcome
Pangilinan’s clear directive foreclosing estoppel.
10 For the same reason, we cannot backdate Lall’s
application and make it one for naturalization rather than
derivative citizenship. “[A] court may not award equitable
relief in contravention of the expressed intent of Congress.”

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III. CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that the government erroneously issued
Lall a Certificate of Citizenship in the first place. And it is
inexcusable that it quickly discovered its error but failed to
correct it for over twenty-one years. Of course, it is Lall’s own
subsequent criminal conduct that has brought the consequences
of the government’s dereliction down on his head. Still, that
dereliction has fundamentally changed Lall’s identity and
place in the world. He turns to us for assistance, but we cannot
provide the relief he seeks. Not every wrong is ours to right.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s dismissal of Lall’s declaratory judgment suit and deny
his petition for review of the IJ’s order removing him from the
United States.
Cheruku v. Att’y Gen., 662 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2011). And
8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) confers upon the Attorney General the “sole
authority to naturalize persons[,]” a statutory limitation on our
ability to confer citizenship via naturalization. Finally, 8
U.S.C. § 1429 forbids the naturalization of one “against whom
there is outstanding a final finding of [removal].” Accordingly,
we also “clearly lack the authority to provide nunc pro tunc
relief” when such relief “would require agency review of an
alien’s naturalization application while that alien is the subject
of an outstanding finding of deportability or a pending removal
proceeding.” Duran-Pichardo v. Att’y Gen., 695 F.3d 282, 288
(3d Cir. 2012) (citing Cheruku, 662 F.3d at 209).

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