Anthony Johnson v. STATE of PENNSYLVANIA

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 21-3359
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ANTHONY JOHNSON,
Appellant
v.
STATE of PENNSYLVANIA; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; MARK COPOULOS,
doing business as Brucha Holdings Realty; PHILADELPHIA
COUNTY, Solicitor; BANK OF NEW YORK; JASON YATES;
JAY ROSENBERG, doing business as Avenue 365 Lender Services; JAMES
LEONARD, Commissioner of Deeds; DAN EGAN, doing business as New
Penn Financial; JOEL FURLOS, Interloper doing business as Brucha
Holdings Realty, LLC; JOSH SHAPIRO, doing business as Attorney General
State of Pennsylvania; MARCIA FUDGE, Secretary United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development; DIANE CORTES, Solicitor
Philadelphia County; CHARLES P. RETTIG, Commissioner Internal
Revenue Service; NEW REZ LLC, d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing
__________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-21-cv-04597)
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 14, 2022
Before: MCKEE+, SHWARTZ and MATEY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 19, 2023)
+ Judge McKee assumed senior status on October 21, 2022.

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___________
OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Anthony Johnson appeals from an order dismissing his complaint. We will affirm.
I.
Johnson filed pro se a complaint1 against numerous defendants raising claims
regarding the ownership of a home in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His complaint is
barely comprehensible and alleges very few facts, but it appears that he sought to
challenge as “fraudulent” a mortgage foreclosure on the home and his ejectment from the
property. It further appears that those matters already have been litigated to some extent
in state court.2
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1 Johnson filed his complaint in the name of “Estate of Johnson” and identified himself as
a “beneficiary claimant.” We construe his complaint to raise only personal claims.
2 Johnson sought to stay an apparently related state-court action that he identified as case
number 190801900 in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County.
The District Court denied his request. Johnson also filed his federal complaint in the
state-court action. Johnson’s complaint is titled “complaint notice of removal” with the
words “notice of removal” crossed out. We do not regard the state-court action as having
been removed to federal court.

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One defendant—an apparently former mortgage holder of the property that
Johnson identified as “Bank of New York”3—filed a motion to dismiss Johnson’s
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 12(b)(6). In response, Johnson filed a “brief in
support of motion for leave to amend.” He requested leave to “expand upon the factual
bases” for his claims, but he did not say how or include a proposed amended complaint.
The District Court granted the Bank’s motion and dismissed Johnson’s complaint with
prejudice. Johnson appeals.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court did not explain
in detail its reasons for dismissing Johnson’s complaint, but we will affirm that ruling
under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that Johnson failed to state a claim.
To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th
275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). This standard applies even to pro
se complaints. See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
Johnson’s complaint, even liberally construed, fails to satisfy this standard. As the Bank
argues, Johnson did not allege any facts plausibly suggesting any valid claim or even
specifying what role Johnson believes that the Bank played in these events. Instead, his
barely comprehensible complaint consists largely, and at best, of conclusory allegations
3 The Bank asserts that its correct designation is “The Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a
The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders of the CWABS, Inc., Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2006-4.” We refer to this defendant simply as the Bank.

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of “fraud” and other wrongdoing. Such conclusory allegations do not suffice. See
Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92-93 (3d Cir. 2019).
Nor was leave to amend warranted. Johnson already sought an opportunity to
amend and “expand upon the factual bases” for his claims in the District Court, but he did
not say how and did not cure any of the deficiencies in his complaint. He also does not
argue on appeal that the District Court erred in denying leave to amend, and he has not
otherwise raised anything suggesting that he could plead any plausible claim if given
another chance. Thus, we see no indication that amendment would be anything other
than futile. See Talley, 15 F.4th at 285 n.6.
Johnson does raise some other arguments on appeal,4 but they lack merit. Johnson
argues that his payment of the filing fee for his complaint “creates an implied contract . . .
to help remedy, provide relief or order restitution for [his] injuries.” (Appellant’s Br. at
2.) It does not. Fees are assessed for the privilege of initiating a case and do not entitle
litigants to any particular disposition. Cf. Porter v. Dep’t of Treasury, 564 F.3d 176, 179
(3d Cir. 2009). Johnson also argues that the District Court should not have dismissed his
complaint as to the non-moving defendants. But Johnson’s complaint was deficient as to
those defendants largely for the same reasons that it was deficient against the Bank, and
the Bank’s motion effectively put Johnson on notice of those deficiencies. Cf. Couden v.
Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 500 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming sua sponte grant of summary
4 We decline the Bank’s invitation to dismiss this appeal or deem all of Johnson’s
arguments waived for inadequate briefing. Instead, we liberally construe his brief and
deem it sufficient to raise the issues addressed herein.

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judgment where the “grounds for dismissal” as to the moving and non-moving defendants
“were identical”). And although Johnson makes some factual assertions regarding some
non-moving defendants for the first time on appeal, those assertions too remain
insufficient to state a claim and do not suggest that Johnson could state any plausible
claim. Thus, we discern no reversible error in this regard, or in any other.
III.
For these reasons, we will affirm the dismissal of Johnson’s complaint.5 To the
extent that Johnson’s filings on appeal can be construed to request any other relief, such
relief is denied.
6
5 We affirm the dismissal with prejudice as to the Bank. As to the other defendants, our
ruling is without prejudice to Johnson’s ability to assert his claims in a new complaint if
it is otherwise proper for him to do so. We express no opinion on that issue.
6 Johnson’s notice of appeal seeks injunctive relief pending appeal. He has not shown
that any such relief is warranted. Johnson’s notice of appeal also cites the rules
governing hearing and rehearing en banc. We do not construe it as a petition for hearing
en banc because, inter alia, it does not comply with Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(1).

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