Samuel Ross v. Clerk of Courts of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

DLD-034 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 22-2829
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SAMUEL ROSS,
Appellant
v.
CLERK OF COURTS OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA,
PENNSYLVANIA; D. JUGLE, Prothonotary of the Office of Judicial Records;
C. FORTE, Prothonotary of the Office of Judicial Records of Pennsylvania
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-05012)
District Judge: Honorable Juan Sánchez
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 17, 2022
Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 28, 2022)
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OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not

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Appellant Samuel Ross, an inmate at Somerset State Correctional Institution
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s denial of his
motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). We will summarily
affirm.
In his complaint, Ross, proceeding in forma pauperis, sued the Clerk of the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia and two prothonotaries. He alleged that the defendants
violated his constitutional right to access the courts because they failed to file a motion he
submitted in a medical malpractice suit unrelated to his imprisonment. Dkt. No. 5 at 9-
10. The District Court screened Ross’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) and dismissed it for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 3 at 5. Ross appealed
that dismissal, which we summarily affirmed in June 2018. C.A. No. 17-3719. In
February 2022, Ross filed a Motion for Relief Under Rule 60(b). Dkt. No. 11. The
District Court denied the motion, concluding that Ross’s arguments that the interests of
justice warranted reconsideration of the District Court’s dismissal (and our ruling in his
earlier appeal) did not “change the conclusion that his constitutional right of access to the
courts does not cover his medical malpractice claim as a matter of law.” Dkt. No. 16 at 1
n.1.
constitute binding precedent.

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Ross filed this timely appeal. The Clerk notified the parties that we could consider
whether the District Court order would be summarily affirmed. Ross filed a document in
support of his appeal, essentially repeating the arguments that he made in the District
Court. C.A. Dkt. No. 9.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a District Court’s order
denying a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. See Jackson v. Danberg, 656
F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2011). Upon review, we will affirm because no substantial
question is presented on appeal. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ross’s motion for relief
from judgment because Ross’s motion has set forth no proper basis to find “extraordinary
circumstances” that would justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Budget Blinds, Inc. v.
White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that a showing of extraordinary
circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6) involves demonstrating that “without relief from the
judgment, an extreme and unexpected hardship will result”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Ross argues that an extreme hardship has already resulted
because he has been denied his constitutional right to access the courts. C.A. Dkt. No. 9
at 4. The District Court, however, properly concluded, as it had in its original decision
dismissing Ross’s complaint, that, in our circuit, “prisoners may only proceed on access-
to-courts claims in . . . challenges (direct or collateral) to their sentences and conditions

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of confinement.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). As we explained
to Ross in our decision in his earlier appeal, because he was pursuing a medical
malpractice claim, he was deprived of no constitutional right.1
Accordingly, the District Court committed no error, and we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
1 Furthermore, Ross’s Rule 60(b) motion was not the appropriate vehicle to raise
arguments appropriate in an appeal, see Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 343 (3d Cir. 1999)
(explaining that Rule 60(b) may not be used as a substitute for appeal), or to challenge
our decision in his earlier appeal.

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