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231504np-pdf•United States of America v. Zachary Bosh
231504np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third CircuitApr 19, 2024
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 23-1504
_______________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ZACHARY BOSH,
Appellant
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-21-cr-00439-001
Chief District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak
__________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 17, 2024
Before: HARDIMAN, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 19, 2024)
_____________________
OPINION*
_____________________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Zachary Bosh entered an open plea of guilty to production of a visual depiction of
a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The
District Court imposed a sentence of 210 months of imprisonment and a lifetime term of
supervised release. Bosh appeals his sentence, specifically the imposition of the lifetime
term of supervised release. We will affirm.1
Bosh contends that the Court erred because it did not provide an explanation as to
why a lifetime period of supervised release is “sufficient but no more than necessary to
fulfill the purposes of sentencing.” Bosh Br. at 5. Because Bosh did not object after the
Court imposed its sentence, we review for plain error. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759
F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).
After reviewing the sentencing colloquy, we conclude that the District Court
committed no error, plain or otherwise. The sentencing colloquy, which thoroughly
complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, belies Bosh’s
argument. Before pronouncing sentence, the District Court advised that the sentence to
be imposed “is to be sufficient to fulfill the purposes of sentencing, but at the same time,
it should not be greater than necessary to do that.” A78. After identifying several of the
purposes of sentencing, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (B), and (C), the District Court
stated that, upon release from prison, Bosh would “still be a young man.” A82. With
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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that in mind, the Court then explained that a life term of supervised release would deter
both Bosh and others from engaging in similar conduct. And the Court further declared
that the period of supervision “is both necessary and sufficient to adequately protect the
public.” A84. Before addressing the other conditions of his term of supervised release,
the District Court added that the evidence of record showed that “there’s a real and
substantial risk of danger to the community and to other people, particularly minors, that
can only be mitigated, reduced, [or] addressed . . . by supervision.” A89-90.
In short, the sentencing transcript confirms that the District Court thoughtfully set
out its reasons for imposing a lifetime term of supervised release. We see no basis for
disturbing the District Court’s judgment. We will affirm.
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