Martaba Azamova Akramova v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA On

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 22-2689
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MARTABA AZAMOVA AKRAMOVA,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_______________
On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(No. A099-083-201)
Immigration Judge: R.K. Malloy
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on June 22, 2023
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, and BIBAS and MATEY, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 19, 2023)
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OPINION*
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BIBAS, Circuit Judge.
After missing her immigration court date, Martaba Akramova waited more than eight
years to move to reopen her case. Because she has not shown changed country conditions to
warrant reopening her case after this lengthy delay, we will deny her petition for review.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.

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In 2005, Akramova came to the United States on a six-month visa. After she overstayed
that visa, she sought asylum. She said she feared persecution in her native Uzbekistan based
on her Tajik ethnicity, her Muslim faith, and her husband’s opposition political activity.
But she skipped her 2007 hearing and was ordered removed.
In 2016, Akramova reappeared and moved to reopen her asylum case in Chicago. She
admitted that she had gotten notice of the 2007 hearing and was late, but sought an excep-
tion based on changed country conditions. Uzbekistan, she claimed, had started stripping
citizenship from expatriates who had lived abroad for at least five years. And she pointed
to a news report about a group of Uzbeks who had been arrested, imprisoned, and tortured
upon their return. She feared similar treatment. The immigration judge denied her motion
in a four-sentence opinion. The Board of Immigration Appeals remanded for more
explanation.
Before the Chicago judge could do so, Akramova moved her case to Philadelphia.
There, a different immigration judge reviewed the evidence, found that she had not proven
changed conditions, and denied her motion to reopen. The Board affirmed. She now peti-
tions for review.
The Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3), 1240.15, and we have ju-
risdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We review the denial of reopening for abuse of
discretion. Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2017). That stand-
ard is highly deferential; we will reverse the Board’s ruling only if it was “arbitrary, irra-
tional, or contrary to law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And we accept the

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administrative factual findings unless the evidence would compel a reasonable adjudicator
to decide differently. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Akramova makes three claims, but none shows an abuse of discretion. First, she says
the Board should not have rejected her claim of changed country conditions. But the Board
correctly reviewed the immigration judge’s findings for clear error and found none. The
immigration judge acknowledged Akramova’s evidence, weighed it against State Depart-
ment reports, and found that conditions had not grown worse. Evidence supported that
decision, and we cannot say a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide other-
wise. Bamaca-Cifuentes, 870 F.3d at 113.
Second, Akramova objects that both the immigration judge and the Board overlooked
her Convention Against Torture claim. But they applied the law correctly. To reopen an
asylum hearing, the petitioner must first show that her motion is timely or that country
conditions have changed. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), (3), (4)(i). Those requirements apply
equally to Convention claims. Bamaca-Cifuentes, 870 F.3d at 109. So as the Board noted,
her Convention claim failed for the same reason as her asylum claim.
Finally, Akramova suggests that the immigration judge never judged her case but in-
stead delegated it to her law clerk. The Board acknowledged that the judge’s remarks at
the hearing “may have inadvertently given the impression” that she would let her law clerk
decide the case. AR 4 n.3. But it found “no indication” that the judge had actually abdicated
her role. Id. Looking at the record for ourselves, we agree. See Radiowala v. Att’y Gen.,
930 F.3d 577, 581 (3d Cir. 2019). The immigration judge signed her decision, in which she
said she had considered Akramova’s evidence and arguments in detail. That was enough.

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That said, even the suggestion that a judge delegated her authority to her clerk is trou-
bling. Each judge, whether Article III or administrative, is responsible for her own orders
and opinions. Each of us solemnly swears or affirms “that I will well and faithfully
discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter.” 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (emphasis
added); accord 28 U.S.C. § 453. We may use clerks to aid our research and drafting, but
our judgments are ours alone. To earn the public’s confidence, we must not delegate away
that core task—nor give any impression that we have.
* * * * *
After skipping her hearing, Akramova waited eight and a half years to return to court.
Yet she could not prove that, in the meantime, Uzbekistan had grown worse. So her motion
to reopen is too late, and we will deny her petition.

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