Darien Houser v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 20-2430
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DARIEN HOUSER,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; MR. WETZEL, Secretary of
State; LOUIS S. FOLINO, SCI Greene Superintendent; DEPUTY WINFIELD,
Administrative Officer; MAJOR LEGGETT, Administrative Officer; LT. GREGO,
Administrative Officer; LT. KENNEDY, Administrative Officer; LT. KELLY,
Administrative Officer; SGT. MITCHELL, lower ranking Administrative Officer; SGT.
GAGNON, lower ranking Administrative Officer; SGT. JOHN DOE, lower ranking
Administrative Officer; CO1 MCCUNE, Property Correction Officer; CO1 CARTER,
Property Officer; C/O MICHELUCCI, Correction Officer; C/O GILLIS, L-Block
Correction Officer; HEARING EXAMINER NUNEZ; JANE AND JOHN DOE,
Correction Staff Smokers; DR. JIN, Medical Director; JOHN MCANANY, Nurse
Supervisor; NEDRA GREGO, Nurse Supervisor; MR. POKOL, Nurse; PA
ANATANOVICH, Medical Staff; PA WEST, Medical Staff; MR. WILSON, Medical
Staff; C/O JONES, Correction Staff; C/O KELLER, Correction Staff; JANE AND
JOHN DOE, Medical Staff; WEXFORD MEDICAL INC, Jane and John Doe; BUREAU
OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES; WINDY SHAYLOR, Graterford Grievance
Coordinator; DORINA VARNER, Chief Grievance Coordinator; LT. TONY,
Administrator Officer; PETER VIDONISH, Administrative Officer; C/O COLES,
Correction Staff; C/O SEGY, Correction Staff; SGT. LUBAY, lower ranking
Administrative Officer
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-01068)
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab

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________________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 7, 2022
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 7, 2022)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Darien Houser appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania granting the appellees’ motions for summary
judgment. For the reasons below, we will affirm.
Houser, a Pennsylvania prisoner, filed a civil rights complaint (ECF 6), which he
later amended twice. (ECF 69; 72.) He named as defendants the Department of
Corrections (DOC) and several of its employees, as well as the medical director at SCI-
Greene and two medical assistants. Those defendants filed motions for summary
judgment, arguing that Houser’s claims were barred by the doctrine res judicata, also
called claim preclusion, because they could have been raised in an earlier, unsuccessful
suit that Houser had brought against the same or similar defendants. (ECF 162; 164 &
165.) The District Court granted those motions (ECF 182 & 183), and entered judgment
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. (ECF 184.) Houser timely appealed.
(ECF 185.)
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and exercise de novo review over the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of claim preclusion. See
Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009).
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars claims that were brought, or could have been
brought, in a previous action. See In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008);
CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1999). “The
preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by federal common law.”
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008). Claim preclusion under federal law applies
where there is “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same
parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.”
Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991). The party asserting
claim preclusion bears the burden of proving all the elements. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at
907.
We agree with the District Court that claim preclusion bars Houser’s claims. The
first element is satisfied because, in an action that Houser brought in 2010 (“Houser I”),
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. See Houser v. Folino, W.D. Pa.
Civ. No. 2:10-cv-00416 (judgment entered Dec. 4, 2015). The District Court denied
Houser’s motion for a new trial, see Houser v. Folino, No. 2:10-cv-00416, 2016 WL
791934 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2016), recons. denied, 2016 WL 1555518 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 18,

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2016), and we affirmed, Houser v. Folino, 927 F.3d 693, 701 (3d Cir. 2019).
The second and third elements are also satisfied. In Houser I, the amended
complaint, which was filed on July 31, 2012, named many of the same DOC employees
and medical staff at SCI Greene who were named in the underlying action. The claims in
that complaint concerned medical treatment that Houser received at SCI-Greene between
January 2007 and October 2011.1 While that case was pending, Houser filed the
underlying action (“Houser II”), which named numerous defendants from Houser I,
including the DOC itself, the DOC Bureau of Health Care Services, DOC officials and
employees, corrections officers, and health care providers. Like the amended complaint
in Houser I, Houser II involved alleged constitutional violations related to medical
treatment at SCI-Greene. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 277 (3d
Cir. 2014) (stating that courts should take a “broad view” when considering what
constitutes the same cause of action); see also United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746
F.2d 977, 983-84 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that asserting different theories of recovery in a
second lawsuit will not defeat the application of res judicata where the events underlying
the two actions are essentially the same). And the conduct giving rise to the claims in
1 We note that Houser later narrowed the scope of the case in Houser I. Specifically, the
Magistrate Judge granted his motion to voluntarily dismiss all but four of the named
defendants, see Houser v. Beard, W.D. Pa. No. 2:10-cv-00416 (ECF 144 & 184), and
permitted him to amend the complaint to name only those four defendants. (Text-only
order entered Dec. 21, 2012.) Later, at trial, the District Court permitted Houser to
withdraw his claims against two of the four remaining defendants. (ECF 415, at 41-42.)
Houser does not argue, and we cannot conclude, that the narrowing of the case under
these circumstances precludes the application of the res judicata doctrine.

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Houser II predated the filing of the amended complaint in Houser I. Cf. Morgan v.
Covington Twp., 648 F.3d 172, 178 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding “that res judicata does not
bar claims that are predicated on events that postdate the filing of the initial complaint”).
It is clear, therefore, that the claims in Houser II could have been brought in the amended
complaint that was filed in Houser I. Indeed, both actions involved claims against the
same defendants or their privies that were related to allegedly improper medical care at
SCI Greene between January 2007 and April 2012.
Accordingly, because we conclude that the District Court properly held that the
claims in Houser II were precluded by res judicata, we will affirm the judgment of the
District Court.

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