United States of America v. Deamonte Law

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 23-2540
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DEAMONTE LAW,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2:20-cr-00341-001)
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 27, 2025
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Before: BIBAS, PHIPPS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 2, 2025)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.
Section 922(g)(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code prohibits felons from
possessing firearms or ammunition that have passed through interstate commerce:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court
of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . .
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
In August 2013, Deamonte Law was arrested and temporarily detained on three
counts for violating federal drug and gun laws. And as part of a plea agreement, Law
pleaded guilty in February 2015 to charges of conspiracy to possess with the intent to
distribute a quantity of cocaine base, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Because both
offenses were punishable by over a year’s imprisonment, he was thereafter subject to the
prohibitions of § 922(g)(1).
In September 2020, Law lived at a halfway house in Pittsburgh as he was completing
the sentence he received for those crimes – 90 months in prison (inclusive of time served)
followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The Friday before Labor Day, he went
to the Crawford Village public housing project in nearby McKeesport to attend a video
shoot for an amateur rapper. Police were surveilling that event through the complex’s
security cameras in search of another man, who was wanted on an arrest warrant and who
announced on social media that he would be in attendance as the organizer of the video
shoot. In the process of locating and arresting that other man, the officers noticed that Law
ran off with his hand on his right hip, suggesting that he was holding something. The
surveillance videos showed Law duck beneath an SUV and discard an item in the same

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parking spot from which officers later recovered a Smith and Wesson M&P Shield .40
caliber pistol in the aftermath of the other man’s arrest. A federal grand jury later indicted
Law on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1).
Law disputed that charge both legally and factually. Before trial, citing New York
State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), he moved to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional, facially and as applied to
him. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B). The District Court denied that motion. Although
Law did not testify at trial, his possession of the handgun was the only issue before the
jury, and he disputed that fact. The jury, however, returned a guilty verdict. After the trial,
Law sought reconsideration of his motion, in particular to revisit his as-applied challenge
in light of this Court’s intervening decision in Range v. Att’y Gen., 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir.
2023) (en banc), vacated sub nom. Garland v. Range, 144 S. Ct. 2706 (2024). The District
Court denied that motion.
Through a timely notice of appeal, Law invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court, and he now argues that applying § 922(g)(1) to him under these circumstances
violates the Second Amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1
The problem for Law is that he was still under a criminal sentence when he
possessed the firearm. And this Court has recognized that the Second Amendment permits
the disarming of convicts in that circumstance. See United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266,
1 The parties disagree whether Law preserved his as-applied challenge. If Law did preserve
it, the District Court’s legal conclusions would be reviewed de novo, and its factual
determinations for clear error. See United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2013).
If Law did not preserve his challenge, but instead forfeited it, it would be reviewed for
plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993);
United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2020). Either way, because plain
error’s first step, evaluating whether an error occurred, “uses the standard of review that
would have applied had the argument been preserved,” Law must demonstrate that the
District Court made an error of law in concluding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as
applied to him. United States v. Adair, 38 F.4th 341, 356 (3d Cir. 2022).

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271–72 (3d Cir. 2024) (explaining that at the Founding, “[c]onvicts could be required to
forfeit their weapons and were prevented from reacquiring arms until they had finished
serving their sentences” and “hold[ing] that convicts may be disarmed while serving their
sentences on supervised release”); see also United States v. Quailes, 126 F.4th 215, 223
(3d Cir. 2025) (holding that felons on probation may be disarmed during their terms).
Thus, the application of § 922(g)(1) to Law’s possession of a firearm in September 2020
does not offend the Second Amendment. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the
District Court.

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